


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THE DISPATCHES  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,  
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS  
FROM  
1799 TO 1818.

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“ Monumentum ære perennius.”

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THE DISPATCHES  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL  
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,  
DURING HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS  
IN  
INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW  
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE,  
FROM  
1799 TO 1818.

---

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS,

BY

LIEUT. COLONEL GURWOOD,

ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH.

---

VOLUME THE THIRD.

*A NEW EDITION.*

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LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

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THE EARLY SERVICES  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,  
IN  
INDIA.  
WITH THE OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES.

---

*To the Hon. H. Wellesley.*

‘ Camp, 7 miles south of the Godavery, 40 miles  
‘ MY DEAR HENRY, N.E. from Ahmednuggur, 24th Jan. 1804.

‘ I have not written to you, I believe, since I sent you the account of the battle which I fought at Assye on the 23rd September last, although many interesting events have occurred since that time; but the fact is, that I have not had leisure; and I knew that you would learn these events from the public dispatches. I propose, however, in this letter, to give you an outline of our operations in this part of India, which have ended in treaties of peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

‘ After the battle of Assye, those two Chiefs fled into Candish with their armies in great confusion; Scindiah’s in particular was almost entirely disorganized, and vast numbers deserted him. Colonel Stevenson followed them down the Adjunttee ghaut. They fled to the Taptee, along which river they marched to the westward. As soon as I had placed my numerous wounded in security, I marched with my division to Adjunttee, and ordered Colonel Stevenson to advance towards Burhampoor, and levy a contribution upon that city, and to lay siege to Asseerghur.

‘ Upon my arrival at Adjunttee, I found that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had quitted the Taptee, and had moved to the southward, apparently with an intention of passing out

of Candeish through the hills situated north of the Godavery, and of invading the territories of the Peshwah or the Nizam, and all the remains of the defeated infantry had been sent across the Taptee towards Hindustan. This movement was intended to divert my attention from the siege of Asseerghur ; or if I should persevere in that operation, the confederates would have invaded the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and would have entirely destroyed the rich provinces of the latter, upon which I depended for resources of grain to enable me to carry on the war, and would, at all events, have cut off or impeded the communication which I had with Poonah and Bombay by Ahmednuggur. I therefore determined to leave the siege of Asseerghur to Colonel Stevenson's division, and to march myself to the southward, in order to follow the motions of the confederates.

‘ On the 11th of October, I arrived in the neighbourhood of Arungabad, and there remained till the 15th. On that night I received most accurate accounts of the disposition of the enemy's army, from which I was of opinion that they intended to move upon Colonel Stevenson, in order to interrupt the siege of Asseerghur, and I returned immediately towards Adjuntee.

‘ I arrived there on the 18th, and descended the ghaut into Candeish on the 19th. Scindiah, who had returned to the northward, then halted his army at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, within three marches of Burhampoor.

‘ Colonel Stevenson arrived on the 15th at Burhampoor, of which place he took possession ; he marched to Asseerghur on the 17th, drove in the enemy, and took possession of the pettah on the 18th, by which means he had a fine situation from whence to carry on his attack against the fort ; he broke ground on the 19th, and the fort surrendered on the 21st.

‘ I did not receive intelligence of the surrender, on which I could depend, until the 24th, in the evening ; and at the same time I learnt that the Rajah of Berar, who had separated from Scindiah when he had marched to the northward for the relief of Asseerghur, had passed through the hills which form the southern boundary of Candeish, and was then encamped between the hills and the river Godavery. There was no longer any reason for remaining below the ghauts, and I therefore determined to re-ascend them. I sent orders

to Colonel Stevenson to re-equip his division for the siege of Gawilghur, in Berar, from the stores in Asseerghur ; and while he was making the necessary arrangements for that purpose, to watch the motions of Scindiah's army, and prevent him from undertaking any thing of importance.

‘ I arrived at Adjunttee, on the top of the ghaut, on the 25th, marched on the following days to the southward, and passed Aurungabad on the 29th. The Rajah of Berar, in the usual style of a Marhatta, had spent his time after he had come out of Candeish, in plundering the country, and negotiating with Amrut Rao, who was encamped on the Godavery, to induce that Chief to join him.

‘ The Rajah was still, on the 29th, between Aurungabad and the Godavery, and I hoped to have been able to attack him. He marched, however, on the the night of the 29th, and between that time and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which I was in his neighbourhood, he marched with his camp five times. On the 31st, in the morning, he detached a body of five thousand horse to attack a large convoy on its march from the southward to join the troops on the frontier, the arrival of which had been delayed by the obstinacy of the officer who commanded, before it crossed the Godavery, and which river it crossed only on the 30th. The Rajah's troops were beat off with considerable loss, and the convoy joined me in safety on the 1st of November.

‘ The necessity of taking care of this convoy was unfortunate. If I had not been under the necessity of directing the movements of the troops in such manner as to protect it, at the same time that I pushed the Rajah, I should have had it in my power to have destroyed him between the 29th and 31st of October.

‘ But all the subsequent solid operations of the war depended upon the arrival of that convoy, and it was more important to secure it, than to gain a victory over a body of horse ; in the attempt to obtain which I might have failed, and then I should have lost the convoy.

‘ The troops had now been in march nearly every day, from the beginning of October, and it was necessary to give them some rest. Accordingly, I left the Rajah to go off to the eastward, towards Berar, and I halted till the 4th in the neighbourhood of Umber.



‘ Immediately after the battle of Assye, I had received from the confederates a variety of propositions tending to the commencement of negotiations for peace: they were all made in the usual Marhatta style, in such a manner, that it was possible either to deny that they had been made, or to continue the negotiations founded upon them, as it might suit the interests of the confederates. In answer to them all, I said that if the confederates, or either of them, wished for peace, they might send a vakeel to my camp with proper powers, who should be received with the respect due to his rank and character; and that I would listen with attention to what he might have to communicate, and would give him a distinct answer.

‘ The result of the different propositions, and a variety of messages, was, that on the 6th of November a vakeel from Scindiah arrived in camp. His name was Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, a nephew of the celebrated Morari Rao. He was received with due respect, but when we began business, it was found that he had no powers, and then we came again to a stand. However, I allowed him to remain in camp for a few days, till he should receive his powers, which shortly afterwards arrived.

‘ In the mean time, Amrut Rao, with whom, I believe I before informed you, I had made a treaty in August, joined me on the 12th November. According to the Marhatta custom, after making this treaty, he had waited to see which of the parties was likely to succeed in the war; and he had not decided this question in his own mind, till after the battle of Assye and its consequence, the fall of Asseerghur.

‘ As soon as Goorparah received his full powers, the first measure he proposed was a suspension of hostilities between the confederates and me. I refused to suspend hostilities with the Rajah of Berar, but agreed to suspend them with Scindiah, in the Deccan and Guzerat, upon certain conditions, which appear in the treaty of which I enclose a copy.

‘ My reasons for agreeing to this treaty were:—

‘ First. I had, in fact, at that moment, no means of annoying Scindiah. I had defeated and destroyed his army, and taken every thing from him which he had in the Deccan. I could not carry the war into Hindustan till I should have secured the Rajah of Berar.

‘ Secondly. He might do me a great injury, and materially impede my operations in Berar, either by assisting the Rajah with his army of horse, which still remained, or by a diversion such as the Rajah had made for him, viz., an irruption into the Nizam’s or Peshwah’s territories.

‘ Thirdly. I could do him no injury on the side of Guzerat ; the troops there were not sufficiently strong, or well organized, or equipped ; and in that most important point in a war with the Marhattas, our attention was taken up by a domestic contest with a member of the Gnickwar family. On the other hand, Scindiah had collected a numerous body of defeated infantry, cavalry, &c., at Ougein ; and their advance into Guzerat would have been attended by unpleasant consequences.

‘ Fourthly. By making the suspension of arms with Scindiah only, and by including in the treaty arrangements for the continuation of hostilities with the Rajah of Berar, I, in fact, dissolved the confederacy in the very best manner in which I could dissolve it ; and Scindiah left the Rajah to our mercy.

‘ I concluded this treaty on the 23rd of November. While all this was going on, I was advancing gradually towards Berar, and pushing the Rajah before me to the eastward and annoying his rear with my Mysore horse.

‘ Towards the middle of November, Colonel Stevenson had completed all his equipments for the siege of Gawilghur, and was enabled to quit Burhampoor. He marched up the valley of the Poorna river to Ballapoor in Berar, where he arrived on the 23rd, and he was joined on the 24th by the convoy which had been saved from the Rajah of Berar by Captain Baynes’ affair at Umber, on the 31st October, and my march to the southward.

‘ As soon as I found that the Rajah of Berar’s march was decided, I determined to go into Berar to support and cover Colonel Stevenson’s operations against Gawilghur. Scindiah had moved to the eastward in front of Colonel Stevenson, and towards the end of November had encamped in the neighbourhood of an army commanded by Vincatjee Bhoonslah, the brother of the Rajah of Berar, consisting of the greater number, if not the whole, of the Rajah’s regular infantry and artillery, and a large body of cavalry. Thus, in

the end of November, no less than four armies were assembled in Berar. A happy circumstance for the Rajah, who is supposed to have planned the confederacy.

‘ The united armies of Scindiah and Vincatjee Bhoonslah were between Colonel Stevenson and the fort of Gawilghur, and it was necessary to beat them before the siege of that fort could be undertaken. Colonel Stevenson and I joined on the 29th of November, at Paterly, about seventeen miles north of the Poorna river, and I attacked the enemy that afternoon on the plains of Argaum, about six miles from that village, and gained a complete victory with but small loss on our side, having taken from them all their cannon, ammunition, &c., numbers of elephants, camels, quantities of baggage, &c. From unavoidable circumstances, we did not begin the action till late in the day, and not more than twenty minutes’ sun remained when I led on the British cavalry to the charge. But they made up for it by continuing the pursuit by moonlight; and all the troops were under arms till a very late hour in the night.

‘ I do not send the detailed account of this action; I think it probable that you will have received it before you get this letter.

‘ It was an extraordinary and fortunate circumstance, that after Colonel Stevenson and I had been separated for above two months, at a distance of nearly three hundred miles, I should have joined him on the very morning of this engagement; and that, in order to enable me to join him, he was not obliged to halt more than one day. But the operations of this war have afforded numerous instances of improvement in our means of communication, of obtaining intelligence, and above all, of movement. Marches, such as I have made in this war, were never known or thought of before. In the last eight days of the month of October, I marched above one hundred and twenty miles, and passed through two ghauts with heavy guns, and all the equipments of the troops, and this without injury to the efficiency of the army; and in the few days previous to this battle, when I had determined to go into Berar, I never moved less than between seventeen and twenty miles, and I marched twenty-six miles on the day on which it was fought.

‘ After the battle at Argaum, I moved on the 1st of

December with the two divisions in two columns, towards Gawilghur. I arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th, and established there an hospital for the wounded in the battle of Argaum. On the 27th both divisions moved to take up the ground for the siege of Gawilghur. Colonel Stevenson's division, which had been equipped for the siege of Asseerghur, was destined to make the principal attack on the northern face; while that under my immediate command, with all the cavalry (British and native), should cover the siege, and co-operate with Colonel Stevenson as far as might be practicable, by attacks to the southward and westward. The march of Colonel Stevenson's division through the mountains, to the northern face of the fort, was one of the most difficult, and, in the success of the execution, extraordinary operations I have ever witnessed. All the heavy ordnance and store carriages were dragged by hand by the troops over high mountains, through valleys and ravines, for nearly thirty miles from Ellichpoor, by roads made by themselves with a laborious exertion to which I did not think they were equal. They were enabled to break ground on the 12th, and on the same night I commenced an attack upon the southern face.

‘ On the 15th in the morning, Colonel Stevenson had effected a breach in the outer walls of the fort, and we determined to storm. While he attacked the breaches on the northern wall, the infantry of my division were to attack the western and southern gates. There remained a third wall, which had not been breached, and this the troops escaladed, and we were shortly in possession of the place. Our loss on this occasion was not great, but that of the enemy was immense. The killadar, all the principal officers, and the greater part of the garrison were killed.

‘ During the siege, the negotiations for peace were going on briskly, particularly with the Rajah of Berar's vakeel, who had arrived in camp on the day after the battle of Argaum. I concluded a treaty of peace with him, of which I enclose you a copy, on the 16th of December, and signed it on the following morning, previous to my march towards Nagpoor, in order to keep alive the impressions under which it was evident that it had been concluded.

‘ I halted after making three marches towards Nagpoor; as I found that the Rajah would ratify the treaty, and I saw



that if I marched forward I should destroy his government entirely. I received the ratification on the 23rd of December.

‘ You will have observed, that after I had concluded the treaty for suspending hostilities with Scindiah, I had fought his army at Argaum on the 29th of November. At that time he had not ratified the treaty, and he had not performed any one of its stipulations; and I gave notice to his vakeels that I should attack him if I should meet his army. After the battle he did ratify the treaty, but he did not perform the condition which required that he should go to the eastward of Ellichpoor. However, he did not interfere in the siege of Gawilghur, and did not take advantage of my being employed in that operation, to attack the Peshwah or the Nizam.

‘ As soon as he found that the Rajah of Berar had made peace, he began to be a little alarmed respecting his own situation; and the negotiations for peace with his vakeels, in which no great progress had been made, then took a favorable turn.

‘ On the 23rd, the day on which I received the Rajah’s ratification of his treaty, Scindiah’s two principal ministers, Eitul Punt and Moonshee Kavel Nyn, arrived in my camp to conclude the treaty of peace. On the same day I gave them notice, that on the 27th, if the treaty of peace should not then be concluded, hostilities would no longer be suspended; and on the 24th I returned to the westward, and joined Colonel Stevenson (who had only then come out of the mountains from Gawilghur), on the 26th, to the westward of Ellichpoor.

‘ On the 28th I concluded a treaty of peace with Scindiah’s ministers, which I signed at one in the morning of the 30th; and on the 5th of January I received Scindiah’s ratification of the treaty.

‘ I enclose a copy of this treaty, and copies of my letters to the Governor General upon this treaty, and that with the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I have now brought you from the battle of Assye to the conclusion of peace, and my hand is almost tired; but I have other circumstances to mention to you, and if I do not continue now, it is possible that I may be delayed for another week before I shall be able to finish this epistle, the first



page of which was written, as it appears, on the 24th of January, and the remainder on the 1st of February.

‘ Since the peace I have marched to the southward, and am now encamped between Ahmednuggur and Kurdlah. A banditti were on this frontier, whom I intended to destroy, but they have dispersed, and I propose to break up the army almost immediately.

‘ Malcolm is at Scindiah’s durbar, endeavoring to arrange the defensive alliance, in which he has not made much progress. Mr. Elphinstone is with the Rajah of Berar. The Governor General is well pleased with the treaty with the latter, and has ratified it : he has sent me copies of your letters of the 30th August.

‘ Ever yours, most affectionately,

‘ *The Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell, Residency at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 24th January, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters of the 20th and 21st ; and regret exceedingly the circumstances which have occasioned Lieut. Colonel Close’s departure from Poonah.

‘ I beg that you will correspond with me publicly or privately, as you may think proper.

‘ Tell the Peshwah’s ministers, that Colonel Close has not had orders from the Governor General to communicate to his Highness the treaties of peace ; and that, of course, it would be very improper to communicate them to any body, till his Excellency shall have ratified them.

‘ I do not know whether the Colonel ever mentioned to the durbar the arrangement alluded to in my letter of the 15th regarding Loghur. However, supposing he did not, there is no harm in having mentioned it. After the behaviour of the Loghur man during the war, the British government will not take Loghur for the Peshwah, and there does not appear to me any other mode of getting it than that proposed. I have an order in my possession for Poonadur, and with or without the Peshwah’s consent, I can get Loghur for him whenever I please. By the possession of those two forts, and Ahmednuggur, in my opinion, his government will be more respectable than it ever was.

‘ In respect to the release of Amrut Rao’s servants (and I

rather believe that Colonel Close did not understand me clearly), the names of the persons whom I wished to have relieved from the Peshwah's oppression, as being Amrut Rao's servants, were included in a list No. 8, enclosed in my letter of the 14th December. No. 2 contained a list of persons to whom I wished that no injury should be done in future; and No. 3 a list of persons whom I recommend to Colonel Close to have released from their confinement, as being the antient servants of the Poonah state. I imagine, from his answer to that letter, that he thought I wished those included in No. 3 to be released as a *sine qua non*, but he was mistaken.

‘ I will send to the Pagah sirdars, as the Peshwah wishes it, and let them know that nothing will be done for them through our mediation. But it is proper that the Peshwah should be informed, that, from the highest man in his state, to the lowest, there is not one who will trust him, or who will have any connexion or communication with him, excepting through the mediation, and under the guarantee, of the British Government.

‘ I have no wishes in respect to those sirdars, or any other person whatever, excepting to forward his Highness's Government. But possibly he will be able to settle it without any assistance from us. He shall try it, as I intend to fix the troops in a place of security, and in such a position as will prevent foreign invasion, and then let him do his best.

‘ You may tell the Peshwah's Government that they shall have one month's pay for the two thousand men. But I want in camp all the money collected at Poonah, and that payment must consequently be delayed.

‘ Does the Peshwah mean to take into pay the cavalry and infantry belonging to Amrut Rao, respecting which I wrote to Lieut. Colonel Close?

‘ I am going to-morrow to endeavor to cut up the free-booters in the frontier. If I do not succeed in cutting them up, I shall disperse them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Boodaigaum, 24th January, 1804.

‘ I observe that, by the orders of the Commander in Chief at Bombay, Major Urquhart is posted to the 2nd battalion of the 9th regiment, and officers not on furlough or on staff employments are to join their corps without delay. I do not know whether Major Urquhart’s situation at Baroda is considered a staff employment; but at all events, whether it is or not, it is of the utmost importance that he should not quit it until the orders of the Governor of Bombay are received on the subject; or some arrangement for conducting its duties, equally beneficial to the public interests, shall be made, if Major Urquhart is to quit his situation. Accordingly, I request that you will detain Major Urquhart at Baroda, until you shall receive further orders.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 26th January, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a dispatch from Mr. Elphinstone, and the copy of one which I have written to that gentleman, which explains my sentiments upon the subjects to which Mr. Elphinstone’s dispatches relate.

‘ It is impossible for persons to have behaved in a more shuffling manner than the Soubah’s servants have in every transaction relative to the peace. Their conduct has been entirely inconsistent with every principle of policy or good faith; they have withheld from me information upon every point, particularly upon the subject of the revenues of Berar, only with the miserable view of delaying the cession of the districts near the hills, in order that they may have an opportunity of plundering them for some time longer; and at last, after delaying the decision on this question for nearly six weeks, for want of the accounts, I am obliged to decide it on this day, fixed by myself, on the accounts of the revenues produced by the Rajah of Berar. After all, I suspect that I shall be obliged to make use of the British troops to put the Rajah in possession of those districts.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, with the Rajah of Berar.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 26th January, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th, and that for the Governor General of the 19th.

‘ I do not apprehend any evil design in the detachment to Hoossingabad, which it is probable is sent for the purpose stated. The necessity of making this detachment is a proof of the difficulties in which the Rajah of Berar would have been involved, if the war had continued, and the troops had marched to Nagpoor, and I recommend that you should take an opportunity of pointing this out to the Rajah’s ministers.

‘ I do not think the differences between the account given by the Rajah and Jykissen Ram, of the cause of the detachment to Hoossingabad, is material. It is very probable that the Afghan Nawab of Bopal has been residing in the Cuttack country, possibly in the service of the Rajah of Cuttack, or pensioned by him, and that the Rajah has encouraged or possibly assisted him in making this attack. The Marhattas are but little in the habit of adhering to truth; they are generally indistinct in their account of a transaction of the nature of that alluded to; and it rarely happens that those accounts are found to agree exactly with the state of the facts.

‘ You have acted quite right in pressing the Rajah to send orders to his troops to withdraw. I have received no complaints lately, and no accounts from Lieut. Colonel Lang, who is in Berar with a British detachment, that any of them remain. But the fact is, that the Marhatta troops are but little under control, and they withdraw from a country, even belonging to their own employers, with great reluctance, as long as there is any thing in it to be plundered.

‘ The Mogul troops and Chiefs are not much better, and I have been obliged to do all but attack the troops left in Burhampoor, in order to induce them to withdraw; and although the Soubah’s officers must be aware that the Soubah’s government will be a loser by the omission or delay to perform strictly the stipulations of the treaty, it is with the utmost difficulty, and only by the threats to use force, that I can prevail upon them to perform them; and



even at this moment, parts of the treaties, both with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, are not performed.

‘ Under these circumstances of irregularity and want of principle and good faith, and as it appears impossible to raise the views of those with whom we are obliged to act above those of a pindarry, or a rapacious amildar, I have only to recommend to you to continue your efforts to oblige the Rajah to withdraw the few troops who remain in Berar ; but their being there shall not prevent me from giving up the fort of Gawilghur, or the districts, the revenue of which is to be applied to the support of the garrisons of Gawilghur and Nernulla.

‘ I hope to be able to settle all remaining points with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder this day ; and he will then go to Nagpoor. I gave him a letter a few days ago, addressed to the officer commanding the British troops advancing from the province of Cuttack, to request that he would halt, and do no injury to the country, until he should have received further orders from the Governor General, unless he should have heard that his Excellency had not ratified the treaty of peace.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 26th January, 1804.

‘ I have had a correspondence with Lieut. Colonel Close, upon the subject of the proper situation for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, the result of which is, that I propose to post it at or in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur, detaching two battalions, if they should be required by the Peshwah, to Poonah. In this position the troops will enjoy a healthy climate ; and the advantage of drawing their supplies from the Soubah’s territories, from which alone I fear that, for some time, they will be able to procure subsistence. They will be in a good position to check invasion by a foreign enemy, or internal insurrection or commotion ; they will protect effectually the frontiers, both of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan ; and they will give countenance to the operations of the Peshwah’s troops in settling his countries, should his Highness ever manifest a disposition to re-establish his government in them.



‘ Of course, the fort of Ahmednuggur will remain in our possession till your Excellency’s orders regarding its disposal shall have been received. But whether it is given over to the Peshwah or not, I most anxiously recommend that, at least for some time, till it shall be seen in what manner the peace operates upon the different Marhatta states, and how the whole will settle, that fort may be garrisoned by British troops.

‘ Your Excellency has had experience in the late war how little the killadars and forts belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan are to be depended upon ; but I assure you, that if it was in their power, those belonging, or rather nominally belonging, to the Peshwah, would behave still worse.

‘ I acknowledge that I do not consider this disposition of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah to be the best which I could make, connecting it with that serving with the Soubah of the Deccan. It is my opinion that, after leaving two battalions of the former at Poonah, and two battalions of the latter at Hyderabad, the whole of the remainder of the troops ought either to be upon, or to the northward of the river Godavery ; the former in the territories of the Peshwah, and the latter about forty or fifty miles lower down the river.

‘ This disposition, with a British garrison in Ahmednuggur, and one devoted to the British Government in Dharore, would be an effectual security against foreign invasion and internal commotion. But I cannot recommend it at present, as I have not a sufficiently correct or extensive knowledge of the state of the politics at the court of Hyderabad, to be certain that the presence of the whole subsidiary force at Hyderabad is not necessary to preserve the British influence in the Soubah’s councils.

‘ Unless the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan should be posted on the frontier, I do not think it would be prudent to post that serving with the Peshwah farther to the northward than Ahmednuggur, and therefore I recommend to your Excellency the adoption of the position which I first proposed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

*The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 26th January, 1804.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3rd instant. As you have sent a copy of it to the Governor General, it is probable that you will receive his Excellency’s sentiments upon your operations.

‘In the mean time I have to inform you that I conceive you did every thing in your power in the common cause. Your corps was certainly not sufficiently strong for the invasion of the enemy’s country, but you obliged a formidable rebel to retire, and you preserved the peace of Guzerat, a country which was certainly, in some degree, exposed to be invaded by the enemy.

‘In respect to your arrangements with the Bheels, there will be no difficulty in confirming them. All the Rajahs whom you have named are provided for under the article of the treaty of peace, and I will send a list of their names to the Resident with Scindiah, with a request that he will take care that no injury is ever done to them on account of their conduct during the war.

‘The Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte come under the article of the treaty of peace. I do not exactly understand the nature of your arrangements with the former, whether it is that the tribute due should be remitted, or that it should be remitted in all future times. I beg to hear from you on this subject.

‘I also hope to receive from you the amended treaty with the Rajah of Sounte, which will, of course, be confirmed. I have the pleasure to send you copies of the two articles of the treaty of peace, which provide effectually for all engagements of this description.

‘I have now only to recommend to your attention the discipline of the troops under your command, and a determined resistance to every thing like an abuse in the service, which can tend to subtract from the efficiency of the corps in the field. I have lately written to Mr. Duncan, to propose an alteration in the plans which I submitted to him on the 2nd of August last, according to which, if he should adopt it, your strength in European troops will be diminished, but that of native troops will be increased by two battalions.

This arrangement is advisable, and indeed necessary, for many reasons not necessary at present to discuss; but if troops in Guzerat are kept in a proper state of discipline and efficiency, I do not apprehend any inconvenience from it.

‘ Upon this subject I have to observe, that there is a tendency in the service in this country to admit abuses beyond any other that I have met with. I cannot say whether this is to be attributed to former habits and example, or to the laxity which must attend all distant establishments. But of this I am very certain, that it is the first duty of a commanding officer to resist every thing of the kind in a most determined manner. The want of discipline among troops is very bad, and renders them useless: but the want of efficiency, which is the result of the application to private purposes or profit of the persons paid by the public as troops, or as the necessary attendants or equipments of these troops, is worse, as it may exist with a certain degree and appearance of discipline, and Government may be misled by the notion that they have an army, whereas they have nothing but paper.

‘ The troops under your command are in a distant country, and they can come but seldom under the view or inspection of the Government; it is therefore particularly incumbent on you to take care that no practice or custom shall exist which may destroy their discipline or lessen their efficiency; and I beg leave to assure you, that without the most constant vigilance on your part, you will not be able to avert these evils.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 26th January, 1804.

‘ I have written to the Governor General this day on the subject of the future position of the subsidiary forces. I prefer that disposition which I recommended in the second instance; viz., both corps upon the Godavery; but I am afraid that we cannot carry it into execution.

‘ There are symptoms of ill temper at Hyderabad, which must be met by firmness, but conciliation; and we must be strong at that point, either to support Aristo Jah in his office, or whoever may be appointed to conduct the government in his room.

‘ I give up the notion of posting the troops upon the Godavery with great reluctance : because I want to have it understood, particularly at Hyderabad, that our troops are not to be the only support of the Government ; that they are to oppose foreign invaders and great rebels, but are not to be the support of the little dirty amildarry exactions. It is, besides, very disadvantageous and unjust to the character of the British nation, to make the British troops the means of carrying on all the violent and unpopular acts of these Native governments, such as, for instance, the resumption of the jaghires of the Mussulman chiefs in the Soubah’s countries. It makes our cause unpopular, which it ought not to be, and would not be ; and, in our present glorious situation, it is very desirable that we should avoid this unpopularity.

‘ In respect to the Peshwah’s government, I have given my opinion fully to Colonel Close, that till the Peshwah organizes his revenue departments, and the other departments of his state, which he cannot do without relinquishing the whole system of revenge, which is the only principle of his government at present, (excepting, indeed, jealousy of my influence,) the Colonel ought to give him no assistance whatever in settling his country. The consequence of a departure from this recommendation will be, that the troops will take mud forts, which they must garrison, and the British officers must be amildars ; or the forts, after having been taken, must be abandoned to their old possessors, who, instead of being in the light of friends, as they have hitherto been, would be our worst enemies.

‘ I could settle the Peshwah’s countries in a few days, if I could bring him to act rationally, or if I could inspire him with confidence in me or the British Government.

‘ I have got from Amrut Rao orders for the fort of Poona-dur and all the districts he held under the Poonah state, which I would give to the Peshwah if he would only release the servants and women belonging to Amrut Rao and his servants. Besides this, I could get possession of the fort of Loghur on the Bhoire ghaut for him. By these possessions, his government would be more respectable than ever it was, and his country would settle itself. But he will not do any thing that is desired of him. He will not consent to liberate Amrut Rao’s servants, and therefore I cannot give up the



countries without violating every principle of good faith, and keeping alive for ever the spirit of hostility ; and he will not consent to allow the killadar of Loghur to remove with his property and the family of Nana Furnavees to Bombay, under the protection of the British Government.

‘ There are two modes of getting the better of these inconveniences ; one is to restore Amrut Rao’s districts, and to take, for the Peshwah, the fort of Loghur. I have already given my opinion upon the restoration of Amrut Rao’s districts ; and in respect to taking the fort of Loghur, I have to observe, that this fort commands the road by which, during the war, we have communicated with Bombay from Poonah.

‘ To take the fort would have been impossible ; the enmity or even the treachery of the killadar would have proved fatal to our operations in this quarter. We must have depended entirely upon the Nizam’s territories, which are but a slender prop. The killadar has been kept in order only by the assurances given him, that as long as he should be friendly to the cause of the Peshwah, nobody would interfere with his fort ; and by the hopes that at some time or other he would be permitted to send his property to Bombay, and go and end there his days. After this statement, I believe it will be agreed that it will not answer to attack Loghur.

‘ Another mode of arranging this matter would be, that we ourselves should release Amrut Rao’s servants and restore their property, and then give the Peshwah possession of Poonadur, to settle with the killadar the mode of transporting his property to Bombay, and to send the whole down there under convoy of the corps which will march thither in a short time.

‘ But the adoption of these measures will incense the Peshwah, beyond all hopes of forgiveness, however advantageous they may be to his government. He will immediately begin again (or rather will continue, for I have reason to believe that he has never discontinued) his old intrigues with Scindiah’s government ; and, by giving him these two forts, we should have added most considerably to his strength, and particularly to his means of annoying us.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I recommend that all these measures connected with the settlement of the Peshwah’s government may be left to time and the efforts of Colonel Close.



‘ From many circumstances, and particularly from a letter which I have received from Mr. Frissell, a copy of which will have gone to the Governor General, containing the Peshwah’s answer to a request I made, that he would pardon four or five hundred of his Pagah horse, who had been serving with Baba Phurkia, I am induced to believe that he is very jealous of me, and of the influence which he imagines the British Government maintains through my means ; notwithstanding all that I have done for him, his declared sense of it, and the confidence he has expressed.

‘ If this be the case, we shall never be able to prevail upon him to do any thing which can be beneficial, either to his own government or the common cause ; and if to maintain our influence in the Marhatta empire be an object, the sooner I withdraw from the scene, and the sooner his jealousy is allayed, the better. In fact, this influence can be maintained only by conferring benefits on the persons who are the objects of it ; it is now fed and upheld by hope, but as soon as people shall find that my recommendation is the road to disgrace instead of to favor, they will not follow our fortunes much longer. I therefore think that as soon as I shall have settled every thing that I have to do, I ought to withdraw.

‘ I certainly have a bad opinion of the Peshwah ; he has no public feeling, and his private disposition is terrible. I have no positive proof that he has been treacherous, but I have a strong suspicion of it ; and I know that since he signed the treaty of Bassein, he has done no one thing that has been desired, either with a view to forward his own interest, or the views of the alliance, or the common safety during the war.

‘ It may be asked, will you leave a fellow of that kind in possession of that government ? I answer, I have no remedy ; I cannot take it for the British Government, without a breach of faith and another war. I do not know whether I should mend the matter in respect to treachery, by giving him either of his brothers as a dewan ; but I do know, that if I was to give the government over to Amrut Rao, I should establish there a most able fellow, who, if he should prove treacherous, would be a worse thorn in the side of the British Government than the creature who is Peshwah at present can ever be.

‘ In respect to Amrut Rao, I recommend that he should, for the present, reside at Surat upon his pension, to be paid

by the British Government. This pension, as well as the value of the countries ceded by Amrut Rao, may be carried to the Peshwah's account, as so much gained by him during the war; for it is ridiculous to suppose that the British Government are to bear the expense of this pension, excepting by such an arrangement.

'Amrut Rao is very anxious that the Governor General should ratify the treaty with him; upon which subject I will address him.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Shawe.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

'MY DEAR MALCOLM,

'Camp, 26th January, 1804.'

'I return the treaty, which I think will answer well; but I should doubt their adopting the arrangement. Nothing new. The Rajah of Berar has detached troops towards Hoossingabad, to oppose the ancient Nabob of Bopal, who has attacked him in that quarter.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Malcolm.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

'MY DEAR MALCOLM,

'Camp, 27th January, 1804.

'I received last night your letter of the 20th, and this morning that of the 22nd.

'I beg that you will open any dispatches that may come into your hands addressed to me, either from the Governor General or any other person, from whom you may think it desirable to receive intelligence.

'I am afraid that the people who were at Peepulgaum were killed; if they were not, they have gone to Scindiah's camp. They are certainly not here at present. I shall inquire about them particularly, and will let you know the result of my inquiries.

'I have desired Rajah Mohiput Ram repeatedly to release every person who may have been taken by his troops. He says that he has done so. I have also written to him positive orders regarding the zemindar of Eedlabad, and I have complained of his conduct in this and other transactions.

‘The Peshwah has no districts in Candeish. That province is divided principally between Scindiah and Holkar; and some other chiefs may have interests in it, but the Peshwah himself none. I must put a stop to this plan, for it will not answer to be intrigued into a war with Holkar, through the medium of Ballojee Koonger.

‘It is most desirable that we should prevent, as much as possible, the communication between the Peshwah and Scindiah; otherwise, without allying ourselves with Scindiah, we shall do his work for him through the Peshwah. I see that the intriguers at the Peshwah’s durbar are hard at work upon something of this kind at this moment.

‘I have written fully to the Governor General and to Shave about the Peshwah; and have pointed out the necessity there is for retaining possession of Ahmednuggur. I have also laid open the Peshwah’s character, rather more than it has been lately. He has lately disclosed a great jealousy of the British Government, and of me personally; and has intimated plainly to Mr. Frissell, that one reason for not carrying into execution a measure recommended to him by me was, that I had recommended it. This measure was neither more nor less than to pardon 500 Pagah horsemen, who offered, as the price of their pardon, to give up their horses.

‘I have got from Amrut Rao the orders for all his countries, and the fort of Poonadur; but the Peshwah will do nothing.

‘There is no doubt about the 7th article of the treaty of peace. I consented to it for several reasons: the principal of which were, first, to facilitate the cession; secondly, to provide for so many people in Scindiah’s service, who would otherwise be obliged to go into Holkar’s; and, thirdly, to establish an influence in the durbar of Scindiah himself. This arrangement, in my opinion, is one of the main stays of the peace, and none of its principles ought to be departed from. But you will depart from its principles, either if you give the money in a lump to Scindiah, or if you allow him to dispose of it without the intervention of the British Government.

‘I think it immaterial whether the condition of the grant is that the receiver shall maintain a body of cavalry or not.

It might be as well, for many reasons possibly, that it should be so. The arrangement also is perpetual, as well as the treaty; but it may be proper not to canvass that point. It also stands to reason that the grant is made only during the good behaviour of the receiver; and I do not see any objection to the insertion of such a clause in the sunnud. But it is not necessary to us, and may as well be avoided, unless you should be of opinion that the insertion of this clause will decrease the jealousy, in Scindiah's mind, of the whole measure.

‘ I have no doubt whatever of the necessity of insisting that we should appear very prominent characters in this transaction. It is honorable to the national character; and if we do not appear, we shall lose all the benefit that we expect from it.

‘ In case any further difficulty should be made by Scindiah's ministers on this subject, I refer you to the words in the treaty, “under the protection of the British Government,” which are clearly demonstrative of the intention of all the parties, when they made the treaty.

‘ I shall take care of Munsoor Saheb. I do not see any advantage resulting from giving Scindiah the regiment of cavalry, and the regiment of European infantry, in lieu of the six lacs of the pension money, excepting that of saving so much money.

‘ Whenever we come, to assist Scindiah seriously, we must employ our whole force situated every where; and every detachment of our troops must have with them a proportion of European infantry and of regular cavalry. But unless you should decide that it is necessary to have the subsidiary force at Scindiah's capital, and Scindiah should fix that capital at Ougein, I do not think that the European infantry and regular cavalry are at all necessary, for the purposes which it is supposed the ordinary residence of the subsidiary force in his country will produce. However, I differ in opinion upon the whole of this subject with all the other doctors; but my comprehension may be dull upon the minute parts of the question, of which this is one.

‘ In respect to Scindiah's residence at Ougein, I think it probable that he dislikes as much to trust his person in that city, as I do six battalions of British infantry, and probably



for the same reason. If that be the case, and he should determine to reside at Burhampoor, which I think he will, there is no necessity whatever for our giving him either cavalry or European infantry; excepting that we may save ourselves the expense of maintaining them.

‘ It may not be unnecessary to observe upon this point, that if Scindiah gets European infantry, they must come from England, as we have not one corps here to spare. Within these five days I have ordered one from Guzerat to Bengal; and I suppose that hereafter Bombay must have a soldier or two in its garrison.

‘ Upon the whole, putting lucre out of the question, I am of opinion that we shall gain more influence, and that is real strength, by the arrangement as it stands in the treaty, than by that proposed: but supposing that you should think it necessary to give the regiment of Europeans and one of cavalry, instead of ten lacs of rupees, I would still distribute the five lacs in the manner settled in the treaty.

‘ Bellingham has sent you the cipher.

‘ I have no doubt about the peace: and every body is delighted with it. But the machine in Bengal was so much screwed up, that I fear the Governor General may not feel about it as I do.

‘ I send you a letter from Mr. Duncan, from which you will observe that all is now right. Murray has withdrawn his letter, as I desired him, and I hope will go on well in future.

‘ The Nizam’s rascals in this country have given me false intelligence of the practicability of the ghauts; and I am in consequence a little thrown out in my pursuit of the thieves.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 27th January, 1804.

‘ Cashee Rao, the late deshmoor of Ellichpoor, gave his daughter in marriage to Cashee Rao Ramchunder, the brother of Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar who negotiated the peace. Jeswunt Rao has desired me to apply to the Soubah’s government for a sun-

nud, appointing his brother deshmoock in the room of his late father-in-law Cashee Rao ; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will endeavor to arrange this matter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 27th January, 1804.

‘ I have been desired by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder to request that you would be so kind as to recommend his brother Eitul Rao Ramchunder to the government of the Soubah of the Deccan, for some employment under that government ; and I now take the liberty of asking you to use your influence in his favor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Rajah Mohiput Ram.*

‘ Camp, 27th January, 1804.

‘ I have been for some time waiting for the accounts of the revenues collected from the districts in Berar, bordering upon the hills on which are the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur, in order that I might arrange with the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar what districts should be given over to him. But you have not sent me these accounts ; and I am now under the necessity of referring Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder to you, in order to have this question settled, according to the treaty of peace.

‘ I enclose to you a copy of the article of the treaty of peace, under which I have bound the British Government and their allies to give over to the Rajah of Berar country which will produce annually four lacs of rupees, and which is to be in the neighbourhood of the hills on which are situated the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur.

‘ I request you will examine the accounts, and fix upon the countries which, in conformity with this engagement, it will be most convenient to the Soubah of the Deccan to cede.

‘ You will strike out of the amount of the revenues, the amount of the jaghires granted by the Peshwah, or by the Soubah of the Deccan ; and you will then ascertain the amount of the remaining revenue actually collected from

each district. You will ascertain what has been the highest revenue collected in any one of the last twelve years, and you will fix the amount as that at which the districts are to be given over to the Rajah of Berar.

‘ After having done this, you will deliver over the districts, which you will settle with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, that the Rajah is to leave to the person whom the Rajah shall appoint to take charge of them. You will withdraw all your people from these districts, and you will understand clearly that the Rajah of Berar is to have the revenue of them from the 17th of December, the day on which I signed the treaty.

‘ I have desired Captain Johnstone to wait upon you with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder to settle this affair, and I beg that no time may be lost.

‘ *Rajah Mohiput Ram.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 27th January, 1804.

‘ I before addressed you upon the subject of Madhoo Rao Ramchunder, and now trouble you again, at the request of his brother, Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder.

‘ Madhoo Rao Ramchunder had heretofore, in the service of the Soubah of the Deccan, 100 horse; he now wishes to have 300 horse, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will endeavor to arrange this matter for him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 27th January, 1804.

‘ Since I wrote to the Governor General the other day, I have received a letter from Colonel Murray, in which he acknowledges his error in writing to the Governor of Bombay his letter of the 12th of November. According to my advice he has made an apology, and has desired leave to withdraw it. His letter upon this subject will probably have reached Bengal as an accompaniment, before you will receive this; but as these accompaniments, or possibly the text, are seldom read, I shall be obliged to you if you will notice the subject to the Governor General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 28th January, 1804.

‘ Previous to the late war with the Rajah of Berar, his confidential servants possessed, in the province of Berar, certain villages in enaum, some of which belonged to the Peshwah, and others to the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar. They enjoyed the whole revenues of some of those villages, and only the Rajah of Berar’s share of others, but their rights are exactly known and acknowledged by the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ When the province of Berar was ceded by the treaty of peace, Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder mentioned to me these possessions, which he was desirous to secure. I told him that the war was not carried on against individuals, and that I would recommend the Rajah’s confidential servants to the Soubah of the Deccan, for a continuance of the favor they had received from his father’s government, and of the benefits they enjoyed in Berar.

‘ I have requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to renew the sunnuds, or rather to give orders to his officers in Berar not to interfere with their possessions; and I have the honor to enclose copies of the papers which have been written by him on this occasion.

‘ I request you to use your influence at the Soubah’s court to procure the regular sunnuds for these possessions, to the same purport as the enclosed papers.

‘ One of the papers relates to the revenue derived by Goneish Punt, for doing the duty of an office in a village in Bheer. It appears that half the revenue of the office, amounting to about eighty rupees a year, has been lately sequestered, and I have prevailed upon Rajah Mohiput Ram to restore it. I request you also to procure from the durbar a sunnud upon the subject. Goneish Punt was employed under Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder in the negotiations for the peace, and he was very useful. I have recommended Ramchunder to the Governor General for a reward; and I beg to recommend Goneish Punt to the Soubah of the Deccan for a mark of his Highness’s favor.

‘ In case his Highness should be pleased to attend to this recommendation, Goneish Punt is desirous that what his



Highness may give him may be situated in the province of Bheer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 28th January, 1804.

‘ I am concerned to inform you, that I have not yet been able to settle with the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar what districts are to be handed over to him, according to the treaty of peace, as I have not yet been able to induce Rajah Mohiput Ram to give me the accounts of the revenues of the districts in Berar, bordering on the hills; and I am afraid that I should be accused of having acted unjustly towards the Soubah of the Deccan, and with precipitation, if I was to settle the business on the basis of the accounts received from the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I have, therefore, thought it best to refer the business to Rajah Mohiput Ram; and I have the honor to enclose the translation of a letter which I have written to him upon this occasion.

‘ From the unaccountable delays which have occurred in furnishing me with the accounts to enable me to settle this business, I am induced to imagine that Rajah Mohiput Ram is inclined to object to and frustrate the arrangement. If this be true, much time will elapse before it is concluded; and, until it is concluded, we cannot withdraw our troops from the neighbourhood of Berar, or from that province.

‘ Under these circumstances I shall be much obliged to you, if you will urge the minister to send orders to Rajah Mohiput Ram, to the same purport as the requests contained in my letter, of which the enclosed is a translation.

‘ As Rajah Mohiput Ram is gone to Ellichpoor (I believe), the minister’s orders will reach him by the Soubah’s dawk, before Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder can arrive in his camp.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



should not despair of the peace. But unless Scindiah changes his nature, and that of a great proportion of his subjects, and dismisses a very large part of his army of horse, (who must eat up more revenue than he can afford to pay them,) and obliges the men to adopt habits of industry, which are entirely foreign to their nature, I do not see how the peace is to last.

‘I rather believe now it would be a good measure to attack Holkar, in order to give Scindiah something to do, and to look forward to.

‘A letter is written by this day’s post to Asseerghur, upon the subject of the complaints of the officer there.

‘I enclose to you a copy of the letter sent to Guzerat, containing the orders for the surrender of the districts there, than which nothing can be more positive.

‘I wrote to you fully, on the day before yesterday, respecting the 7th article of the treaty.

‘Your accounts ought to go to Bengal in the usual way. All my accounts go to General Stuart, who lays them before Government. This ought not to be the channel in which your accounts should go.

‘Strachey will be here this day, and shall go on immediately with a guard.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major Malcolm.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Demangaum, 29th January, 1804.

‘I have received your letter of the 12th instant. Long before this you will have received particular details of all my proceedings in this quarter; as in my letter of the 11th instant, I have recapitulated all that has passed, and enclosed additional copies of my dispatches to the Governor General.

‘Nothing extraordinary has lately occurred. The Rajah of Berar has given up his unjust claim to the Soubah’s territories east of the Wurda, and I have in consequence restored the fort of Gawilghur. Scindiah has been very busy plundering his own pindarries, and much progress has not been made in the negotiation of the treaty of defensive alliance; but I imagine that he is not disinclined to it.

‘ Colonel Halyburton must by this time have passed through the ghauts. He will remain to the northward of Jaffierabad for some time, until I can make arrangements for drawing off the captured guns from Adjunttee and Ellich-poor, and for removing the hospitals from those places.

‘ I have come to the southward, and am now between Ahmednuggur and Kurdlah, nearly at an equal distance from each place.

‘ The banditti have begun to disperse, and those who remain collected are at too great a distance for me to attempt any thing upon them. But I have some hopes that I shall yet be able to strike a blow at them.

‘ Colonel Stevenson and I were obliged to use our brass 12 pounders at Gawilghur, and I am sorry to say that we broke the axletrees of every carriage we had.

‘ I enclose a copy of the only letter I have received from General Lake, from which you will observe that the treaty of peace will secure all the objects which the Governor General had in view. If Narwar, which has been guaranteed to Ambajee Ingolia, belongs to Scindiah, it must be given up, and Ingolia must receive compensation from the conquered countries. I rather believe, however, that it belongs to the Peshwah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Camp, 30th January, 1804.

‘ After I had written to you yesterday, Goorparah came here; and I had a conversation with him on the subject of Gwalior.

‘ He said that accounts had been received that General Lake had attacked that fort. I told him that those accounts were to be expected. He desired that I would give him a letter to General Lake, to cease his attack. I told him that such a letter would be useless, as it was probable that he would have possession of the fort long before the letter would reach him. Goorparah then desired that I should inform the General of the peace. I told him that I had done so already in quintuplicate, and had sent him copies of the treaty; and that as soon as he should receive any one



of them, he would act in respect to Gwalior as the treaty would require.

‘ I then hinted to Goorparah that treaties had been made with many chiefs. We afterwards conversed about different other points, chiefly relating to the execution of the treaty in this part of the country, which was all settled to his satisfaction; and at last Goorparah said that the Maharajah had written to him, to desire that I should devise some mode of furnishing him with money. He said that the Maharajah was in the greatest distress, and he proposed that an advance should be made to him, on account of the money which was to be received out of the territories ceded in Hindustan.

‘ I pointed out to Goorparah the meaning of the 7th article of the treaty, and showed that it was made only to avoid bringing distress upon individuals, and by no means to give an additional resource to Scindiah’s government; and I observed that the consequence of giving Scindiah part of it would be, that the individuals, for whose benefit the article had been agreed to, would lose all the advantage expected from it, and would suffer the distress from which it was intended to relieve them.

‘ In answer to these objections, Goorparah said that Scindiah was to name the persons who were to receive these advantages, and might he not dispose of them as he may think proper? I told Goorparah that it was intended that he should name the persons who should suffer by the loss of their jaghires in Hindustan: but that if any of these persons should have behaved ill to the Maharajah, there would be no objection to his naming others; but that the revenues must be paid to persons in his service, and not allotted to his own use. Goorparah said that this was just and proper.

‘ Goorparah then renewed the proposition for the loan of money. In answer, I told him that the Company had large revenues, certainly, but that the expenses also were numerous; that they supported several large armies, and the establishment of their great government; and that although they could always command money from their subjects and servants, they were not rich. I at the same time told him that the Company would not act in the quality of money lenders themselves, on any account; but that it was possible that if the Maharajah should make a proposition to you

upon the subject, you might find means of obliging him. I said that this was only possible; and that even the possibility depended upon the orders you would receive upon the subject from the Governor General.

‘ I took this opportunity of saying that early measures might be adopted to settle the country, as the best mode of filling the Maharajah’s treasury.

‘ If you should think it advisable, for any reason, to assist these people with money, it is evident that the mortgage of the pension revenues must be out of the question. It is possible that you may be able to get in mortgage the Powanghur and Dohud territories. But you will observe by the enclosed account of their revenues, that they will not repay a very large loan. I got the paper, of which this is a copy, from Mr. Duncan this morning. The revenue of Dohud is not included, but it is very small.

‘ I enclose the copy of a paper which I received this morning from Poonah. I am afraid that it is late to endeavor to stop these Frenchmen now. But I have given directions on the subject to Major Graham, as it is more than probable that, if they go to the northward, they must pass through his districts. There is no government in any other part of the country which could find them out: but besides Major Graham, I have written to Aurungabad, to Adjunttee, and to Colonel Halyburton in the Badowly ghaut, to watch these gentry, and to take them up if they should pass near any of these places.

‘ You will do well to have an eye upon the proceedings of the durbar respecting these gentry.

‘ I have always thought the Rajah of Kolapoor a proper instrument for the French. His country is well situated for their designs. He has no money, it is true: but nobody has in India; and the choice of allies for the great nation must depend upon local situation, and upon means in troops, and good will or security towards the British Government, and the system of order.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letter of the 21st. I have already given you my opinion about the regiment of infantry and the regiment of cavalry. I have also received your letter of the 24th.

‘ Mr. Strachey is arrived and goes on to-morrow. He

shall have an escort from the Hyderabad subsidiary force. I shall write hereafter about medical aid for Mr. Strachey. It is my opinion that Webbe will be appointed to that Residency.

‘ Mr. Strachey shall take 10,000 rupees to you. As for rice, if you should want more than you have got, Colonel Halyburton, who is near the Badowly ghaut, will send you some.

‘ Not a line from Bengal for this age.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 30th January, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th, upon the subject of the landing of three French officers in the Konkan; and I have taken measures to have them arrested, should they attempt to pass to the northward of Poonah, through the district under the management of Major Graham, or through the city of Aurungabad, or the Cassarbarry, the Adjuntee, or Badowly ghauts. I have also given notice of their landing to the acting Residents at the durbars of the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ I think it probable that their first communication will be with the Rajah of Kolapoor, and I recommend that you should endeavor to gain a knowledge of what is going on in the durbar of that chief. He has lately renewed his attack upon the chiefs of the Putwurdun family, which is of little consequence, as both parties respect our communication, and the posts established to protect it. But the Rajah of Kolapoor is a likely person to make himself the medium of communication between the French and the northern Marhatta chiefs.

‘ I have also received your letter of the 24th instant, and it is very satisfactory to me to find that the Peshwah is likely to adopt the measures which I have recommended, as most likely to lead to a settlement of his government. His Highness has not stated the names of the persons included in the list No. 1, who, he says, are not the servants of Amrut Rao; and, therefore, I can say nothing regarding them, excepting that I think it would be best to release the whole of them.

‘ I beg you to inform the Peshwah, that I have got from Amrut Rao orders to his servants to evacuate all the Peshwah’s forts and territories, which I will deliver to whomsoever he will appoint to receive them, when I shall hear that the persons mentioned in the list No. 1 are released from confinement, and their families, houses, and properties restored to them.

‘ In respect to the fort of Poonadur, I apprized Lieut. Colonel Close, at an early period, that it would be necessary to pay the arrears of the garrison, amounting to fifty thousand rupees; and that the killadar should be allowed to move away with their property to a British garrison. This condition must be likewise complied with; but if the Peshwah should not have the means of paying this expense at present, we must advance the money, and it can be repaid in the same manner as the advance made to Goklah and Appah Dessaye.

‘ In respect to Loghur, I beg you to apprise the Peshwah’s ministers, that I cannot attempt to induce the killadar to give up that fort, unless his Highness should consent to allow the widow of Nana Furnavees to go away, as well as all the other persons mentioned in your letter. I can easily conceive, that to have allowed this lady to reside at Bombay might have been attended by dangerous or inconvenient consequences formerly; but under present circumstances, when the Peshwah is closely allied with the British Government, he can have nothing to apprehend from her being used as a means of intrigue, either by that government or by any other person.

‘ The Peshwah should be made to understand, that the British Government feel for the honor, the security, and the prosperity of his government, in the same manner as they do for that of the Company; that they are too strong to render it necessary that they should have recourse to intrigues to overturn his government, if they should wish it, which is by no means likely; and that, on the other hand, their strength will always protect him from the effects of the intrigues among his relations and subjects, which he had heretofore so much reason to apprehend.

‘ I am glad to see that the Peshwah has determined, at last, to make arrangements to take possession of and settle his countries.



‘ It is necessary, however, that we should proceed with caution in this business, as the Peshwah’s territories are much intermixed with those of the Soubah of the Deccan, of Holkar, and of Scindiah ; and it will not answer to allow the Peshwah’s amildars to be the judges of the right of possession of each of those powers and chiefs. This will be the case, if their requisitions for assistance are not accurately examined, and the assistance given confined entirely to the demand.

‘ Accordingly, I beg leave to recommend the following rules for the consideration of the Resident. He will, of course, ascertain exactly the object which is required, who is the present possessor, in whom is the right, &c. ; and he will give directions that the assistance may be given accordingly. Secondly, that the commanding officer of the troops should have positive orders, on no account whatever to give to a greater extent than will be specified in the orders he will receive ; and that he should give information to the Resident, if he should observe that the amildars take possession of districts which do not belong to the Peshwah.

‘ This last clause is particularly necessary, as the amildars will be very likely to take advantage of the presence of the British troops, to seize and plunder many districts to which the Peshwah has no right whatever. According to the principles above suggested, I should wish, before I detach troops to assist the Peshwah’s amildars, to receive from you a particular statement of the objects which it is intended this assistance should require.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of letters which I have written to Narsing Kundee Rao, and Kundee Rao Rastia, in answer to letters from those persons, on the subject of my interference in favor of Narsing Kundee Rao, at Scindiah’s durbar. The communications of all these persons, or of the Peshwah, through any channel, excepting that of the Resident, are very irregular, and must occasion inconvenience. I have, therefore, written fully upon that subject to Kundee Rao Rastia, and have taken this opportunity of alluding to the necessity of settling the country.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that I have made arrangements for discharging Amrut Rao’s troops, when their month of service shall have expired. Amrut Rao will

reside, for the present, at Bingar, under the guns of the fort of Ahmednuggur.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 31st January, 1804.

‘ After I had closed my dispatch to you yesterday, Goklah called upon me, accompanied by the person who, I before apprized you, passed himself in this camp as the accredited agent of the Peshwah, and is, I believe, the brother of Suddasheo Munkaiseer. He said that he had some papers to send to me upon which he wished to have my answer. I then told him that I was very desirous that the Peshwah would be so kind as to communicate to the British Resident what he had to say to me, and intimated that I could give no regular answer to any thing that came to my knowledge in that irregular manner.

‘ This person, however, persisted in reading a long paper upon the subject of the former disturbances in the Marhatta empire; and I told him that the best answer I could give him to that paper would be to read a letter which I had written to Kundee Rao Rastia, a copy of which was enclosed in my letter of yesterday.

‘ He said that Kundee Rao Rastia must not be informed of his communication, and that my letter did not contain any answer to the point in which he was instructed to procure information. I begged him to state what that point was.

‘ He then went into a long history of the injuries the Peshwah had received from Amrut Rao; and said that he had obliged the Peshwah to ally himself with the English, and asked whether the English now intended to pass those injuries unnoticed, or to put Amrut Rao in the Peshwah’s power? In answer, I told him that it was impossible I could believe that he had been deputed by his Highness the Peshwah to put such a question to me, and that at all events, whether he had been so deputed or not, I should not answer such a question, so put: nor until I should know who he was, should I hold any communication with him whatever; and I then called for beetel, and dismissed him from my tent.

‘ After he was gone, I explained to Goklah the particulars of the letter of the 24th, which I had received from you, and pointed out the inconsistency of the questions put to me by Munkaiseer’s brother, with the arrangements entered into by the Peshwah at Poonah.

‘ I have to request that you will apprise the Peshwah’s ministers of these circumstances ; and that you will communicate to them my earnest entreaty that they will send me the Peshwah’s orders through the British Resident ; but if his Highness should think proper to communicate with me through one of his own servants, I request that the person he will send to me may have some authority. It will also be desirable that his communications should be consistent with those which I may receive from the British Resident.

‘ I wrote to you yesterday on the subject of the fort of Poonadur. It is absolutely necessary that the arrears should be paid to the troops. But the sum required may be advanced by the British Government. Suddasheo Munkaiseer has written to me upon the subject of assisting the Peshwah’s amildars to the southward, and I propose, in answer, to refer him to you.

‘ I think that the Peshwah might now be assisted in obtaining possession of the southern countries ; but when you write to Major General Campbell upon the subject, I recommend that you should adhere to the rules proposed in my letter of yesterday ; and that you should take care not to interfere with the Putwurdun, the Rajah of Kolapoor, or Goklah. I shall write to General Campbell, and let him know that you will apply to him upon the occasion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 31st January, 1804.

‘ The Peshwah’s minister has written to me, to direct that I would entreat you to assist his Highness’s amildars in taking possession of his countries situated on the Toombudra, &c. I have written to the Resident at Poonah, to request he will be so kind as to ascertain exactly what the objects are which his Highness wishes to acquire in the southern countries, and to acquaint you with them, and urge

your assistance in putting the Peshwah's amildar in possession.

‘ I have requested the Resident at Poonah to be very cautious respecting the rights of the Rajah of Kolapoor, of the Putwurdun and Goklah, and other great jaghiredars in the southern districts; and to give you the most accurate information respecting the particular objects to which he will be desirous to direct your attention.

‘ I know the Peshwah and his ministers, and the character of every Marhatta amildar, sufficiently well to be very certain that they would not scruple to involve the British Government in another war, were it only to get possession of, and plunder, one village. It is therefore very necessary that we should proceed with all this caution.

‘ I have passed the Godavery, and have come to the southward, with a view to check the banditti upon the Nizam's frontier; and I am now encamped between Kurdlah and Ahmednuggur. They have already begun to disperse, and I imagine that in a few days none will remain. The Nizam's subsidiary force is still to the northward.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Camp, 31st January, 1804.

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 25th, after I had closed my dispatches, and could not get the treaty with the Rajah of Jeypoor copied in time. I now send it to you. If he has written to Scindiah, you see he has deceived him, or is deceiving us.

‘ If the news writer of whom you speak is Mirza Wahed Beg, I recommend you to have nothing to do with him. I shall recollect what you say about Kawder Nawaz Khan.

‘ If Scindiah pushes you on the subject of money, you might possibly get Dhoolpoor, Rajah Kerrah, and Baree in a mortgage.

‘ Upon considering the subject of the pensions, I think that fourteen or fifteen lacs of rupees may be more than will be necessary to lay out in that manner; and we might give a part to Scindiah himself, possibly a third; as I rather be-



lieve that some of the persons in the list who have lost their serinjaumy lands have joined us already. However, do you arrange this matter as you think best. It will not be a bad plan to bribe the prince, as well as his ministers.

‘ I have discharged Amrut Rao’s horse. He goes to Bingar. I thus get rid of a very large expense in camp. Webb was to leave Hurryhur about the 27th. Strachey went away this morning.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 1st February, 1804.

‘ In answer to that part of your letter of the 29th January, relative to Narsing Kunder Rao’s claims in Malwa, I have to request that, in future, after having ascertained the nature of such claims, you will state them yourself to Major Malcolm, or the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 2nd February, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th of January.

‘ I have no doubt whatever but that the building which has been taken, and used as a native hospital at Baroach, is the property of Mr. De Souza. However, the inquiry, which it is probable that the Honorable the Governor in Council will have ordered into that point, will ascertain it to the satisfaction of every body.

‘ If it should turn out that the building is Mr. De Souza’s property, I hope that the Honorable the Governor in Council will give orders that it may be restored to him, and that he may have a reasonable compensation for the use the Honorable Company have had of it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘ Camp, 2nd February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 22nd of January.

‘ I have heard nothing about Houghton.

‘ The freebooters are off. The Nizam’s killadar and amildars have behaved upon this occasion with their usual fortitude and good sense, in paying their contributions at the moment at which they heard that I had arrived in the country to give them assistance.

‘ I have a letter from Webbe, who had not quitted Hurryhur on the 25th of January. Lord William Bentinck has written to him, that he thinks there will be a vacancy in the Council at Fort St. George, in which case he intends to call him (Webbe) to fill it. This is pleasant news for Fort St. George and its dependencies; but not very pleasant for affairs in this quarter.

‘ I enclose a paper which I have received from Mr. Frissell, on the subject of Narsing Kundee Rao’s claims in Malwa. I wish that, if possible, you would arrange this matter for Narsing Kundee Rao. The Peshwah positively denies that he desired Scindiah to seize his jaghire. However, the discussions upon this subject must of course be postponed, till other matters are settled.

‘ I have no doubt about the hostage you mention: they gave a bond for a valuable consideration, viz., a whole skin, and they ought to discharge it.

‘ Bonds given, or hostages taken, to make good contributions, stand upon entirely different grounds.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 2nd February, 1804.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 12th of January, I have to tell you that I entirely approve of your having ordered Captain —— to Bombay, and I trust that Major General Nicholls will order him to join his corps in Europe.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 14th January, I have to observe, that we cannot expect that Canojee will give up his followers; or that, if he should be willing to give them up,

he will have the power to do so. If Canojee should himself reside under the Company's protection, and in a place subject to their power, there is little to apprehend from his followers. They must disperse, and they no longer can do any mischief. I am, therefore, of opinion, that it is not necessary to require that Canojee should give up his followers.

' As the Guickwar government will necessarily have to pay a part, if not the whole, of the expense attending this arrangement with Canojee, you will take care to conduct it in concert with Major Walker.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Colonel Murray.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

' Camp, 6 coss north west from Perinda,  
4th February, 1804.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' I have had the pleasure of receiving your official letter of the 1st instant. The Peshwah's conduct is certainly very extraordinary. What can he mean by staying away from Poonah for such a length of time, at such a crisis? and by delaying all business, however important to him, till he shall return and see me? It occurs to me, that his object is to avoid to see me altogether. The change of the moon will not be till the 11th, and he must have expected my arrival at Poonah long before that period. It is probable now, that I shall not arrive there till after it. But he could not have known that, and he must have determined to stay away in order to avoid seeing me.

' If this conjecture be correct, it will answer no purpose to endeavor to see his Highness, and if I should succeed in being admitted to an audience I shall do no good. I have for some time been of opinion, that the sooner I should withdraw from the country the better, which opinion is now confirmed. But I should be sorry to take any step of this kind, without the opinion of those more interested in the question than I can be. Accordingly, I should wish to know from you and Colonel Close, if he should be well enough to give an opinion, what you think upon this subject.

' I am convinced that the Peshwah is desirous not to see me, because he thinks that I shall urge him to adopt the

measures recommended in respect to Amrut Rao, and that he stays at Wahy in order to avoid this meeting. If this be the case, surely it is better that I should not go to Poonah at all.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Instructions for the Captain of the day.*

‘ 4th February, 1804.

‘ You will march at one in the morning, on the high road to Perinda, with the baggage, &c. of the detachment.

‘ The company of the 1st of the 8th, now in piquet, is to be the rear guard of the baggage.

‘ On your arrival at Perinda you will send the accompanying letter to the killadar, and desire him to point out a place in which you can secure the baggage. You will then endeavor to procure forage and water for the cattle, but will be prepared to move as soon as you shall receive orders from me.

‘ You will of course halt occasionally on the road, to allow the baggage to keep up with you, but you will not allow it to get before you. Guides are sent herewith.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Munkaiseer, 5th February, 1804.

‘ After I had crossed the Godavery, and made one or two marches to the southward, I agreed to give cowle to the Chiefs who commanded the bands of freebooters who had carried on the operations on the western frontier of the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, on the condition of their dismissing their troops, and coming into my camp within five days, and I had some reason to believe that they would act as I had desired; but upon the expiration of the term fixed for their arrival in my camp, viz., the 2nd instant, finding that they had not come in, and that their troops were still assembled in the Soubah’s territories between Perinda and Toljapoor, I determined to endeavor to cut them off. They were at the distance of eighty miles from my camp, and there was some reason to hope that I might surprise them by making forced marches.



‘ I began my march on the 4th, in the morning, with the British cavalry, the 74th regiment, the 1st battalion 8th regiment, and five hundred men belonging to the other native corps in my camp, and the Mysore and Marhatta cavalry. On my arrival at Sailgaon, near Perinda, after a march of twenty miles, I learnt that the enemy had broken up from their camp at Vyerag, and were come nearer Perinda, and that at that time they were not farther from me than twenty-four miles. I therefore marched again last night with an intention to attack their camp at daylight this morning.

‘ Unfortunately, the road was very bad, and we did not arrive here till nine in the morning. The enemy had received intelligence of my approach, and I am sorry to say that I have every reason to believe that they received it from persons in my own camp, and their camp was struck, and they had begun their march to their rear when I arrived.

‘ I followed them, however, with the British cavalry, in one column, acting upon the right of their rear, while the Mysore and Marhatta cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, Goklah, and Appah Dessaye, pursued the centre and left. The enemy formed a large body of cavalry, apparently with an intention to cover the retreat of their guns and baggage, which were falling into our hands, and I formed the British cavalry in two lines to attack them. I followed them in this order from height to height, as long as I could see any of them collected. In this advance, some horse and infantry were cut up, and the whole of the enemy’s guns, ammunition, bazaars, and baggage, fell into our hands.

‘ The Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, and the Marhatta cavalry under Goklah, were engaged with the enemy on the right of the British cavalry, and killed great numbers of them, and these troops also followed them as long as they could see any collected.

‘ Upon the whole, although I have reason to believe that the Chiefs have escaped, the result of this day is the complete defeat of a numerous and formidable band of freebooters, who were the terror of the country, were daily increasing in numbers, and had already defeated a body of the Soubah’s troops, and had taken from them the guns which I have retaken. I do not think that they will ven-

ture, or indeed that they can collect again, as they have lost every thing which could enable them to subsist when collected.

‘ The troops bear with the utmost cheerfulness the extraordinary fatigue of this short, but active expedition \*. The infantry under Major Swinton, of the 74th regiment, arrived at the point of attack at the same time with the cavalry ; but from the nature of the action, they could not co-operate further in it than by moving into the enemy’s former camp, which they did with great regularity.

‘ The advance of the British cavalry, when formed, was in the best order, and very rapid, notwithstanding the fatigue to which both men and horses had been exposed for the last twenty-four hours. Our loss, of which I enclose a return, is but small.

‘ I have given the four guns which we have taken to the killadar of Perinda, who lost them about six weeks ago.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Troops under the Command of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, in the action near Munkaiseer, on the 5th February, 1804.*

			Rank & File.		Horses.
H.M. 19th Lt. Dragoons.			2		3
Wounded					
			Jemidar.	Private.	Horses.
4th Regt. Native Cavalry.	Wounded		1	—	1
5th ditto	Killed		—	1	—
7th ditto	Killed		—	—	1
			<hr/>		
			Total 1	3	5

N.B. The Man and Horse returned killed, died of fatigue.

COLIN CAMPBELL, Act. Brigade Major.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ Camp at Munkaiseer, 15 miles N. E. from Perinda,

‘ SIR,

5th February, 1804.

‘ I this morning attacked in this neighbourhood, and defeated and dispersed, a formidable band of freebooters, who have been for some time on this frontier.

\* This expedition has often been remarked by the Duke of Wellington as the greatest march he ever made.

‘ I left my camp on the 3rd, about thirty miles s.e. from Ahmednuggur; and I arrived by forced marches at Sailgaon, near Perinda, on the 4th. I there heard that the enemy were at this place, twenty-four miles from me, and although I had marched twenty miles that morning, I determined to march on in the night. The road was very bad, and till one o’clock the night was very dark, and we made but little progress. The consequence was that we did not arrive till nine in the morning, instead of at daylight. The enemy had received intelligence of my approach; I believe from my own camp. They had struck their camp and had begun their march, but were still in sight. I pursued them with the cavalry, cut up some, and took all their guns, baggage, bazaar, &c., and followed them as long as they remained collected. I had with me the cavalry, the 74th regiment, the 1st of the 8th, and 500 men from the other regiments.

‘ The camp is at Nimgaum, where I left it on the 3rd. The infantry were up with the cavalry when we advanced to the attack. The Marhatta and Mysore horse were very active and got much booty. Our loss is trifling. I shall send you a regular account of this expedition, as soon as it can be made out.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Munkaiseer, 5th February, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter to the Governor General, which contains an account of the attack and defeat of a band of freebooters who have been for some time on this frontier, under the command of Viswaz Row Ghautky, heretofore in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of Gopal Bhugwunt, heretofore in the service of the Rajah of Berar, of Hurry Punt Bhony, a plunderer from Poonah, and others of inferior note.

‘ I beg you will explain the circumstances of this action to the Soubah of the Deccan, and tell him that I was happy to have had an opportunity of rendering him a service, and of restoring to him the guns lately lost by his own officers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,                      ‘ Camp at Munkaiseer, 6th February, 1804.

‘ I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote yesterday to the Governor General, giving an account of the destruction of a band of freebooters near this place. I endeavored to imitate you, and to surprise them; but the night was dark, the road desperately bad, and my allies, like true Marhattas, gave them information.

‘ This party consisted of Sirjee Rao, or Visvaz Rao Ghautky, Gopal Bhugwunt, Nimbajee Bhoonslah, and others. Mulwa Dada is in the Solapoor country. Baba Phurkia is not with him, as you suppose. He has always been to the northward, and I understand has lately separated his troops and quitted the Nizam’s territories.

‘ I received yesterday your public letter of the 12th, containing an address from the officers of the division under your command, to the Governor of Fort St. George. I rather believe that address would never have been written, if it had not been imagined that we had taken a large prize. But I do not believe the accounts of every thing amount to ten lacs of rupees. At all events, it is not necessary that I should write any answer upon the subject; and I notice it only to apprise you that I have received it, and that I propose not to communicate it to the troops under my command, as it is possible that every body may not be equally disinclined to enter into discussions. These never can do good, and may do much harm; and they have been discountenanced, if not positively forbidden, by Government. Between ourselves, therefore, I think it best to leave to Government the consideration of a question, which Government alone can decide.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Munkaiseer, 7th February, 1804.

‘ I have this day received your letters of the 23rd and 27th of January. A duplicate of my letter to Major Kirkpatrick on the subject of your allowance from the Nizam shall go to him this day. I had recommended to the Governor General



that you should have additional prize money, and I think that he will attend to my recommendation in this instance. However, this is between ourselves.

‘ My idea respecting your entering the King’s service was this, that you should get your rank in England, and a regiment in what is called the army of reserve.

‘ If you should succeed in that object, you might then resign your regiment or brigade of cavalry in this country, but not your pension on retirement. If you should not succeed, you ought not to give up your regiment or brigade here, without having a further provision. These are my opinions; you will see how affairs stand when you get home, and can arrange accordingly.

‘ I am anxious, first, that the public should continue to enjoy the benefit of your services, in a country of which the climate may be more favorable to your health; and next, that you should have the satisfaction of serving in a war which goes to the existence of Great Britain as a nation. But you must not lose your income by it.

‘ I destroyed on the 5th a formidable band of freebooters near this place. The march we made was terrible. I send you the copy of my letter to the Governor General on this subject.

‘ Remember me kindly to Mrs. Stevenson.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Munkaiseer, 7th February, 1804.

‘ I have received a paper from General Campbell, being the copy of an address from the officers of his division of the army to the Governor of Fort St. George, in which they claim to share in the prize taken by the troops under my command.

‘ I have declined to answer this paper, or to procure an answer for it, by communicating it to the troops under my command. However, there is one short and simple answer to it: I am, by the orders of the Governor General, Commander in Chief of an army. General Campbell and the troops under his command can form no part of that army, as he is senior to me.

‘ I could receive no orders from him, or from any person

whatever, excepting General Lake, if I had communicated with him; or General Stuart, if he had remained in the field.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Munkaiseer, 7th February, 1804.

‘ I have already answered your different letters on the subject of Canojee, the last of which is dated the 23rd of January, by letters which have gone to you before this time. The arrangement with that chief must be made in concert with the Guickwar government.

‘ I should wish to decline to give any opinion upon the subject of the claim of any part of the troops under my command to share in prize, as that question must depend upon Government. However, I must say, that as far as they could do so, the troops in Guzerat have decided it for themselves. At all events, the question is not deserving of consideration, as all the prize taken does not, I believe, amount to ten lacs of rupees.

‘ On the day before yesterday I destroyed a band of freebooters, who had for some time plundered the Nizam’s territories, and had become very formidable, had beaten his Highness’s troops, and taken from them four guns.

‘ I marched on the morning of the 4th, twenty miles; at night, twenty-four miles, and arrived here at nine o’clock on the morning of the 5th. Some of our faithful allies in my camp had given them intelligence of my march, and they had struck tents and were going off. But I pursued them, cut up many, took all their baggage, bazaars, guns, ammunition, &c., and entirely dispersed them.

‘ The 74th regiment, one battalion of native infantry, and five hundred men from the other corps in camp were up in the pursuit. The whole was over by twelve o’clock on the 5th. I think that by that time the troops had marched sixty miles, from six in the morning of the 4th, in which time they halted ten hours, from twelve at noon to ten at night of the 4th.

‘ If the night had not been very dark, and the road very

bad, I should have been in their camp at daylight, and should have taken the whole party.

‘ I think we now begin to beat the Marhattas in the celerity of our movements.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 8th February, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving the instructions of your Excellency in council of the 9th January, and at the same time a dispatch from the Commissioners in Cuttack, dated the 19th of January; and upon comparing these two papers, I have doubts respecting the instructions which I shall give to Mr. Elphinstone regarding the communications to be made to the Rajah of Berar, on the subject of the 2nd and 10th articles of the treaty of peace.

‘ No evil can result from the delay in referring the subject to your Excellency’s consideration, and I have, therefore, been induced to desire Mr. Elphinstone to defer to make any communication to the Rajah till your Excellency’s further orders shall have been received.

‘ The first point upon which I entertain a doubt, is the extent of the province of Cuttack. The boundaries are clearly defined in the 7th paragraph of the dispatch from the commissioners, and include the Gurjaut possessions of Khordia, Deopalah, Ougole, Hindole, Dakunal; and I understand from that paragraph, that the Rajahs of Baany Bandera and Koonjoor are independent.

‘ It appears by the 14th and 15th paragraphs of your Excellency’s orders of the 9th January, that your Excellency considers every district, the revenue of which was paid at Ballasore, to be included in the province of Cuttack; and a list of those districts is in the margin.

‘ The commissioners, who have had a copy of your Excellency’s orders before them when they wrote, have not stated whether those districts were or were not within the province ceded by the 2nd article of the treaty of peace, according to their definition of its limits in the 7th paragraph of their dispatch; and supposing that they should not be

included in those limits, I am at a loss to know whether your Excellency is desirous that they should be demanded from the Rajah of Berar.

‘ The names written in the margin of your Excellency’s dispatch are not included in the Persian List No. 6, in the dispatch from the Commissioners, as far as the names in that list can be made out.

‘ Another point upon which I entertain a doubt, is the nature of the communication to be made to the Rajah of Berar under the 10th article of the treaty of peace.

‘ It appears by the 12th paragraph of your Excellency’s orders of the 9th January, that engagements have been made with various zemindars situated within the province of Midnapoor, of whose names I have received no list. But their districts may be included in the limits of the province of Cuttack, as they are defined either by your Excellency’s orders as having paid their tribute at Balasore, or by the Commissioners in the 7th paragraph of their dispatch. In that case, no list of them is required. But this point must be settled by your Excellency.

‘ The 10th article of the treaty of peace is to be construed with reference to the promise which I made to the Rajah’s ministers, as reported to your Excellency, and to the liberal construction which your Excellency’s policy induces you to give to it. When I apply these considerations to the state of the negotiations with the Rajah’s feudatories, as reported by the Commissioners at Cuttack, I am induced to be of opinion, that the only persons who come under the 10th article of the treaty of peace are the Rajahs of Mohurbunge and Singboom, unless your Excellency should be of opinion that the districts in Midnapoor are not in Cuttack, and that the zemindars of those districts, with whom treaties have been concluded, come under its stipulation.

‘ In the eleventh paragraph of their dispatch, the Commissioners write that they are in hourly expectation of receiving the agreement of the Rajah of Koonjoor to become a tributary to the Honorable Company. But I have to observe, that to wait for this treaty is not consistent with the letter, much less with the spirit, of the 10th article of the treaty of peace; or with my promise to the Rajah’s ministers, or with your Excellency’s liberal policy; I therefore con-



clude, that the Rajah of Koonjoor ought not to be included in the list to be delivered to the Rajah of Berar.

‘ In respect to the Rajahs of Boad, Ramghur, Sonapore, and Sumbulpore, I have only to refer your Excellency to the enclosures from No. 2 to No. 5, in the dispatch from the Commissioners of the 19th January; from which your Excellency will observe, that although most advantageous offers had been made to those persons, they had delayed till that moment to accept them. I certainly cannot conceive them to be included in the 10th article of the treaty of peace upon any principle of good faith.

‘ I have no doubt whatever but that the Rajah of Berar will satisfy your Excellency upon the subject of the meaning of the 8th article of the treaty of peace; and that he will engage not to molest those persons who have assisted the British Government during the war. I have protected his friends and adherents in Berar from the depredations of the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan; and I am convinced that he will be inclined to seek the favor of the British Government, rather than to provoke its anger by any act of revenge. But I know that he looks with confidence to the justice and generosity of the British Government, that the 10th article of the treaty of peace shall not be used as a means of diminishing his power. Indeed, without such confidence, no government that was not reduced to an extremity of distress would have agreed to such an article.

‘ While writing upon this subject, I have to express a doubt with which I am impressed, that the Commissioners at Cuttack have defined the limits of the Soubah of Orissa, instead of those of the province of Cuttack. The reasons for which I entertain this doubt, are, that I have understood the province of Cuttack to be no more than the district included between the hills and the sea, the province of Midnapoor and the Chilca lake; and I observe that all the papers I have received from the Commissioners refer to Orissa, and not to Cuttack.

‘ The cession under the 2nd article of the treaty of peace is confined to the latter only; and it would not be proper to demand more from the Rajah. But it is very possible that I may be mistaken, as I have no information upon the subject on which I can place any reliance; although, as I enter-

tain this doubt, it is proper that I should make it known to your Excellency.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 9th February, 1804.

‘ My dispatch of the 5th will have made you acquainted with the destruction of a band of freebooters on that day. The remains of them have fled towards the Solapoor country, where they are likely to join another band of the same description, situated in that quarter, and commanded by Mulwa Dada. But their strength is destroyed, and if the Soubah’s killadars and sirdars will exert themselves, they will soon disperse entirely.

‘ I enclose the copy and translation of a letter which I have written to the Rajah of Solapoor ; and I beg leave to recommend that orders to the same purport may be sent to him from the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ I do not propose at present to follow the remains of the freebooters towards the Solapoor country. In the first place, it has now become a matter of the utmost importance to give some rest to the division under my command, who have been marching since February, 1803 ; and who, since the battle of Assye, in September, have not halted more than one day in any place, excepting during the siege of Gawilghur. Secondly, I do not think it will be proper to allow my attention to be drawn from what is passing to the northward, till I shall have received the ratification of the treaty of peace. It is therefore my opinion that the Soubah’s troops ought to be employed in the pursuit of this banditti. If, however, I should have an opportunity of striking a blow at them, I shall not fail to do so.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Camp, 10th February, 1804.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. Duncan, which gives more intelligence of the Frenchmen.

‘ I have received letters from the Governor General, from which I judge that the treaty of peace will be approved.

‘ He approves of the general article regarding the treaties with the feudatories, instead of the particular articles providing for the independence of each petty Rajah.

‘ He appears anxious to avoid a contest with Holkar ; and in instructions to General Lake, of which I shall send you a copy, if I should be able, he desires him to give him assurances of friendship, provided Holkar does not interfere with the Company or their allies. He particularly desires him, however, to avoid guaranteeing to Holkar the possession of the dominions of the Holkar family, which he has usurped. He wishes not to enter at all into the discussion of that question.

‘ Attend to all this in your negotiations with Holkar. I will try to get you a copy of this paper ; but really the Governor General’s dispatches are so long, that I have not sufficient assistance to master them, and do my own business besides.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 10th February, 1804.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 3rd instant, regarding Mr. Ambrose, I have to inform you that I do not consider that person to be entitled to the benefit held out by his Excellency the Governor General’s proclamation of the 29th August, 1803, to Europeans in the service of the Marhatta states.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gore.*

‘ MY DEAR GORE,

‘ Camp, 10th February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 28th of January, for which I am much obliged to you. It is true that there are many important objects to engage my attention ; but none of them can ever make me indifferent to what passes in the

33rd regiment, in whose honor and welfare I always consider myself particularly interested.

‘ Accordingly I shall be glad to hear from you whenever you may have leisure to write ; and whatever may be the nature of my occupation at the time I shall receive your letters, you may depend upon it that they will not remain unanswered.

‘ I conclude that the mistake respecting West’s promotion will be rectified, as soon as the deaths of Captain Anderson and Captain Lowe shall be known. Captain Eustace will then be the senior Captain ; Captain Eustace, of the 16th, the second ; and Lambton, I suppose, the third. I approve of the exchange of Mr. Orrock, although I rather believe that I refused him once before ; also of your recommendation of Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Fitzpatrick to be Ensigns.

‘ I have no objection to Mr. Macintosh, with whom I am acquainted, and I believe him to be a very good man. But he cannot be so good a man for the 33rd as Mr. Naig ; and as the object of the exchange is the wish of the latter to go to England, I hope that the exchange will be delayed : indeed it must be delayed till the 73rd regiment be ordered home. As I think it very probable that, under the present circumstances, the 73rd will remain in India at least as long as the 33rd, our regiment will continue to enjoy the advantages of the services of our own Quarter Master, who has been with us so long.

‘ I know that Colonel Moneypenny has always an eye to get a good and useful officer into the 73rd ; and he has already succeeded in getting one or two from the 33rd. But I rely upon you to be equally watchful, and not to lose the services of useful men, so long as you can keep them.

‘ Upon the subject of clothing, you must obtain the permission of the Commander in Chief in India, to give money in lieu of clothing, according to the terms of the warrant ; after having done which, draw upon the agents for the money to be paid to the men ; at the same time send home to the agents an account of the clothing you have in store, and let them know at what time you will want more clothing. The men should have their clothing as soon as possible, whether in the field or not.

‘ You did quite right to go to Vellore. The 33rd could



not join me. I should have lost the campaign if I had attempted to have drawn troops from General Campbell's division.

‘ I shall be happy to have the regiment with me always ; but God knows whether I shall be more successful in my future, than I have been in my past endeavors to effect this object, or whether I shall ever be five days in the same place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gore.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 10th February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3rd instant, and I am rejoiced to find that you are recovering.

‘ The last letter I received from Webbe was dated the 30th January, and he was then likely to leave Hurryhur on the 30th. It is probable that he will not be at Poonah till the 20th at soonest.

‘ You will have observed by my letter to Mr. Frissell of the 4th, a copy of which he will, of course, have sent to you, that I am of opinion that the Peshwah has gone to, and now stays at Wahy only to avoid having an interview with me ; and I judge from your letter of the 3rd, that you are nearly of the same opinion. If that is the case, I really do not see any end that is to be answered by my pressing that meeting, and I think that it would be best for me to avoid to go to Poonah.

‘ Webbe and I can easily join at Tullygaum, and go down to Bombay together ; and from this measure we shall gain the additional object of having an interview with you, and of giving you the benefit, for a greater length of time, of the sea air at Bombay.

‘ Let me know whether this arrangement will suit you. You will have heard of my expedition against the free-booters. I am watching them still, and they do not seem to me to know which way to go or what to do. Mulwa Dada was not in the action, and he is still entire somewhere upon the Mangeyra river. The others are scattered in all parts. I believe that I shall yet have an opportunity of striking

another blow at them, although I am very anxious to give the troops some rest.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 10th February, 1804.

‘ I observe in a letter from Major Walker to the government of Bombay, of the 18th January, that when that gentleman applied to you for a supply of military stores, for the use of Babajee, an officer in the service of the Guickwar government, you informed him that the supplies of powder and shot in Guzerat are confined to the exigencies of the service.

‘ I have to request, that whenever the Resident may apply for military stores, you will attend to his application, and order the supply of such as may not be immediately required for the use of the Company’s troops ; and you will indent upon the stores at Bombay for an equal quantity.

‘ In this instance, as the demand was only for twenty barrels of powder, four hundred 18 pound, four hundred 12 pound, and two hundred 6 pound shot, the supply might possibly have been granted without inconvenience to the service.

‘ While writing upon this subject, I have to recommend generally a system of conciliation and encouragement to the Guickwar sirdars and troops, as the best mode of drawing from them the assistance which they may be capable of giving, and of precluding the necessity of employing the Company’s troops upon every trifling occasion.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 10th February, 1804.

‘ Since I had the honor to address your Excellency on the 8th instant, I have received from the Commissioners in Cuttack a dispatch, dated 29th January, in which they have enclosed a letter from the Secretary of Government, dated the 24th of January.

‘ All doubt is now removed respecting the limits of the province of Cuttack, which I understand to be those stated in the seventh paragraph of the dispatch from the Commissioners of the 19th January ; and that they include the districts in Midnapoor, and those, the list of which is written in the margin of your Excellency’s instructions of the 9th January.

‘ I am still in doubt, however, regarding the communication to be made to the Rajah of Berar, under the tenth article of the treaty of peace, and I propose still to wait for your Excellency’s further instructions upon this subject.

‘ I do not think it appears that the Rajah of Koonjoor has yet come to an agreement with the Commissioners. His letter is written only in general terms ; it is such as the natives are in the habit of writing to officers commanding British troops ; and I received many such from the Rajah of Berar himself, before I brought the treaty of peace to a conclusion. But instead of considering those letters as containing engagements, they appeared to me, as this letter does, to have been written to procrastinate, or, possibly, entirely to avoid the conclusion of real engagements.

‘ The cases of the Rajahs of Sonapore, Boad, and Ramghur, are similar. They have received and sent messages, they have sent vakeels, have received cowle, and written letters in general terms, but it does not appear that they have concluded engagements.

‘ My idea of the conclusion of an engagement is, that the party should have positively agreed, at least verbally, to certain stipulations, under which it was to enjoy the benefit of the protection of the Company. It does not appear that any of these Rajahs have entered into any such agreements ; although I am well convinced that, having witnessed the effects of the Company’s power, and having reason to expect benefit from the protection of the British Government, they will now readily enter into all the stipulations required. But that is not consistent with the letter of the treaty with the Rajah of Berar, much less with my promise to the Rajah’s ministers ; that this article should not be made to extend farther than was necessary to preserve the good faith of the British Government, or with your Excellency’s policy.

‘ It is certain, that when the party has not agreed to cer-

tain stipulations, as the price of the protection offered to it, it is not necessary, for the preservation of good faith, to extend to it the British protection.

‘ I have been very particular in stating to your Excellency all that occurs to me upon this subject, because it appears that the Commissioners in Cuttack are not aware, or not sensible, of the circumstances under which that article of the treaty was concluded, and which must be a guide in its application. They have a natural desire to extend it to as many cases as possible ; because they feel that, in proportion as they can extend its benefits, they increase the chance of the peace, the happiness, and the prosperity of the people whose country is committed to their management. But these, although important objects, are not to be compared to the importance of preserving the national faith.

‘ Under this view of the subject, and having witnessed the confidence reposed in your Excellency’s government by all the powers of this part of India, I have given your Excellency more than ordinary trouble upon it, and I have only now to request your orders.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 10th February, 1804.

‘ I have received your dispatch of the 28th January, and likewise that of the 6th instant, as I have established a communication with the dawk between Hyderabad and Poonah.

‘ As I have not by me my papers, which were left in my camp near Ningaum, I am obliged to defer for some days to reply to parts of your dispatches. I proceed, however, immediately to reply to that part of your dispatch of the 28th of January, which refers to the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th paragraphs of your dispatch to the Governor General of the 27th of January.

‘ There can be no doubt on the subject of the 5th article of the treaty of Deogaum. It is therein positively stated that the districts to be ceded shall be contiguous to the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur.



‘My various reasons for agreeing to the cession of districts in that quarter are fully stated in my dispatch to his Excellency the Governor General on the subject of the peace, and have been approved of by his Excellency; and, in fact, the cession, instead of breaking in upon the continuity of the frontier, will eventually become a security to the whole country. Of this no man will doubt who knows the nature of the Soubah’s territories, and the total absence of all government.

‘But the reasons for agreeing to the stipulations, on the effect of the cession, are now immaterial; it is in the treaty which has been ratified by both parties, and the question is, whether it is to be carried into execution. Upon this point there can be no doubt.

‘In respect to Rajah Mohiput Ram’s proposal, that the districts beyond the Wurda should be ceded, instead of those on this side of the river, I have made it known to the Rajah of Berar’s minister, and it has been rejected by him, and, of course, I cannot insist upon it.

‘I have also to observe that the statements in Rajah Mohiput Ram’s letter, regarding the districts near the hills, are not correct; those districts have been the seat of the war; they contained, during the greater part of November, the whole of December, and part of January, four hostile armies; and I am afraid that the best that can be said of any army, situated in a district, is, that it has done no mischief.

‘I was desirous that the execution of the 5th article of the treaty should be consistent with the views and interests of the Soubah of the Deccan, and I think that I could have arranged it if I could have obtained from Rajah Mohiput Ram the required information; but he has given me none, even till this moment, and the cause of the delay is now very obvious. I have therefore been obliged to refer to him the settlement of the question, as I informed you in a former letter, in which I requested that positive orders might be sent to him to carry into execution that article of the treaty of peace.

‘I beg that you will accept my best thanks for the attention which you have paid to the request which I made in favor of Narroo Hurry, an attention of which I have fully

enjoyed the benefit on a variety of occasions throughout the service in this quarter ; and that you will make my acknowledgments to Azim ool Omrah, and to the Soubah of the Deccan, for this mark of his Highness's favor.

‘ I am still watching the motions of the freebooter, Mulwa Dada, who was not engaged, as his band was to the southward near Solapoor : he has a small force on the Mangeyra, and is apparently going to the northward. The others who were engaged are scattered, and moving in different directions in the greatest distress. If I can gain intelligence on which I can depend, of Mulwa Dada's position, I propose to endeavor to strike a blow on him, although I am very anxious to give my troops some rest, and I think that the Soubah's troops might destroy him entirely if their commanders thought proper.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 11th February, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a dispatch from Mr. Elphinstone ; I have desired him to inform the Rajah's ministers that your Excellency had ordered Major Broughton to retire from Sumbulpore, as soon as you had received the intelligence that the peace had been ratified.

‘ I have also desired him to tell the ministers that your Excellency did not intend to increase the number of persons to be included in the benefits of the tenth article of the treaty of peace, further than should be necessary ; and that the cause of the delay in the delivery of the list of those persons was to be attributed to the desire to render it as perfect as possible, and that no person should be included, the insertion of whose name was not absolutely necessary, by the nature of the engagements which had been made.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 11th February, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Major Irton, relative to the desire of the body of troops

under his command at Hyderabad, to be included in the distribution which it is imagined your Excellency will order of the property captured during the war, by the army under my command.

‘ I am perfectly satisfied with the manner in which Major Irton and the officers and troops under his command have done their duty, and it is with regret that I feel myself obliged to give an opinion which is not favorable to the wishes of those troops. They certainly have been in an important post ; but I must observe, that it was not more important to the success of the war, and had no greater effect, than many other posts occupied by the British troops.

‘ When I submitted to your Excellency my sentiments on the subject of the distribution of the property captured in the war, I considered that it was necessary to draw a line. The most distinct line that could be drawn, under existing circumstances, was between the troops who had, and those who had not, been engaged with the enemy. According to this plan, many of the troops who have been employed in the detachments mentioned by Major Irton will be included in the distribution.

‘ The principle of the distribution, which I have above stated guided me in the formation of the plan which I recommended to your Excellency, appears to be that which has guided the Commander in Chief, as published in the General Orders, and is particularly applicable to the present case, as the amount of the property captured is not large. If it had been great it would have been otherwise.

‘ There can be no doubt but that Major Irton’s detachment, with the exceptions which have been provided for, underwent none of the labour, suffered none of the fatigue, incurred none of the expense or risk, and gained none of the honor of the late campaign in this quarter ; and therefore, as the amount of the property captured is not great, I have not recommended, and do not recommend, that any part of it should be distributed to them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 11th February, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a dispatch for his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to forward after you shall have perused it.

‘ You will observe, in the letter from Mr. Elphinstone to me, of the 27th January, a request that I would recommend Saccaram Latchmun Parmdry to the countenance and favor of the Soubah’s government, and I shall be much obliged to you, if you will be so kind as to forward this recommendation.

‘ I have written to Rajah Mohiput Ram on the subject of the other points mentioned in the letter from Mr. Elphinstone.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 11th February, 1804\*.

‘ I received your letters, and answered them some days ago. They were to the same purport as one of the 4th instant, which has just reached me.

‘ I have sent to the Resident at Hyderabad a duplicate

*\* Marquis of Wellesley to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Barrackpoor, 11th February, 1804.

‘ I have just now received your letters of the 16th January to Major Shawe, containing the comparative statement of your treaty with Scindiah, and the three plans, A. B. C., contained in my instructions of the 11th December. I lose not a moment in assuring you that I shall ratify your treaty with the utmost satisfaction; it is a glorious and brilliant termination of the war, and equal to the lustre of the campaign.

‘ Ambajee has relieved your article in the treaty from all difficulty. In any case, however, I should have been able to surmount the embarrassment which you apprehend.

‘ You acted with perfect judgment in making the cessions to the allies generally; I shall send a partition treaty to Poonah and to Hyderabad, as soon as I shall receive the copy of your treaty with Scindiah, which, to my great surprise and distress, has not yet reached me. There appears to be a chasm in your dawk from the 23rd December to the 13th January; you may imagine the embarrassment which this circumstance occasions to all my operations.

‘ I have been very seriously ill.

‘ Ever yours, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.



of my letter, regarding your allowance from the Nizam's government.

‘ I had recommended to the Governor General what you have desired respecting your prize money, when I reported to him the state of the property captured. But you know that every thing in that question depends upon him.

‘ Since I wrote to you last I have seen some English papers, and perused debates on the subject of the increase of the army.

‘ When I first wrote to you on the subject of endeavoring to get removed to the King's service, I had reason to believe that all parties in England had agreed that it was absolutely necessary, at last, that Great Britain should really have an army, and not the skeleton of one, as had been the case hitherto. I knew that the object of having an army could not be accomplished without a very large increase of the number of officers, particularly of high rank; and it appeared to me that the services of yourself, and others of your description, from the service in this country, would be desirable.

‘ The plan adopted, however, does not by any means go upon the scale that I supposed it would. Every body appears to be convinced of the necessity of having an army, but nobody appears to be inclined to adopt the measures which are necessary for that purpose. The same little temporary expedients are adopted that have been before practised, and they will equally fail; and in respect to the plan I contemplated for you, that is entirely out of the question, as I observe that the service of several officers belonging to this country has been offered and declined.

‘ I am therefore most decidedly of opinion that you ought not to make up your mind to anything till you shall get home. If you should find that circumstances are then favorable, and that you can change, without material loss to yourself or your family, you might do so, but not otherwise. But I am afraid that you will find that you will not be able to change at all.

‘ I send you the book which you desired. The Governor General wishes that it should not, on any account, be generally circulated or published. You will recollect this.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘ Camp, 11th February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 3rd, and I am much obliged to you for the pains you have taken to recover my horse. I had always understood that he was killed.

‘ I now enclose the dispatches on the subject of Holkar. Also a dispatch from Mr. Edmonstone, regarding Ambajee Ingolia, received this morning; and I think that the facts therein stated will remove a great deal of embarrassment on the final settlement of affairs.

‘ I have had a great deal of trouble with the Cuttack gentlemen. They construe general letters from zemindars about “master’s favor,” and professions of obedience to orders, into treaties; and I think that the moderation of the Governor General, which in any other man would pass current for ambition, induces him rather to adopt the principles of the commissioners in Cuttack, and to increase as much as possible the limits of the province, and the number of people to enjoy the benefits of the tenth article of the treaty of peace.

‘ I have, however, written to him two public letters upon the subject, in which I have pointed out that the objects of the Commissioners, in claiming to enlarge their province as much as possible, however praiseworthy, are not very consistent with national good faith, of which they, very naturally, have entirely lost sight.

‘ It is really ridiculous to read the dispatches on this subject: whole provinces must be considered to be included in Cuttack, under the second article of the treaty. The tenth article must be construed to apply to many zemindars, who have only asked for “master’s favor,” and taken cowle and safeguards, and the poor national faith goes to the devil. In fact, my dear Malcolm, I see very clearly that I have made two very good treaties of peace, but I have not influence to carry them into execution in any of their stipulations; and there is no person about the Governor General to take an enlarged view of the state of our affairs, and to resist the importunities of the local authorities to force on the treaties a construction which will tend to the increase of their own petty power and authority.

‘ The Soubah’s government, who will not execute the fifth article of the treaty regarding the four lacs of rupees, plunder the forts, although any man in his senses must see that that article will eventually be beneficial to the country and to them. After witnessing the prosperity of Berar, I acknowledge that my opinion is much altered, regarding the propriety of excluding the Marhattas entirely from the Nizam’s territories.

‘ As long as the government remains in its present state of weakness, it is a good principle to interest in the prosperity of the country those who would be its enemies and would plunder. But you will say that plunder must now be at an end, and the exclusion of the Rajah takes away every pretence for it. The question is, will it be at an end, in fact? Will the British Government leave their troops in Berar? Will they force the Soubah of the Deccan to reform his military establishment? If they do not either the one or the other, take my word for it, that the average of the Nizam’s receipts, for the next ten years, will fall short even of those of the last ten.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 13th February, 1804.

‘ I have to request that you will allow Mr. Goodwin, of the Civil Service of Bombay, to act as an assistant to the Residency at Poonah, till the further orders of his Excellency the Governor General shall be received.

‘ I request you to apprise Mr. Goodwin of the receipt of this letter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 13th February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th, and I enclose a letter for the killadar of Loghur, which will settle this concern. I request you to fill up the blanks in the letter with the name of the carkoon of Samuldoss, and the date of his

arrest; and to forward the letter to Loghur. If he should not release this man, I will take his fort from him. Desire your hircarrah to see that the carkoon is released.

‘ I have written to Amrut Rao respecting Dowlut, and I beg that you will tell the Peshwah’s ministers, that they may do as they please about that person. I have pointed out to Amrut Rao very clearly the danger of his attempting to deceive me.

‘ The soucars at Poonah will now possibly recommence the business of their profession; but I must observe, that although I have taken pretty strong measures to satisfy them, I shall adopt others of a nature still stronger; if these should fail, I do not think that they ought to be allowed to discontinue the exercise of their trade, only because one carkoon was arrested, who, after all, might have been arrested very deservedly, and for reasons entirely unconnected with the disputes between Samuldoss and his brother.

‘ I am by no means satisfied yet with the propriety of my going to Poonah, and I think that Colonel Close agrees in opinion with me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 13th February, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have this day received from Lieut. Colonel Harcourt, upon which I have to observe, that it is dated ten days after that on which he received the notification of the conclusion of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Camp, 14th February, 1804.

‘ Since I wrote to you last, a part of the freebooters have collected again to the southward, upon a band who were not engaged with us on the 5th. I have therefore thought it best to move upon them, and I hope to give a good account of them on the 16th.



‘ I wish you would move after us gradually by the route by which we came. Keep upon the tappall road, of which I send you the stages, and come on to Perinda, upon the Seenah river.

‘ I send you with this a sketch of the country. Bring with you the remount horses of the cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 14th February, 1804.

‘ I have this day received your letter of the 25th of January, and I am concerned to observe that you had not received several of my letters: viz., one of the 17th of December, one of the 23rd, one of the 30th of December, and one of the 5th of January, all relating to the treaties of peace.

‘ Besides these, I wrote you a long letter, on the 11th of January, I think, in which I recapitulated every thing that had passed from the battle of Argaum; shortly after which the tappall began to be irregular to that day on which I hoped that I had re-established the communication; and I sent you, with that letter, additional copies of the treaties of peace, and of my letters regarding them to the Governor General. I still hope that you will have received that letter; but if you should not acknowledge the receipt of it before I return to camp, I shall again write to you the purport of it, and shall send you copies of the papers above mentioned.

‘ The whole of the subject of your letter of the 25th has had much of my attention and consideration; and I shall proceed to give you my sentiments upon it, according to your desire. That part which first calls for a decision relates to the subsidiary corps serving with the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ The first point to be considered is, the station for those corps in future; and the decision upon this may facilitate the decision regarding the establishment to which the troops forming the subsidiary corps ought to belong. If the subject can be decided upon military principles,—if there are no political considerations to induce the Government to

wish to have the subsidiary corps at Hyderabad and at Poonah, (and I acknowledge that I see none,)—it is my opinion that the subsidiary force, serving with the Peshwah, ought to be placed either upon the Godavery, at or below Toka, or upon the high road between Toka and Ahmednuggur. This last place ought to have a British garrison, and there might be two battalions at Poonah. By this position, the Peshwah's territories will be secured from foreign invasion; at the same time that the supply of the subsidiary force will be certain from Bombay, by the medium of Poonah and Ahmednuggur.

‘But I do not think that one regiment of cavalry and four battalions of native infantry will be very safe in a position so far advanced; unless it should be convenient to place the subsidiary force, serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, (excepting two battalions to be at Hyderabad,) likewise upon the Godavery, about forty or fifty miles lower down that river.

‘If that should not be politically inconvenient, (and I really do not understand the gentlemen who contend for the necessity of fixing the subsidiary force at the capital,) many benefits will result from the measure. In the first place, it will secure that capital position for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah; and in the next, it is the only measure that can be adopted which will give the Soubah of the Deccan the full benefit of the territories lately ceded by the Rajah of Berar.

‘The late arrangements made with the Soubah of the Deccan, regarding his forts, will secure the use of the fort of Dharore for the subsidiary force; supposing that it should be convenient and cheap to supply it from the eastern, rather than from the western coast.

‘That is the position which I should recommend, supposing there is no objection on the part of the politicians, whom I do not understand upon this subject, and who, I believe, do not understand themselves. But if the subsidiary force with the Soubah of the Deccan must be at Hyderabad, I would still recommend that we should continue to hold Ahmednuggur, and post there the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, excepting two battalions to be at Poonah.

‘ If the forward position which I have proposed should be adopted, I think that the country will be saved from plunder. We tried a similar experiment in the Nabob of Oude’s territories, above thirty years ago, which we have ever since saved from plunder; although the Marhattas were much stronger and we much weaker than either are at the present moment.

‘ Supposing all consequences to be equally convenient, I acknowledge that I should wish to see the Bengal troops composing all the subsidiary forces. The men are of a better size and description, of a higher caste, and the natives have more respect for them than they have for the Coast or Bombay troops. They have proved in this campaign that they yield to none in bravery; and, I believe, are tolerably disciplined, and they have been long notorious for their contempt of their enemies on horseback. But all these circumstances must yield to others of a more pressing nature; and certainly, in a great military arrangement, the facility of relief is an important consideration.

‘ However, supposing it should be decided that the subsidiary corps should be posted on the Godavery, as I have above proposed, the plan for relief will no longer be convenient; and then possibly you may be of opinion that the Bengal troops ought to be the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ While writing upon this subject, there is one convenience resulting from the employment of the Bengal troops, which, in a pecuniary point of view, will more than compensate for all the additional expense which may attend it. It is that they eat the flour of dry grains, whereas the Coast and Bombay troops must have rice. This article will always cost much money in this country, but flour of all kinds will be cheap.

‘ In respect to the subsidiary force serving with Scindiah, supposing that he should become a party to the defensive alliance, it ought certainly to be composed of Bengal troops; and if the Bengal army should furnish this force, the Governor General may possibly not think it proper, and indeed may be unable, to detach a force to the Deccan for the Soubah, or for the Peshwah. But my opinion upon this subject, which I have never given to the Governor General, is inde-

pendent of all considerations of relative promotion, and is founded solely upon the relative qualities and fitness of the troops for the service. If you and the Governor General should adopt this opinion, the Bengal army will eventually furnish all the subsidiary forces; and the others will be confined to the Company's own territories.

‘ After this consideration of the question, I come to the point of the battalions lately raised. Whatever may be the decision regarding the composition of the subsidiary forces in future, those battalions are absolutely necessary to enable you to conquer Malabar again, and to relieve the Bombay troops in that province and Canara: a measure which, I have already observed, is absolutely necessary, both to preserve the peace of Malabar, and to secure the existence of the Bombay army as a respectable body. If the Coast army are to continue to furnish either of the subsidiary forces, they will require a permanent augmentation, to the full amount of the number of troops to be sent to Malabar and Canara, to relieve the Bombay troops.

‘ The principle on which I go is, that the subsidiary arrangement with the Peshwah, and even that with Scindiah, supposing that it should be carried into execution, will not decrease the necessity for keeping up the same garrisons, and of the same strength, as they were established in the year 1802; at least as far as I have any knowledge of the principles on which those garrisons were established, which, I confess, extends no farther than the Ceded districts and Mysore.

‘ If the Coast army are to furnish both subsidiary forces, they will require a permanent augmentation to the amount of six battalions, and whatever force may be stationed in Malabar, in relief of the Bombay troops.

‘ If the Coast army should not furnish either of the subsidiary forces, it will require a permanent augmentation only to the amount of the number of troops which Malabar and Canara will want beyond six battalions.

‘ But till the Governor General shall decide all these points, and at all events to enable you to relieve Malabar, I conceive that it is indispensable to keep up the eight new battalions.

‘ I do not think that you will be able to do any thing



effectual in Malabar in this season. I conclude you will not wish General Campbell to withdraw from his position, till I shall break up in this country; and, supposing that I were able to do so on this day, the troops would not arrive at Seringapatam till the end of March; and it would then be too late to commence a serious settlement of that province.

‘ I should therefore recommend the assembly at Seringapatam, during the summer months, of a respectable garrison, which might be made the foundation of the force to enter Malabar by Wynaad, early in the next fair season; and in the mean time, possibly a battalion might be sent down to enable Colonel Montresor to hold his ground throughout the rains. I am very certain that, if the troops spend the rains in Malabar, they will not be fit for much upon the opening of the fair season—particularly as much time does not remain to provide for their comfortable accommodation; that they will not have time to do much before the rains; and that they can do nothing while they last, and for some time after they have ceased, possibly till the month of December.

‘ I have always been of opinion that Malabar is our weakest point in India, against an European enemy. There is no mode of keeping in order the inhabitants, whose turbulence is the great cause of our weakness, excepting by having in Malabar a strong and efficient force, and a strong garrison at Seringapatam to support that force, and act upon the back of the rebels, through Wynaad. When some years of peace shall have elapsed, and the inhabitants shall have acquired habits of tranquillity, and shall have enjoyed its advantages, the experiment of weakening the military force in Malabar might be tried; but certainly not till tranquillity, which will first be the effect of fear, becomes a habit.

‘ I agree entirely with your opinion regarding the cavalry. In fact, we have as large a body of regular cavalry as we can want, or as we can support. The expense of it is enormous. The gram alone, for the four regiments with me, has in some months cost 50,000 pagodas.

‘ There is no doubt whatever of the advantage of a body of irregular cavalry; but I acknowledge that I am not prepared with an opinion on the best mode of supporting such a body in the Company’s service. I am afraid it will be

found that the allies, instead of being satisfied with what has been done for them in the war, and being in consequence inclined to give up the territory in Savanore or the Dooab for the support of such a body of cavalry, will be much dissatisfied with the greater share of the benefits of the peace which will fall to the Company.

‘There is no hope of being able to have in the Company’s service, permanently, a body of irregular horse, without the existence of all the abuses which prevail in the native armies, and which, in fact, are the cause of the destruction of every power in India. Besides, another fact is, that land given to pay troops will not provide for their payment upon distant expeditions. I believe, therefore, that nothing would be gained by such an establishment, excepting the certainty of having the horse in the time of service, when an additional expense must be incurred in their support; and I very much doubt whether it would not be easy to get them at such time, without the constant expense.

‘I have already, as you will have observed, called the attention of the Governor General to the improvement of our alliances in this particular point, as an object of essential consequence in other respects; and I have written more than one letter upon the subject to the Resident at Hyderabad.

‘Besides this, I propose to recommend to the Governor General to pay the expenses incurred by the Rajah of Mysore in this war, (whether the Rajah is or is not entitled to such payment, which I acknowledge I think he is,) as a certain mode of insuring for the Company, at a future period, the services of all the horse that have served with me in this campaign.

‘I have now, I believe, gone through, rather more at length than you expected, all the subjects on which you desired my sentiments.

‘Since the 5th, I have been watching the freebooters, many of whom have dispersed; but some have again collected near Alkulcotta upon one chief, who was not with the others on the 5th, and whose baggage was not plundered. I have therefore made a movement to the southward towards them; and if they remain where they are, I shall destroy them on the day after to-morrow.

‘ As soon as I shall have dispersed these bands of freebooters, I propose to wait till I receive the Governor General’s ratification of the treaty with Scindiah, and then break up the army. For the present, the troops must remain in this neighbourhood, as there is no forage or subsistence for them to the northward, every thing being ate up or destroyed.

‘ I think it desirable that I should soon quit this country. The Peshwah has manifested a most unaccountable jealousy of me, personally ; and has refused to adopt certain measures, evidently calculated for his advantage, only because I recommended them. He has allowed their benefit, and has avowed this motive for refusing to adopt them. We have always found it very difficult to manage him ; but it will become quite impossible, if this principle is allowed to guide his conduct. I therefore think it best that I should go away as soon as possible ; and I am certainly very desirous of getting some rest.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ Camp, 12 miles south of Solapoor,  
15th February, 1804.

‘ SIR,

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th, but not that which you say you had written to me upon the subject of bullocks, which I conclude has gone to my camp, and which I shall probably get this day.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for the communication of your sentiments regarding the representation of the officers with the army in the Dooab. General Campbell sent me a copy of the representation by desire of the Officers who made it, and I have the honor to enclose a copy of my answer upon that subject.

‘ Since I wrote to you last, I find that the accounts of the numbers of the freebooters who had collected about Alkulcotta were much exaggerated, with a view to induce me to march that way to drive out the few that hung about the district. In this, I am sorry to say, those who gave the accounts have succeeded, and I have made some terrible marches in this hot weather. But the freebooters are all

gone in different directions across the Beemah, I suppose to their homes.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 16th February, 1804.

‘ I have received a letter from the Subsidiary force, by which I learn that the killadar of Dewal ghaut has been deprived of his fort and district, which have been made over to Soubahan Khan. This killadar has behaved remarkably well during the war ; he has kept up a constant correspondence both with Colonel Stevenson and me, and has, at times, given us valuable intelligence ; under these circumstances, I think it is to be wished that he had not been deprived of his fort.

‘ At the same time I draw your attention to this subject, I am aware that it is possible that it may not be proper to attempt to alter the arrangement complained of. I mention the circumstance only, that, in case it should be possible, you may endeavor to save the late killadar of Dewal ghaut.

‘ It was reported to me that the freebooters, who, since the 5th, had been wandering about in different directions, apparently without design or means of subsistence, or of annoyance to the country, were collecting again about a party which was near Toljapoor on that day, and whose baggage was not plundered, and which remained entire. I have therefore moved with celerity towards Alkulkottah ; and I have now the pleasure to inform you, that the whole have crossed the Beemah, and have gone in different directions, all in great distress, and apparently towards their own homes.

‘ I hear that the party supposed to belong to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, which was not in the action of the 5th, was cut off, a day or two afterwards, by the troops from Hyderabad, near Toljapoor. This party has also crossed the Beemah, near Abdulpoor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ Camp, 12 miles south of Solapoor,  
16th February, 1804.

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ I have received your letter of the 5th. I think there is nothing in Eitul Punt’s letter of much consequence. The treaty is clear. We are to have nothing south of Joudpoor, &c., and all treaties made by us are to be confirmed by us, no matter where the Rajahs are, unless serinjaumy or jaghire lands should have been granted away by them.

‘ Narwar is a Raojee, of which place there is a Rajah, at least so I learn. You never mentioned the desire to have the pettah of Asseerghur, and I acknowledge that I wish not to give it up. However, in case they should insist upon it, I enclose an order for the pettah; and I request you to settle that my troops in the fort are supplied with provisions from the country.

‘ The only mode of attacking Asseerghur is from the pettah; and till every thing is finally settled, I hope that it will be possible to keep it.

‘ I have made some dreadful marches to the southward after the freebooters, who, it was reported, were about to collect again in the Alkulcotta districts. But they have gone off, in different directions across the Beemah, I hope to their homes.

‘ I enclose a duplicate of my letter of the 29th of January, which you had not received.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 16th February, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th instant. Mr. Elphinstone did not apprize me of his wish to receive from Bombay the articles mentioned in Mr. Smith’s letter of the 6th. If he had, I should have written to you upon the subject. But it appears to me to be very necessary that he should have these articles, and it is very satisfactory to find that they have been sent.

‘ Mr. Elphinstone (to whom I conclude a copy of the bill

has been sent) will of course carry the different articles to the account of the Honorable Company as received from Bombay.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Vernon.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 16th February, 1804.

‘ Upon the receipt of this letter you will withdraw your troops from, and deliver up to the person who will be sent on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to take charge of, the pettah of Asseerghur, and you will confine your attention entirely to the care of the fort.

‘ In case you should experience any difficulty in getting provisions after you shall have withdrawn your troops from the pettah of Asseerghur, you will correspond on that subject with Major Malcolm.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.,

‘ *Captain Vernon.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Munt.*

‘ Camp, 12 miles south from Solapoor,

‘ SIR,

‘ 16th February, 1804.

‘ I learn from the resident at Hyderabad that you were likely to march on the 8th instant towards Dharore, in charge of treasure to the amount of six lacs of rupees, for the use of the troops under my command. I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will continue your march, with the cavalry and half of the infantry under your command, to Jalnapoor, with half of the treasure, or three lacs of rupees; and send the remainder of the infantry with three lacs of rupees to join my camp at or near Perinda.

‘ You will find or hear of Colonel Halyburton’s camp at Jalnapoor, and you will deliver to Captain Down the three lacs of rupees which you have been above directed to keep in your charge.

‘ I have not yet by me a list of the coins in which you have brought the sum of six lacs of rupees; but I request you to desire the person in charge of the money to divide

the different denominations of coin as equally between the two divisions as may be practicable.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Munt.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ Camp, 12 miles south of Solapoor,  
16th February, 1804.

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Since I wrote to you last, the freebooters, who had been for some days marching about in different directions, apparently without plan or determined intention, at length manifested the appearance, as I was informed, of collecting again in strength in the Alkulcotta district, upon a party which, having been near Toljapoor on the 5th instant, had not been engaged, and which had therefore preserved its baggage entire. I therefore again moved upon them, and they have now crossed the Beemah, and are gone off in different directions. Mulwa Dada is, I believe, gone towards Bejapoor.

‘ I send this letter by an hircarrah to that place, to be forwarded thence by dawk.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shauve.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 16th February, 1804.

‘ I send you an extract of a letter which I have received from General Stuart \*, from which you will observe, that he agrees in opinion with me, upon the subject of the representation from the officers serving in the Dooab, regarding the property captured by the troops under my command.

\* *Lieut. General Stuart to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Choultry Plain, 4th February, 1804.

‘ I judge it proper to inform you, that I have received a representation from the army in the Dooab, stating their claim to participate in the prize money of the troops in advance.

‘ Although I do not approve of the subject of the representation, yet, as it is addressed to this Government, and to the Governor General, I shall be obliged to submit it to the Governor in Council.

‘ It will, of course, be forwarded to Bengal; but I do not suppose it will meet a favorable decision.

‘ I shall send you a copy of the representation.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘ J. STUART.

‘ Since my last letter, some of the freebooters manifested an inclination to collect again in the Alkulkottah district, upon a party which had not been engaged on the 5th. I have made some rapid marches upon them, and they have now left the country entirely.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 17th February, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th, and I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken to procure orders to Rajah Mohiput Ram, to carry into execution the 5th article of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you, that I have this instant received a letter from Captain Johnson, the Persian interpreter with the subsidiary force, whom I had requested to act as mediator between Rajah Mohiput Ram and Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, by which I learn that the arrangements required by that article had been completed on the 7th instant, to the satisfaction of both parties.

‘ Captain Johnson has conducted himself upon this occasion much to my satisfaction; and I take this opportunity of mentioning, that, throughout the late war, he has made himself very useful both to Colonel Stevenson and me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 17th February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th, containing a copy of your dispatch to Mr. Edmonstone, on the subject of the Frenchmen supposed to be at Poonah.

‘ I think it desirable that you should continue to remonstrate with the Peshwah’s ministers on his Highness’s conduct in this business; and particularly that you should point out to them that, in this instance, his Highness has broken the only stipulations of the treaty which are important to the British Government, viz., those contained in the first and seventeenth articles.



‘ You may likewise hint to them that it is of little importance to the British Government whether the Frenchmen are given up by the Peshwah or not, only as far as that by not giving them up his Highness will break his treaty with the Company, and it will be necessary for the British Government to adopt the measures which, in that case, will provide for its security and that of its allies; as I have adopted measures to seize their persons, which must throw them into my hands as soon as they leave Poonah.

‘ In the mean time I conclude that you will not relax in your endeavors to discover them in Poonah, and if you should find them out, I beg you to apply to Colonel Coleman for a sufficient force, and take measures to seize their persons.

‘ If the Peshwah should persist in his refusal or evasion to deliver up the Frenchmen, I beg you to delay to make any communication to his Highness regarding the treaties of peace, respecting which you may receive orders from his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 17th February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 11th.

‘ The Peshwah’s conduct appears extraordinary only to us, who, since he signed the treaty of Bassein, have trusted to his professions, notwithstanding a variety of facts of which we have a knowledge.

‘ The first of these was his telling me plainly, that he could not say whether or not he wished Scindiah to come to Poonah with his army, when I was pressing him to dispatch a letter to that Chief with orders not to advance, which letter he had promised to write.

‘ The next fact was his contrivance to correspond with Scindiah’s durbar, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty with the Company, to the very day that I ordered the dawk to be drawn off the road.

‘ The third fact was his breach of the treaty in not sending his *quota* of troops to join the army.

‘ The fourth fact, that he notoriously communicated with

the enemy, by means of a Ballojee Pundit at Poonah, during the existence of the war.

‘ The fifth fact, that he never gave any demonstration of public satisfaction upon the occasion of the successes in the war, in which he was supposed to be the Company’s ally.

‘ The sixth fact, that since the signature of the treaty of Bassein, to this hour, he has never adopted any one measure recommended to him by the British Government, either for his own benefit, or for the general benefit of the alliance. On the contrary, he has always resisted those measures, only because they were recommended by the British authorities, although he acknowledged their benefit.

‘ The seventh fact, that he has kept at his durbar, only for the purposes of mischief, Sirjee Rao Ghautky, notwithstanding our repeated remonstrances, and his own proposal, that he should seize his person. By the by, while writing regarding this person, I may mention, that a buckshee and a body of horse, belonging to this same man, were opposed to me in the action of the 5th; whom I dare say that I shall have the pleasure of meeting, shortly, at the Peshwah’s durbar, as he and his horse, after having plundered the Nizam’s country, and having been employed to cut off the supplies going to the British army, have gone direct to Poonah.

‘ The eighth fact, that the Peshwah wrote a letter to Scindiah, at the time of the negotiation with Colonel Collins, to desire Scindiah to concede nothing, as he did not find the English as yet sufficiently disposed to punish the rebels.

‘ Major Malcolm has a copy of this letter, of which Amrut Rao has the original, which original I will bring with me to Poonah. Under this head I may mention, that Amrut Rao has in his possession letters from Scindiah to the Peshwah, intercepted, as this letter was, upon the road, in which Scindiah gives the Peshwah accounts of his negotiations with Colonel Collins, which, by the description of them, I judge to be far more detailed than those which the British Government received from Colonel Collins. I have also to mention, under this head, that Goorparah, in the course of many confidential conversations which I have had with him, told me repeatedly, that Scindiah, in his negotiation with Colonel Collins, never took a step without consulting the Peshwah,

and that his Highness ought in fact, to have been considered a party to the war on the side of the confederates.

‘ The ninth fact, which crowns the whole, that he has communicated with Frenchmen, and has endeavored to conceal his communications from the agents of the British Government, and to screen the Frenchmen from their search.

‘ I acknowledge that I always have been induced to view his Highness’s conduct as the effect of weakness and folly ; and I believed him to be sincere in his alliance with the Company ; but while I encouraged this belief I shut my eyes against the facts of which I had a knowledge, and which I have above detailed ; and against his Highness’s notorious treachery, which was the theme of all the public dispatches, previous to his signing the treaty of Bassein ; and I considered nothing but what I wished to be true, and what I knew to be the Peshwah’s interests.

‘ This last act, however, has rendered it necessary that we should turn our minds seriously to the consideration of the measures to be adopted for the safety of the British Government in this critical moment.

‘ At such a time, it is very unfortunate that Colonel Close should be sick ; but we shall have Mr. Webbe at Poonah, and shall be able to avail ourselves of his advice. I think it probable that Mr. Webbe will be at Poonah about the 20th. I write to him by this post, but I beg you to show him this letter, and my public dispatch of this day. I cannot be at Poonah before the 24th ; but I think I may on that day, or in one or two days afterwards.

‘ I conclude that you will not have forwarded my letter to Dhoondoo Punt, regarding the harbour of Samuldoss.

‘ I am sorry to find that Colonel Close is still very unwell.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Graham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 17th February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 13th instant. All the property taken from the family of Mulwa Dada must be considered as captured property, and must not be restored. It

would be ridiculous to adhere to the terms of a capitulation, of which he has broken every stipulation.

‘ The 1000 rupees for Ram Rao and the peons, respectively, must be taken from the property captured.

‘ I cannot, and have no inclination to take any article myself; and cannot consent that any article should be taken by any other person. Every thing that is sold must be put up to auction, unless the officers to whom the charge of captured property has been given should be of opinion that it can be sold to advantage by private contract, under a valuation. You will observe, that this principle applies to the article which you proposed to retain, upon the valuation by the shroff.

‘ I shall write to Goorparah, to desire him to send a person to point out Scindiah’s horses; and you will be so kind as to give up those which he shall point out.

‘ I gave notice to Scindiah’s vakeels, that I should not give up the districts till Mulwa Dada should have gone away to the northward. They deny that Mulwa Dada is Scindiah’s servant, and have expressed a wish that I may treat him as I may think proper. I think, therefore, that they ought to get the districts; but I beg you to tell the vakeel with you, that my reason for not giving them to him is, that I know well that they have not the means of keeping them from Malwa Dada; and that if he or his troops should ever get into any of them, I must immediately again take possession. Mulwa Dada cannot now last much longer; and therefore it is desirable that the delivery of the districts should be delayed for a short time.

‘ I am decidedly of opinion that some serious step might still be taken to annoy this banditti, who were breaking up daily. They almost all belong to the districts under Ahmednuggur, and their families are living under the Company’s protection. Surely their families might be arrested; and I can tell you that if they were, a more effectual stop would be put to the depredations of the freebooters than can be by the operations of the troops, however successful.

‘ I am very desirous at all times of doing what is satisfactory to you, and to every officer. But I am sorry that I



cannot consent to your going to Madras, at the time you propose. It is absolutely necessary that you should wait till the Governor General shall have ratified the treaty of peace, and shall have disposed of the territories which are under your management.

‘ I never had any doubt respecting your sharing, with the remainder of the army, in the property captured during the war.

‘ I have reason to believe that the Frenchmen, about whom I wrote to you formerly, are in Poonah ; and I beg you to have an eye upon them, in case they should endeavor to pass through your district.

‘ I wish that you would send Captain Barclay an authority for Gundapoor, and desire him to send it to Major Palmer.

‘ I rather think it will be best to give the districts over to Scindiah’s people, if you should find they wish to have them, after what I have requested you in the letter to point out to them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Graham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Camp, 18th February, 1804.

‘ I have this day received your different dispatches of the 6th, 7th, and 8th ; and of the 5th and 6th for the Governor General, which I have forwarded. There is also a letter for me without a date, but which I believe was written on the 5th.

‘ I wish that you would send me a copy of the dispatch to the Governor General, of the 5th (No. 5.), as it contains some valuable information.

‘ Not a word yet from Bengal about the peace with Scindiah ; but I hope it has been received. Six copies of it were sent.

‘ You will have been relieved from all anxiety about Ambajee Inglija by the dispatch which I sent you lately, announcing the intention of the Governor General not to adhere to his treaty with him. Not that I rely upon that intention either, as he may alter it ; and I observe that he is inclined to make the most of the 10th article of the treaty

with Ragojee Bhoonslah, notwithstanding my promise to that Chief's vakeel.

‘ To this he is urged by Mr. Melville and Colonel Harcourt, who do every thing in their power to increase the limits of their province; but I have written a serious dispatch upon the subject.

‘ I agree in opinion regarding your diplomatic arrangements. You have done very right about the soucars. I have been to the southward of Solapoor, after the freebooters, who made some show of an intention of meeting again. But they are now across the Beemah, and can do no more mischief; and I am on my march towards Perinda.

‘ I should have been glad to stay to the southward a few days longer, but I am obliged to go to Poonah; and excepting Wallace, who is with the camp to the northward, there is nobody that I can trust with the command of the cavalry. I declare that this is becoming a most serious concern.

‘ My reason for going to Poonah is to meet Webbe, who, I believe, will be there on the 20th; and to endeavor to prevail upon his Highness the Peshwah to give up the Frenchmen, who are at Poonah, after having had an interview with his Highness at Wahy. The secretary of state for foreign affairs, Rigajee Naig, has almost acknowledged that they are at Poonah, but they are not yet given up.

‘ Is not this shocking? What is to be done with the fellow? It is my opinion that he wishes us to adopt some extreme course.

‘ Visvas Rao Ghautky and Ballojee Punt, Sirjee Rao's buckshee, with a body of horse, who were in the action of the 5th, fled from the field of battle to Wahy; and I dare say that the next place at which I shall meet them will be at the Peshwah's durbar at Poonah!

‘ This is our good and faithful ally!

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ Camp at Tankly, on the Seenah,  
18th February, 1804.

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ I have returned to the northward along the Seenah, and

I shall be to-morrow at Seerapoor or Hingerry, and on the 20th at Beedoorā Nalgaum, on the Seenah.

‘ I conclude that you will have marched from Walkee to Kurkut, either on the 16th or 17th ; and that you will have continued your march to Perinda, after having received my letter of the 14th.

‘ If you should have reached Kurkut on the 16th, you will be at Taundoobwarry this day ; if not, you will be there to-morrow, and near Perinda on the 20th.

‘ If you should arrive near Perinda on the 19th, I should wish you to meet me on the 20th at Beedoorā, on the Seenah, about ten miles from Perinda.

‘ If you should not be near Perinda till the 20th, I should wish you to meet me on the 21st at Roorā, on the Seenah, two or three miles to the westward of Perinda, on the road to Poonah.

‘ Tell Captain Barclay that I shall not want the rice for which I wrote to him yesterday ; but that instead of it, I should wish to have fifty bags of rice at Beedoorā, on the Seenah, on the 20th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 18th February, 1804.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 13th I have to mention, that unless the Peshwah delivers over the three Frenchmen, and all their papers, I do not conceive that he ought to be considered in the light of an ally to the British Government, or that he is entitled to such a mark of confidence as is proposed, by showing him the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Camp, 20th February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 10th. The escape of the pindarries is unlucky, and I have no doubt but that they will enter Berar, as you foresee.

‘ But Colonel Halyburton must be alert, and march upon them, give them no rest, and then they will soon come away again. I am afraid that they will be joined by the vagabonds of this quarter. But the Soubah must keep an army to preserve the peace of his own territories.

‘ I regret the change of the ministry. It will appear to the world as if it had been made because the late ministers had negotiated the peace; and I considered it as a beneficial circumstance that Eitul Punt was so long in our camp, and saw how we went on.

‘ Every thing, but particularly this change of councils, convinces me that you ought to stay at Scindiah’s durbar, till you shall be relieved by Webbe, or by the person whom the Governor General shall appoint the permanent Resident with Scindiah. Your health is mended, and you have given up all thoughts of going to England, unless sent home on a public mission.

‘ I do not think that there is now a great probability that you will be sent in this capacity, for the reasons you state yourself; and because I learn that Colonel Houghton is going in the Tigris, as soon as the accounts of the peace shall be received.

‘ That being the case, you surely cannot be better employed than at Scindiah’s durbar; and by the delay of your departure for some time, you not only will have an opportunity of rendering essential services, but you possibly will regain your health by rest; and you will have a better season for your march to the southward than you have at present.

‘ I wish that you would consider these circumstances. I have the pleasure to inform you that the Peshwah has delivered up the Frenchmen. They are now in charge of a guard of British grenadiers at Poonah.

‘ I omitted to mention to you, as an inducement to you to stay at Burhampoor, that Captain Wilks has been appointed to act as Resident in Mysore during your absence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Captain Wilks, Acting Resident at Mysore.*

' MY DEAR SIR, ' Camp at Roora, 21st February, 1804.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 9th instant, and I beg leave to congratulate you upon your appointment in Mysore, of which I am convinced that Lord Wellesley will approve.

‘ I shall always be ready to assist you with my opinions whenever you may require them, and in any other manner in which you may think that I can be useful to you.

‘ I have lately written to Piele, to recommend that the Rajah’s army may be kept upon the frontier till I shall be enabled to break up in this quarter, on receiving the Governor General’s ratification of the treaty of peace with Seindiah. Indeed I think they ought to remain in their position till some of the Company’s troops shall return to Mysore, as we must expect that some marauders will still keep the field, and the territories of Mysore are a most tempting bait to them.

‘I have lately driven a band of freebooters out of the Nizam’s territories, and some of them are gone towards Meritch. It is not impossible but that they might go farther south, particularly if there should be any hopes that they would not meet with opposition.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘Captain Wilks.’

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘ Camp, Roora, near Perinda,  
21st February, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters of the 11th, and I think your sunnud will answer well.

‘ Ambajee Inglia is just like the rest of the Marhattas. I am not sorry for Gwalior either.

‘ I returned to the army this day, and shall go towards Poonah the day after to-morrow. Webbe is arrived there.

‘ I have settled the subsidiary force. Agnew, Adjutant General; Johnson, Deputy Quarter Master General; Welsh, Judge Advocate, and Campbell, Postmaster. This is the best I could do.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘Major Malcolm.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Roora, 21st February, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 14th instant.

‘ When all the arrangements consequent to the late war, and the treaties of peace shall be made, particularly those which may be necessary in consequence of the 15th article of the treaty of peace with Scindiah, his Excellency the Governor General will probably take into consideration the state of all the military establishments in India, and will fix them in reference to the state of public affairs at the moment.

‘ When he shall take this subject into his consideration, he may find it convenient to keep up the 9th native regiment on the Bombay establishment; and, on the other hand, if he should think it proper to reduce it, the men will be required to complete the other native corps belonging to the Bombay establishment.

‘ Till his Excellency shall decide whether the regiment shall be kept or not, the expense of keeping it, considering the fact above mentioned, will be but trifling, and certainly no object in comparison with the advantage of having a regiment of disciplined, instead of one of undisciplined soldiers, supposing that his Excellency the Governor General should determine that it is expedient to keep up the 9th regiment; I, therefore, beg leave to recommend to the Honorable the Governor in Council not to reduce the 9th regiment till he shall receive the further directions of his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Roora, 22nd February, 1804.

‘ I shall leave camp to-morrow, and I expect to arrive at Poonah on the 26th. I shall be obliged to you if you will send my letters, and those for camp, by the Hyderabad dawk, made up in a separate packet.

‘ I enclose a letter, which I beg you to send to the killadar of Loghur.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor of Bombay.*

‘ HONORABLE SIR,

‘ Camp, 22nd February, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 14th instant.

‘ When carrying on the operations of the late war against Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, I found that the rebellion of Canojee Rao Guickwar was very inconvenient, as it kept in employment a large body of troops, which, at the period to which I am alluding, were equipped for service, and which might have marched towards Ougein, and thus have carried the war into the heart of the territories of the most powerful of our enemies, and have created a most seasonable diversion in favor of the troops in this quarter. I therefore requested Major Malcolm, who was at Bombay, to suggest to you the expediency of endeavoring to reconcile Canojee, by making to him some concessions.

‘ I was not aware that any former attempts, with these same views, had been made, or that they had been treated in the manner in which it appears, by your dispatch of the 14th, that Canojee received and answered them. If I had had that knowledge, I should have been very certain that, under the circumstances of the moment at which the fresh offers should be made, Canojee would not accept them; and that the effect of the offers would be to draw from him additional insolence. Much less was I aware that you had fixed the amount of the concession to be made to Canojee; and, indeed, upon that point, which I consider to be in a great degree referrible to the Resident at Baroda, as the Guickwar Government would pay the expense, I never formed any decided opinion.

‘ The circumstances of the times are much changed, but still it is my opinion that it is desirable that you should have in security the person of Canojee Rao Guickwar. He is a legitimate pretender to the government of the Guickwar state; and I am sorry to observe, that in the present state of the military establishment of all the powers in India, a

person of that description will never fail to have numerous followers, for whom he will gain subsistence by the plunder of the country of which he claims the government. You must employ your troops against him, and they must be strong, and equipped in such a manner as to be enabled to act at a distance from their magazines, and in exhausted countries, as they must be prepared to pass the boundaries of the Guickwar state, and to follow Canojee into those of Holkar, or wherever he may go. The operations against Canojee then come to be of considerable importance, and they involve financial and political considerations, upon which it is necessary that you should take the orders of his Excellency the Governor General.

The question is, in what manner is Canojee Rao Guickwar to be reconciled? My opinion is, that too much has been already done, with the best intentions, to carry into execution that object, and that we shall not succeed in it as long as he shall believe, as it appears he does, that the Company's Government are anxious to reconcile him. His vakeel repeats in his letter to you the number of offers which had been made to Canojee through various channels, only for the purpose of founding thereon his own insolent answers, and of introducing an account of an insolent debate, which, if it ever took place, is the strongest proof of an indisposition to accept the terms which you are disposed to grant. In fact, Canojee's views have been raised by these offers, and he must be humbled in some degree, before he will accept any terms which, to a man in his situation, can be called reasonable.

I therefore take the liberty of recommending you to answer the letter from the vakeel in very few words, stating that you are concerned to find that Canojee Rao Guickwar is not disposed to accept the terms which you had intended to grant to him, and that you desire that he (the vakeel) will quit the territories of the Guickwar without loss of time. I recommend that you should apprise Colonel Murray of the contents of this letter, and order him to have no communication with Canojee Rao Guickwar, which shall not be commenced by Canojee Rao, and no negotiation till Canojee Rao shall have manifested a disposition less haughty, and shall use language less insolent.



‘ In giving this recommendation, I am not cavilling about words, but from some experience and intimate knowledge of the Marhatta character, gained by having conducted a variety of negotiations with many chiefs, I am of opinion that no progress can be made in any negotiation that is not founded upon a respect for the character of the British Government, and which is not carried on in cordial and civil language.

‘ After having sent away this vakeel, Colonel Murray must, of course, be prepared to attack Canojee if he should venture into the territories of the Guickwar state ; and I do not doubt but that he will conduct his operations with such rapidity and vigor, as will induce that chief to repent his conduct, and to refrain from future invasions. The arrangements for the military in Guzerat, which I proposed to you in my letter of the 2nd August, will give Colonel Murray the means of carrying on these operations.

‘ If Canojee should make no overture to renew the negotiations, and he should persist in keeping his troops collected on the frontiers in Holkar’s territories, the Governor General must decide upon the measures to be taken against him ; and the attack upon Canojee must be one connected with other military operations and movements, to provide for the safety of the corps making it, and to show Holkar the danger of treachery towards it.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the copies of the letters from Colonel Murray and Major Walker, with their enclosures, to the Secretaries of Government in Bengal, which papers I had not before seen.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that a copy of this letter may be sent to Colonel Murray.’

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 22nd February, 1804.’

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd, from which I perceive that you have received mine of the 11th of January.

‘ I joined my camp yesterday, and made the arrangement for the subsidiary force, which I shall send you hereafter. I shall go to Poonah to-morrow to meet Mr. Webbe and Colonel Close. The latter is still at Bombay, but I hope that he will arrive at Poonah about the beginning of March.

‘ I have already reinforced Guzerat with one battalion of the 9th regiment, and I proposed to send there the Bombay battalion now at Poonah. I have drawn from thence the 75th regiment, which is to go to Bengal by order of the Governor General, and five companies of the 84th will go to Bombay. But Guzerat will still have two complete regiments of Europeans, and a disposable native force of six battalions.

‘ I see that the Governor General has disapproved of raising the 9th regiment; but either that regiment must continue on the establishment, or some of the corps must be drawn from the coast of Malabar.

‘ If the Governor General should ratify the treaty with Scindiah, I can break up immediately, and send the troops supernumerary to the subsidiary force off to the southward; at least I now think so.

‘ It would be very desirable for me to know from you what corps you would wish should form the subsidiary forces. The two battalions of the 3rd, the 1st of the 2nd, the 2nd of the 18th, the 1st of the 4th, and 1st of the 10th, appear to be the strongest and most complete corps for the subsidiary force with the Peshwah; but none of them are of the required strength, viz., 1000 firelocks.

‘ The 5th or the 7th regiment of cavalry would likewise be the most proper to remain in this country. The 4th regiment have not been at Arcot since the year 1799, and you would possibly wish that corps to go to Arcot. I must inform you, however, that neither the 5th nor the 7th regiment are in such a state of order, or so complete or efficient as the 3rd and 6th; indeed the 5th regiment, as I have heretofore reported to you, has always been very bad.

‘ If we should break up, the rice will not be wanted; but till the Governor General shall ratify the treaty, and so long as the troops are in the field, I think it will be advisable to keep the bullocks hired to carry it. If they should be ordered to march, they ought to cross the Kistna by the

Kalachabootra ghaut, and to Ahmednuggur by the same route that Major Dallas took.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Roora, 22nd February, 1804.

‘ I returned to my camp yesterday, and having examined my papers, I write in the margin the dates of all the letters which I have received from you since I wrote on the 21st of December \*. I have also received your letter of the 5th October.

‘ I shall leave camp, and proceed to Poonah to-morrow.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 23rd February, 1804.

‘ Bappojee Goneish Goklah called upon me yesterday afternoon, and after some previous conversation, informed me that he had applied to the Peshwah’s government to make a permanent provision for the pay and support of his troops; and that his agent at Poonah had been told by the Peshwah’s ministers that the lands held by the family of Pursheram Bhow should be made over to Goklah for this purpose. Goklah said he was desirous to have my opinion upon this subject before he should send his answer to his agent at Poonah.

‘ I pointed out to Goklah that it was very improbable that the chiefs of the house of Pursheram Bhow would resign their possessions without a contest; that they were masters of some strong places, and it was probable that the contest would not be a short one; but that, whether it was long or short, the result of it would be, that the country which was to be fought for would be ruined. That, in the mean time, it did not appear that any funds had been provided to pay Goklah’s troops, who, I supposed it was intended, should fight this battle; and that certainly a ruined and exhausted

\* December 5th, 16th, 22nd; January 4th, 7th, 15th, 24th, 28th; February 6th, 12th.

country would be but an inadequate reward to them if they should be successful.

‘ I then said that it appeared to me that it would be better for Goklah to endeavor to get possession of some countries for the support of his troops, for which he would not have to fight with the most powerful family in the southern part of the Marhatta empire.

‘ Goklah said that he felt the force and truth of every thing I had urged to him ; and that he saw clearly he was not equal to a contest with the family of Pursheram Bhow, unless the English should assist him ; and that, in fact, he was not desirous of having the possessions of those chiefs, or of seeing them ruined.

‘ In answer, I said that it was not necessary that I should tell him whether, in the attempt to gain those possessions, he would or would not be assisted by the British Government ; that to afford that assistance would not diminish the inconveniences which he would feel, in the mean time, for the want of pay for his troops, or those he would feel for the same want after he should have obtained full possession of a ruined and exhausted country.

‘ Goklah said, that of course, without the assistance of the British Government in money, he should feel those inconveniences. In answer, I told him, that if the British Government are to incur all the expense, as well as their troops to perform the service of this expedition against the family of Pursheram Bhow, it would be desirable to ascertain clearly the necessity of destroying this family before the measure should be undertaken ; and that, of course, the British Government would act in this instance with its usual caution and wisdom.

‘ I desired him to understand clearly, that I had given no opinion on the subject whether assistance would be afforded or not, as that was a question which must be referred to the Governor General ; but I mentioned these circumstances to him as a friend, to point out the difficulties and delays in the way of carrying this plan into execution ; and as a ground for recommending that he should endeavor to obtain the grant of other lands, either not already granted, or in the possession of a family not so powerful as that of Pursheram Bhow. He said that he should follow my advice in every thing.



‘ I have thought it proper to communicate to you this conversation much in detail, and I shall proceed to give you my opinion upon the subject in general; as the plan of the Peshwah, disclosed in this conversation, is one of the utmost importance in every point of view, and will probably cause another war, if it is to be carried into execution.

‘ Goklah says most truly, that it is impossible to carry it into execution without the assistance of the British Government, both in money and troops; and it stands to reason, that the British Government must exercise its discretion regarding the propriety of attempting it. To attempt it, unless these chiefs should be guilty of some act of infidelity towards the Peshwah’s government, would be a breach of an engagement I made to those chiefs in a letter which I wrote to them during the war. But I think that reasons exist for which it should be discountenanced entirely, and that the British Government should not assist in it.

‘ The family of Pursheram Bhow are the most antient friends that the British Government have in the Marhatta empire. Pursheram Bhow had under his command a body of British troops during the former war against Tippoo. His sons and relations, the present chiefs of that family, served in the same army, and there gained a knowledge and respect for the valor and discipline of a British army, which was the first cause of their joining me in the campaign of 1800 against Dhoondiah Waugh.

‘ The friendship then established, and the friendly terms on which I was with those chiefs in the beginning of last year, enabled me to bring them forward to Poonah to re-establish the Peshwah on his musnud, although, with or without reason, these chiefs did not wish well to his Highness’s cause. This service ought never to be forgotten by the Peshwah, and probably never will be forgotten by the British Government, as it is a well known fact, that if the Chiefs of the Putwurdun family had done so little in the cause of his Highness, or rather had done so much against that cause at that moment, as others now enjoying his Highness’s favor, the success of the march to Poonah would have been a matter of doubt, and if they had opposed the advance, it must have been relinquished under the orders of his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ Afterwards, they did not come forward in support of the cause of the allies in the war. But when I consider the circumstances under which that war was commenced, the nature of the Marhatta character, the fact, that for a Marhatta to suppose the allies would be successful, was to relinquish every idea of national pride, and to lose the recollection of their former triumphs, I am not astonished that these chiefs should have kept aloof. But some of the Marhattas cordially supported the cause of the allies in the war. That cause was supported by two Marhatta chiefs of inferior rank and interest. The troops of both were paid by the British Government during the war; and that of the Peshwah did not give the assistance even of the grain and cattle which it might have supplied. Neither of them was considered by the Peshwah as his servant when I marched to Poonah; neither was ordered by the Peshwah to accompany me, and both came because they had known me before, and saw a prospect of advantage.

‘ The chiefs of the Putwurdun family were at least neutral in the contest; which neutrality, however, was a most important object for the Company’s possessions. I cannot say this for some of the persons now in favor at the Peshwah’s durbar.

‘ Under the engagement that I have made, that they shall not be attacked so long as they are the faithful servants of the Peshwah, it will certainly be necessary that the Peshwah should produce some proof of their want of fidelity to his government, before he can receive the assistance of the British Government in the execution of this plan of destruction. It is probable, in the present state of the Marhatta empire, that either the refusal of these chiefs to resign their lands, or to come to Poonah without the guarantee of the British Government for their personal safety, will be deemed acts of infidelity.

‘ But admitting them to be so, and that the British Government is at liberty consistently with an adherence to good faith to act against these chiefs, I still doubt the expediency of giving British assistance to work their destruction.

‘ The Putwurdun family, connected, as I have above mentioned, as they are with the British Government, are certainly the most respectable of all the Peshwah’s subjects

properly so called. They are the support of the system of order which exists on the Company's frontier, and on the frontiers of Mysore; and they are a check to the nest of freebooters kept by the Rajah of Kolapoor, and to the numerous polygars who inhabit the countries watered by the Kistna, Malpoorba, and Gutpurba.

‘ If the Peshwah had the power, or had manifested an inclination to establish his government on a respectable footing, or on any footing, I should doubt the propriety of allowing him to root out this family of friends to the British Government from their important position, in respect to the frontiers of Mysore and the Company's territories. But when I see that the Peshwah does nothing to settle his government; that the only system of government is that of a robber, I cannot think it expedient to allow this family to be destroyed.

‘ In a discussion upon this subject, the motive for their destruction may be considered. It is revenge for the acts of Pursheram Bhow, during the political disputes at Poonah. If it was because these chiefs did not support the cause of the allies in the war, why are not others punished as well as the chiefs of the Putwurdun family? Why do some escape who have actually been opposed to the British troops, and others who did not assist in restoring the Peshwah to his government?

‘ In respect to the plan itself, it will be one of great unpopularity, and of some difficulty in the execution. It is well known throughout the Marhatta empire, that those chiefs are the ancient friends of the British Government, and that they are detested by the Peshwah, for former acts which have nothing to do with the politics of the present day. The other chiefs of the empire will, I fear, have but little reliance upon the friendship of the British Government, to protect them against the effects of the known feelings in the Peshwah's character, if we should be the instruments of his revenge in this instance; and each will expect, in his turn, to become the victim of the same passion. This feeling may operate to induce them to make the defence of the possessions of the Putwurdun family a common cause; and in that case, the attack of those possessions becomes a military operation of some magnitude and extent.

‘ At all events, whether all the chiefs do or do not make the defence of those possessions a common cause, it is my opinion that it would not be prudent to send any part of the subsidiary force at present to the southern countries to attack them. The attack, therefore, must be made by troops brought from the frontiers of Mysore and the ceded countries: and here arises a new question of expense; another affecting the safety of the frontiers of Mysore, and the Company’s territories, while these troops are to be employed in this manner; and a third, regarding the preference of this operation to others in the Company’s territories, on parts of which it is absolutely necessary to take some effectual measures to establish the authority of Government.

‘ Upon the whole, I think I may conclude that the Governor General will not attend to the Peshwah’s wishes upon this subject, and I have to request that, if his Highness should propose this plan to your consideration, you will not encourage it till you have taken the orders of his Excellency.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 24th February, 1804.

‘ I find that I shall not be able to reach Poonah till the 27th, in the morning; but I shall be at Nizam Pett, about seventeen miles from Poonah, on the 26th.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 26th February, 1804.

‘ I have this day received from Heshmut Jung a copy of Mr. Edmonstone’s dispatch of the 4th instant, on the subject of his plan for the resumption of the jaghires in the Soubah’s territories; in order to provide a fund for the payment of the expense of a reform in the military establishments of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. I am afraid that the Governor General will not approve of the sentiments which I have expressed to Heshmut upon these subjects, and therefore I state to you the grounds of them.



‘ You will have observed that I agree in opinion with the Governor General, regarding the resumption of the jaghires. It is a measure which must be attended by great unpopularity, and ought not to be adopted, excepting in a case of very evident necessity; and even in such a case the British Government ought not to appear in it, unless it should be necessary in order to carry the measure into execution. This, I am afraid, would be necessary; and you will see that I dislike the whole proceeding, and have pointed out to Heshmut other funds from which he may draw the supplies of money which may be necessary in the reform of the army.

‘ The reform of the army is the point upon which I am not of the same opinion with the Governor General, and I think it very possible that my opinion may be biassed by the inconveniences which I have experienced during the war from the extreme weakness of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. However, on the other hand, I do not think that sufficient weight is given in Bengal to the necessity that the army should be employed in all these native governments, in the administration of the civil government and in the collection of the revenue.

‘ Bengal, “ the paradise of nations,” enjoys the advantage of a civil government, and requires its military force only for its protection against foreign enemies. All the other barbarous establishments called governments, without excepting even that of Fort St. George, have no power beyond that of the sword. Take from them the exercise of that power, and they have no other; and can collect no revenue, can give no protection, and can exercise no government. The native governments, I mean those of the Nizam and the Peshwah, are fifty times worse than ours in this respect. They do not choose to keep armies themselves, their territories are overrun by a race of armed men, who are ready to enlist with any body who will lead them to plunder; and there is no power in the country to support the government and give protection to the industrious classes of the inhabitants, excepting the British troops.

‘ Upon this subject two questions occur for consideration: one is, whether the subsidiary British troops, now with the Peshwah and the Nizam, are sufficiently strong to be able

to give the requisite support to the civil government in all parts. As far as I am able to form a judgment, I am of opinion that they are not ; and that if the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan are not to entertain armies for the support of their own authority, the number of troops supplied to each ought to be doubled. I am clearly of opinion that each force is fully equal to any particular service in which they may be employed ; but their services are required in so many places at the same time, in these extensive countries, that the number of troops are not sufficient for the demands upon them.

‘ The next question is, whether the Soubah of the Deccan or the Peshwah will pay for an increase of the forces subsidized. It must not be expected that the Soubah of the Deccan will do any such thing. The Peshwah, indeed, may be induced to grant lands in Bundelcund, or in any other province of which he has not possession, to increase his subsidiary force, if at any time he should be disappointed in the execution of any favorite plan, from its weakness ; but not otherwise. In fact, excepting in Bundelcund, the Peshwah has nothing to give ; and the Soubah of the Deccan will not give any thing.

‘ I have no apprehension of any future foreign wars. Indeed no foreign powers now remain ; even if Scindiah should not come into the defensive alliance, we have got such a hold in his durbar, by the treaty of peace, that if ever he goes to war with the Company, one half of his chiefs and of his army will be on our side. But I think that we run a great risk from the freebooter system.

‘ It is not known to the Governor General, and you can have no idea of the extent to which it has gone ; and it increases daily. I could state facts on this subject, which would prove the extraordinary weakness of the allied governments, and would show the necessity of strengthening them. But a letter is not the proper place for them. Conceive a country, in every village of which there are from twenty to thirty horsemen, who have been dismissed from the service of the state, and who have no means of living excepting by plunder. In this country there is no law, no civil government, and no army to keep these plunderers in

order; and no revenue can be collected,—indeed no inhabitant can, nor will remain to cultivate, unless he is protected by an armed force stationed in his village.

‘ This is the outline of the state of the countries of the Peshwah and the Nizam.

‘ The extension of our arms and influence certainly increases this evil; because, wherever we go, it is soon found out that we are always ready and willing to fight; money is always wanted for the expenses of luxury and debauchery, and armies are discharged to procure it. The danger of the evil is also increased by the extension of our arms, our influence, and our protection: first, by the increase of the number of the people, who must and will subsist by plunder; secondly, by narrowing the scene in which the freebooters may plunder with impunity.

‘ The first requires no illustration. In respect to the second, I have to observe that, after having stood still nearly forty years (with the exception of the small acquisitions made by Lord Cornwallis from Tippoo), we have, within the last five years, extended ourselves by our policy and our bravery over the whole of India, excepting the territories of Holkar and the Rajah of Berar; supposing that Scindiah should come into the defensive alliance. In this vast extent of country, in which the numbers of the people, with arms in their hands, who have no means of living excepting by plunder, are so much increased, no man can venture to plunder without incurring the risk, at least, of being destroyed by a British army. Habits of industry are out of the question; they must plunder for subsistence, or be destroyed, or starve, or be taken into the service of some of the allied powers. As we have now narrowed the scene so much, we must not expect that our own territories will be entirely free from their depredations. In fact, if they are to meet the Company’s troops in all countries, they have no choice excepting the richest and best cultivated, and those in which they are likely to meet the smallest number of these formidable troops. The Company’s territories answer the description in every respect; and there, I think, is the danger of our present exalted situation.

‘ The Governor General has never had this picture before him. No man has ever had so many opportunities of con-

templating the subject in all its parts as I have ; and possibly no man has ever adverted to it. The remedy is clear, viz., to force the allies to keep up their military establishments. This is the first step ; I would then give them no assistance in carrying on their internal government, excepting to oppose formidable rebellions. After this is done, by degrees a regulation may be introduced, which I recommended in 1800, in Mysore, viz., that no horse be kept that is not registered, and that no horseman should be allowed to travel through the country without a passport from the Government. In this manner the breed will, by degrees, be diminished.

‘ But Mr. Edmonstone says, in his dispatch, that to put the military establishments of the allies in a state of efficiency is inconsistent with the fundamental principles on which all the treaties of defensive alliance have been framed, which were to make the powers dependent upon the British Government.

‘ In the first place, the military establishments can never be made so efficient as to place the native powers in any other excepting a state of dependence on the British Government, in respect to all their foreign concerns.

‘ In the second place, the measure which I propose goes no further than to insist upon having that body of troops really, which the treaties require they should have.

‘ In the third place, if, after all that has happened, I could suppose it possible that any of our allies would rebel against us (for I think that the breach of the defensive alliance ought with propriety to be called rebellion), I should say that they have in their hands at this moment a most formidable weapon against us, in the numerous horse which reside in their countries ; every one of whom would join their standard, if it were raised to collect a body for the invasion of the Company’s territories, by any chief, no matter by whom. This weapon, the strength of which my system would go to destroy, is far more formidable in the hands of any one of them than the regular military establishments of all of them put together.

‘ I see clearly that the Governor General has never contemplated this state of the question ; indeed he could not contemplate it, for it has never been brought before him in



any shape. The gentlemen at the Residencies see nothing excepting what passes in the durbars, and therefore could not report it; and it could not reach the Governor General in any other manner.

‘I have had many opportunities of seeing and feeling the effects of the evil. Scindiah’s and Ragojee Bhoonslah’s armies were composed of horse drawn from the countries of the Nizam and the Peshwah, and from Mysore. The freebooters whom I destroyed the other day, and who had become amazingly numerous, were, first of all, five hundred horse belonging to Scindiah, who escaped from Ahmednuggur the day the pettah was taken; about one hundred belonging to Ragojee Bhoonslah’s amildar, of Nimgaum; and about three hundred brought from Scindiah’s army by Viswas Rao Ghautky. When I destroyed them they were a very formidable body, which nothing but British troops could venture to oppose; and they were composed of horsemen collected from Poonah and from the districts of Bheer, Perinda, Dharore, Beeder, Puttun, &c. I mention this as a fact, which I know from information collected on the spot.

‘Heshmut Jung, in a letter which I received from him this day, dated the 19th, talks of a party of them having been defeated by the Soubah’s troops, with an immense slaughter of the freebooters. I mention this just to show you the kind of information picked up at the durbars. The fact was, the Nizam’s troops were at first defeated by a party of freebooters under Mulwa Dada, who were not engaged with me. During the action Mulwa Dada heard of the defeat of the party under Ghautky and the others by my troops, and he was afraid to push his advantage so far as he might have done. In the mean time the guns were brought up, and a cannonade was commenced. Mulwa Dada went off, and in his retreat lost some baggage; but he could have lost but little, as, in my pursuit of the others across the Beemah towards Beejapoor, I heard of him with a great quantity of baggage.

‘In order to bring this subject before the Governor General, I called the attention of Heshmut Jung to the state of the military establishments belonging to the Nizam; and I now give you the grounds of my opinion. The remedy is clear, easy, and I think not attended with danger. This

last is the only point on which we differ. But take the danger at its greatest pitch, and I think it not so great as that which will be the consequence of the increase of the freebooter system.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shaue.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I shall be at Poonah to-morrow.’

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 27th February, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th instant, in which you have enclosed a copy of a treaty which you have made with the Rajah of Lunawara. There is no date to that instrument, but, from the purport of your former letters, I imagine that it has been concluded since you received the accounts of the signature of the treaty of peace with Scindiah. If that should be the case it cannot be ratified, and the British Government cannot return the name of the Rajah of Lunawara as one of the chiefs with whom a treaty had been made, and whose case is provided for by the ninth article of the treaty of peace.

‘ Your promise to the Rajah that this year’s revenue should not be taken from him, will, of course, be performed, and the Rajah will be entitled to all the benefits of the tenth article of the treaty of peace.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Poonah, 29th February, 1804.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 22nd instant. I followed the freebooters to the Beemah, to the southward of Solapoor, and in fact I was not farther than thirty or forty miles from Beejapoor.

‘ I remained upon the Beemah till the 19th, and then returned to the northward, and joined the army on the 22nd, near Perinda. There was not a soul near the Beemah when I was in that part of the country; and in fact the bands of freebooters whom I had pursued were entirely dispersed; and some of them have been caught in their flight to the

northward, by the Mysore troops, which escorted me from the army to this place.

‘I rather believe that your intelligencer must have reported to you what passed before I reached the Beemah, as the enemy were then collected at Dewangaum, and wanted to enter Solapoor, but the Rajah stopped them; they then returned to the northward, but, hearing of me, they went off to the westward and dispersed.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Campbell.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Graham.*

‘SIR,

‘Poonah, 29th February, 1804.

‘I conclude that by this time you will have given up to the agents of Dowlut Rao Scindiah the places restored to him by the eighth article of the treaty of peace, respecting which I wrote to you on the 5th of January. If you should not have done so, I beg you now to restore those places without loss of time.

‘I beg you also to consider all the collections made from those districts since the 30th of December, 1803, to be on account of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to pay the amount to his agent.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s agent may occasionally have to communicate with you on the service of his master; and I beg that you will consider Dowlut Rao Scindiah as a friendly power to the Company, and assist, as far as may be consistent with the peace and safety of the Company’s districts, in preserving order in those of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. But I request you to have no communication with any other of his agents, excepting the principal person, who will be made known by a letter from Major Malcolm or me.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Graham.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Agent of his Excellency the Governor General, at Benares.*

‘SIR,

‘Poonah, 29th February, 1804.

‘I have the honor to enclose a memorandum which I have received from the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in this

camp, upon a subject which I imagine is a matter of litigation in the court of justice at Benares.

‘ I have repeatedly apprized Scindiah’s vakeel that a letter from me was useless; that no introduction was required to obtain justice for his friend; and that no application which I should make would obtain more. However, as the judicial establishments fixed in the territories of the Honorable Company are not known, and the real justice administered but little understood by any of the natives of these parts of India, I have found it impossible to convince the vakeel of the inutility of my troubling you upon this subject; and I transmit to you the enclosed memorandum, with a request that you will see the person to whom it relates, and that, if he should not have adopted the proper mode to have his case decided, you will be so kind as to advise him in what manner to proceed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Agent to the Governor General  
at Benares.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Secretary Edmonstone, and the copy of my address to his Excellency the Governor General, to which this letter is an answer.

‘ You will observe that by the former I am directed to make arrangements in concert with you for the payment of the stipend to Amrut Rao, under the treaty made with that chief, and to his adherents under the same treaty, and to certain persons mentioned in the enclosed letter, to whom his Excellency the Governor General has been pleased to grant pensions at my recommendation.

‘ You have already got a copy of the treaty with Amrut Rao; and I now enclose a list of his adherents, to whom pensions have been granted, with the amount of the sum granted to each.

‘ I likewise enclose a copy of the sunnud which I have given to each of the persons whom I recommended to the Governor General, and to whom pensions have been granted in consequence of my recommendation; excepting Jeswunt



Rao Ramchunder, who I propose shall receive the amount of his pension at Nagpoor, payable by the Resident of that durbar.

‘I have made the pensions payable at Poonah, not only because this may be the most convenient to you, but because it will give you frequent opportunities of inspecting and controlling the conduct of those receiving the bounty of the Honorable Company. But this arrangement will not prevent you from paying them in any other parts of the Marhatta empire, if you should think it proper; and if any of the pensioners, or Amrut Rao, should wish to reside in any other part of India, you will be so kind as to apply to the Governor General in Council for orders to the British authority, in which such persons may choose to reside, to provide for the payment of their stipends.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

‘Since I wrote to you last, I have received your private letters of the 7th and 13th, and several public letters, which I shall acknowledge and answer by this day’s post.

‘In answer to those two, I have only to observe, that I should not have noticed the circumstances to which they relate, only that I saw that they would become the subject of discussion in Bengal; and I wished you to avoid all discussions upon points which can tend to keep alive heats and animosities, by which your efforts in the service of the public must be impeded.

‘We have not exactly understood each other about the Rajah of Lunawara, but I shall set all right in my letter of this day.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Colonel Murray.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘SIR,

‘Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

‘I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 13th, 22nd, and 23rd of February.

‘You will observe by a letter which I have lately addressed

to the Governor of Bombay, a copy of which I requested him to transmit to you, that I conceive it to be absolutely necessary to dismiss Canojee's vakeel, and that the negotiation with that chief ought not to be renewed, excepting by his request, made in terms of decent civility. If I had been aware of the transactions with Canojee before I came to this part of the country, I never should have recommended a negotiation with him.

' When I wrote to you on the 27th of February, I did not exactly comprehend the reason for which the treaty with the Rajah of Lunawara bore no date, as I had not received your letter of the 13th, which fully explains that circumstance, as well as the reasons for which the agreement with the Rajah had not been reduced to writing at an earlier period.

' In a transaction of this nature, however, the very foundations of which are the necessity of preserving the Company's faith, and the confidence of the enemy in the honor of the British Government, it is necessary to proceed with caution in every instance. Accordingly I wish you to let me know the particular agreement which you had made verbally with the Rajah of Lunawara before you received my letter of the 26th January: I still fear that Scindiah's ministers may object to the treaty, that it was not concluded till six weeks after they had signed the treaty of peace. However, if verbal engagements were made, by which both parties were bound, it must answer the same purpose.

' I shall send you orders regarding the trial of the officers in arrest.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Colonel Murray.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

' SIR,

' Camp at Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

' Naroo Hurry, to whom I delivered the paper enclosed with your letter of 6th February, has informed me that he cannot get possession of the villages which the minister intended he should have, till he shall produce a sunnud from his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. I request you to do me the favor to apply for this sunnud, and to forward it to me.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Major Kirkpatrick.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

‘ Since I wrote to you last, I have received particular accounts, on which I can rely, that the freebooters, or many of them, are gone off to the northward, and have broken. Some of them are now at Rymurpoor, near Sattarah, between this and Meritch, and I propose forthwith to disperse them.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will send the money you have for me to Hyderabad. The bullocks and grain may as well be kept till some future opportunity.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Gen. Campbell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose two dispatches from Major Malcolm ; I shall be obliged to you, if you will be so kind as to make arrangements to be prepared to take up the bills which Major Malcolm will have drawn on you for one lac and a half of rupees.

‘ I have written to General Campbell, to request that he will send to Hyderabad the money waiting on the Toombuddra, for the use of the troops, part of which may be applied to the discharge of Major Malcolm’s draft, and the remainder be sent to Dharore.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Camp, Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

‘ I received yesterday your letters to the 25th and 26th February, and I should have written to you before now, if I had had leisure upon my march to, or since my arrival at, this place.

‘ I beg that you will allow Lieut. Shawe to go to Bombay. Send me a regular application for leave of absence for him.

‘ You did quite right to open the letter from the officer coming with the tents.

‘ Barclay will send you orders respecting Colonel Harness’s

baggage; and you shall have the order for the distribution of the remount horses, as soon as I shall receive the proceedings of the casting committees.

‘ When you shall find it necessary to move, I wish you to keep up the Seenah towards Ahmednuggur.

‘ If you should find that Gopal Bhugwunt stays in your neighbourhood, send Bistnapah to make a dash at him. But I think he is going towards the Rajah of Berar’s country; at least he sent me word that he was.

‘ I hear from camp that every body was well satisfied with the arrangements which I made before I left it, excepting your friend —. I must say that I think his dissatisfaction is unreasonable; and its existence entirely removes the regret which I felt upon the disappointment which he suffered. Supposing that your friendship for him gave him a claim upon you, his friendship for you should induce him to omit urging that claim, when your ease, your satisfaction, and your future success are at stake. I declare that I conceive it was necessary you should have Captain Johnson in the subsidiary force, and I do not think it would have been fair to call upon him to make every sacrifice, in order that you might have that advantage. It was desirable to you, but not equally necessary, to have —. You have, therefore, in my opinion, decided as every man ought who takes upon himself a public charge: and if you are not of the same opinion now, you will be so as soon as you have anything to do.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters of the 16th, 17th, and 18th, and have forwarded the enclosures to Major Kirkpatrick, and I have requested him to be prepared to take up your drafts.

‘ I enclose you a letter which will remove all uneasiness about the treaty of peace. The minutes of the conferences had been received; but not one copy of the treaty. I have sent six copies.

‘ I have no anxiety respecting the draft of the treaty which you have received from Scindiah’s ministers: it is probably



in the same style with the treaty of peace, in two articles given to me, which you will find recorded in the minutes. But whether you can conclude the treaty of alliance or not; I hope that you will stay at Scindiah's durbar till every thing is settled. You have the Governor General's opinion upon the subject; you have Webbe's, and you have my most anxious request; and I hope that, after all these, you will not think of coming away, particularly as your health is mended.

‘ I am every day more convinced that it is necessary that I should quit this country. In short, nothing can settle till I do quit it. But of course I shall not go, if there should be a war with Holkar.

‘ This I think very improbable, notwithstanding the reports we have from your quarter, as well as from Hindustan. Mercer is in treaty with Meer Khan; and if he should draw him off from Holkar, there is an end of the latter.

‘ I have had one conversation with Munkaiseer since my arrival here, in which there was more confidence than I expected; and the result of which was, in my opinion, favorable.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th February. My letter to the Adjutant General, dated the 6th July, 1803, will have shown that I wished all accounts of expenses, incurred by officers on the Bombay establishment, to be submitted for audit to the Auditor General at Bombay, and to be settled with that Presidency. All expenses relating to the stores at Poonah, with which the Resident has nothing to do, come under this head.

‘ Captain Young's accounts shall be rectified in the manner wished by the Military Board; but it is necessary that they should be sent to me for that purpose.

‘ I never conceived that my signature was a voucher to the correctness of the charges contained in any account to which it might be affixed; or even of the propriety of incurring any expense.

‘ I conceive that my signature to an account is only an authority to the paymaster to discharge it ; and that it is afterwards liable to all the forms of audit, &c., required by the regulations of the government. I am not aware whether this notion is consistent with the principles of the Bombay regulations ; but if it should not be so, I beg to be informed of it.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Graham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st instant. It is necessary for a man who fills a public situation, and who has great public interests in charge, to lay aside all private considerations, whether on his own account or that of other persons. I imagine that you must feel on this subject as I do.

‘ I am very much distressed on account of the inconveniences which your family suffer in your absence from Madras ; and equally so, that it is not in my power to relieve their distress, by allowing you to quit your situation. But, under present circumstances, it is not in my power to grant your request to go to Madras, consistently with the duty which both you and I owe to the public, as public men.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will not urge me again upon this subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Graham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Poonah, 3rd March, 1804.

‘ I enclose a gazette, which will show you that the treaty has been ratified. The first copy which arrived was that which I sent to Burhampoor with you.

‘ I have received your letter of the 21st. You must recollect that in the conferences I positively refused to agree to the proposition that every thing south of the Company belongs to Scindiah ; as I should thereby agree that Jey-

poor, Joudpoor, and Gohud were his, which, by another article of the treaty, would be independent of him and every body else.

‘ I trust that I am getting on a little here.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 3rd March, 1804.

‘ I rather think it will be desirable to draw some of the troops a little nearer to Poonah, in order to settle some of the political points now depending.

‘ I therefore wish that, upon the receipt of this letter, you would send the 78th regiment and two battalions of sepoys, of which Hill's corps may as well be one, with their guns, to march by the road which I took towards Gardoon on the Beemah. From Gardoon they must keep along the Beemah, till they come near the junction of the Moota Moola with that river. Send 500 of Bistnapah horse with the 78th, &c., and let them have with them twenty days' arrack and provisions.

‘ Let some proper person have charge of the Company's camels and draught bullocks that will go with them; and let their guns, as far as possible, be the Bombay guns with Scindiah's cattle.

‘ I should wish the army to keep up the Seenah. You can afterwards come towards the Beemah, gradually, to join the detachment above ordered to march by the route by which I marched. It will not answer to march by that route with the whole army, as there is neither water nor forage, excepting the former in wells, and the latter in small quantities.

‘ You will probably be able to arrange the marches better than I have done in the enclosed; but, after Gardoon, this route is not to be followed, excepting as far as it leads along the Beemah.

‘ Take care to keep up a communication with this detachment, in order that you may be able to supply them with provisions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*The Army of the Deccan to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ Camp at Poonah, 4th March, 1804.

‘ At a meeting of the principal officers of General Wellesley’s division of the army, assembled in Colonel Wallace’s tent on the 26th February, 1804, a proposal was made to present General Wellesley with a token of their esteem, accompanied by an appropriate letter.

‘ Colonel Wallace, in the chair.

‘ The following proposals were made.

‘ To present General Wellesley with a handsome gold vase, of superior workmanship, of the value of 2000 guineas, with an inscription recording the principal event, so decisive of the campaign in the Deccan, and denoting the present from the officers to General Wellesley.

‘ It is proposed, that officers commanding corps, staff and departments, should send the secretary a list of officers who may choose to subscribe, in order that the sum may be ascertained; and they are requested to receive the amount subscribed, and pay it to a committee, that will hereafter be appointed, on or before the 1st of May next.

‘ The above proposals were submitted for general consideration, and a meeting was again requested in Colonel Wallace’s tent, at ten o’clock in the morning of the 28th February.’

‘ Camp, near Perinda, 28th February, 1804.

‘ The officers having assembled agreeably to appointment, communicated the general approbation of the officers of General Wellesley’s division of the army of the proposals suggested at the meeting of the 26th; and appointed a committee from their number, to receive the amount subscribed, and to carry into execution the wishes of the officers.

#### COMMITTEE.

*President*—Colonel Wallace.

*Members*—Major Swinton and Major Dallas.

*Treasurer*—Captain Heitland.

#### PROPOSED INSCRIPTION ON THE VASE\*.

‘ BATTLE OF ASSYE, September 23rd, 1803. Presented to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, by the Officers of

\* A service of plate, with the inscription, was afterwards substituted for the gold vase.



the division of the Army who served under his immediate command in the Deccan, in commemoration of the campaign in 1803.'

*The Committee directed the following Letter to be written to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, Commanding the Division of the Army in the Deccan, &c. &c.*

' SIR,

' The officers who served with the division of the army under your immediate command, in the Deccan, are desirous of presenting you a pledge of their respect and esteem, and to express the high idea they possess of the gallantry and enterprise that so eminently distinguish you ; they request your acceptance of a golden vase of the value of two thousand guineas, on which it is proposed to record the principal event that was decisive of the campaign in the Deccan.

' In conveying to you this mark of their esteem, they sincerely add their wishes for your future welfare and prosperity, and their hopes, that when the public claims on your talents allow you repose, this vase may give pleasure to your social hours, in bringing to your remembrance events that add so much to your renown.

' We have the honor to be,

' Sir, with great respect,

' Your faithful and obedient Servants,

' W. WALLACE, Lieut. Colonel, commanding 5th brigade ; J. M. CHALMERS, Lieut. Colonel, commanding 4th brigade ; J. KENNEDY, Lieut. Colonel 19th dragoons, commanding 1st brigade cavalry ; J. FORTNAM, Major 19th light dragoons, and officers of his Majesty's 19th dragoons ; J. COLEBROOKE, Captain, and officers, 5th regiment native cavalry ; — DAVIDSON, Lieut. and officers, 4th regiment native cavalry ; R. HUDDLESTON, Major, and officers, 7th regiment native cavalry ; WILLIAM CUNNINGHAM, Deputy Quarter Master General, and officers of the general staff ; JAMES LIMOND, Captain, and officers of artillery ; S. SWINTON, Major, and officers, his Majesty's 74th regiment ; A. ADAMS, Lieut. Colonel, and officers, his Majesty's 78th regiment ; J. M.



he will commence his intrigues immediately with Scindiah's durbar, respecting Jansi, Calpee, &c., which the Governor General may have taken for the convenience of our frontier. He will grant sunnuds for them to Scindiah or Ambajee Ingolia, or he will intrigue in any other manner to distress the British Government.

‘ In order to bring the proposed partition treaty, and the cession of Jansi and Calpee to a favorable conclusion, there is but one remedy, and that is to bribe the Peshwah with money; to supply him with small sums occasionally, till he shall finally have come into all the Governor General's views, for the final settlement of the peace, and for the frontier of Bengal.

‘ Nothing but this will answer. The Peshwah is callous to every thing but money and revenge. He will call upon the British Government to gratify the latter passion; but he will make no sacrifices unless to procure money. I must see Colonel Close before I give my opinion about his sincerity. I think it will be difficult to account for his having the Frenchmen concealed in Poonah for a month, and having never communicated one word to the British Resident respecting their arrival.

‘ But supposing him to be insincere, it is difficult to say what ought to be done at the present moment. The arrangements which I have made for restoring to the Peshwah the forts of Poonadur and Loghur, will conciliate the Peshwah to us; and will show us what effect that will have. At all events, they will lay the grounds for any other measure that the Governor General may think proper to adopt, whether of force or bribery, to induce his Highness to come into our views; and it has really become absolutely necessary to give the Peshwah's government some respectability in the eyes of his own subjects, and of foreign nations.

‘ The appointment of our killadar to the fort of Loghur, upon which the communication with Bombay depends, was worth the fifty thousand rupees which I agreed to pay for the fort of Poonadur; and I was happy to have an opportunity of showing upon that occasion, and in giving two months' pay to the two thousand men, which, in my opinion, was justly due, that we were desirous to forward the Pesh-

wah's objects, and to attend to his wants whenever he should demonstrate a spirit of accommodation.

‘ I shall write fully about the southern jaghiredars when I shall have seen Colonel Close.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Chowke, 7th March, 1804.

‘ After I had completely dispersed the freebooters, who had for some time infested the frontiers of the Soubah of the Deccan and of the Peshwah, I returned to the northward and joined the army near Perinda on the 21st of February. I quitted it on the 23rd, with the troops under Goklah and Appah Dessaye, and a squadron of native cavalry, to go to Poonah, where I arrived on the 27th.

‘ Upon the former occasion on which I visited Poonah, I observed that every attempt made by the officers employed by the British Government to settle the government of his Highness the Peshwah, had been resisted by his Highness ; and every object recommended to his attention had been neglected. The same had occurred during my absence, and it was particularly stated in reply to a recommendation, which I had forwarded, that his Highness should pardon some of his Pagah horse ; or that, if he was not willing to pardon them, he should send and take possession of his horses, of which they had had the use, “ that it was not proper that his Highness should adopt those measures upon my recommendation.”

‘ I therefore determined on this visit to Poonah, not to ask his Highness to admit me to an audience, and to avoid to recommend any measure to his attention through his ministers, unless my opinion and advice should be required ; as every measure which I had to recommend was with a view to pardon and conciliate his Highness's numerous subjects, from whom he has undoubtedly received great injuries, rather than to revenge those injuries at the present moment.

‘ Shortly after my arrival at Poonah, the Peshwah's minister, Suddasheo Munkaiseer, appointed a day to meet and converse with me on the Peshwah's affairs, previous to a



meeting for the same purpose which, he said, his Highness was desirous of having with me.

‘ There were present at the meeting, which took place on the 1st of March, Suddasheo Munkaiseer, Anund Rao, and Byajee Naig. Suddasheo Munkaiseer first alluded to the fact, that peace had been made with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar ; and he said, that his Highness the Peshwah had not been consulted on the terms of the peace, and that his orders had not been taken on many points in which his interest was concerned.

‘ In answer, I told Suddasheo Munkaiseer, that the fact of the vakeels of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar being in my camp, and treating for peace was notorious ; and that as his Highness the Peshwah had troops and a vakeel there on his part, he must have been apprized of it at a very early period after their arrival : that Scindiah’s vakeels were there nearly two months, and the Rajah of Berar’s nearly one month, before their negotiations were concluded by treaties of peace ; and that there certainly had been many opportunities for his Highness to intimate to me his wishes regarding his objects with those Chiefs respectively. He had omitted, however, to attend to his interest upon this occasion, and the treaties of peace had been concluded. But I observed, that though they had been thus concluded, and I had not had the benefit of being made acquainted with his Highness’s wishes, I hoped, when your Excellency should give orders that the treaties might be communicated to his Highness, that his Highness would find that his interests had not been neglected by me.

‘ Suddasheo Munkaiseer then adverted to the conclusion of the foreign war ; but said there still remained the punishment of rebels. I begged him to name them ; and he said Amrut Rao and the freebooters who had been plundering on the frontiers, and who had lately been defeated and dispersed by the British troops. He went much at large into the subject of the Peshwah’s complaints against Amrut Rao ; and declared that even his name was so odious to his Highness, that if it were only mentioned in his presence, it would be necessary for his Highness to perform his ablutions.

‘ In answer to this speech I related the progress of the

British Government and their armies, from the date of the signature of the treaty of Bassein, to the moment of the breaking out of the war with the confederated Marhatta chiefs. I pointed out to Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had derived all the benefit of his treaty with the Company, and that he had been restored to the exercise of the powers of his government; but that when he was called upon to perform his part of the treaty, and to produce his army, his treasure to pay his troops, his provisions and equipments in the common cause in which the allies were subsequently engaged, he was deficient in every respect. I said that I did not mean to inquire into the causes of that deficiency. It existed at the moment of difficulty, and for what cause the inquiry was not then material; but that as I was charged with the defence of his Highness's territories and person, it was necessary that I should take every step to preclude the possibility that his Highness should suffer from this deficiency.

‘On this ground, as soon as the war broke out, it had appeared important to me to secure, by a treaty of peace, one great branch of the confederated chiefs, and I had made a treaty with Amrut Rao, of which I, and of course his Highness, had received all the advantage during the war; and I further observed that his Highness had been distinctly apprized that this measure would be adopted if he should omit to furnish his *quota* of troops, &c., for the war.

‘In respect to the freebooters upon the frontier, I observed, that I had beaten and dispersed them. It was true that I had not seized their persons; but I informed Sud-dasheo Munkaiseer that the principal of all those persons, Sirjee Rao Gautky, had resided at the Peshwah's durbar, where he had received marks of his Highness's favor; that I had reason to believe that his brother, Viswas Rao Gautky, had fled to Wahy, after his action with me on the 5th of February, and that he had been received into his Highness's presence; and that certainly I thought if one freebooter deserved punishment, it was he who had been the principal, but who had received marks of his Highness's favor.

‘In answer, Byajee Naig denied that Sirjee Rao Gautky had received the marks of his Highness's favor which I supposed he had. He said that Sirjee Rao had been allowed

to depart, because it was not the custom of the durbar to seize the persons of those who had been allowed, or who had been encouraged, to come to Poonah to pay their respects to the Peshwah.

‘Munkaiseer observed, that the reason for which the Peshwah had omitted to perform his treaty was, that the Putwurdun and other principal jaghiredars of the empire had refused to serve, and had disobeyed his Highness’s orders. He said that Goklah and Appah Dessaye had served; and it was his Highness’s wish to reward them with the lands held by the chiefs of the family of Pursheram Bhow, by Prittee Niddee, and by Rastia; and he asked whether the principle of rewarding those who did serve, and of punishing those who did not, was not fair?

‘I told Munkaiseer, that it was not possible for me to give any answer to a question asked in such a manner. I said that I considered the plan which he had then proposed to my consideration, viz., to destroy all the great families of the state, as one of the greatest importance, and likely to be attended with much difficulty in the execution, in the present state of the Marhatta empire. I observed to Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had not even settled the country about Poonah; and that after having come out of a foreign war of great extent, he was about to commence a domestic one.

‘I then asked Munkaiseer what resources of money and troops his Highness had to carry on this war, and in what manner he proposed to proceed?

‘In answer, he gave me to understand, that his Highness expected the assistance of the British Government; and he gave me the choice of two plans, either to begin with the family of Pursheram Bhow, or with Rastia and Prittee Niddee; and to deceive, in the mean time, that party whose destruction might be delayed.

‘I told Munkaiseer that his plan was impracticable; that those chiefs were not to be deceived by the Peshwah; that the whole would join for their common defence; that in that case the operations against them would become of importance; that they could not, at all events, be undertaken without your Excellency’s orders; and that while they were carrying on, the foreign enemy might come in again, and his

Highness and his territories would be involved in fresh difficulties and troubles.

‘ I observed to Munkaiseer that, in my opinion, it would be much better for his Highness, after seven years of difficulty and civil wars, in the course of which, nearly every man in the empire had at some time or other been opposed to his government and armies, to endeavor, by pardon and conciliation, to settle his government and country, than to enter on any system of revenge so extensive as that proposed, and so dangerous and so imprudent.

‘ Munkaiseer asked how his Highness’s country was to be settled; and said his Highness’s most anxious wish was to follow the advice of the British Government in every thing.

‘ I here again recommended the plan which I apprized your Excellency, in my letter of the 15th of January, I had recommended to Lieut. Colonel Close, with a view to a final settlement with Amrut Rao, which went to the release of the persons and the restoration of the houses and property of Amrut Rao’s servants in Poonah and elsewhere; and to the evacuation of the fort of Poonadur, by the killadar, upon receiving fifty thousand rupees for the arrears of his garrison, and being permitted to depart with his property from the fort.

‘ In answer, Munkaiseer denied that many of the persons included in the list which I had sent to Colonel Close were servants of Amrut Rao; and he said that it was entirely inconsistent with the rules of the Peshwah’s durbar ever to pay money to those who were in rebellion.

‘ I told him that although I recommended, I did not require, the release of the servants of the state, included in the list of his own servants given in by Amrut Rao; but I said that, in every case, the British Government were desirous of sparing the effusion of blood, and even if the fort were attacked, would give money to procure its evacuation, as, I observed, had been done at Asserghur in the late war.

‘ Munkaiseer said that, besides the fort of Poonadur, the possession of the fort of Loghur was absolutely necessary to enable the Peshwah to conduct his government, and live in peace and respectability at Poonah.

‘ I answered, that the killadar of Loghur had, above two



years before, offered to relinquish his fort upon very reasonable terms, and that he had lately renewed the offer, but that his Highness would not listen to it, because it did not go to the punishment and plunder of the killadar; and now there was more reason to believe that the killadar would not agree to surrender his fort.

‘ I observed that the siege of Loghur was a very serious operation, for which, as usual, his Highness had no means, and depended upon the British Government; and it certainly was incumbent upon that government to see that there were just grounds for depriving the killadar of his fort before they entered upon that operation. I here remarked that, during the late war, his fort had been most important, and the killadar of Loghur had conducted himself in a satisfactory manner.

‘ Munkaiseer said, that the killadar had lately sent some Arabs from his fort to attack a fort in the Konkan belonging to the Peshwah, which they had taken, and that a fort under Loghur had lately fired upon the Peshwah, near Wahy. He asked whether this was to be suffered?

‘ I told him, certainly not; these were acts of hostility and insult which no government would bear, and against which the British Government would certainly protect the Peshwah, if the facts were as he had stated. I observed, however, that it was desirable to come to an arrangement with the killadar of Loghur; and I asked Munkaiseer, whether the Peshwah was willing to allow him to go and reside at Bombay, taking with him his property and the widow of Nana Furnavees.

‘ Munkaiseer said there was no objection to his taking his property: but that the Peshwah was desirous that the widow of Nana should reside at Poonah: that the Peshwah would make any provision for her the British Government might think proper, and would allow that Government to be her guarantee, but she must reside in his Highness’s territories.

‘ The conversation then turned upon the importance of this fort; and I said, that if I should be able to get it for the Peshwah, I hoped a proper person would be made killadar, who would not betray his trust, or lose his fort by his negligence, as had been the case with others of his High-

ness's forts; and I asked whom the Peshwah intended to appoint killadar?

‘Byajee Naig said himself, if the British wished it; and Munkaiseer said that he (Munkaiseer) would undertake the office of killadar, if it was wished; and then there could be no doubt but that the duties would be performed to my satisfaction.

‘I then ended this discussion, by saying that I expected that if the Peshwah should get this fort, no person should be appointed to be killadar who should not be approved of by Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘In this Munkaiseer acquiesced, and repeated the offer of his own services.

‘As I now found that the Peshwah's ministers showed more confidence than they had at the commencement of the conversation; and that the arrangement above alluded to, if carried into execution, was likely to be highly advantageous to the British Government, and to preclude the possibility of inconvenience from the change of the killadar at Loghur, which must sooner or later occur, I told Munkaiseer, that I was so much pleased with that accommodating mode of proceeding in the instance of the fort of Loghur, that I was willing to remove the difficulty attending the obtaining possession of Poonadur, and that provided his Highness acted upon a broad liberal principle respecting the release of Amrut Rao's servants, and the restoration of their property, I would give him the fort of Poonadur, and take upon the Company the payment of the arrears to the garrison.

‘With this the Peshwah's minister expressed great satisfaction, and said that it would convince his Highness more forcibly than they could convince him otherwise of the desire of your Excellency to settle his government.

‘Munkaiseer then expressed a wish to know what was to be done about the payment of the body of horse by the British Government under the modification of the treaty of Bassein. He said that two thousand horse had been raised to serve at Poonah, and three thousand ought to have been raised to serve with the army.

‘I told him that I had raised the three thousand horse,

and paid them for three months, and at the end of the war had discharged them ; but I understood that the Peshwah had two thousand horse, and had received notice to discharge them at the end of the war, and assurances that they should be paid for the month in which they had been in the service.

‘ Munkaiseer answered, that the Peshwah did not consider the war to be yet concluded, as Holkar had not yet been punished ; and he pointedly contrasted the benefit received by the British Government by the modified treaty with the expense incurred by this body of horse.

‘ I answered, that it was true, the war had been short, and the Company had the full benefit of the arrangements made by Government, and the bravery of the troops which had brought it to a conclusion at so early a period. But I said, that as the Peshwah really had the troops, and the ratification of the treaty of peace by the Governor General had not been received ; and, above all, as I had paid the troops who had served in camp for three months, I was willing to take upon myself to pay those serving at Poonah for the same period, under the distinct understanding that they were now to be no longer a burden upon the British Government.

‘ The ministers still endeavored to get pay for them for a month longer, to which I refused to consent, and at last they went away apparently well satisfied with this conference.

‘ Since that day I have had various meetings with Byajee Naig, Anund Rao, the Peshwah, and Suddasheo Munkaiseer, the particulars of which have been reported to your Excellency by Mr. Waring.

‘ Notwithstanding the arrangement settled in the first meeting, and confirmed in a subsequent one, regarding the servants of Amrut Rao, the Peshwah on one day refused to release them, or restore their property, unless they should comply with conditions which would have delayed the final settlement to a very distant day, if it did not defeat it entirely ; at last, however, the arrangement was fully adopted, and a battalion marched this morning to Poonadur to put the Peshwah in possession of that fort.

‘ In the meeting which I had with the Peshwah, his conversation was only general. He expressed his desire to punish those persons in his service who had disobeyed his orders, and prevented him from performing his treaty with

the Honorable Company; and, in answer, I requested his Highness to consider maturely the step which he was about to take, and to do nothing which could be deemed imprudent. I attempted once or twice to render the conversation more particular; but I could not succeed.

‘ Although I believe that your Excellency will have had before you an account of the conference I had with the Peshwah’s ministers on the 1st instant, I have been particular in relating it to you, as it alludes to points of great importance, and lays open, in a great degree, the views of the Peshwah’s durbar.

‘ The principal object there is to procure money, not for the service of the state, nor even to gain the power of inflicting punishment on the objects of the Peshwah’s hatred, but to bear the expense of the pleasures of the court.

‘ To incur expense, or to adopt any solid mode of settling the country, is entirely out of the question. To incur expense for troops is equally out of the thoughts of the Peshwah and his ministers; and although to gratify his revenge is a great object of his government, and he really believes his personal honor involved in it, he leaves that to the British Government and to the exertion of the British troops.

‘ The question with Amrut Rao is completely settled, and Amrut Rao has proposed to go and reside at Benares, as soon as the next rains shall be over. But it is strange, that notwithstanding the Peshwah was professing such an invincible aversion to Amrut Rao, one so forcibly described by Munkaiseer, his Highness had opened a negotiation with him since my arrival at Poonah.

‘ Amrut Rao’s vakeel has attributed this negotiation to the desire of the Peshwah to make for himself better terms than he supposed I should propose to him, and to keep in confinement some of Amrut Rao’s servants. My opinion is, that it has been entered into in order to avoid the necessity of attending, on any subject, to the advice of an officer employed by the British Government. I encouraged this negotiation as much as possible; for nothing can settle so long as the Peshwah and his brother are at variance.

‘ Your Excellency will have observed the commencement of Munkaiseer’s discourse respecting the Peshwah’s wishes in the peace. In the course of the conversations which I



had with his Highness and his ministers, all expressed his Highness's hopes that he should rise, and his state increase in proportion with that of the Company, accompanied by strong expressions of confidence in your Excellency's justice.

‘ It is also my duty to inform your Excellency, that while I was at Poonah, I received intelligence from more than one quarter, that the Peshwah had determined to ask me, whether you did not propose to give up to him all the territory which his servant Scindiah had ceded by the late treaty of peace. I mention these circumstances only because they tend to elucidate the foreign policy of this Prince.

‘ In respect to his domestic policy, his chief object is to destroy all the great families in what can be called his empire; and he proposes to use his alliance with the British Government in effecting this object.

‘ Besides this, his Highness encourages the Rajah of Kolapoor, a foreign prince, to invade and destroy his own territories, in the possession of the family of Pursheram Bhow.

‘ The Peshwah's ministers scarcely deny this fact, and the chiefs of Pursheram Bhow's family allege it as the reason for not serving when called for.

‘ There is no doubt whatever that the Peshwah's government cannot exist on its present footing. Unless the British Government interfere in some manner respecting the southern jaghiredars, there will be a contest in the southern part of the empire, which will, in its consequences, affect Mysore and the Company's territories. They will be obliged to interfere in the end, probably with less effect than they can at present, and in the mean time, all the benefit of the services of the southern chiefs and their troops is entirely lost.

‘ In my opinion, the first step to be taken is to give a check to the Rajah of Kolapoor. His country is the resort of all the freebooters driven from other places, and he is ready to place himself at the head of every disturbance. He has received into his territories the freebooters lately opposed to me on the Nizam's frontiers; on which subject I propose to write to him, and it will remain with your Excellency to determine what shall be done with him hereafter.

‘ In respect to the southern jaghiredars, the following lines of conduct may be pursued:—

‘ To concur with the Peshwah in destroying them; to leave

them and the Peshwah to their fate; and to allow both parties to settle their disputes in the best manner they can without interfering at all. To interfere in a certain degree to ascertain the extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the southern jaghiredars; to oblige them to afford it; and, on the other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's government; and to guarantee to them their possessions as long as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity. To make them at once independent states, under the protection, arbitration, and guarantee of the British Government.

‘Whatever may be the determination of your Excellency upon this subject, it appears to me to be absolutely necessary that the Peshwah should be obliged to check the Rajah of Kolapoor and his nest of freebooters, in the first instance. In respect to the mode of settling the question respecting the southern jaghiredars, I should wish to delay to give an opinion upon it till I shall have seen Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General Lake.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 8th March, 1804.

‘I have the honor to enclose papers which were found in Lieut. Colonel Harness's writing box when his effects were lately examined in my camp, which prove his intention to have resigned his commission in his Majesty's service nearly a month before he died. He was possibly prevented from carrying this intention into execution by the violence of the disease by which he was afflicted.

‘If, in consideration of the services of Lieut. Colonel Harness, you should think proper to allow that his commission may be sold, I beg leave to recommend to your attention Lieut. Colonel Elliot, the Major of the 33rd regiment. This officer has served in the 33rd regiment above twenty years, and has been Major for above seven years.

‘Captain Sale of the 19th dragoons, who was wounded in the battle of the 23rd September, 1803, has desired me to request your Excellency to give a Lieutenancy in the 19th dragoons to his brother Lieut. Charles Sale, of the 12th foot.

I beg leave to recommend Lieut. Charles Sale to your favor upon this occasion.

‘I took the liberty in a former letter, of recommending Mr. Mars, who had come over from Scindiah’s service, for an ensigny. I observe that your Excellency has appointed Mr. Mars to be an ensign in the 94th regiment on the — September, and I am induced to believe that this person is the same that I recommended to you. If this should be the case, I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct that the mistake in the General Orders may be rectified.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General Lake.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To E. S. Waring, Esq., Residency at Poonah.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Cundollah, 8th March, 1804.

‘I have received your letter of the 7th, and I beg you to send on Antojee Pundit.

‘No money has been given to Lingan Pundit or Ball Kischen Letchma. He must be paid till the day he died. I must get fresh orders for a pension to his son.

‘I wish that you would give a hint to Prubbaukur Bellall, that I shall be much displeased if I find Amrut Rao interfering in the affairs of Loghur.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘E. S. Waring, Esq.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘Tell Mrs. Waring that, notwithstanding the debate at dinner, and her recommendation, we propose to go to Bombay by Panwell, and in the Balloon.’

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘Camp, at Condolla, on the Bhore ghaut,

8th March, 1804.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘I have received your letter of the 1st of March.

‘The Governor General has ratified the treaty of peace with Scindiah, and I only wait for his orders to break up the army. These I daily expect.

‘I think, however, it will be prudent for Purneah to keep his troops on the frontier till those of the Company shall return to the southward; but there is no occasion for his remaining at Hurryhur.

‘ I sent Purneah a letter which I had received from Chintomeny Rao, to the same purport as that received by Purneah. Very probably the Rajah of Kittoor, who co-operated in the destruction of some freebooters about the Malpoorba, may have afterwards attacked Chintomeny Rao’s jaghire; and he may have said, or Chintomeny may have believed, that he was assisted in this operation by Purneah’s troops, stationed, by my desire, between the Malpoorba and Gutpurba.

‘ I am going with Webbe to Bombay, to meet and have a conference on Marhatta affairs with Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ You have done quite right about the Nairs. I have already turned my mind to the measures to be adopted for the conquest of Malabar.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Wilks.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Chowke, 9th March, 1804.

‘ In the memorandum which I gave to Major Malcolm, a copy of which has been transmitted to your Excellency, I requested him to urge Scindiah’s ministers to give Jeswunt Rao Goorparah a provision out of the sums, the payment of which is stipulated by the seventh article of the treaty of peace. From the letters which I have received from Major Malcolm upon this subject, I imagine that he has not been able to effect this object; and therefore I have to request the bounty of the British Government for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, in the same manner as for those persons recommended in my letter of the 15th of January.

‘ Jeswunt Rao Goorparah is, however, a person of greater family and consequence in Scindiah’s durbar than those to whom, at my recommendation, your Excellency has been pleased to extend the bounty of the British Government; and the treaty of peace, which he has negotiated, involves interests of greater magnitude than those intrusted to the other persons; and he certainly conducted himself throughout the negotiation in a manner perfectly satisfactory to me. I therefore beg leave to recommend that he should have a pension of twelve thousand rupees per annum.

‘ When addressing your Excellency upon this subject, it



is proper that I should recommend to your favor the native agents who served me in the transaction of the business with which I was intrusted.

‘ Govind Rao, an officer in the service of the government of Mysore, was sent by me, in consequence of orders from Lieut. General Stuart, in the month of December, 1802, to the chiefs of the family of Pursheram Bhow, and the other southern jaghiredars then upon the Kistna. He conducted himself with great propriety, and was very successful in his negotiations upon that occasion. He afterwards joined me upon the Werdah, and has been employed as a channel of communication with the different Marhatta chiefs and their vakeels. During the war he was at the head of one of the intelligence departments which I formed in camp; in the negotiation for the peace he was very useful; and your Excellency will have observed that he was present at every conference that I held with the vakeels.

‘ Upon the occasion of recommending Govind Rao to your Excellency, I must inform you that he was formerly an officer in the department of the Meer Suddoor under Tippoo’s government, and was attached to the fort of Chittledroog. He was very useful in obtaining peaceable possession of that fort for the late Colonel Dalrymple, and Govind Rao afterwards accompanied him, and was very useful to him in the first campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh. I found him at Chittledroog in the year 1800, when I passed that place in the second campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh, and took him with me by permission of the government of Mysore; and, in consequence of his services, I recommended him to the Dewan, who added one hundred rupees per mensem to his salary. He was afterwards employed in Raidroog on a service for the government of the Rajah of Mysore, for which he received a mark of the approbation of that government, and subsequently in Bullum, where I met him at the commencement of the year 1802. I had again occasion to recommend him to the Dewan for his conduct in that country.

‘ As Govind Rao is an officer belonging to the government of Mysore, I did not think it proper to give him any salary on the part of the Company; and he has served in a confidential manner since December, 1802, for one hundred

rupees per mensem beyond his usual allowance in the Rajah's service, which amounted to two hundred rupees per mensem ; however, I imagine that your Excellency will not deem it proper that the Government of Mysore should pay the expense of Govind Rao's service since I sent him from Seringapatam in December, 1802 ; or that of the reward of his services in his different negotiations during the war and in the negotiations for peace. I accordingly beg leave to recommend to your Excellency, that he should have an allowance of six hundred rupees per mensem, from the 1st of January, 1803, to be continued to him, as a reward for his services, so long as he shall conduct himself in a manner that shall be satisfactory to the government of Mysore. I also beg leave to recommend that the Rajah's government may be informed that it is not intended that they shall bear the expense of the additional salary of one hundred rupees per mensem, which they have given to Govind Rao, since he was sent on his mission to Meritch.

‘ Another person whom I have to recommend to your Excellency's favor is the soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan : this person has already received marks of your Excellency's favor for his conduct in the war against Tippoo Sultaun ; he has since been employed by General Campbell in the ceded districts, and he accompanied me when I marched from Hurrhur, in March, 1803. I sent him on a mission to Jeswunt Rao Holkar in July, 1803, as I heretofore informed your Excellency, but he never reached the camp of that Chief. He was detained for some months in the barbarous countries bordering on the Taptee, where he conducted himself with great discretion and fortitude ; particularly when Scindiah's army was in the neighbourhood of the place in which he was concealed. He afterwards passed through Scindiah's army to join me in Berar, and he was present in the battle of Argaum. He is now with Major Malcolm in Scindiah's camp.

‘ He lost his brother, a jemadar in the cavalry, and his son, in the battle of Assye, and the consequence is, that a large family of females are thrown upon him for support. I therefore take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency, that, in consequence of his long, faithful, and various services, his pension should be increased one hundred

rupees per mensem, and that it should be continued for the lives of his widow, the widow of his brother, and the widow of his son, to be divided equally amongst the three families.

‘ In the course of the campaign, I have frequently had occasion to mention to your Excellency the services of the Mysore horse, which I found upon every occasion to be of the greatest use. I attribute the alacrity and cordiality with which their services were afforded, the regularity of the troops, the strict obedience of orders, and the consequent dependence which I could place upon them, to the measures taken by the government of Mysore to ensure their regular payment, and to the excellent character and disposition of their commander, Bishnapah Pundit.

‘ This officer was high in the service of the late Hyder Ali and Tippoo Suldaun. Upon the death of the latter, he was one of the first who joined General Harris, and he was the person who negotiated the return of the present Dewan to Seringapatam. Since that period, upon every occasion in which the British troops in Mysore have been employed, he has acted with them in command of a body of the Rajah’s troops ; and he has always conducted himself in such a manner as to gain my applause and repeated recommendations to the government of Mysore, and the esteem of every officer of the British army. In this last campaign, in particular, in which his situation was naturally very delicate, his discretion in refraining from all communications or connexion with the Marhatta Chiefs, who have frequently applied to him to exert the influence he was supposed to have, to carry their sinister objects, has been equally satisfactory to me with his military conduct.

‘ Your Excellency is aware that, although the pay allowed by the Dewan is regularly given to his troops, and, in respect to the common men, is fully sufficient, the allowances to his officers are far from liberal. Accordingly, Bishnapah’s pay, particularly in time of peace, is by no means proportionate to the importance of his situation of buckshee of the Rajah’s troops ; especially when it is considered that he is always likely to be employed in co-operation with the British troops in situations in which he may be exposed to great temptations, and in which he may have the power of doing great mischief.

‘ Upon the whole, in consideration of the conduct of the troops under his command, of his own discreet conduct, and as a reward for his services, and as a mark of your Excellency’s approbation of the government of Mysore, I beg leave to recommend that a pension of twelve thousand rupees per annum may be given to Bisnapah Pundit, and from the 1st of January, 1804, to be continued as long as he shall conduct himself in a manner that shall be satisfactory to the government of Mysore.

‘ I have to observe, that the pensions to Bishnapah and Govind Rao are likely to produce the very best effects amongst the Rajah’s servants.

‘ They will see, in the handsome provision for those two faithful servants, the honorable rewards for essential and honest services to the British Government; and every one who is employed will be stimulated to make similar exertions in order to merit and obtain similar rewards.

‘ While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid advertising to the conduct of the government of Mysore during the late war, and congratulating your Excellency upon the success of all your measures, and the accomplishment of all your objects in establishing it.

‘ In consequence of the regularity of the system of government established by the Dewan, and the improvements of the country, its resources were so much increased as to enable him to provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the equipment of the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the subsistence of the army on its march from the Carnatic to the frontier, for the supply of the magazines formed in Mysore, or for the large quantities of grain required for the cavalry, and by the brinjarries. All these supplies were furnished with a facility and celerity hitherto unknown in this part of India. He has since continued to forward supplies to the army under my command, as fast as the brinjarries have been found to take them up; and, besides contributing to the subsistence of the corps under Major General Campbell, he has lately forwarded large quantities of grain to Canara, in order to enable the collectors in that province to export larger quantities for the supply of Bombay and Poonah.

‘ Besides the troops employed with me, to whose services



I have already drawn your Excellency's notice, the Dewan has had a respectable corps of troops on the Rajah's frontier since I marched from the Toombuddra, which he has commanded in person ; and a detachment of these troops, under Khan Jehan Khan, distinguished themselves upon a late occasion in the destruction of a numerous band of freebooters who had assembled in the Savanore country, and threatened Mysore.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring, Residency at Poonah.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 12th March, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th, and I am concerned to observe that the Peshwah is disinclined to perform his promise in respect to the release of Amrut Rao's servants, and the restoration of their property ; but you must continue to urge his ministers on that subject, and I am happy to say that your remonstrances will have the advantage of being supported by the restoration of the fort of Poonadur.

‘ If Autojee Pundit should be still at Poonah, I beg you will inform him that the troops have marched, and are already on the Beemah, and point out to him the danger of allowing them to approach the fort of Loghur, as I certainly shall not order them to halt.

‘ I wish you would mention to Byajee Naig, that Goklah has informed me that no arrangement has been made by the Peshwah for the payment of his troops ; and that he appeared to me to be very uneasy on that subject before I marched from Poonah ; that I have since taken the whole into consideration, and, as the services of Goklah's troops are necessary to his Highness at present, I am willing to advance their pay for the ensuing month, provided his Highness the Peshwah has no objection. Apprise Goklah's vakeel that I have sent this message to the Peshwah, and make him acquainted with the Peshwah's answer.

‘ The person who has applied to have his property restored is a relation of the killadar of Ahmednuggur. The killadar broke his treaty in two instances ; first, in carrying

away Scindiah's property from the fort; secondly, in carrying on hostilities against the British Government and their allies. But that has nothing to do with the question, excepting to show that neither he nor his relations are entitled to favors.

‘ The property in question was taken from the killadar of Ahmednuggur, in a subsequent action with his troops, and has been reserved for the orders of government, and probably will be given to the army as prize.

‘ I think it will be well to mention to Munkaiseer upon this occasion, that I have long observed that his applications and his humanity are confined to one description of people only in the Marhatta empire, viz., those connected with Scindiah, whose persons were seized, and their property taken from them in the operations of the late war.

‘ When war is concluded, I am decidedly of opinion that all animosity should be forgotten, and that all prisoners should be released; but property carried to account cannot be restored, and, at all events, I do not see what immediate concern it is of Munkaiseer. In this instance, as Mulwa Dada is still in rebellion, I should have been justified in detaining the persons of their relations.

‘ Colonel Close is better than I expected to find him, and I think that you will have him with you soon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *E. S. Waring, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Walker, Resident at Baroda.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 12th March, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd of March.

‘ In respect to Amrut Rao's bond, I did no more than refer the subject for your consideration; and wished you to do no more than have the subject inquired into, and to take measures to have the transaction closed in a manner that should appear equitable to both parties, whether by payment of the debt, or by a refusal of payment.

‘ I agree entirely in opinion with you, that some valuable consideration or advantage should have been received by the granter of the bond, and that it is necessary that the holder of it should be able to show this advantage. But it

is difficult to apply this nice rule of jurisprudence to a transaction of this kind, which, to say the best of it, was corrupt, and such a one that no Englishman could have been concerned in it, however common it may be among the Marhatta and other natives.

‘ If Raoba had had the command of money at the time he gave this bond, it is possible that he would have given money for the same considerations which induced him to grant the bond, and the same course of political events would equally have impeded the execution of his projects.

‘ On these grounds, therefore, as the corruption of the transaction between the two natives cannot be taken into consideration, you may possibly be of opinion that Amrut Rao ought to have some compensation. But how much, and when and how paid, I cannot venture to give an opinion.

‘ Upon the whole, I leave the question to you, only with this request, that you will take pains to satisfy all parties of the justice of your decision.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Walker.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 13th March, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant.

‘ The agreement made by the Peshwah’s ministers, that they would release the persons, and restore the property, of Amrut Rao’s servants, was upon broad principles; and, after many arguments upon the list of those servants furnished by Amrut Rao, it was finally settled that every person whose name it included should be released, and his property restored. I am, therefore, much surprised that there should be now any difficulty on the subject of this arrangement; particularly as the fort of Poonadur has been restored; but you must continue to urge the Peshwah’s ministers on this subject.

‘ In your private letter of the 10th, you report a conversation which passed at Suddasheo Munkaiseer’s on the subject of Holkar’s demand of tribute from Jeyloor, which is of more importance than any thing relating to Amrut Rao’s

servants. In the first place, I request you to take the earliest opportunity of denying positively that Holkar has demanded tribute from the Rajah of Jeypoor; or that, since I arrived at Poonah, he has in any manner interfered with the Peshwah's territories.

‘ After having done this, I request you to hold no further conversation with the Peshwah's ministers regarding Jeypoor, or any subject connected with his Highness's supposed rights in Hindustan, or with the late war, or the treaties of peace. In case the ministers should advert to such a subject, you will inform them that you will report to the Governor General what they have said, and that he will probably send you his orders upon the subject.

‘ It is perfectly true, as you observed, that the Peshwah had not for many years collected or enjoyed any part of the tribute paid by the Rajah of Jeypoor. It was collected by Scindiah's government, which, since the treaty of Salbye, has been considered as independent of that of the Peshwah, and whose independence has been repeatedly asserted and contended for by the British Government in all its transactions and negotiations with the Peshwah. The late war was carried on on the principle of Scindiah's independence, and peace was negotiated and concluded on the same principle. If any other principle had been adopted, Scindiah must have been considered as a rebel in the war, and in the negotiations for the peace, or the Peshwah must have been considered as a party to the war on the side of his servant Scindiah.

‘ In the usual Marhatta style, Scindiah's ministers, after having made some progress in the negotiation on the principle of Scindiah's independence, shifted their ground, and asserted that Scindiah was the Peshwah's servant, and could do nothing without his consent. But I obliged them to adhere to some principle in the negotiation, and informed them that, if Scindiah chose to be considered as the Peshwah's servant, I should treat him as a rebel, and would break off the negotiation on its former footing immediately.

‘ Scindiah's government having been independent, and having for many years collected the tribute of Jeypoor, had a full right to dispose of it in any manner that Scindiah might think proper.



‘ But I rather imagine that the right to the tribute of Jeypoor is founded upon the possession of the office of Vakeel ool Mutuluk, or, in fact, the power of the crown of Delhi. If that be the case, the right ceases the moment that his Majesty thinks proper to dismiss Scindiah and the Peshwah from their nominal offices in his court; and I conclude that his Majesty will not have delayed to free himself from the claims which they might found upon the possession of these offices, as soon as he shall have been delivered from the oppression of the French infantry in Scindiah’s service.

‘ In this view of the question, it is probable that the Peshwah has no more claim to the tribute at present, than he has in the view of it first considered, viz., that of Scindiah’s dependence upon his government.

‘ I have gone into this question only to point out to you its intricacy, and the variety of ground which it affords for the chicanery of the Peshwah’s ministers. But I recommend to you to avoid touching upon it till the orders of the Governor General upon every subject connected with the peace shall have been received.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *E. S. Waring Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panwell, 13th March, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Murray, the commanding officer in Guzerat.

‘ Shortly after the capture of Powanghur, a considerable time previous to the negotiations for the treaty of peace, I gave orders that the works of the upper fort of Powanghur should be destroyed. I gave those orders because those works were useless to the British troops. Their destruction was subsequently discontinued, when it was agreed that the fort should be eventually given up to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ I beg that you will communicate the purport of the enclosed letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s ministers; and you will observe to them, that to punish any body for his conduct during the war will be a breach of an article of the treaty of peace.

‘The breach will be more flagrant, and it will be more incumbent on the British Government to notice it, if artificers and coolies employed at Powānghur are punished, only because they exercised their trade.

‘I request you to procure from Scindiah’s minister a positive order to his officer in charge at Champaneer, to discontinue the oppression of the people employed at Powānghur by the British engineer; and to inform the minister, that, if I hear more of it, I shall be under the necessity of reporting the subject to the Governor General; and that, in the mean time, I shall require from them that Scindiah’s officer at Champaneer may be dismissed from his command.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Panwell, 13th March, 1804.

‘I have received your letter of the 4th. It does not appear to me that the meeting between Appah Saheb and Rastia is connected with the letter from Chintomeny Rao. I traced the probable cause of that letter in my last address to you; and you may depend upon it that Chintomeny Rao will have been satisfied with the answer which I wrote to his letter.

‘The chiefs mentioned by Ram Rao were beaten by me near Perinda; I afterwards pursued them to the neighbourhood of Beejapoor, where, not hearing more of them, I quitted the pursuit. They have since broken into different parties; some have gone to Kolapoor, others have been cut up by Baba Saheb Putwurdun, and others by Punt Prittee Niddee, and some have been employed in the plunder of others of the same party. I may conclude, therefore, the whole to be completely annihilated, and I have written a letter to the Rajah of Kolapoor which will possibly prevent him from allowing them to reassemble.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Wilks.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Panwell, 13th March, 1804.

‘ Madhoo Rao Hurry Phurkia is Baba Phurkia (I believe); at all events, he is a subject of the Peshwah’s, and possibly his enemy. You will tell Amrut Rao’s vakeel to recollect his treaty. He is to have no communication with the Peshwah’s enemies. I have applied to the Peshwah to pardon Baba Phurkia, and he has refused it. He is to have no communication with Baba Phurkia, in particular.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *E. S. Waring, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Panwell, 13th March, 1804.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 2nd. It appears by the accounts from Hindustan, which are of a date as late as the 17th February, that Holkar avoided hostilities with us, or to attack those connected with us in alliance. It is very improbable, therefore, that he will connect himself with Canojee. But his army is certainly diminishing; Meer Khan has certainly left him; and it is possible that, in the break up of his corps, the Bhow may join Canojee.

‘ If these persons should enter Guzerat, you will attack them at once, and pursue them as long as your means or prudence will permit.

‘ I will send to the Resident with Scindiah your letter regarding the workmen employed at Powanghur.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Resident with Scindiah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Panwell, 13th March 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Murray, the Commanding Officer in Guzerat\*.

‘ Shortly after the capture of Powanghur, a considerable

\* *Captain Kenny, Commanding at Powanghur, to Captain Dale, Major of Brigade.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Powanghur, 24th February, 1804.

‘ I was last night favored with yours of the 15th, and, in reply thereto, have to acquaint you, for the information of Colonel Murray, that I had destroyed

time previously to the negotiations for the treaty of peace, I gave orders that the works of the upper fort of Powanghur might be destroyed. I gave these orders, because those works were useless to the British. The destruction of the works was subsequently discontinued, when it was agreed that the fort should be eventually given up to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ I beg leave to request that you will communicate the purport of the enclosed letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s ministers, and you will observe to them, that to punish any body for his conduct during the war will be a breach of an article of the treaty of peace. The breach will be more flagrant, and it will be more incumbent on the British Government to notice it, if artificers and coolies employed at Powanghur are punished only because they exercised their trade.

‘ I request you to procure from Scindiah’s ministers a positive order to his officer in charge of Champaneer, to discontinue the oppression of the people employed at Powanghur by the British engineer, and to inform the ministers, that, if I should hear more of it, I shall be under the necessity of reporting the subject to the Governor General; and that, in the mean time, I shall require from them that Scindiah’s officer at Champaneer may be dismissed from his office.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Resident with Scindiah.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Resident with Scindiah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Colonel Murray, in which he mentions that the fort of Powanghur has been attacked, as he suspects, in consequence of the interference of the officers in Scindiah’s ser-

six hundred and seventy-five yards of the works of the balla killa, previous to my receiving instructions to discontinue it.

‘ Scindiah’s Brahmin at Champaneer is quite implacable in his threats against the workmen who were employed in the destruction of the balla killa, of whom he has been very diligent in ascertaining all the names and places of abode, and only waits this place being given up, when he intends to carry his designs into execution.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Dale.*’

‘ E. KENNY.



vice employed in Guzerat. There does not appear any proof that the attack has been occasioned by them, but, at all events, their conduct in demanding possession of the forts of Powanghur and Dohud so frequently as they have lately, is irregular, and must proceed from ignorance of the terms of the treaty of peace, or from insolence, if they should have been made acquainted with the treaty.

‘ I have sent to Colonel Murray a copy of the article of the treaty in the Persian and Marhatta languages, which I have desired him to communicate to Scindiah’s principal officers in Guzerat; and I have requested him to cut up the party which attacked Powanghur, if he can find them out, and to write to me, particularly if he should discover any proofs that the attack was excited by Scindiah’s officers.

‘ I request you to represent this matter immediately to Scindiah’s ministers; and to point out to them the misconduct of the officers employed on the part of their master in this instance, as well as in that of the punishment of the persons employed by the engineer at Powanghur. This conduct is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of peace, and the principal officer in Guzerat ought to be dismissed. If persevered in, it may occasion the greatest disasters to Scindiah himself.

‘ It is ridiculous to suppose that a fort can be taken from British troops in the manner attempted; but, if the attempt had succeeded, the consequence must have been a fresh attack upon the fort by the British troops, followed by the expulsion of Scindiah’s officers from Guzerat, and other consequences which I do not wish to anticipate.

‘ In fact, to attack these forts, until the conditions are fulfilled on which their restoration depends, is a breach of the treaty of peace, equally with the attack of any other fort in the possession of the Company’s troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Resident with Scindiah.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

#### BOMBAY OCCURRENCES FOR MARCH, 1804.

*General Wellesley.*

‘ On Saturday last Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, and Josiah Webbe, Esq., Resident at Nagpoor,

arrived at the Presidency, accompanied by their respective suites.

‘ On the Honorable the Governor’s yacht, which had proceeded to Panwell to convey General Wellesley to Bombay, approaching the harbour, a salute of fifteen guns was fired from the Elphinstone Indiaman, and the compliment was repeated on the Honorable General’s landing; whilst the whole of the troops in garrison formed a street from the Dock Head, through which the General passed to the Government House. Captain Barclay, deputy Adjutant General, in Mysore; Captain Knox, Persian translator; Captain Bellingham, Paymaster; Captain Close, commanding the Body Guard; Lieut. Campbell, Major of Brigade; and Lieut. Burne, composed General Wellesley’s suite.

‘ The vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindia, and of the Rajah of Kolapoor, have accompanied General Wellesley to Bombay.’

*Presentation of a Public Address to Major General Wellesley.*

‘ Yesterday, being the day appointed by Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley to receive the address from the British inhabitants of this settlement, Mr. Henshaw, attended by the other gentlemen of the Committee, proceeded to the Government House for that purpose.

‘ The Committee waited first on the Governor, and delivered into his hands the Address to the Most Noble the Governor General, accompanied with a request that he would be pleased to forward it to his Excellency, through such channel as he might make choice of; to which the Governor having expressed his willing assent, the Committee then proceeded to the hall of the Government House, where they were received by Major General Wellesley, attended by some of the officers of his suite. Mr. Henshaw, in presenting the Address to the General, expressed himself as follows:—

‘ SIR,

‘ This Committee have the honor of being deputed by the general meeting of the British inhabitants, to present to you their congratulations on the glorious and happy termination of one of the most decisive, brilliant, and rapid campaigns ever known in the annals of British India; a campaign in

which you have personally borne so conspicuous a share, and proved yourself, at its close, equally great in the cabinet as in the field.

‘ The Address, in the following words, was then read by Mr. Henshaw :—

*To Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ We might be justly deemed insensible to the signal benefits which your late brilliant career has conferred upon your country, if we did not avail ourselves of the opportunity which your temporary residence in this island affords, to express the high sense we entertain of your memorable and important services.

‘ To you, Sir, in an eminent degree, are owing, not only the immense advantages resulting from a successful campaign in the Deccan, but, those having been attained, the blessing of an early peace in India. The enemy’s systematic inclination for desultory and protracted warfare was met on your part, as it likewise was, with equal energy and success, in another quarter, by a wise and gallant resolution to bring affairs to a speedy as well as glorious issue. And the battle of Assye, which displayed how justly you relied on the disciplined valor of your troops, and the zeal, courage, and conduct of every officer under your command, struck a damp on the hopes of the adverse powers, which may almost be said to have decided the fate of the campaign.

‘ But it is not in your military career alone that we have observed the effects of an active, able, and determined mind. The difficult negotiations which you carried on with two hostile powers, while at the same moment your attention was occupied by the operations of the field, do the greatest honor to your talents as a statesman, and display a happy union of military science and political skill.”

‘ Your victories have taken place in our neighbourhood ; they immediately affect our future interests, and are intimately connected with our present prosperity. They lay the foundation of a peace to us and our successors, which is no longer likely to be interrupted by the feuds and combinations of a Marhatta confederacy. They open to the trade and to

the industry of Bombay, the resources of an extensive and populous country.

‘ Under these circumstances, when assembled to express our gratitude towards your noble and illustrious relative, we should have felt our duty only half discharged, if we had omitted this tribute of respect to one who is so justly dear to him, and under whose auspices the troops of every description have shown themselves worthy of such a leader, and of their former renown.

‘ We have the honor to be, Sir,

‘ Your obedient humble servants,

‘ ROBERT HENSHAW,

*and one hundred and twenty-three other British inhabitants.*

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

*To the foregoing Address Major General Wellesley made the following Reply.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ The approbation of this Settlement is a distinction which will afford a permanent source of gratification to my mind; and I receive, with a high sense of respect, the honor conveyed to me by your Address.

‘ The events which preceded the war are of a nature to demonstrate the justice of our cause; while the forbearance with which the British Government refrained from the contest is calculated to manifest that the efficient state of our military equipment was directed to the preservation of peace, and consistent with the principles of our defensive policy. The comprehensive plan of operations for the conduct of the war was equalled by the extent of our resources, and supported by the concentrated power of the empire. The conflict in which the British armies were in consequence engaged presented a theatre capable of displaying at once the most splendid objects of military glory, and substantial proofs of the pervading wisdom of the British councils. To be engaged in such a scene was an object worthy of the highest ambition; and the contingencies which placed a division of the army under my command enabled me to appreciate the permanent causes of our success and power, in the established discipline of our troops, in the general union of zeal for the public interests, in the uniform effects of



our consolidated strength, and in the commanding influence of our national reputation in India.

‘ Under the effects of those certain causes, the troops under my command were enabled to give that support which they were destined by the Governor General to afford to the operations of the Commander in Chief. And, while the grand army, under his Excellency’s immediate command, decided the war in Hindustan, by the most rapid career of brilliant victories, the army of the Deccan, emulating that noble example, contributed to elevate the fame and power of Great Britain in India, to a height unrivalled in the annals of Asia.

‘ In concluding the peace (a duty imposed on me by the local situation of the respective armies) I was enabled, under the immediate orders and instructions of the Governor General, to manifest a practical example of the moderation of the British councils, which arrested the progress of our arms in the hour of victory; to fix the tranquillity of India on the foundations of that enlarged policy; and to receive the best assurances of the continuance of peace from the confidence reposed by the states lately confederated against us, in the generosity, honor, and justice of the British Government.

‘ In reviewing the consequences of our success, it is with unfeigned satisfaction that I perceive the increasing channels of wealth which have been opened to this opulent settlement; and it is peculiarly gratifying to my feelings, that I should have been instrumental in renewing the benefits of peace to a settlement, from the resources and public spirit of which, the detachments under my command have derived the most essential aids during the prosecution of the war.

‘ The occasion which it has pleased you to choose of uniting my name with that of the Governor General has excited the warmest affections of my heart, together with the highest sentiments of public respect; at the same time, therefore, that I receive, with peculiar gratitude, this mark of your kindness, I cannot discharge the obligations you have imposed on me, in a manner more conformable to my sense of the honor and welfare of this settlement, or of the reputation and interests of the empire, than by expressing

my confidence of your cherishing those principles of loyalty, subordination, and government, which have raised and finally established the British empire in India on the extensive foundations of its present security, prosperity, dignity, and renown.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY, Major General.’

*Extract from the Bombay Gazette.*

‘Major General Bellasis, Commandant of Artillery, gave a dinner at the theatre to Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, at which were present the Hon. the Governor, and most of the principal characters in the settlement. The theatre was handsomely fitted up for that purpose, and displayed an elegant transparency of General Wellesley’s arms, fixed so as to face the company. The utmost conviviality prevailed, and the pleasures of the evening were much enhanced by the introduction of several loyal and appropriate toasts, and a few excellent songs.’

*Splendid Fête, in Honor of Major General Wellesley.*

‘An elegant entertainment was given at the theatre, by Lieut. Colonel Lechmere, and the officers of the Fencible regiment, to Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley.’

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘SIR,

‘Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter of the 6th instant from the Resident in Mysore, and the copy of my answer.

‘I request you to take an opportunity of pointing out to the Peshwah’s ministers the difficulties which attend the establishment of his Highness’s authority in Savanore, and urge them to take some measures to provide for Goklah’s troops, as the first step towards a peaceable settlement of that province. It is not necessary to inform them, specifically, whether his Highness will have the assistance of the British troops to drive out Goklah, in case no other provision should be made for the payment of his troops; as you will observe that I think that point ought to be referred for the opinion of his Excellency the Governor General; but

you will impress upon them particularly the danger, that, if they do not make some provision for Goklah, there will be a contest in the province; and that the consequence will be, it will not be worth holding by any body.

‘ Indeed, in the present state of the Peshwah’s affairs, and considering how little revenue he ever gets from any of the countries held by his sirsoubahs, and that, till he can provide for Goklah in land, he must pay his troops in ready money, it appears to me to be by far the best arrangement to leave in Goklah’s hands those parts of Savanore which he now holds, and to receive them hereafter when their state shall have been ameliorated by tranquillity, and his Highness will be enabled to provide some other mode to pay Goklah’s troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *E. S. Waring, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th, upon the subject of the attack made by the Bheels upon the fort of Powanghur. It does not appear quite clearly proved that the attack was excited by Scindiah’s officers in Guzerat; but, at all events, their conduct in making these frequent demands for the possession of the fort is very irregular, and must be attributed either to ignorance of the terms of the treaty of peace, or to insolence.

‘ I now enclose Persian and Marhatta copies of the article of the treaty regarding the surrender of the forts in Guzerat. I request you to send this paper to Scindiah’s principal officer in Guzerat, with a letter to inform him that you have acted only in conformity with the treaty, in retaining possession of the forts; and that he departs from the treaty in attempting to get possession of them before the time specified. You may also inform him that I have written to Scindiah’s durbar upon the subject.

‘ If you should have an opportunity of cutting up the people who have attacked Powanghur, I beg you to attack them; and to report to me particularly, if you should obtain any proof that Scindiah’s servants have been concerned in this outrage.

‘ I likewise enclose a Persian and Marhatta copy of the article of the treaty of peace which provides for the safety of every individual, notwithstanding his conduct during the war. I request you to communicate this paper to Scindiah’s officers, in reference to his conduct towards the persons employed by the engineer at Powanghur.

‘ I have written to the Resident at Scindiah’s durbar regarding this subject, and I shall write this day on the subject of the attack on Powanghur.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 6th instant.

‘ The Peshwah has certainly granted sunnuds for the province of Savanore to Cashee Rao Ball Kischen; and his Highness’s ministers appear to expect that Bappojee Goneish Goklah will deliver over the management to the persons employed by Cashee Rao Ball Kischen. But they have made no other provision for the payment of Goklah’s troops; and the suspicion that they either would not or could not make such provision has probably drawn from Goklah the secret orders to the officer acting in Savanore on his part to delay delivering over the provinces.

‘ It is certainly true that I have written to General Campbell, to request that he will assist the Peshwah’s sirsoubah in Savanore, if he could do so consistently with other objects. But I have informed him that the Resident at Poonah would make him acquainted with the particular objects for the attainment of which his assistance would be required; and I have requested General Campbell to be particularly cautious not to interfere with the rights or interests of the principal jaghiredars or commanders of the troops of the Peshwah.

‘ I therefore imagine that my letter will have the effect of preventing General Campbell from interfering with the persons employed by Goklah.

‘ Under these circumstances, you will observe that the line of conduct which you have recommended to the Dewan



is the most prudent which he could adopt. He could not interfere in favor of Goklah's officers, without opposing the person immediately employed by the Peshwah; and, on the other hand, he could not interfere in favor of Cashee Rao Ball Kischen, without depriving Goklah of the only means he possesses of supporting his troops. As this officer has been an old adherent of the British Government, and in the late war served with the British troops with great zeal and fidelity, and is a singular instance of a Marhatta sirdar possessing these qualifications, it would be very prejudicial to the interests of the British Government to employ the troops belonging to the government of Mysore in destroying him.

‘ I propose to refer the state of affairs in Savanore to the Residency at Poonah, and to request the Resident to prevail upon the Peshwah to provide for Goklah, as the first step towards accomplishing his Highness's objects in that province. If that should be done, the settlement of the province under his Highness's authority will not be difficult. If Goklah should not be provided for, it will be necessary to make a reference to the Governor General to ascertain his Excellency's wishes regarding the assistance to be given in depriving Goklah of Savanore.

‘ In any event, it is desirable that the troops in the service of the Rajah of Mysore should not interfere, excepting to defend the Rajah's territories; and that they should not pass the Rajah's boundary, unless, as in the late instance, to punish a freebooter who had committed depredations within the Rajah's territories.

‘ I do not apprehend any evil from the meeting of the chiefs at Sirhitty mentioned in your letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Wilks.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 16th March, 1804.

‘ Having put every thing in a train of settlement above the ghauts, and having many matters to arrange with this government, and Colonel Close, who is here on account of his health, I came here about a week ago, and have just

received your letter of the 6th instant. I received in due course your letter of the 22nd of February. The freebooters are entirely dispersed, and they have lately plundered each other.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will send the money up to Ahmednuggur, by the road through the Nizam’s country, taken by Majors Dallas and Hill.

‘ Major Malcolm has concluded a treaty of defensive alliance with Scindiah, and therefore there is an end to foreign wars with the native powers.

‘ The conduct of Holkar, however, is still dubious; indeed I think it probable that the Governor General will be under the necessity of ordering him to be attacked; and if that should be the case, I suspect that the operations will be confined to the frontiers of our own territories in Hindustan, and those of Guzerat. The tranquillity of the Deccan will not be disturbed.

‘ It is possible, however, that Holkar, the existence of whose power depends upon his avoiding to come in contact with the British troops, will adopt a course of conduct, when he shall hear of the treaty of defensive alliance with Scindiah, which will enable the Governor General to save him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I have just received your letter of the 2nd. The money will do as well at Hyderabad as at Ahmednuggur. I am much obliged to you for the gram, but we do not want it, nor indeed the rice at present.’

*To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 16th March, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 18th and 20th, I believe. I have already written to you fully upon the subject of the complaints of the Rajah’s ministers respecting the value of the districts ceded by the 5th article of the treaty of peace; and I have now referred the Rajah’s complaints, respecting the conduct of Gungaram Pundit, to the court of Hyderabad.

‘ I think it desirable, that, upon these occasions, you

should yourself write to the Resident at Hyderabad, and urge him to take measures to restrain the irregularities of the Soubah's servants. The fact is, that I have no power to enforce obedience to the orders that I may have to give them. I have, however, written to Gungaram Pundit upon this occasion, and have positively ordered him to arrange with you. An arbitration will not answer any purpose, unless it is superintended by an European gentleman, and I have no person to send. I must therefore request you will send the parties with a servant of your own to the spot to settle, that, when they may agree, the boundary shall be fixed; and where they differ, a description shall be written and signed by all parties, and your servant and you must decide.

‘It might have been expected that there would have been no dispute about a boundary so well defined in the treaty of peace. But the fact is, that the Soubah's servants encourage these disputes in order to have a pretence for entertaining troops, and for diverting the revenues of the country from the public treasury.

‘In the mean time, however, it is absolutely necessary that the Rajah of Berar should withdraw his troops from Berar; and I beg you to remonstrate seriously with him upon this point. Apprise his ministers of the measures I have taken for his satisfaction, and inform them that I expect, if the troops have entered Berar with his consent, or by his orders, he will forthwith order them to withdraw. I rather suspect, however, that little more has been done than to pass the boundary for forage.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘SIR,

‘Bombay, 16th March, 1804.

‘I have the honor to enclose copies of two public letters which I have received from Mr. Elphinstone. They describe the conduct of the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan in such strong colors, that it is unnecessary that I should advert to that part of the subject; but I cannot avoid drawing your attention to the consequences which will cer-

tainly be the result of that conduct. The Soubah has already experienced the first of these consequences. Gungaram Pundit has seized the Rajah's villages, and has refused to deliver up the districts ceded by the treaty of peace; and the Rajah's troops now plunder the southern parts of Berar. The Rajah of Berar will of course deny that they plunder the district by his order and authority, because he will fear the consequences of acknowledging to the British Resident that he has been guilty of a breach of the treaty of peace. But when he finds that the British Government, which is the mediator between the Soubah and him, wants authority or influence to enable it to carry the treaty into execution, it is a doubtful question whether he is not justified in having recourse to the means in his power to do justice to himself.

‘ One of the smallest evils that will result from this state of affairs in Berar will be the necessity of keeping up these large military establishments, so as not to be able to derive any revenue from the country. The Soubah's troops, which are not in the best order, will plunder the country, at the same time that a great proportion of its revenues will be spent in paying them. Indeed, I suspect that Gungaram's object in breaking the treaty is to induce this result, as the most likely mode of enriching himself.

‘ I request you to urge the Soubah's ministers to adopt some effectual mode of putting a stop to these evils. To issue orders is useless, if those who disobey them are never punished.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th February. The amount at which the revenue of the districts to be ceded to the Rajah of Berar, under the 5th article of the treaty of peace, should be valued, was fixed by me, in concert with the Rajah's vakeel, at the highest sum they had produced for the last forty years. The districts were fixed upon by Rajah Mohiput Ram, and the Rajah's vakeel, in presence of Captain Johnson, and both parties appeared to be perfectly satisfied.

‘ The gross revenue of the districts, as valued in the old Revenue accounts, was ————. Besides these districts, the Rajah of Berar's confidential servants enjoyed a few villages in Berar, in enaum, of some of which they had held



the Rajah's share; of others, the whole revenue belonging to the Peshwah, or to the Soubah of the Deccan. Under all the circumstances of the late peace, I considered it to be desirable that the Rajah of Berar's servants should continue to enjoy these advantages, and I requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to give them sunnuds for them. I also wrote to you, in duplicate upon the subject, a letter of which I now enclose a copy. These are the fourteen or fifteen villages alluded to in the fourth paragraph of your letter.

'In respect to the sirdeshmookey of Bheer, the Rajah of Berar has no right to it. I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter to Ghazy Khan, which will show you that I do not think that person deserving of any favor.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

'MY LORD,

'Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

'I forwarded the day before yesterday some important dispatches from Major Malcolm; and I received this morning his dispatch No. 18, of the 8th instant. As I think it desirable that Major Malcolm should receive your Excellency's orders, written subsequently to the receipt of that dispatch, before he makes any communication to Scindiah's durbar of your intentions respecting Gwalior, I have written a letter, of which I enclose an extract, which will allow time for his receiving those orders.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

'SIR,

'Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

'I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 1st instant, and I sincerely congratulate you upon the success of your negotiations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The treaty which you have concluded appears to me to embrace all important objects, and it secures the tranquillity of the possessions of the Company, and of those of their allies.

'In negotiating this treaty, you have displayed all the qualifications which have repeatedly gained for you the ap-

probation of his Excellency the Governor General, and from which I have derived so much advantage ; and you have established fresh claims to his approbation, and the gratitude of the East India Company and your country.

‘ I have perused, and forwarded to be laid before his Excellency the Governor General, all your dispatches from the 22nd February. It appears that Scindiah’s ministers have given that prince reason to expect that he could retain possession of Gwalior ; and I think it possible, considering all the circumstances of the case, his Excellency the Governor General may be induced to attend to Scindiah’s wishes upon this occasion. At all events, your dispatches contain fresh matter, upon which it would be desirable to receive his Excellency’s orders, before you proceed to make any communication to Scindiah’s durbar on the subject of Gwalior.

‘ I therefore beg leave to recommend you to avoid all discussion upon the subject of that fort ; and to delay to communicate his Excellency’s intention respecting it, till you shall receive his orders subsequent to the receipt of your late dispatches.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Treaty of Alliance between the Honorable East India Company and the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Concluded at Burhampoor on the 27th February, 1804.*

‘ Treaty of alliance and mutual defence between the Honorable the English East India Company, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah Behauder, and his children, heirs, and successors, settled by Major John Malcolm, on the part of the Honorable Company ; and by Bappo Eitul Punt, and Moonshee Kavel Nyn, on the part of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. After having communicated to each other their full powers, the said John Malcolm being deputed to the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah by Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley ; the Hon. Major General aforesaid being invested with full powers and authority from his Excellency the most Noble Richard Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious order of St.

Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's most Honorable Privy Council, appointed by the Honorable Court of Directors of the said Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies.

‘Whereas, by the blessing of God, the relations of friendship and union have been happily established between the government of the Honorable Company, and that of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah Behauder, by a recent treaty of peace, the two governments aforesaid, advert-ing to the complexion of the times, have now determined, with a view to the preservation of peace and tranquillity, to enter into this treaty of general defensive alliance, for the reciprocal protection of their respective territories, together with those of their several allies and dependents, against unprovoked aggression and encroachments of all or any enemies whatever.

‘Art. I. The friendship and union established by the former treaty between the two states, shall be promoted and increased by this treaty, and shall be perpetual ; the friends and enemies of either state shall be the friends and enemies of both ; and their mutual interests shall henceforward be inseparable.

‘2. If any person or state whatever shall commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, and, after due representation, shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation, or shall deny the just satisfaction or indemnity which the contracting parties shall have required, then the contracting parties will proceed to concert and prosecute such further measures as the case shall appear to demand. For the more distinct explanation of the true intent and effect of this article, the Governor General in Council, in behalf of the Honorable Company, hereby declares, that the British Government will never permit any power or state whatever to commit, with impunity, any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights and territories of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; but will at all times, in compliance with the requisition of the Maharajah, maintain and defend the same, when such requisition is made, in the like manner as the rights and territories of the Honorable Company are now maintained and defended.

‘ 3. With a view to fulfil this treaty of mutual defence, the Maharajah agrees to receive, and the Honorable East India Company to furnish, a subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular infantry, with the usual proportion of artillery, and with the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition. This force is to be stationed at such place, near the frontier of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, as may hereafter be deemed most eligible by the British Government ; and it will be held in readiness, at such station, to proceed as soon as possible for the execution of any service on which it is liable to be employed by the condition of this treaty.

‘ 4. And it is further agreed, that, in conformity to the stipulations of the fifteenth article of the treaty of peace, concluded by Major General Wellesley, on the part of the Honorable Company, and by Bappo Eitul, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, &c., on the part of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that all charges and expenses of the six battalions above mentioned, and of their ordnance, artillery, military stores, and equipment, shall be defrayed by the Honorable Company out of the produce of the revenues of the territories ceded by the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the said Company, by the articles second, third, and fourth of the afore-mentioned treaty of peace, which territories are specified in a statement annexed to that treaty.

‘ 5. Grain, and all other articles of consumption, and provisions, and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together with the necessary number of cattle, horses, and camels, required for the use of the subsidiary force, shall, whenever the aforesaid force is within the territories of the Maharajah, in consequence of his requisition, be entirely exempt from duties ; and whenever any further force of the Honorable Company shall, in consequence of war with any other state, be in the dominions of the Maharajah, they shall, in like manner as the subsidiary force, be exempt from all duties upon the aforesaid articles of necessary use and consumption. And it is also agreed, that, whenever any part of the army of the Maharajah is in the territories of the Honorable Company, for purposes connected with the fulfilment of this treaty, no duties on grain, camels, wearing apparel, &c., as stated above, which the party of the army of the said Maharajah may require, shall be collected ;



and it is further agreed, that the officers of the respective governments, while they are in the fulfilment of the articles of this treaty, either with the army, or in the territories of the other, shall be treated with that respect and consideration which is due to their rank and station.

‘ 6. The subsidiary force will at all times be ready, on the requisition of the Maharajah, to execute services of importance, such as the care of the person of the Maharajah, his heirs and successors, the protection of the country from attack and invasion, the overawing and chastisement of rebels or excitors of disturbance in the Maharajah’s dominions ; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions.

‘ 7. Whereas it is agreed, in the thirteenth article of the treaty of peace, that the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall never take, or retain in his service, any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with Great Britain, or any British subject whatever, European or native of India, without the consent of the British Government ; the Maharajah now further engages that he will hereafter never employ in his service, or permit to reside in his dominions, any European or American whatever, without the consent and acquiescence of the British Government ; the said British Government on its part engaging that it never will employ, or permit to reside in its dominions, any person, subject of the Maharajah, or others, who shall hereafter be guilty of crimes, or of hostility, against the person or government of the aforesaid Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ 8. As, by the present treaty, the union and friendship of the two states is so firmly cemented, that they may be considered as one and the same, the Maharajah engages neither to commence nor to pursue, in future, any negotiation with any principal states or powers, without giving previous notice, and entering into mutual consultation with the Honorable East India Company’s government : and the Honorable Company’s government, on their part, declare that they will have no manner of concern with any of the Maharajah’s relations, dependents, military chiefs, or servants, with respect to whom the Maharajah is absolute ; and that they will on no occasion ever afford encouragement,

support, or protection, to any of the Maharajah's relations, dependents, chiefs, or servants, who may eventually act in opposition to the Maharajah's authority, but on the contrary, at the requisition of the Maharajah, they will aid and assist to punish and reduce all such offenders to obedience ; and it is further agreed, that no officer of the Honorable Company shall ever interfere in the internal affairs of the Maharajah's government.

‘ 9. As the chief object and design of the present defensive alliance is the security and protection of the dominions of the contracting parties, and their allies and dependents, from all attack whatsoever, the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah engages never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against any state or chief in alliance with the Honorable Company, or against any other principal state or power ; and, in the event of differences arising, whatever adjustment the Company's government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet with his full approbation and acquiescence.

‘ 10. The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war, and for that purpose will at all times be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other principal states or powers, and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the principal powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this treaty. But if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other state or power whatever, then the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah Behauder engages, that the English force, consisting of six battalions, with their guns, &c., joined by a detachment of his army, consisting of six thousand of the Maharajah's infantry, and ten thousand of his Pagah and Silladar cavalry, which force the Maharajah engages always to keep ready, shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy ; and the Maharajah also engages to employ every further effort for the purpose of bringing into the field the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions, with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war. The Honorable Company in the same manner engage, on their part (on such event occurring), to employ in active

operations against the enemy, as large a force as the service may require, over and above the said subsidiary force.

“ 11. Whenever war shall appear probable, the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah engages to collect as many brinjarries as possible, and to store as much grain as may be practicable in the frontier garrisons. The Company's government also, with a view to the effectual prosecution of the war, engage to adopt similar measures in their frontier garrisons.

‘ 12. The contracting parties entertain no views of conquests or extensions of their respective dominions, nor any intention of proceeding to hostilities against any state or principal power unless in the case of unjust and unprovoked aggression, and after the failure of their joint endeavors to obtain reasonable satisfaction, through the channel of pacific negotiation, according to the tenor of the preceding treaty. If, contrary to the spirit and object of this defensive treaty, war with any state should hereafter appear unavoidable (which God avert), the contracting parties will proceed to adjust the rule of partition of all such advantages and acquisitions as may eventually result from the success of their united arms. It is declared that, in the event of war, and of a consequent partition of conquests between the contracting parties, the shares of each government shall be equal in the division of any territory which may be acquired by the successful exertion of their united arms, provided that each of the contracting parties shall have faithfully fulfilled all the stipulations of this treaty.

‘ 13. The interests of the contracting parties being identified by this defensive alliance, it is agreed, that the Honorable Company's government shall be at liberty to employ the whole, or any part of the subsidiary force established by the treaty, in quelling of any disturbances which may arise within their territories, or in the performance or any other service which may be required by the said Honorable Company's government, provided such service shall not interfere with any other duties on which the said subsidiary force is liable to be employed, under the conditions of this treaty. And if disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of the Maharajah's dominions which lie contiguous to the frontier of the Honorable Company, and to which it might



be inconvenient to detach any proportion of the subsidiary force, the British Government in like manner, if required by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, shall direct such of the Company's troops as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose, to assist in quelling the said disturbances within the Maharajah's dominions; and if disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of the dominions of the British Government which lay contiguous to the frontier of the Maharajah, the Maharajah, if required by the British Government, shall direct such of his troops as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose, to assist in quelling the said disturbances within the dominions of the British Government.

‘ 14. In order to strengthen and confirm the friendship established between the two states, it is agreed that neither of the two contracting parties shall enter into any alliance, or have any concern, with the tributaries or chiefs of the other; and in order to support the independent authority of both governments it is agreed and declared, that hereafter neither of the contracting parties will give protection or countenance to the rebellious tributaries and subjects of the other, but they will use their utmost endeavors for the apprehension of such rebels, in order that they may be brought to punishment.

‘ 15. The Honorable Company agree to exert their influence to maintain the observance of such usages on matters of form, and ceremony, and other customs, as shall appear to have been fixed on all points of intercourse and communication between the Peshwah and his ancestors, and the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his ancestors; and the English Government also agree to recognize the right of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to all possessions he holds, whether by written sunnuds or grants, or by the unwritten authority of the Peshwah, according to former usage, provided such sunnuds do not interfere with the faithful fulfilment of the treaty of peace; and provided also, that in all cases where disputes may arise on the subject of possessions held by unwritten authority, the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah agrees to refer to the sole arbitration of the said British Government, who will decide with reference to former usage, on the principles of truth and justice. The English Go-



vernment further agrees to use its endeavor to prevent any acts which have been done by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or his ancestors, under the authority reposed in him or them by the Peshwah or his ancestors, from being subverted, provided their being supported is strictly consistent with the preservation of the honor and dignity of his Highness the Peshwah, and of the stipulations of the treaty of peace.

‘ 16. This treaty, consisting of sixteen articles, being this day settled by Major Malcolm, on the part of the Honorable Company, and by Eitul Punt and Moonshee Kavel Nyn, on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; Major Malcolm has delivered one copy thereof in Persian, and Marhatta, and English, signed and sealed by himself, to the said Maharajah, who, on his part, has also delivered one copy of the same, duly executed by himself : and Major Malcolm, by virtue of a special authority given him in that behalf by Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, (himself vested with full powers as before stated,) hereby declares the said treaty to be in full force from the date hereof, and engages that a copy of the same, from the Governor General in Council, in every respect the counterpart of that executed by himself, shall be delivered to the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in the space of two months and ten days ; and on the delivery of such copy, the treaty executed by Major Malcolm shall be returned.

‘ Done at Burhampoor, the twenty-seventh of February, A. D. 1804, or fourteenth of Zeecada, A. H. 1218.’

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

‘ Having many matters to arrange with Mr. Duncan and with Colonel Close, who had been obliged to come here on account of his health, I arrived here about a week ago, and I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th of February.

‘ I did not mean to compare the state of discipline of the Bengal troops with that of the troops of the Madras establishment. They are not to be compared at all, I imagine : but I gave the preference to the Bengal troops on account

of their superior size and appearance, and their caste ; and I conceived them not to be objectionable on the score of discipline.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that Major Malcolm has concluded the treaty of defensive alliance with Scindiah ; so that, if we only make the arrangements depending upon the treaty of peace, in the same liberal manner that we have made the peace itself, there is an end to all formidable foreign wars with the native powers in India. The subsidiary troops are not to be within Scindiah’s territories, an arrangement which I acknowledge I prefer to having them there.

‘ The conduct of Holkar is still dubious. He has written to me a letter, dated about the 1st of February, in terms very civil and respectful towards myself, but much otherwise towards General Lake, whose letter he has not answered, and whom he threatens in his letter to me. I rather think it will be necessary for the Governor General to order him to be attacked, unless he should alter his tone, and adopt a line of conduct more suitable to his interests in the present situation of affairs, by which the Governor General may be enabled to save him. This is possible, as Holkar’s power depends upon his avoiding to come in contact with the British troops ; and he will see that he cannot avoid this much longer, as soon as he shall hear of the alliance with Scindiah.

‘ He must then determine to adopt one of three lines : viz., either to adopt the line of conduct prescribed to him by General Lake, or to enter into a war and fight General Lake, or to go away by Ajmeer, into the Seik countries, and endeavor to establish himself among the Seiks and Afghans. He cannot delay his decision in the usual Marhatta style, as General Lake will not give him time, after so much has elapsed, and the rainy season is approaching. I rather think, therefore, that he will go off to the Punjaub ; and what gives me stronger reason to think so is, that on the seal of his letter to me he calls himself *the slave of Shah Mahmoud, the king of kings*. Shah Mahmoud is the brother of Zemaun Shah. He seized the musnud and government of Caubul, after having defeated Zemaun Shah, two or three years ago, and put out his eyes ; but he was in his turn defeated and

dethroned very lately by another brother, assisted by the king of Persia.

‘ Holkar has taken this title either to frighten us with the prospect of an invasion of India by the Afghans, or he has really communicated with and entered the service of Mahmoud Shah. In the latter case he may be going to the Punjaub; and his march to Ajmeer, and the state to which he has reduced the whole of Hindustan and the Deccan, and the certainty that he cannot now subsist his troops any where without coming in contact with the British troops, render that movement very probable. In that case the war with Holkar will be delayed to a very distant period, if it ever takes place at all.

‘ In case of the war with Holkar, the Deccan would not be the scene of the operations. The contest would be on the frontiers of Hindustan and Guzerat; and, excepting to lay siege to Chandore, there would be nothing to do in the Deccan. It is pleasant to think that, for once, the Deccan will escape.

‘ I informed you that I intended to send into Guzerat the battalion of sepoys now at Poonah. I propose to draw another battalion from Goa to Guzerat by sea, to relieve the battalion drawn from Goa, by the corps now at Hullihall in Soonda, occupying that post only by one company, till further arrangements are made. I think it probable that it will be necessary to draw another battalion from Goa, and to relieve it by one of the Coast battalions with me. I hope that you will have no objection to these arrangements; it is the only mode in which I can reinforce Guzerat, without sending there some of the Coast troops, which would entirely destroy them. At Goa they will be within your reach, and you can relieve them, or withdraw them altogether, as you may think proper.

‘ It will not answer to march the troops from the Deccan into Hindustan. If the troops go north of Chandore, fifty Holkars will start up in all parts of the territories of the Peshwah and of the Soubah of the Deccan; and it would be a most difficult operation to get through the hills between the Nerbudda and the Taptee. But we may establish a communication through them, between the troops operating on the frontier of Guzerat and those about Chandore.



‘Whether the war with Holkar be immediate or not, I think it desirable to reinforce Guzerat at an early period. In the first place, the Governor General may fix Scindiah’s subsidiary force in Guzerat; and in that case the troops will be wanted: in the next place, whether he fixes there the subsidiary force or not, Guzerat is our weakest point. It is that from which we can most easily annoy Holkar and assist Scindiah, and it is that in which we have the smallest means. This arrangement, therefore, is desirable on every ground in which it can be viewed.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

‘I received the day before yesterday all your letters from the 22nd of February to the 5th of March, and yesterday that of the 8th of March.

‘I imagine that you have altered the time of the dawk, which may have caused the delay in the arrival of the letters.

‘I am delighted with every thing that you have done. The treaty of defensive alliance includes, in my opinion, all the material points, and you will recollect that I always thought it was preferable to post the subsidiary force in our own territories, to keeping them in the territories of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘I have written fully to the Governor General on the subject of Gwalior; and if you can only keep down the discussions respecting Gwalior, till he shall have had time to receive my letter, the decision respecting that place will, I think, be satisfactory to us all. I enclose you a copy of my letter, as the shortest mode (for me) of explaining my sentiments.

‘There is one part of the question into which I have not entered in that letter very fully, that is, our right to Gwalior\*. This stands upon two grounds: first, our right under the 9th article of the treaty of peace, a treaty having been made with the Ranah of Gohud. Secondly, our right under the same article, a treaty having been made with Ambajee

\* For further particulars respecting Gwalior, see the fourth volume of the Marquis Wellesley’s Dispatches.



Ingliā. I think your argument with Kavel Nyn is unanswerable, respecting the first ground. The treaty of peace mentions the Ranah of Gohud and his territory frequently; these are the Company's boundary, &c. &c.; and if they do not exist, one of the parties who made that treaty was guilty of a fraud, of which he has no right to the benefit.

‘But, supposing that the Ranah of Gohud is to have territory, the question is, whether Gwalior is included in that territory? I have not got a translation of the treaty with that Chief; but I am informed that it does not notice Gwalior. The Governor General claims that on the other ground, the treaty with Ambajee; therefore the ground on which I, who made the treaty of peace, considered that we should get possession of the fort of Gwalior, entirely fails.

‘The fact is, that we now feel the consequences of my ignorance of the real state of affairs in Hindustan. Till I received the Governor General's great dispatch regarding the peace, I thought that the state of the Ranah of Gohud existed; but that dispatch for the first time informed me, that it was a state to be restored, and not one to be supported in independence, for which I was to provide. There was the error; and the same error will be found in his own treaty.

‘In respect to the second ground of our claim to Gwalior, viz., the treaty with Ambajee, on which alone the Governor General rests, it fails us in two instances. First, Ambajee held the fort as a servant of Scindiah. The fort was Scindiah's, and Ambajee his amildar. The clause in the 9th article of the treaty will therefore deprive us of it.

‘Secondly, Ambajee has broken his treaty, and we have determined that he shall not enjoy any of the advantages for which he had stipulated. The Governor General will, I know, bring forward an ingenious argument, on which he will claim the fort; but I am afraid that it will be too ingenious, and too much abstracted from all the circumstances of the case, to elicit the other parts of the proceeding.

‘The question, in my opinion, stands thus. Is it consistent with good faith to insist that the stipulations in our favor shall hold good, not against Ambajee, but against Scindiah, when the ground of the 9th article of the treaty of

peace, that upon which we claim the independence of the Rajahs, was the necessity of preserving the Company's faith? Where is the necessity of preserving the Company's faith with Ambajee, who has broken his treaty?

‘ I think it rather doubtful whether, in a case of this kind, we can adhere to one part of the treaty, and not to another, although I believe it is done in many instances. That is to say, the powerful party adopts the measures required by its own dignity, interest, and safety. This, I think, will be the Governor General's theme. But at the expense of what other party are those measures adopted? at the expense of that party who broke the treaty, but not at the expense of Scindiah, a power independent of both.

‘ The fair way of considering this question is, that a treaty broken is in the same state as one never made: and when that principle is applied to this case, it will be found that Scindiah, to whom the possession belonged, before the treaty was made, and by whom they have not been ceded by the treaty of peace, or by any other instrument, ought to have them.

‘ In respect to the policy of the question, it is fully canvassed in the enclosed letter. I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every frontier of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and the advantages and honor we gained by the late war and the peace; and we must not fritter them away in arguments, drawn from overstrained principles of the laws of nations, which are not understood in this country. What brought me through many difficulties in the war, and the negotiations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else.

‘ I think that all those questions will be settled as they ought to be; in the mean time, I am making arrangements to settle Holkar. The war against him must be carried on to the northward, and from Guzerat. It will not answer to allow the subsidiary forces to quit the Deccan. We must take Chandore, and his possessions in Candeish, and open a communication through the hills, between the Taptee and Nerbudda, with the corps which will advance towards Indore from Guzerat. This will keep him to the northward, where General Lake must beat him. I see that he calls himself the slave of Shah Mahmoud Ghazy.

‘ You appear to think that Holkar’s omission to answer General Lake is a cause of war : but you think nothing of the insolence of his letter to me. Indeed, it is civil to me personally, but the most insolent production I have ever seen towards General Lake. I conclude that you have sent a copy of it to Bengal, and the Governor General must decide what is to be done. But I think that Holkar, finding that he has famished the Deccan and Hindustan, and has no chance of getting on much longer without coming in contact with the British troops, is going to Ajmeer, to join his master, Shah Mahmoud Ghazy, who, by the by, has lately been dethroned in Caubul.

‘ I am going to reinforce Guzerat as much as I can, which, with a garrison for Bombay, will weaken me a little. But, as the active operations will not be in this quarter, and the peace of the Deccan is secure, that will not signify at all.

‘ I think you might quiet Bragge’s\* spirit, by pointing out to him the scrupulous good faith with which I have acted in this quarter. I have given them all their territories, and restored every farthing of revenue collected since the 1st of January ; and have paid all the expenses. You may tell Bragge that the Governor General has only received the treaty, and that it is not possible that he can immediately have made all the arrangements consequent to it. That the restoration of the forts depends upon the peaceable possession of the countries in Hindustan, of which we can have received no accounts.

‘ However, you may tell him that, as Scindiah appears very impatient to have back his forts, and as we are all very desirous to gratify him in every thing that is possible, I will send you orders for the delivery of the forts, to be used as soon as you hear from General Lake that he has quiet possession of the countries in Hindustan. This probably will keep matters quiet till you shall receive orders respecting Gwalior.

‘ I shall write to you a public letter this day, to request you to defer the discussions on that question till the Governor General can consider and answer your late dispatches. You must now use your efforts to keep down the discussions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

\* A nickname for one of Scindiah’s ministers.

‘ P. S. I enclose a copy of the treaty with the Ranah of Gohud, by which the country round Gwalior is mentioned, I understand, but not Gwalior itself.’

*To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ MY DEAR HENRY,

‘ Bombay, 18th March, 1804.

‘ After I had written to you, in January, a letter which I believe is still here, I found that the banditti, who, I imagined, had dispersed, were still assembled in a very formidable body, on the Nizam’s frontier, near Perinda. They had beaten one of his Highness’s armies, and had taken its guns, and they were plundering the country in all directions. I therefore determined to destroy them. With this view, I marched from the army on the 3rd of February, with all the cavalry, the 74th regiment, and two battalions of sepoy. I marched again on the 4th twenty-two miles, again on the 4th at night, and came upon them on the 5th in the morning, and entirely destroyed them; taking from them the guns which they had taken from the Nizam, their camp, baggage, camels, and all their plunder. This was the greatest exertion I ever saw troops make in any country. The infantry was in the attack, although we marched sixty miles between the morning of the 4th and 12 o’clock at noon of the 5th of February; and yet I halted from noon till eight at night of the 4th.

‘ I afterwards pursued them, and run them down to the neighbourhood of Beejapoor and the Kistna, where they dispersed entirely.

‘ I then returned to the army near Perinda; and from thence came to Poonah, where I arranged several matters depending with the Peshwah’s government. From Poonah I came to Bombay, to meet Colonel Close, who is sick, and I have been here a week.

‘ Malcolm has, I see, written to you; and I shall only tell you that he has concluded the treaty of defensive alliance with Scindiah. I think it possible that we may have to attack Holkar, but in the present state of our power that can hardly be called a foreign war.

‘ Ever yours, &c.

‘ *The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 18th March, 1804.

‘ The intelligence which I have received lately from the northward, and the enclosed letter which was sent to me by Major Malcolm, render it probable that your Excellency will have sent orders to the Commander in Chief to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar. It is therefore necessary that I should make a disposition to co-operate with his Excellency as far as may be in my power ; although, from circumstances which I shall state hereafter, I apprehend that I shall not be able to do much in the Deccan.

‘ Holkar has no force, and no possessions in the Deccan, excepting Chandore, and a small territory in Candeish, UMBER, and its district, and half of the pergunnah of Sieugaum, south of the Godavery, of which Scindiah holds the other half. The fall of the fort of Chandore, which must, I imagine, be regularly attacked, will deprive Holkar of all those possessions.

‘ In the present state of affairs in the Deccan, I imagine that it would not be prudent to march the British troops into Hindustan. All that can be done, therefore, after taking possession of Chandore, will be to open the communication between the troops in Hindustan and those in the Deccan, through the hills between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda.

‘ The troops in Guzerat, however, may co-operate very essentially with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and I have determined to reinforce them. My objects in taking this step, without waiting for your Excellency’s orders, are, first, to be able to detach a corps towards Indore, keeping in Guzerat a sufficient body of troops to preserve its tranquillity ; secondly, to provide for the possible desire of your Excellency, that the subsidiary force for Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be in Guzerat ; thirdly, Guzerat is in many respects the weakest of the British possessions on this side of India, at the same time that it is the most exposed, and best situated for annoying an enemy.

‘ I therefore propose to send into Guzerat one battalion of the Bombay army now serving at Poonah, and another battalion from Goa, which I propose to replace by the battalion

of the Bombay army stationed at Hullihall, in Soonda, holding this post by a detachment.

‘ If I should learn from the northward that your Excellency has given orders that Holkar may be attacked, or that that Chief has committed hostilities against the Honorable Company, or their allies or dependents, I propose to order another battalion of the Bombay army into Guzerat, from Goa, which I shall relieve at Goa by a battalion of Coast native infantry, from my division of the army. In this manner, since the peace with Scindiah, Guzerat will have been reinforced by four battalions ; and one regiment of Europeans will have been drawn from thence to send to Bengal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ N.B. I beg leave to draw your Excellency’s notice to the seal of Jeswunt Rao Holkar’s letter ; in which he styles himself the servant of Shah Mahmoud Ghazy, who, I believe, was King of Caubul.’

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 19th March, 1804.

‘ You did quite right to refrain from saying any thing about the money for Goklah ; and I beg you will not say any thing upon that subject, until you hear further from me.

‘ I am very much obliged to you for the detail into which you have gone, respecting the motives of Byajee Naig’s journey to Bombay. Tell him that I can have no objections to his coming here, excepting those founded upon the inconvenience which the Peshwah may feel from the want of his services ; but that, if he chooses to come here, I shall be glad to see him.

‘ As the Peshwah may be somewhat jealous of stationing the troops near Poonah, you may mention that I have drawn them there in order to show the Loghur man that I am in earnest, and to be ready to attack his fort, if he should not accept the terms which I have offered him.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *E. S. Waring, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I did not say that I would make arrangements when I should see Colonel Close. I said that I had much to say

to Colonel Close, and that it was necessary that I should go to Bombay to see him.'

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

'SIR,

'Bombay, 20th March, 1804.

'I enclose a list of villages which have been made over to Appah Dessaye, as he says; and he has asked for the assistance of the British troops to take possession of them. If you should find, upon inquiry, that they really have been made over to him, and the troops can put him in possession of them, without a contest with some of the great southern chiefs, or the Rajah of Kolapoor, you might write to General Campbell, to request his assistance for Appah Dessaye, if he should happen to pass in the neighbourhood of them, and it should be convenient to grant it.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'E. S. Waring, Esq.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

'SIR,

'Bombay, 20th March, 1804.

'I have the honor to enclose a receipt for duties levied on grain coming into my camp; and, as levying such duties has occurred frequently, and is the source of much inconvenience to the troops, I beg that you will be so kind as to take measures to get it prevented.

'I have the honor to be, &c.,

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

'SIR,

'Bombay, 20th March, 1804.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant. So long as the troops remain in the field, I beg leave to recommend that the Mysore horse may be kept with them, as being very useful, and indeed necessary in this country. In case of war with Holkar, I think that we might possibly carry with us a large body of Marhatta horse. The Marhatta chiefs, however, are to a man so very capricious, that I do not think we ought to depend upon that assistance, which we must do if we do not keep the Mysore horse.

‘When I wrote to you on the 16th of February, that I would consider of the mode of keeping up a body of light cavalry, I understood, from a perusal of the notes on the war, that the Governor General had imagined that the assistance which we received from the government of Mysore was given at the expense of that government; and I intended, when I should meet Colonel Close and Mr. Webbe at Poonah, to concert with those gentlemen the mode of rewarding the government of Mysore, in which I proposed to include a plan for keeping up in the Mysore service, at all times, an additional body of horse. I have since found that I had misunderstood the meaning of the notes; and that, in fact, the reimbursement of the expense to the Rajah’s government, which was always intended, had actually taken place in some degree. There was an end, therefore, of the plan which I had in contemplation.

‘The only plan that I can suggest is for the Company to take into pay a body of horse. They can be got for twenty-five rupees each horseman, upon an average; but, I believe, when they receive only this sum, they muster tattoos, which is the common practice of the Marhatta armies. From thirty to thirty-five rupees each horse is the sum paid to the best horsemen.

‘There is no doubt of their utility in time of war; but I think they may be hired when war may break out, and be nearly as useful as those kept constantly in pay. At least, I am certain that the superior utility of the latter will by no means compensate for the additional expense.

‘Purneah will of course discharge the supernumerary horse at the end of the war, in which measure he will experience no difficulty or inconvenience, as he has, in general, the families of the horsemen in Mysore. He knows where their families reside, as they are under the immediate superintendence of the village amildars. The horsemen themselves will be in the same state when they shall be discharged; and, moreover, the regulations of the Mysore government, formed since the campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh, are so strict respecting the removal of horses from one village to another, and the travelling of horsemen through the country, that no danger will be incurred by discharging these men. The persons thus discharged will always be at



the disposal of the British Government. The Mysore government can always hire them again in a short time, and with great facility.

‘ Supposing that you should take a body of horse into the Company’s constant pay, it is probable that you would prefer a part of this body now serving with me. And you would thus deprive Purneah of an additional resource in time of war, which he would otherwise be able to supply ; and you will gain nothing by the constant expense. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that it is best not to enter into this plan.

‘ Although the Marhatta chiefs are capricious, and not entirely to be depended upon, I think they are to be kept in a disposition so favorable to us, by a constant course of civil communication and good offices, as that you will be able to command their services with their troops for payment. I parted with two that I had with me in great good humour, and well disposed towards the British Government. I have recommended them strongly to the Peshwah ; but there I am afraid that I have failed. However, I am about to write a dispatch to the Governor General on the subject of the southern jaghiredars, in whose concerns with the Peshwah we must interfere, or we shall never have complete tranquillity ; and the settlement of this question, in any way, will insure for the British Government a large body of Marhatta horse at all times.

‘ You will have observed from my last letter, that I have contemplated the possibility of hostilities with Holkar, and have made arrangements to provide for that event. I have accounts from Hindustan of a date as late as the 26th of February, and no act had then been committed on either side. The only cause of complaint that General Lake had was, that Holkar had not answered his letter ; although he had complied with his desire to refrain from attacking those under the Company’s protection. Major Malcolm’s last public dispatches of the 3rd instant, which, however, are of a date prior to that of his private letter, render the probability greater that Holkar will remain in peace.

‘ It appears that he has suggested to Scindiah that they should forget their mutual injuries, and join to attack the

English; and that Scindiah told him that he could not break his faith with the English; and, at all events, could not trust him, Holkar. I think it possible, therefore, that upon hearing that Scindiah had connected himself with us, he will have adopted a line of conduct which may enable the Governor General to save him.

‘ I rather think that you and the Governor General agree in opinion on the subject of the affairs of Malabar. He says, “ examine and report the state of the province before you commence your military operations: define the evils, and propose a system of government which shall afford a remedy, towards the establishment of which system the military operations may be directed.”

‘ It would be useless to commence military operations upon any great scale, unless the civil officers should be prepared to take possession of the country, and to re-establish the civil government as the troops shall conquer it. If the civil government were not re-established in this manner, the rebels would rise again as soon as the troops would pass through the district; and the effect of the operations of a large body of troops would be much the same as that of a small body. But if the civil government is to be re-established in this manner, it would be better to establish that system which is found to be good, and is to be permanent, than that which is known to be bad, and which is intended should not last.

‘ Supposing that the bad system were first introduced, it must be followed afterwards by the good one; and supposing that the bad system did not produce a rebellion of itself (which I acknowledge I do not think it would, as rebellion in Malabar is to be traced to causes entirely independent of all systems of civil government, excepting as they are connected with a strong or weak military force), the change from the bad to the good system would produce a degree of convulsion, and, possibly, momentary weakness, which it is always desirable to avoid. It is particularly desirable to avoid it in this instance, as it will not be difficult, by an examination of all that has passed in Malabar, to fix upon the general principles according to which that province ought to be governed, and to frame a system accordingly,

in the time which must elapse before the troops can be employed in re-settling the province.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

[ *To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 21st March, 1804.

‘ I had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the 7th instant, and informed your Excellency of the particulars of the conferences which I had had with the Peshwah and his ministers during the time I was at Poonah; one of the subjects of those conferences was, the Peshwah’s design to attack the southern jaghiredars, and I deferred to lay my sentiments on that subject before your Excellency, till I should have had an interview with Colonel Close.

‘ Since I had the honor of addressing your Excellency, I have written a letter to the Rajah of Kolapoor, of which I enclose a translation, which lays the ground for any further proceeding that your Excellency may think proper to order for the settlement of the southern provinces. The operations of that chief being brought to a conclusion, the whole question respecting the southern jaghiredars lies between the Peshwah and them; and the British Government can easily settle it.

‘ The first point which it is desirable to obtain is, the Peshwah’s formal consent that the British Government should interfere between his Highness and the southern jaghiredars.

‘ If this should not be effected, the settlement will be imperfect; intrigues will be carried on by the Peshwah and his ministers, to derange the settlement made; and other sirdars of the empire, possibly some who have rendered services, and to whom the British Government may wish well, will be urged to excite disturbances in the countries allotted for the payment of the troops employed by the jaghiredars. By obtaining his Highness’s consent to the arrangement, persons of that description, or others, possibly really in rebellion, and not employed by him, will be deprived of the use of his Highness’s name, which is the common instrument used by every freebooter in the empire,

who takes up arms against his Highness's authority, or that of the persons acting under the authority of his government.

‘ After that is done, the best mode of settling the questions between the Peshwah and the jaghiredars is that alluded to in the third instance, in my address to your Excellency of the 7th instant, viz., “ to interfere in a certain degree; to ascertain the extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the southern jaghiredars; to oblige them to afford it, and, on the other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's government, and to guarantee to them their possessions, so long as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity.”

‘ The modes proposed in the first and second instances, in my address of the 7th instant, viz., “ to concur with the Peshwah in destroying the southern jaghiredars,” or “ to leave them and the Peshwah to their fate, and allow both parties to settle their disputes in the best manner they can, without interfering at all,” will infallibly occasion a contest, which will, in its consequences, affect the peace of the territories of the Honorable Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

‘ If the first mode be adopted, and the settlement of the country, after it shall have been taken from the jaghiredars, is to rest with the Peshwah's government, it will not be so advantageous to the British Government as that which exists at present; and if the second mode be adopted, the contest will be long, the issue uncertain, the resources of the country will be destroyed, the communications between Mysore and the troops at Poonah interrupted, vast bodies of freebooters will be collected in the southern provinces of this empire, and the British Government will at last be obliged to interfere, to provide for its own security and the peace of the territories of the Honorable Company, and of the Rajah of Mysore.

‘ The mode proposed in the fourth instance, viz., “ to make the jaghiredars at once independent states, under the protection, arbitration, and guarantee of the British Government,” is one which would possibly provide more effectually for the security of the Honorable Company, and their allies and dependents, than any other that could be devised. But it must be founded upon the fact, that the Peshwah has



broken his treaty with the Honorable Company, in instances in which it was in his power to perform it; and upon a knowledge of the personal characters and dispositions, and military resources of all the southern jaghiredars, which I am afraid we do not entirely possess.

‘The mode in which I have recommended to settle this question arises out of the treaty of Bassein, and the present state of his Highness’s government and power. The measure is pressed upon the British Government by considerations relative to the safety and peace of the Company’s territories, as well as the advantage of the Peshwah, the increase of his power, and of the means of his government to assist the British Government in any future war; and it will be a preparatory step to the independence of the jaghiredars under the Company’s protection, if circumstances should ever render that event necessary or desirable.

‘I have little doubt but that the southern jaghiredars, particularly the family of Pursheram Bhow, will readily come into this arrangement; and, in my opinion, if affairs should settle to the northward, the best period to complete it would be during the rainy season.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To the Rajah of Kolapoor.*

‘Bombay, 20th March, 1804.

‘You will have learned from various reports, that, after I had concluded treaties of peace with Senah Sahib Soubah, and the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I returned to the southward, and entirely defeated and dispersed a band of freebooters, who had assembled and were committing depredations within the frontier of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘Among those freebooters were Viswas Rao Ghautky, Mulwah Dada, and other chiefs, who had received the orders of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to withdraw with their troops, and join his army at Burhampoor, as peace had been made. When I arrived in their neighbourhood, I gave time to those chiefs to disperse and go away; but they did not think proper to obey the orders of their master, or to attend to my warning; and the consequence is, that they have been beaten and dispersed.

‘ Viswas Rao Ghautky is the brother of Sirjee Rao Ghautky ; and I have every reason to believe that the buckshee and troops in the service of the latter were in the action with my troops ; although Sirjee Rao himself was then residing at the Peshwah’s durbar. Viswas Rao Ghautky has fled to Kolapoor, and Sirjee Rao Ghautky has gone there from Wahy.

‘ I am perfectly aware of the family connexion between you and those brothers ; and it is not the custom of the British Government, and it is certainly not my wish, to perpetuate enmities, or to deprive those of an asylum who are inclined to live in tranquillity ; therefore I do not call upon you to give up those brothers, as I might be justified in doing.

‘ But as you have given them an asylum, I give you notice that the British Government will consider you responsible for their conduct ; and that if they assemble troops again, which can be intended only to disturb the peace of the territories of other powers, you will be to blame, and you will be called upon to answer for the injuries which they may do.

‘ As a friend, I give you this warning. It is time now that the nations of India should enjoy some peace ; and you may depend upon it, that the British Government will not suffer the peace to be disturbed by any body or any power with impunity.

‘ *The Rajah of Kolapoor.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Bombay, 22nd March, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters of the 2nd, 3rd, 10th, and 12th instant. My last letter will have detailed my plans in case of war with Holkar, which, however, I think not to be probable at present. We must attack him, however, if he does not refrain from his plunder of Scindiah’s territories : but Holkar appears to me to wish to avoid the contest at present ; and so does General Lake, possibly from a desire to give his troops some repose, and not to expose the Europeans to the hot winds in Hindustan. However, the letters which I shall receive from you, in the next three or

four days, will throw some light upon this subject, and will determine the measures which I shall take.

‘The army in Guzerat will be reinforced by three complete battalions, two of them 900 men each. It will be stronger by four battalions than it was during the war.

‘I have recommended your prize money exactly according to your wishes to the Governor General; but I have forgotten Mr. Elphinstone, both with respect to prize money, to which he is fully entitled, and to his salary as secretary, from the time he joined me at Ahmednuggur. The first shall be settled by me, if ever I receive the Governor General’s orders on the subject of the division of the prize, which he appears to have forgotten, as well as to take any notice of the battle of Argaum, the siege of Gawilghur, or the battle of Munkaiseer; all of which make me very uneasy, particularly when I know what has been done for the army in Bengal.

‘In respect to Mr. Elphinstone’s salary, I shall recommend it as soon as I receive an answer to any letter that I have written to Bengal since the month of December last.

‘Affairs in Persia are going on very badly, I should think. First of all, Manesty and Lovett exchanged situations, without order or authority. After announcing this arrangement to Government, they have changed back again; but Manesty has gone on to Taheran as an ambassador, I suppose from his own ships, and Lovett is gone to Bengal. Skippers are appointed to act as Residents at Bussora and Abushcher\*; and the Residents are considered (a favorite word in the diplomacy of the present day) as “absent by leave,” of whom is not stated.

‘I have received your letter without a date, but written, I suppose, on the 13th. My last letter will have convinced you that you have not written a line too much, at least to me, on the subject of Gwalior; and you will have observed that I have not received one of the letters, which you supposed that I had received previous to the 7th. But I wonder how you could imagine that you could write too much to me on any subject.

‘I have not time to tell you all that I have done at Poo-

\* The two principal ports in the Persian Gulf.

nah. Amrut Rao's affairs are settled. The Peshwah has the fort of Poonadhur; and Amrut Rao goes to Benares after the rains. I shall have the fort of Loghur, which I propose to give Kundy Rao Rastia, by which I shall secure the road to Poonah, through the Konkan. I have proposed a plan to the Governor General for the settlement of the affairs of the southern jaghiredars. These are the outlines of the arrangements made.

'The Governor General is deceived respecting the Peshwah's inclination to agree to the peace, as he is respecting many other points connected with that subject.

'I enclose the order for the forts.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Malcolm.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

'SIR,

'Bombay, 23rd March, 1804.

'I enclose a memorandum and a translation of it for Kundee Rao Rastia. I request you will give the memorandum to Colonel Close's Parsee servant, and desire him to deliver it in person to Kundee Rao Rastia. I should wish him to deliver the memorandum in private, although you will observe that it is a matter of no very great consequence, whether the Peshwah sees it or not. I should wish the Parsee to get an answer from Kundee Rao Rastia.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'E. S. Waring, Esq.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

'MY LORD,

'Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

'I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Major Malcolm, containing the names of rajahs and other feudatories of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with whom treaties have been made, or communication was held during the war, by the officer commanding in Guzerat.

'I propose hereafter to have the honor of forwarding, to be laid before your Excellency, the copies of the treaties made with the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, March 25th, 1804.

‘ I learn from letters from Colonel Murray that, during the war, he concluded engagements with the Rajahs of Lunawara, and Sounte, in Guzerat, which require that they should be independent of the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ Accordingly, I request that you will include the names of those Rajahs in the account which you will communicate to Scindiah’s durbar, by order from his Excellency the Governor General, of those feudatories of Scindiah’s government with whom treaties have been made during the war, by which they are rendered independent of Scindiah, under the ninth article of the treaty of peace.

‘ Colonel Murray had an intercourse, and received assistance in various ways from the Rajahs of Barreah, Kairah, Ballasinnore, Mullaow, Kundjiree, Umlyalla; and I beg that you will inform Scindiah’s government that those people will be entitled to the benefits of the tenth article of the treaty of peace.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shave.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

‘ I have written several letters to the Governor General, and you, upon the subject of a variety of important points in this country, to which I have hitherto received no answer—I conclude, because the Governor General has been occupied by other more important considerations. However, the time is now fast approaching, in which my ignorance of the Governor General’s intentions and wishes, on many points, to which I have alluded in my letters to you and to him, since the beginning of January, will be very inconvenient; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to review those letters and let me have an answer.

‘ All matters of detail depend upon the Governor General’s general arrangements, and there are many essentially necessary for the comfort and efficiency of the troops depending upon their distribution. I cannot commence one of them, or give any answer to one of the many references

regarding them, which I have received from Fort St. George, till I receive your answers to my letters written since the 1st January, or some intimation of the Governor General's intentions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 12th and 15th, and, in answer thereto, have to inform you that I have desired the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah to return the names of the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte as persons rendered independent of his government by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace; and the Rajahs of Barreah, Kairah, Ballasinnore, Mullaow, Kundjiree, Umlyalla, as persons for whose indemnity provision is made in the 10th article of the treaty of peace.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

‘ You will observe by my letter of this date, that I have desired that the treaties with the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte might be communicated to Scindiah, and that their names might be returned to his durbar, as those chiefs rendered independent of his government by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

‘ It is necessary, however, that you should send me copies of the treaties as they were written in the native language, with the signatures annexed, and the English copies, which I wish you to send with the native copies, in order that I may transmit them to be laid before the Governor General.

‘ I wish, also, to have the names of the other Rajahs who will come under the 10th article of the treaty of peace.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

SIR,

Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 24th instant, in which you convey to me the expression of a confident hope of his Highness the Peshwah, that I shall form such arrangements as that thieves, who have taken refuge in the woods, shall be prevented committing further devastations.

‘ I have long observed and lamented the state of the police in the territories of his Highness the Peshwah; and particularly the fact, that his Highness’s ministers and favorites are the patrons and the sharers of the profits gained by the thieves in their plunder of those whose necessities obliged them to travel through the country.

‘ I have frequently had occasion to punish those who had had the insolence to plunder, and even to murder, the dealers attached to the British army; but I never considered it to be a part of my duty to provide for the police of his Highness’s territories, although I have more than once conveyed my advice to his Highness’s ministers respecting their management of the country, which advice had for its object the suppression of robbery.

‘ One of the resources which I recommended to his Highness’s attention was to pardon those of his subjects who had offended him, and to return their houses and property, as the first step towards the establishment of tranquillity; because I conceive that so long as his Highness detains in the hands of his government the property of a great proportion of his subjects, those subjects must plunder for their subsistence; and I see no means in the hands of his Highness’s government to protect those who may be inclined to exert themselves to gain a subsistence by honest means.

‘ As the expectation that I should interfere in the police of the country has now, for the first time, been brought forward officially, I beg that you will state distinctly to his Highness the Peshwah, that I have no means in my power to provide for the police of his territories. The British troops cannot be dispersed in small bodies for the purposes either of revenue or police. These are branches of the civil government in which the British Government are bound by

treaty not to interfere. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that his Highness should adopt measures to have a force of his own for the ordinary purposes of his government, in order that he may not be obliged to have recourse to British assistance upon every trifling occasion. I request you to put this letter into the form of an official memorandum, and convey it to his Highness.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *E. S. Waring, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 23rd. You must have no scruple in acting at once for the benefit and safety of your corps, whenever you are fully convinced, from the evidence given to the persons appointed to inquire into the circumstances of any robbery, that those attached to your camp have been plundered or ill treated.

‘ In this instance I have no doubt but that Carribul and Manygee were both guilty of the murder. Accordingly I request that they may be hanged ; and let the cause of their punishment be published in the bazaar by beat of tom-tom, or in any other mode by which it may be supposed that it will be rendered more public.

‘ The patel of Batculgaum, in the usual style of a Marhatta patel, keeps a band of plunderers for his own profit and advantage. You will inform him that if he does not pay for the horses, bullocks, and articles plundered, he shall be hanged also. You will make him acquaint his village with this determination, and allow time for the answer to return ; and you will hang him if he does not pay the money at the time fixed upon.

‘ It is impossible to get on without these punishments in the Marhatta country. The Peshwah has no authority ; and if he had, he would not exert it for the advantage of our troops.

‘ I have lately been a little anxious about the fort of Loghur, which I imagined I should have been obliged to take by force. But I made a treaty yesterday with the killadar’s vakeel, which will save us that trouble ; and in a few days I



hope to be able to relieve you from the necessity of staying any longer in a part of the country, in which you experience difficulties on account of forage. Barclay wrote to you yesterday on this subject. I expect daily to receive orders from Bengal respecting the prize money.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Adams.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

‘ Captain Barclay wrote to you yesterday to inform you that I had made an arrangement with the killadar of Loghur for the delivery of that fort to the British troops, for the use of his Highness the Peshwah.

‘ The particulars of this engagement are, that the fort shall be delivered over to the British troops sent to take possession of it on the 2nd of April ; that the killadar and garrison shall be allowed to carry away their private property, not including guns, military stores, or grain ; that the killadar shall be taken under the protection of the British Government ; that he shall be allowed to take his property and family, and lodge them upon the island of Salsette ; that he shall have an escort of British troops to protect them upon the road to Salsette ; and that he shall hereafter be under the British protection and guarantee, so long as he shall conduct himself as a friend.

‘ Besides the killadar of Loghur, the widow of the late Nana Furnavees is in the fort of Loghur, and is provided for under this arrangement. This lady is to reside in the Peshwah’s territories, under the protection and guarantee of the British Government. She will, I imagine, choose Poonah as the place of her residence, but that point is not yet settled.

‘ I have been thus particular in detailing the objects of the arrangements made for obtaining possession of the fort of Loghur, in order that you may more clearly understand the instructions which I am about to give you, in order to carry these objects into execution.

‘ Upon your arrival at Karly, you will be so kind as to write a letter to the killadar, with which you will send the

enclosed from his carkoon at this place. You will inform the killadar that you are the officer appointed to receive charge of the fort; and that as the 2nd of April quickly approaches, it is desirable that he should send you a person, with whom you can conduct all the arrangements preparatory to the evacuation of the fort by his garrison. If he should omit to send you an answer immediately, or to depute a person to your camp, you will again write to him: inform him that the time presses; that I have ordered you not to take possession of the fort, excepting by force, on any day subsequent to the 2nd of April, without receiving further orders from me.

‘If he should send a carkoon to your camp, you will propose all the measures which you may think necessary, in order to obtain possession of the fort on the day stipulated; and you will particularly inform this carkoon that you have my orders not to take the fort under the arrangement concluded with Ambajee Punt, the killadar’s carkoon at Bombay, on any day excepting the 2nd of April; and that if the cession should be delayed beyond that day, it is my intention to attack that fort, or to insist upon terms in a new arrangement by no means so advantageous to the killadar as those concluded yesterday.

‘It is probable that the carkoon will object to the evacuation on the 2nd of April, that Dhoondoo Bullall, the killadar, has no means of moving his baggage; that the widow of Nana Furnavees has no tents; that a house is not provided for her reception at Poonah, &c.

‘In answer to these excuses you will say, that I have no objection to the killadar remaining in the fort till a convenient time shall have elapsed to enable him to remove his property; or to the lady remaining till all the preparations shall have been made for her removal to Poonah, and her accommodation in that city; but that the garrison, excepting unarmed attendants, must evacuate the fort on the day stipulated, and our troops must be put in possession of the gates and other points which will secure to us the fort.

‘Let the carkoon know that my anxious wish is to conduct this transaction in a manner that will be satisfactory and honorable to Dhoondoo Punt, and to the widow of Nana Furnavees; but I will not sacrifice essential objects

to that wish, nor admit of any trifling in engagements solemnly entered into.

‘If the carkoon should make any objection to the delivery of the fort, founded on the mutiny of the garrison and their want of pay, you will absolutely reject such objection ; and tell him that Dhoondoo Punt must abide by the consequences of this state of his garrison.

‘If you should be able to make all the arrangements for the peaceable possession of the fort, you will send Major Dallas there with his corps on the 2nd of April, to take possession ; giving him a caution to beware of treachery in his march through the woods or villages in the neighbourhood.

‘When he shall get possession, I most anxiously recommend him to conciliate Dhoondoo Bullall, the lady, and all the inhabitants of the fort, as far as may be in his power ; and not to commit any act not immediately necessary for the security of the fort and the troops, and by no means to consider the killadar and lady as prisoners.

‘If the arrangement for the delivery of possession should not be made on, or previously to, the 1st, so that you cannot take possession on the 2nd, you are to cease all communication with the killadar and his carkoon, and you will report the state of affairs to me at this place.

‘Upon your arrival at Karly, but particularly if the pioneers should have joined you, you will prepare materials for a siege. You will also look about you, and endeavor to ascertain the best mode of approaching the fort, particularly on and after the 2nd of April. If you should not have possession on that day, you will push your reconnoitring parties as close as may be practicable, and let them be numerous, and all out nearly at the same time.

‘If possession should not be delivered to you on the 2nd of April, apprise Colonel Wallace thereof, who has orders to march with the remainder of the army to Karly, and I propose to join it myself.

‘If you should obtain possession on the 2nd, you will give orders to Major Dallas to comply with the killadar’s requisitions for escorts to his property down the ghauts to Salsette. He is also to furnish an escort for the lady to go to Poonah, if she shall be prepared to set out ; and to act in

every respect in conformity to the spirit of the arrangement made with Ambajee Pundit, as above explained.

‘ Before the killadar leaves the fort he must give into your hands an order for the fort of Kellinjah, which is likewise to be ceded. This fort is near Wahy on the Kistna.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Adams.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

‘ I have frequently had occasion to observe the diligence, zeal, and other good qualities of Lieut. Frissell, particularly on a late occasion, when he had charge of the Residency at Poonah. I think it probable that his Excellency the Governor General will appoint him to be an assistant at Poonah, in conformity with your request; and that the appointment has been delayed only because his Excellency’s attention has been occupied by other important affairs.

‘ However, as I have been obliged to draw away from Poonah two gentlemen appointed to assist you, as you and the public have already derived great advantage from the use of Lieut. Frissell’s talents, and above all, as he has had charge of the Residency, I request that you will consider him as an assistant on the establishment from the date of your letter to his Excellency the Governor General, in which you stated that you recommended Lieut. Frissell to his Excellency, till you shall receive further orders from the Governor General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 29th March, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th. It is absolutely necessary that before you write to General Campbell, or before the troops are employed on any service for the Peshwah, measures should be taken to ascertain distinctly the Peshwah’s right, who is in possession, &c., and that care



be taken not to interfere with the Rajah of Kolapoor, or with any of the great southern jaghiredars.

‘ I refer you to a letter which I wrote in the end of January to Mr. Frissell on this subject. General Campbell has not the means of making the inquiries necessary in such a question as that referred to you ; and at all events, it ought not to be referred from the Residency to any military officer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Mr. Scott Waring.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Bombay, 29th March, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters to the (no date), but I believe the 20th instant ; upon which I have no remark to make. Shawe’s letter must have been very satisfactory to you in many respects, and I hope that you will have dispatched another letter to Edmonstone without delay.

‘ I do not like the Delhi journey. It will delay the final settlement of affairs in Hindustan, and will impede the settlement of many questions, on which a decision must be made before the Governor General can quit India. However, I fear that the plan of the journey will be carried into execution. I anticipate a favorable decision of the Gwalior question, from the change of ground which the Governor General has made, on which to place the question. He first founded all his arguments on the treaty with Ambajee ; in the second letter to General Lake, he founds them on the treaty with Ambajee, and that of the Ranah of Gohud ; and in the instructions to you, the treaty with Ambajee is laid aside, and the treaty with the Ranah of Gohud is alone brought forward. In my opinion that treaty affords good ground for your arrangement about Gohud, but none for Gwalior.

‘ I believe also that I have moved the Governor General a little about his treaties with the Rajah of Berar’s feudatories.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Graham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 29th March, 1804. ’

‘ It is difficult to say what ought to be done with Holkar’s man in Sieugaum. The best mode of proceeding with him, is to give him no cause to complain; and on this point I recommend that you should look sharply after your own Marhatta amildars, who are not unlikely, under our protection, to lay about them more than we can intend or justify. There is no calling any Marhatta to account without an army; but I shall bear this complaint in mind; and the conduct of Bunda Ali Khan shall not be unpunished, when the army shall move to that quarter. You may as well circulate the report that the army is coming there.

‘ As I observe that we have but little country left, and that little close to the fort of Ahmednuggur, I think that you might discharge nearly the whole of the provincial force.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the revenue reports and accounts. We must make some arrangements to feed the poor. To issue grain *gratis* will not answer. It will draw numbers of people to Ahmednuggur, and will thereby increase the distress. The best thing to do would be to undertake some useful work, such as the completion of the *glacis* of the fort, to perfect it, to knock down that bad work in front of the gateway, and to make a good modern *flèche* in lieu thereof, and pay the workmen in grain. This might answer, and I shall write to the engineer to desire him to give me his sentiments on the subject of the work to be undertaken. I have no objection to your proposal about Heura. It is a nice little fort, and might be very useful as a point of communication between Ahmednuggur and Aurungabad.

‘ I wish you would give one hundred rupees to the jemidar of cavalry, who behaved so well in the Gundapoor district, as a reward for his good conduct. I only wish he had kept the guns. Do not give up the sirdeshmookhy of Puttun till you hear further from me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Graham.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Bombay, 30th March, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the (no date), in which you acknowledge the receipt of mine of the 14th and 15th. I hope that you will have received mine of the 17th, in time to delay the discussions on the subject of Gwalior, which it appears by another letter that you intended to bring forward. However, I have but faint hopes that I shall succeed in inducing the Governor General to alter his intentions; as, by a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. Edmonstone, it appears that he insists upon the confirmation of all the treaties made with the feudatories of the Rajah of Berar; some of which were signed at Cuttack, not less than ten days after the intelligence of the treaty of peace.

‘ I have to observe also upon those treaties, that they have been negotiated and concluded, not with the real Rajahs or feudatories, but with their rannees or ministers. The real Rajahs are, and have always been, in confinement at Nagpoor. The Governor General has, however, offered compensation to the Rajah of Berar for the loss he will sustain by the transfer of these Rajahs from his authority. But this will not satisfy him, as I know that his object was to establish his own authority in those countries.

‘ My dear Malcolm, we shall have another war, and the worst of it will be, that all these questions will not bear inquiry. It is not even denied that the treaties were signed many days after the treaty of peace was known at Cuttack; but all that is nothing; the previous *verbiage* is thought sufficient to bind us, as if the signing of a treaty was not that which concluded and bound the parties; and as if, in the treaty of peace with Ragojee, we had not so far insisted upon this point as to continue our operations till he had ratified his treaty.

‘ I declare that I am dispirited and disgusted with this transaction beyond measure; however, I can say no more on it. The orders are called final; but my public letters, written in February, show my opinion of it.

‘ There is good news about the China fleet, in which this settlement is much interested.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Bombay, 1st April, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters to the 24th March. Your breeze about Gwalior and Gohud went off tolerably well. My reason for wishing to avoid all discussion on the subject was, that it was carried on in such a tone, that I feared something would be said, which would render it impossible for the Governor General to concede, which I think still that he may be inclined to do. God send that he may, for the subject will not stand discussion.

‘ Goorparah was with me this morning; he said that Scindiah was not so well satisfied with his communications with General Lake, as he was with those which he had had with me. I told him that both acted under the orders of the Governor General, and that the communications of both ought to be the same; but I said that the fact was, that Scindiah used Ambajee Inglia, or one of his people in his communication with General Lake; that Ambajee had destroyed Scindiah, and deceived General Lake, which was the cause of the difficulty of the present moment, in respect to the ninth article of the treaty of peace; and that it was probable that General Lake entertained doubts of his sincerity in every communication which he made on the part of Scindiah; and that where there was no confidence nothing could succeed. Accordingly, I recommended that he should appoint another agent. Goorparah said that he would recommend the change, and desired me to write to you upon the subject.

‘ However, it is possible that Scindiah may wish to delay the change, for the same reasons that he wishes to delay to take possession of Dhoolpoor, &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 1st April, 1804.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 20th March. The general rule respecting the trial of criminals, for offences committed even in camps in the Com-



pany's territories is, that they should be made over to the Company's civil tribunals; and I understood from Mr. Duncan, that a mode of trying criminals has been ordered by the government of Bombay, and that it will be put in execution whenever any criminals shall be arrested and sent to the Resident or collector for trial.

‘ According to this mode of procedure, the trial and punishment of an offender will not be quite so quick as we might wish, but it will be certain and regular: at all events, it is the mode ordered by government, and must be put into execution.

‘ However, I think that bheels, and people of that description, whose profession is plunder, and who come armed into the camp for that purpose, ought not to be considered and treated as common robbers. They are public enemies and rebels against all authority, and I recommend that when one of them is caught in the camp, whether it be situated in the Company's territories, or in those of the Rajah, he may be shot by the nearest rear guard, if he should be taken in the act of robbery. If something of this kind be not done, the robberies and outrages of the bheels will reduce the troops to the greatest distress.

‘ If a robbery should be committed in the camp when it is situated in the territories of the Guickwar, Mr. Duncan and I are both of opinion that the criminal ought to be tried and punished according to military process, under the orders of the commanding officer. The country is the Rajah's and the Company's civil authority has no power within it. The Rajah's civil power, to which, according to our notions, the trial of criminals ought to belong, has no authority in our camps; it cannot be admitted there, and, therefore, can have no jurisdiction.

‘ Accordingly, if a robbery be committed in the camp, when situated in the Rajah's territory, the criminal must be tried and punished by military process. Of course this power must be used with discretion; care must be taken not to shock the feelings by violent or unusual punishments, nor to interfere, in any manner, with persons employed in the collection of the revenue or the administration of the government.

‘ I enclose a copy of Major Malcolm’s answer on the subject of the behaviour of Scindiah’s servants in Guzerat.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 3rd April, 1804.

‘ I have just received your letters of the 23rd and 25th. By the last accounts from Hindustan, I judge that Holkar will remain quiet; and that the Governor General will be able to leave him unmolested, of which I have reason to believe he is desirous. At all events, I am very certain that Holkar will not be attacked previous to the next rains.

‘ We have concluded the subsidiary alliance with Scindiah; which event, and the possibility of a war with Holkar, induced me to take measures to strengthen Guzerat immediately with two battalions, one from Poonah, and another, consisting of nine hundred men, seven hundred of them old soldiers, from Goa: and I have it in contemplation to send into Guzerat another battalion from Goa; I shall, however, wait to send it till I shall receive orders to do so from Madras, unless the war with Holkar should be certain.

‘ You must dispose of the troops in such a manner as you may think most expedient, bearing in mind the disposition which I originally proposed to Mr. Duncan, and the fact that your enemies are all to the northward at present. I shall take away from you, for Bombay, the five companies of the 84th regiment.

‘ In case of a war with Holkar, you must, besides the corps in front of Surat, have a disposable corps of two or three battalions, as a reserve, in Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda. With your Europeans, and the remainder of your force, and the Rajah’s cavalry, I should wish you to penetrate towards Indore, where you would be joined by a large proportion of Scindiah’s army, and very probably I should be in communication with you with a corps from this quarter.

‘ According to this plan, we ought to be hanged if we do not get the better of Holkar in a very short time.

‘ A reserve is necessary in Guzerat to keep Canojee in check, and to prevent Holkar from detaching to your rear.

‘ I mention these ideas to you now, not because there is

any probability of a war, but that you may turn your mind to the system of operations which I prefer, if there should be one. In the mean time, you will do well to take every measure in your power to establish the Company's authority in the districts supposed to be disturbed, as the more firm we are at home, the greater safety will attend our forward movement into the enemy's country, if ever that should be necessary.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray,*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major \* \* \* \*.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 3rd April, 1804.

‘ Captain Wilks has transmitted to me a copy of a letter which you addressed to him on the 10th of March, and a copy of his answer of the 23rd of March, from which I am concerned to observe that you have mistaken the nature of your situation at Bangalore.

‘ It never entered into my contemplation to confide the military defence of Bangalore to a havildar and twelve sepoys, placed under your superintendence ; or to require from them more than to preserve the Company's property which was, and may still be, in the fort. The duties required from you were to keep up the communication between the Presidency and the advanced stations of the army ; to see that stores for the troops did not delay on the road ; and above all, to give countenance to the servants of the native government of Mysore, in its communications with the Company's servants and subjects travelling on the high road between Madras and Seringapatam, and the frontier ; and also to take care that the government should be treated with the respect which it deserves.

‘ The way in which you have performed these duties is, first, to take possession of the fort as a military post, which was never intended ; and then to quit your situation, (I conclude by permission of the Commander in Chief, but without attending to my orders of March, 1803,) and to leave to the havildar and the guard to carry into execution all your oppressive orders regarding the military post, the result of which must be to degrade the government in the eyes of those over whom its authority must be extended. The con-

sequence of those orders (which were not communicated to the amildar, although directed against him personally) was, that there was a dispute between that part of your garrison stationed at the gate, and the amildar's attendants, upon the occasion of his attempting to enter the fort. I hope I shall not be accused of insulting the havildar's guard, when I say that they owe their safety and their lives at this moment to the moderation of the amildar, to whose conduct you have been pleased to apply the term "infamous."

'It is no part of my duty to defend the officers of the government of Mysore, or I should find it an easy task upon the present occasion; but it is so to confine the attention of the officers under my command strictly to their duty: accordingly, I have to direct that you will recall your orders regarding the gate at Bangalore: indeed, unless the amildar should wish you to take charge of it, I do not see that you have anything to do with the gate; and to confine your attention and the services of your sepoy's entirely to the objects specified in the second paragraph of this letter.

'I observe that you have not sent your returns of the garrison of Bangalore for the last two months: I conclude, because you have been absent.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major \* \* \* \*.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Wilks.*

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Bombay, 3rd April, 1804.

'I have received your letter of the 23rd of March. I shall never consider it a trouble to interfere in supporting the authority of the government of Mysore; and accordingly, I have written a letter to Major \* \* \* \* this day, of which I enclose you a copy. As you have desired it, I have not dismissed him from his situation, which I certainly should have otherwise done. But I have said enough to prevent a recurrence of the inconvenience complained of.

'Colonel Close is quite well, and he and Webbe go to Poonah on the day after to-morrow. From thence Webbe will go to Ougein. I hope to leave this in a few days.

'Believe me, &c.

'Captain Wilks.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Lieut. Colonel Adams.*

‘SIR,

‘Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3rd instant. I beg you to accept my acknowledgments for the manner in which you have carried into execution the instructions which I gave you, with a view of obtaining possession of Loghur. Every thing has been conducted to my satisfaction; and I observe in this instance the same zeal and judgment of which I have frequently enjoyed the advantages during the campaign.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Adams.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

‘I have received your letter of the 1st. I am afraid that you will find rice to be but bad food for the horses of the cavalry, and I have endeavoured to get some gram here for you. I think that I shall be able to send off to the stores at Poonah three or four thousand loads of some kind of gram in a few days. I think that Captain Monteith would do well to send his bullocks to a great distance towards the Nizam’s country to get grain.

‘I am preparing the orders and arrangements to break up, which I hope to be able to send you in a day or two. I shall also write to you a few lines about the prize money, although I have not yet received the Governor General’s orders upon that subject.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Graham.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

‘I enclose a letter from Bunda Ali Khan, and a copy of it.

‘I mean to pay the expense of the sebundy in Scindiah’s villages, all the time we held them, and give him the clear revenue.

‘Arrange this matter accordingly.

‘Believe me, &c.

*Major Graham.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

‘ I had the honor to inform your Excellency in my letter of the 7th March, that the Peshwah had called upon me to resent an affront which he received from the killadar of Kellinjah, when he was on a late excursion to the river Kistna, at Wahy. The fort of Kellinjah is of no very great strength, I imagine, and belongs to the family and adherents of the Nana Furnavees. The widow of Nana Furnavees resides at Loghur, where the greatest part of Nana’s treasure is supposed to be lodged, and the killadar, Dhoondoo Bullall, is the principal of all Nana’s adherents. Loghur is a fort of extraordinary strength, situated immediately on the road between Poonah and Bombay, and it can command the communication between those two places.

‘ Dhoondoo Bullall, the killadar of Loghur, had made a proposal some years ago to Mr. Duncan, that he might be permitted to retire with his property to Bombay, to reside there under the Company’s protection; which proposal having been referred to the Peshwah, his Highness refused to consent to it. It has been renewed at different periods, and in different channels since that time; but since the conclusion of the peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, Dhoondoo Bullall made proposals to Mr. Duncan which indicated a wish to depart from those heretofore made, and which went to his permanent establishment in his fort, and to the adoption of a son, by the widow of the late Nana Furnavees.

‘ Affairs were in this situation when I arrived at Poonah, and was pressed by the Peshwah to resent the insult offered to him at Kellinjah. On the other hand, I had no reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Dhoondoo Bullall during the war. He had it in his power to interrupt the communication with Bombay, and to do great mischief in that manner; but his conduct was strictly neutral; and in the different letters which I had occasion to write to him, I gave him assurances, that so long as he should conduct himself as a faithful servant of the Peshwah, he should not be molested by the British troops.

‘ The unexpected alteration of the proposals of the killadar of Loghur created some suspicion in my mind; and I de-

terminated, when I went to Poonah, to bring him to a decision, in respect to his future plans; and to adopt a mode of securing the communication with Bombay, which should not depend entirely on the promises, or the forbearance of Dhoondoo Bullall. The insult to the Peshwah at Kellinjah, which could not be passed over at all events, held out a fair opportunity of settling every thing, respecting the important fort of Loghur, upon a firm basis.

‘ In the conference with the Peshwah’s minister, reported to your Excellency in my address of the 7th March, your Excellency will observe that he agreed to the terms which I intended to propose to Dhoondoo Bullall; those were, that the killadar should be allowed to remove with his property to Bombay, that the widow of Nana Furnavees should reside in the Peshwah’s territories where she should think proper, under the protection of the British Government, and that she should enjoy a pension from the Peshwah, under the guarantee of the British Government.

‘ It was besides agreed, that the person to be appointed killadar hereafter by the Peshwah, should be a person trusted by the British government.

‘ According to this arrangement, I informed Dhoondoo Bullall, that the Peshwah had serious cause to complain of him; that his highness had been grossly insulted at Kellinjah; that the British Government would not suffer this insult to pass unnoticed; and that he must either satisfy his Highness on that subject, as well as respecting his conduct in future, or he must surrender the forts of Loghur and Kellinjah. I informed him at the same time, that if he should be inclined to surrender his forts, the proposals which he had made to Mr. Duncan some years ago should be accepted; and that he should be permitted to reside at Bombay with all his property, under the protection of the British Government.

‘ At the same time that I sent these proposals, I ordered a detachment from the army, consisting of the 78th regiment, and two battalions of native infantry, to march towards Poonah; and they have since advanced towards Loghur, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Adams, with a battering train, and the detachment heretofore at Poonah.

‘ A negotiation was commenced shortly after these pro-

posals were made; which, after much Marhatta tergiversation, and some insolent and extravagant proposals, all tending to delay the final settlement, was concluded by a treaty on the 26th March, of which I have the honor to enclose copies in the English and Marhatta languages.

‘According to the terms of this treaty, the fort of Loghur was delivered up to the British troops on the 2nd instant, and Dhoondoo Bullall and his property are on their way to Bombay, escorted by a British detachment. The widow of Nana Furnavees, who has chosen Culwah, opposite to Tannah in Salsette, as the place of her residence in future, accompanies him.

‘Upon consultation with Colonel Close, it appears most desirable to give the fort to Kundee Rao Rastia, as he is the only person in the Peshwah’s service who possesses certain means of paying the garrison; and as Bassein and other possessions in the Conkan are in his hands, all of which are at the mercy of the government of Bombay, there are ample means of controlling him, in the use which he might have it in his power to make of this fort. But besides these advantages attending this disposal of it, there is every reason to believe that Kundee Rao Rastia is attached to the Peshwah’s cause, and fully aware of the benefits of his Highness’s alliance with the British Government. I have therefore requested Colonel Close to recommend to the Peshwah to give this fort to Kundee Rao Rastia.

‘I beg leave to draw your Excellency’s attention to the favorable circumstance attending this arrangement. Besides the security which it gives to the communication between Bombay and Poonah, by placing in the hands of a friend a post reported by Lieut. Colonel Adams to be of extraordinary strength, the family and adherents of Nana Furnavees are taken under the protection and guarantee of the British Government, a circumstance highly honorable to the national character.

‘It is supposed (on what grounds I am not able to say) that the killadar of Loghur possesses large treasures. The Peshwah and his ministers assert it positively; and there can be no doubt, but that the cause of the former proposal of Dhoondoo Bullall to Mr. Duncan, and his motive at present, for giving up his fort, arise from a desire to save



his property. Whatever that property may be, it will add to the resources and capital of this opulent island.

‘ In the course of the various revolutions in the government of Poonah, many soucars and others possessing property, took refuge at Loghur, where they remained till this time. I know that some, and, I believe, almost all, of these persons will come to Bombay in the train of Dhoondoo Bullall, and will settle here with their property, adding again to the resources of Bombay.

‘ This island now becomes, by the possession of Loghur by the Peshwah, the only place of security in this part of India for property, and for those who are the objects of the Peshwah’s enmity and vengeance ; a circumstance equally honorable to the character of the British nation and advantageous to their interests, and affording the strongest proof of the confidence which the natives repose in the justice and wisdom of our policy and our laws.

‘ It may happen that the Peshwah will claim some of the persons, who may come into Bombay upon this occasion, as his subjects, under his treaties with the Honorable Company.

‘ In the course of the conversations which I have had with different natives, on the subject of their settling in Bombay, I have apprized them of the nature of the engagements of the British Government with the Peshwah ; but I have told them that it never was intended that those engagements should be made the instruments of the Peshwah’s vengeance, or deprive those of an asylum, who, in a long course of political contests, had, at some time or other, been his opponents ; that, of course, every case would be strictly inquired into, and that no person, who should take refuge on the island of Bombay, should be given up, respecting whom it was not proved that he was a decided enemy of the Peshwah.

‘ According to this principle, I have requested Lieut. Colonel Close to inquire particularly into the case of every person demanded by the Peshwah’s government, before he should require him from the government of Bombay.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

‘ When I had occasion to call Mr. Elphinstone and Mr. Strachey from the Residency at Poonah, I requested the Governor of Bombay to send to Poonah Mr. Goodwin, a gentleman who, I had heard, had distinguished himself at the College at Fort William; as, in the absence of Lieut. Colonel Close and of Mr. Waring, whose return was not to be expected, there was no gentleman at that Residency to assist Lieut. Frissell.

‘ Upon my arrival at Poonah, I found that Mr. Goodwin was a senior civil servant to Mr. Waring, whose appointment was only that of an assistant; and I was informed that, according to the rules of the service, Mr. Goodwin, if appointed to act as an assistant, would have charge of the Residency in the absence of Colonel Close.

‘ I therefore determined to send him on to one of the other durbars, at which assistance was equally wanted; and, in the mean time, till an opportunity of his moving from Poonah should offer, he has given whatever assistance was in his power to the Residency at Poonah.

‘ I have now requested Mr. Webbe to take Mr. Goodwin to Ougein, and to consider him as an Assistant with that Residency till your Excellency’s orders should be received.

‘ The Residency at Poonah is greatly in want of assistance; in fact, it was given in charge to Lieut. Frissell, who does not belong to the diplomatic branch of it, on the late occasion of the absence of Lieut. Colonel Close and Mr. Waring. In consequence of this circumstance, and of a letter which I received from Lieut. Colonel Close, of which I enclose a copy, I wrote to Lieut. Colonel Close to request that he would consider Lieut. Frissell as an assistant at Poonah, from the date of his address to your Excellency on that subject.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter to Lieut. Colonel Close, upon this occasion.

‘ I hope that your Excellency will approve of these arrangements.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Elphinstone, containing fresh complaints from the ministers of the Rajah of Berar, of the conduct of Gungaram Pundit, the Soubah’s amildar in the Berar country. This conduct, in which Gungaram Pundit appears determined to persevere, notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of peace, and with the letter and spirit of the treaty of Deogaum. If the Rajah of Berar should retaliate, the Soubah of the Deccan will lose all the advantages which he might derive from a sole possession of the rich countries ceded by the treaty of peace; and the consequences may be a renewal of the war. In that case the British Government may be reduced to the necessity of making a choice between seeing the reduction of the power of its ally, or commencing a war in which the Soubah of the Deccan will have been the aggressor. I therefore most earnestly urge you to use your influence at the court of Hyderabad to induce the soubah of the Deccan to perform the stipulations of the treaty of peace.

‘ In my opinion, Gungaram Pundit ought to be seized and punished for his conduct; and, until that measure is adopted, no amildar will obey the orders which he may receive.

‘ As the Berar country is at present managed by the Soubah’s officers for the benefit of the allies, I request you to inquire, and report to his Excellency the Governor General, whether Rajah Ragotim Rao has interfered and given orders inconsistent with the principles of peace, and with the instructions which I gave to Rajah Mohiput Ram.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 7th April, 1804.

‘ I had yesterday the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th, and two letters of the 22nd of March.

‘ I must first take the liberty of expressing my acknowledgments for the handsome manner in which you have been

pleased to notice my services, in your dispatches to His Royal Highness the Duke of York and to his Majesty's ministers.

‘In the course of the operations intrusted to me, I certainly had difficulties to encounter which are inseparable from all military service in this country, but I enjoyed an advantage which but few have had in a similar situation. I served under the immediate orders of an officer, who was fully aware of the nature of the operations to be performed ; and who, after considering all that was to be done, gave me his full confidence and support, in carrying into execution the measures which the exigency of the service might require.

‘Under these circumstances I was enabled to undertake every thing with confidence ; and if I failed, I was certain it would be considered with indulgence.

‘I declare that I cannot reflect upon the events of the last year without feeling for you the strongest sentiments of gratitude, respect, and attachment ; and to have received these marks of approbation has given me more real satisfaction, than all that I have received from other quarters.

‘As soon as I received the account from Major Kirkpatrick of the event at Hyderabad, I took measures to send up additional quantities of grain from hence to Poonah, as I thought it probable that you would be desirous of sending to Hyderabad the grain which had been prepared in the Ceded districts for the troops. I have not yet called for that grain, as in fact we have as much at Poonah and Ahmednuggur as we can well require ; and I wished still to leave the bullocks in the Ceded districts, in order that they might have a chance of forage for some time longer, and might come fresh to the troops, if their services should be required at a late period in the season.

‘I rather think that Holkar will remain quiet. He has opened a negotiation with General Lake ; and General Lake has spoken to his vakeels with great firmness, but with moderation and indulgence. The vakeels at first were very exorbitant in their demands, and, as usual, rather insolent, but before they departed they acknowledged that Holkar was unequal to the British Government. They in a manner threw themselves upon General Lake's mercy,



and said that he, Holkar, would retire to his own territories as soon as they should return to camp.

‘ I think it probable, not indeed certain, that there will be no interruption of the peace ; although it is possible that the negotiations with Holkar may be protracted to a late period in the season, notwithstanding that General Lake has placed them on such a basis as to render their early conclusion the most probable event. In a few days I shall understand the subject more clearly, and I shall determine either upon keeping the troops here during the rainy season, or upon sending them back. This I must do immediately, as they want clothing and other necessaries which they must have at an early period ; and the place must be fixed at which each corps can meet what it may want.

‘ As soon as I shall be able to determine whether to break up or keep the troops together, I shall write to Major General Campbell respecting the bullocks in the Ceded districts.

‘ In answer to your letter of the 20th of March, I have to inform you that I determined to pay Goklah and Appah Dessaye after the month of February, when I marched the Marhatta troops back to Poonah.

‘ I have handed Amrut Rao over to the Resident at Poonah. The Mysore troops have never been more than a temporary burden on my finances, as when the convoys have arrived, they have regularly repaid the advances which had been made to them.

‘ I have also to observe that the advances made to the Peshwah’s troops are in a train of repayment to the Resident at Poonah, from the revenues of the Ahmedabad district in Guzerat, amounting to about six lacs of rupees per annum. I believe that the Peshwah does not owe us more than six lacs of rupees on this account.

‘ The future demand therefore upon the finances of the British Government, for the troops in this country, will be only for the troops belonging to it.

‘ From what I have above mentioned respecting Holkar, you will observe that I cannot say exactly what will be the number of troops to be paid in this country after April ; but I propose to desire the Paymaster to send his estimates

regularly every month to the Paymaster General, according to the regulations of the service.

‘Till I see one of these estimates, I cannot ascertain exactly the amount of the monthly expense. I think, however, that a sum amounting to about one lac of pagodas per mensem ought, if possible, to be sent for the service of the division under my command, if their numbers should not be reduced. It is true that we may not require the whole of that sum. It is possible, and, from what has passed already, more than probable, that we shall be able to procure at Poonah, for bills on Bombay, Benares, and Calcutta, money to defray the greater part of the expense of the troops stationed in this country ; which mode would possibly be the cheapest, and certainly the most convenient, to the government of Fort St. George. But the supply is so very uncertain at present, that Colonel Close cannot engage to furnish the funds required. I had a full discussion with him on this subject before I received your letter, of which that was the result.

‘However, I know that there are several causes which must produce an increase of the money to be got at Poonah for bills ; and I have but little doubt that in a short time Colonel Close will be able to procure so much in that manner, as to be entirely independent of any to be sent from the Carnatic.

‘I shall desire the Paymaster to send an account of the expenses incurred on account of the auxiliary troops serving during the war. The account, however, must be balanced by the revenues received by the Resident at Poonah from the Ahmedabad district.

‘Indeed, the payments made to the Peshwah’s troops stand in our accounts to the debit of the Resident at Poonah. I shall take care that, with the account, shall be sent such information respecting the amount of the revenues received by the Resident, as will show the real state of the transaction, and of the balance still due.

‘I have the pleasure to inform you that I have received a letter from Major Shawe, from which I learn that the Governor General has approved of, and has adopted my sentiments respecting the necessity of obliging our allies to place

their military establishments on an efficient footing. This is in my opinion a very important point.

‘Mr. Webbe and Colonel Close went away the day before yesterday; the latter much recovered.

‘I have taken from the Peshwah the important fort of Loghur, by capitulation with the killadar. But I propose to send you to-morrow copies of my late dispatches to the Governor General, which will show you the arrangement I have made in the last month, and those which I have proposed to the Governor General for the future settlement of various points in this country.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

At a Meeting of the British Inhabitants of Calcutta, held on the 21st of February, 1804, an Address was proposed by Mr. Speke, the Chairman, and unanimously voted to be presented, on the 29th of February, to his Excellency the Governor General.

The Chairman then read and presented to his Excellency certain resolutions of the British inhabitants of Calcutta, of which the following is an extract, connected with the subject of the Address; with the request of the settlement, that his Excellency the Governor General would be pleased to communicate to Major General Wellesley the desire of the settlement, as expressed in that resolution.

‘Resolved, that a sword of the value of £1000 be presented to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, in the name of the British inhabitants of this settlement, as a testimony of the sense which they entertain of the services rendered by him to the East India Company, and to his country.’

His Excellency the Governor General was pleased to signify his compliance with the above solicitation of the settlement in the following terms :

‘GENTLEMEN,

‘This honor is peculiarly acceptable to the warmest sentiments of my heart. The zeal of fraternal affection and of private friendship cannot furnish expressions of approbation equal to those which the services of Major General Wellesley

demand from my public duty. He will receive this honor with every degree of satisfaction which private regard can add to public sentiment.

‘ WELLESLEY.’

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 8th April, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letter of the 9th March, with the resolution of the British inhabitants of Calcutta, passed at a meeting held the 21st of February, presenting to me a sword of the value of one thousand pounds, which resolution was transmitted to me by your Excellency.

‘ I have expressed my sense of the honor conferred on me by the British inhabitants of Calcutta, in a letter to the chairman of the meeting in which they passed their resolution, which I have the honor to enclose, and I request your Excellency to give orders that it may be forwarded to Mr. Speke.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Peter Speke, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, April 8th, 1804.

‘ His Excellency the Governor General has transmitted to me a resolution passed at a meeting of the British inhabitants of Calcutta, on the 21st of February, for presenting to me a sword, as a testimony of the sense which they entertain of the services which I have had an opportunity of rendering to the East India Company and our country.

‘ The approbation of gentlemen, with many of whom I have the honor of being personally acquainted, for whom individually I have the highest respect, and who have been distinguished during the eventful administration of His Excellency the Governor General, by their sentiments of zeal for the public interests, is extremely gratifying to me; and I request you to express to the British inhabitants of Calcutta, the satisfaction, respect, and gratitude, with which I receive this honorable testimony of their approbation of the conduct of the troops who served in the Deccan under my command, and of their kindness towards myself.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *P. Speke, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 8th April, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the 75th regiment, a detachment of the 88th, and a detachment of the 61st, sailed from hence on the 5th instant, for Bengal. These troops had been embarked at Surat in the end of February; but in consideration of the recommendation of Admiral Rainier, and of his giving it as his opinion, that, in consequence of the expected change of the winds, they would arrive in Bengal, if they should not sail till the middle of March, at as early a period as if they should sail immediately, I consented to the detention of the ships till the troops which I proposed to send from Poonah should have approached Bombay.

‘ Afterwards, the crew of the *Centurion*, the ship appointed by Admiral Rainier to convoy the fleet of transports, became very unhealthy, and Captain Rainier was obliged to land the men for their recovery. None of the other men of war in Bombay harbour were fit for sea, or likely to be so for many days; and it became necessary to arm one of the transports in order to give protection to the fleet. This took some time, and, upon the whole, the fleet could not sail till the 5th instant. There is every reason to hope that they will have a short passage to Bengal.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Bombay, 9th April, 1804.

‘ Mr. Duncan has shown to me your letter to him on the subject of Powar of Dhar; I entirely agree in opinion with you on that subject.

‘ Powar is a Marhatta chief of the same nominal rank in the empire as Scindiah and Holkar; but he is not so powerful as either, and latterly he appears to have considered himself as inferior to the former, and served in Scindiah’s army at the battle of Assye. After that battle he fled to Dhar, and opened a friendly communication with Major Walker, and since the peace he has come to Baroda without leave.

‘ We have no right to interfere in favor of Powar under the 9th article of the treaty of peace ; and in your letter to Mr. Duncan you have pointed out clearly the inutility of attempting it under the 10th article.

‘ If we are not to interfere in favor of Powar in consequence of either the 9th or 10th article of the treaty of peace, the question is, whether we ought to interfere on any other ground more general.

‘ I have always been of opinion that we have weakened Scindiah more than is politic ; and that we shall repent having established such a number of these little independent powers in India, every one of whom will require the support of the British Government, which will occasion a constant demand of employment of troops, a loss of officers and men, and a claim of money.

‘ In respect to Powar, he is naturally, and in consequence of the local situation of his capital in the neighbourhood of both Holkar and Scindiah, the weakest of the weak. For that reason, I objected to making a treaty with him ; because I knew he would render us no service in the war adequate to the expense of supporting him in a state of independence in peace, which operation would have required an army. That opinion is not changed by his having gone to Baroda ; and all that I can recommend for Powar is, that if Scindiah’s durbar should be brought into tolerable temper, a general recommendation of this chief should be given in by the Resident, founded upon his connexion with the Guickwar, with whom the British Government is so closely allied.

‘ In respect to the idea of supporting Powar’s independence, as a member of the Marhatta empire, that in my opinion is equally absurd with taking up the cause of Cashee Rao Holkar. There is nothing new.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Bombay, 10th April, 1804.

‘ I received only last night your letter of the 7th instant. I did not know of the inconvenience suffered by the Sheer Shahy mohurs, or I should have regulated the issue of them. Indeed, I did not know that we had such a coin.

‘ In the first place you must order Major Robertson to exchange for rupees, or other coin, every Sheer Shahy mohur now in the hands of the troops ; in the next place, let Major Robertson send me a report, stating the number of this coin he has, when he received them, and at what rates of exchange ; in the third place, you must send me an official report, stating that these coins will not circulate at a higher exchange than thirteen rupees\*.

‘ In future, when there is any coin in the treasury not likely to circulate at a rate as high as the other coins, it ought to be issued only at small sums at a time ; and only in the same proportion to each individual that that coin bears in the treasury to the other coins. I gave an order on the subject on the 27th of October, and another on the 4th of December last, to which I refer you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Bombay, 10th April, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st instant, and I entirely agree in opinion with you regarding the 10th article of the treaty of peace. Accordingly, I beg you to say nothing about the persons in Guzerat whose names I sent you in my letter of the 25th instant.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 10th April, 1804.

‘ I received only last night your letter of the 6th. In respect to the countries to the southward, I have only to refer you to my letter to Mr. Frissell, of the 30th of January, for my sentiments regarding the mode of proceeding to be adopted when the Peshwah calls for assistance. Colonel Close must be the best judge whether it is proper to assist the Peshwah’s amildar to take possession of the countries now held by the Putwurdun family, Rastia, the Rajah of Kolapoor, Goklah, Appah Dessaye, the Goorparah family,

\*. See Letter to Major Kirkpatrick, 14th October, 1803.

&c. &c., all of which are included in the list transmitted to me by you.

‘ This very list is the strongest proof that can be given of the propriety of the advice which I gave to Mr. Frissell in my letter of the 30th January.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *E. S. Waring, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of orders issued by me, which require your Excellency’s confirmation.

‘ The first, relating to the officers heretofore in Scindiah’s service, were issued to provide a regular mode of paying and of disposing of them, and the last to provide for the duties of the subsidiary force at Poonah. I fixed upon the officers to perform those duties, who had distinguished themselves during the war, and whose talents were most likely to be useful. Captain Noble, Mr. Gilmour, Lieut. Bellingham, and Major Robertson, had filled the same situations with the division of the army under my command, and had conducted the service of their several departments in a manner highly advantageous to the public interests. Lieut. Bellingham was employed confidentially by me in the care and arrangement of my papers, in which situation he has given me entire satisfaction; and is deserving of a public reward for his services.

‘ The staff appointed for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, is the same as that appointed for the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

‘ I enclose a letter for Colonel Wallace, in which I have desired him to send a detachment to obtain possession of Kellinjah, along with the Peshwah’s troops, of such strength as you may think necessary for the purpose.

‘ If the Peshwah has any troops, in my opinion, one company will be sufficient. If he should not have any, the



number must be increased. The principal object in sending them is to hold the fort till the Peshwah can take possession of it, and to give security to the killadar and his garrison, and their property.

‘Orders are gone to Major Dallas, to give the fort of Loghur to any person that shall arrive there with a letter from you, pointing out that he is the person to receive it. I hope that you will soon have arranged that point with the durbar.

‘I think of moving the army towards Loghur, in the valley of the Poonah river, in order to get forage, &c., at a cheaper rate.

‘It is reported here, that the Peshwah has lost Poonadur already. What truth there is in this report, I cannot say.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Graham.*

‘SIR,

‘Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

‘I have taken into consideration the various reports which I have received from you, of the miserable state of the lower classes of the inhabitants of Ahmednuggur, in consequence of the dreadful scarcity of provisions in that part of the country; and I proceed to give you my sentiments on that subject, and directions regarding the mode of providing for their relief.

‘The delivery of the provisions *gratis* is, in my opinion, a very defective mode of providing against the effects of famine.

‘It is liable to abuses in all parts of the world, but particularly in India; and at Ahmednuggur, the consequence of its adoption would be, that crowds of people would be drawn there from other parts of the country, in which the distress is equally felt; and they would increase the distress at Ahmednuggur to such a degree as to render all the efforts to remove it from its immediate inhabitants entirely fruitless; and it might at last reach our own troops and establishments. The principle, therefore, of the mode in which I propose to relieve the distresses of the inhabitants is not to give grain or money in charity.

‘Those who suffer from famine may properly be divided

into two classes ; those who can, and those who cannot, work. In the latter class may be included old persons, children, and the sick women ; who, from their former situation in life, have been unaccustomed to labor, and are weakened by the effects of famine.

‘ The former, viz., those of both sexes who can work, ought to be employed by the public ; and in the course of this letter I shall point out the work on which I should wish that they might be employed, and in what manner paid. The latter, viz., those who cannot work, ought to be taken into an hospital and fed, and receive medical aid and medicine at the expense of the public.

‘ According to this mode of proceeding, subsistence will be provided for all ; the public will receive some benefit from the expense which will be incurred ; and above all, it will be certain, that no able-bodied person will apply for relief, unless he should be willing to work for his subsistence ; that none will apply, who are able to work, and who are not real objects of charity ; and that none will come to Ahmednuggur for the purpose of partaking of the food which must be procured by their labor, or to obtain which they must submit to the restraint of an hospital.

‘ I enclose a memorandum of the work which I should wish to have performed at Ahmednuggur. This work must be carried on under the superintendence of the engineer, by the persons you will send to him who may be desirous of partaking of the subsistence which, according to this plan, will be afforded to them. You ought to have a sufficient number of persons to attend the engineer, and to ascertain the number of people who go to work ; and each person ought to receive for the day’s labor half a seer of grain and two pice, to be issued daily.

‘ I wish you to provide a building in the pettah of Ahmednuggur, for the reception of those who cannot work. Objects of this description, suffering from want, ought to be removed immediately to this building, where they must be attended by a medical gentleman. This gentleman shall provide them with the necessary quantity of food to be drawn from you ; and he shall be paid for his trouble at the rate of fifty pagodas per month.

‘ The next point to be considered is the mode in which

grain is to be procured for the subsistence of these people. There is at present, at Ahmednuggur, a quantity of damaged jowarry, but which I take to be by no means sufficient to enable you to carry on this plan for any considerable length of time. It will answer, however, for a certain space of time, till you shall be enabled to procure additional quantities from the districts of the Soubah of the Deccan. You will exert yourself to the utmost to procure the grain required; and, in the mean time, orders will be sent to Ahmednuggur to place the jowarry at your disposal. From this grain, and from what you will purchase, you will supply the surgeon with what he may require for the hospital ordered to be established by this letter.

‘ You will pay the surgeon for his attendance upon this hospital, and you will keep a separate account of the expense of the whole establishment; whether for labor, or for food for the infirm, or for attendance and medicines for the hospital.

‘ Orders conformable to this plan will be sent to the proper officers at Ahmednuggur.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Graham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 13th April, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 30th March. I am well pleased with the proposal of the Rajah of Lunawara. It must, however, be more specific as to numbers, and as to the sum he will pay for these troops, and the length of time which he will retain them, before we can venture to adopt any measure founded upon it. You might, therefore, hold a little more conversation with the vakeels upon the subject, and bring them to a point; and, if possible, let them make their proposals in writing. At all events, read to them the memorandum which you will take of the conversation. I can then refer the subject to the Governor General.

‘ In the mean time, however, if it should be necessary, you will have no scruple about occupying Lunawara, if we should attack Holkar; and leave the question regarding the payment of the troops open for future discussion and decision.

‘The war with Holkar becomes every day more impro-  
bable. He has opened a discussion with General Lake, and  
his army is not in a situation to undertake any thing.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Bombay, 13th April, 1804.

‘I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the  
16th March, and I rejoice to find that the Governor General  
approves of the sentiments expressed in my letter of the  
26th of February. I wrote that letter only to justify the  
suggestions which I had made to Major Kirkpatrick, that  
he should take into consideration the state of the Soubah’s  
army.

‘I am glad to learn that the Governor General has re-  
ceived satisfactory letters from the King’s ministers; but I  
anxiously hope that he will not be induced to stay in India  
beyond the time which he had fixed for his departure.

‘As all the correspondence with the Residents goes to the  
Governor General, I have not troubled him with complaints  
of the conduct of the Soubah’s servants, as that conduct  
affects the treaties of peace. But it is as bad as it can be,  
and shows that the Soubah of the Deccan, when he feels that  
he is strongest, is equally faithless and rapacious with a  
Marhatta.

‘I judge, from the last letter from General Lake’s camp,  
that Holkar will retire from Ajmeer. In that case, I shall  
send the troops to the southward, and shall embark for  
Mangalore, having nothing to detain me in this country.

‘I am obliged to you for your letter of the 4th March. I  
was in hopes that I should have received the Governor  
General’s orders upon the subject to which it relates before  
I should break up the army; but I think that very impro-  
bable at present.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an order directed to the killadar of Kellinjah, situated near Wahy, on the Kistna, to deliver up that fort to the British troops.

‘ You will be so kind as to prepare a detachment of native infantry of the strength that will be pointed out to you by Lieut. Colonel Close, to proceed to Kellinjah with the Peshwah’s troops to receive possession of the fort.

‘ You will instruct the officer commanding this detachment to send to the killadar on his arrival in the neighbourhood of the fort, and apprise him that he has been appointed to receive charge of it, and to escort the killadar and his baggage to any place of security that he may think proper to point out. At the same time, he will communicate to him the enclosed order, and transmit the letter from me, likewise enclosed, of which you have a translation.

‘ The officer will desire the killadar to send a carkoon to arrange the mode and time of the evacuation; and he will inform him that he has my positive directions not to take possession of the fort, unless he obtains it within four days after his arrival in its neighbourhood.

‘ If the fort should be evacuated within the period specified, the officer commanding the detachment will put the Peshwah’s killadar in possession; and he will take the old killadar and his garrison, and all their property, under his protection, and escort them in safety to Poonah, from whence you will send them forward to Bombay, or to any other situation that they may prefer. The officer commanding the detachment is to understand clearly, that these persons are not prisoners, and he is to treat them with the utmost kindness.

‘ If the fort should not be delivered up in the time specified, the officer commanding the detachment is to break off all communication, and to report to you. He is to put his detachment in a place of security, if there should be such a one in the neighbourhood; if not, he is to withdraw towards Poonah.

‘ In that case you are to commence your march forth-

with towards Kellinjah with the remainder of the army and the heavy guns, which by that time will have joined you from Loghur, and you will lose no time in getting possession of the place by force. Unless there should be any reason for it, you will not grant a capitulation to the killadar of Kellinjah, if you should be obliged to go against that fort with the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘ Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd instant. I wrote to you fully on the day before yesterday respecting Powar ; and I agree entirely in opinion with you that you ought not to interfere in his affairs. He has no claim upon us whatever, excepting that of relationship to the Guickwar, which is one that ought to have operated in preventing him from joining our enemies : but it did not ; and it ought not now to be brought forward for his protection, unless to interfere in his favor should be perfectly convenient. I had given a passport for Sirjee Rao Ghautky’s pagah to return to Burhampoor.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 13th April, 1804.

‘ Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who negotiated with me the treaty of peace, has an interest in Soondor, situated to the southward of the Toombuddra, and his family occasionally reside at that place. They travel between Soondoor and Petwar, in the territories of the Rajah of Kolapoor, a village belonging to Goorparah, and he has desired me to request that they may not be molested on the road. I therefore request your protection for them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Gen. Campbell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Bombay, 13th April, 1804.

‘ I have received your dispatch of the 4th. I said to Goorparah that I was not aware of the treaties which had been made by General Lake, and did not know in what manner Gwalior and Gohud might be affected by them; that therefore I could give no opinion upon the subject, excepting that the Governor General would strictly execute the treaty of peace. I then recommended that all discussions should cease between you and Bappo Vitell.

‘ I do not know what is intended by a recognition of treaties with the feudatories by Scindiah’s government, as alluded to in your letter to Webbe of the 2nd. The treaty of peace says, that the feudatories who have made treaties shall be independent, and lists of their names are to be given to Scindiah, in order to show who are and who are not to be independent. What is the use of requiring Scindiah’s recognition of the treaties, excepting to occasion a discussion on a subject on which none is necessary, and which is mischievous? If he should refuse to recognise any treaty, what becomes of the feudatory? To be independent or otherwise, will not the demand and refusal to recognise the treaty create a doubt upon that point? I see no benefit in multiplying the subjects of discussion.

‘ Arsito Jah justifies the Soubah’s servants who have behaved ill in Berar, and he demands that the Rajah shall not be permitted to keep troops in the districts under Nernulla and Gawilghur. I am disgusted beyond measure with the whole concern; and I would give a large sum to have had nothing to do with the treaties of peace, and if I could now get rid of all anxiety upon the subject. All parties were delighted with the peace, but the demon of ambition appears now to have pervaded all; and each endeavors, by forcing constructions, to gain as much as he can.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 14th April, 1804.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 11th, and I am rejoiced to find that Kundee Rao Rastia is pleased with the acquisition of the fort of Loghur. I beg you to write to Major Dallas to give the fort up to Kundee Rao Rastia whenever you may think proper.

‘ I conclude that you propose to have some communication with the Peshwah on the subject of the arrangement with Dhoondoo Bullall, and the appointment of Kundee Rao Rastia to be the killadar.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 15th April, 1804.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 13th. I have given no orders respecting the currency of the gold mohurs. Some coins of that description have been issued since I left camp, at a rate at which they would not pass in Poonah, or in the country. Complaints on this subject reached me through various private channels, and I ordered that all the gold mohurs might be called in, and that none might be issued till I could receive a report upon their value in the market, and could issue orders accordingly, as to that at which they should be paid to the troops.

‘ The coins, respecting which a complaint was made to me, were not, I believe, received from the Resident at Poonah, but from the Resident at Hyderabad; and so far from their passing for twelve rupees and three quarters, they do not pass at Poonah for eleven rupees: so that, giving you information upon the subject, the durbar has, as usual, said what is not true.

‘ It is now above a week since I wrote to camp upon this subject, and most probably I shall get the answer to-morrow. If I should, I will pass the order regulating the rate of the issue immediately, and thus the inconvenience complained of at Poonah, respecting these coins, will be removed. But, by a private letter received this day, I have some reason to apprehend that the troops are likely to lose again a part of



their pay, given to them in rupees, because the shroffs at Poonah have lowered their value.

‘ In short, in a country regulated as the Peshwah’s is, these complaints must constantly occur ; and I certainly think that which ought to be taken care of in such a country is the subsistence, the ease, and the convenience of the troops.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 15th April, 1804.

‘ I enclose some papers put into my hands by Mr. Duncan, written by a very good man, and I believe, a respectable officer, to whom without knowing it, I have for some time done a great injury. Mr. Duncan will do nothing to relieve the inconveniences of which he complains ; he will make no alteration in the command in Guzerat, because he thinks that the Governor General has prohibited it ; although it is very obvious that the Governor General’s prohibition extended only to the period during which I should remain in the command in this country.

‘ It is possible that the Governor General may think it proper to notice the conduct of Colonel Murray towards the government of Bombay, or that Colonel Murray may go home. In either case I think General Jones the fittest man to command in Guzerat ; and I should recommend that he be placed on the staff. The troops there are very numerous : it is a command for a general officer : there is nobody on this side of India so fit to exercise it as General Jones ; and I do not think it would be fair to employ him without placing him on the staff.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 16th April, 1804.

‘ Goklah’s vakeel has been with me this morning to ask for a month’s pay. You will see my sentiments upon this subject in a letter which I wrote to Mr. Waring ; and if,

after a conversation with the Peshwah's ministers, you think it proper to give Goklah the money, I beg you to do so.

'The vakeel also spoke to me respecting the price of some horses, killed in the battle of Munkaiseer; upon which subject I request you to make inquiries at the durbar, to ascertain whether it is the Peshwah's custom to pay for the horses of his troops killed in action. If this should be the custom, I will request you to pay the money to Ballojee Punt, who will wait upon you, and the amount must be charged against the Peshwah, with other sums, which have been paid monthly to Goklah and Appah Dessaye.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

'SIR,

'Bombay, 16th April, 1804.

'I have this instant received your letter of the 7th. I shall order a General Court Martial for the trial of the sepoy mentioned by you.

'I see no objection to keeping the two European regiments north of the Nerbudda for this season; on the contrary, I think the measure will be an advisable one. It will be best to get the men under cover somewhere, and possibly Baroach will answer better than Baroda, if there should be accommodation for them there: however, on this subject, you must act as you think best.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

'SIR,

'Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th instant, in which you have enclosed the copy of one you had written to Mr. Elphinstone, regarding the disputes between the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan and the Rajah of Berar, respecting the boundary between those states.

'I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written this day to Mr. Elphinstone, upon that subject, and the copy of one which I wrote to him on the 16th March.

'I am happy to find that the Soubah of the Deccan is willing to consent to an arbitration to settle the boundary;

and to send a person, on his part, to the frontier, to meet one deputed in like manner by the Rajah of Berar.

‘It may happen, however, in consequence of my letter to Gungaram and that to Mr. Elphinstone, of which the enclosed is a copy, the question regarding the boundary may have been already settled. I beg leave to suggest to you, that the person now to be deputed from Hyderabad should have directions to return immediately, if, upon his arrival at Ellichpoor, he should find that Mr. Elphinstone and Gungaram Pundit have settled the points in dispute.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, with the Rajah of Berar.*

‘SIR,

‘Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

‘Major Kirkpatrick has transmitted to me a copy of his letter to you of the 8th instant, in which he proposes a mode of settling the disputes regarding the boundary between the Rajah of Berar and the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘I agree in opinion with Major Kirkpatrick, that this question would be best settled under the superintendence of an European gentleman; but, under present circumstances, as I had the honor of pointing out to you in my letter of the 16th March, I cannot command the services of any gentleman who is qualified to fulfil the duty; and therefore I must request you to arrange the arbitration according to the mode proposed in that letter.

‘I think it better that you should decide, in case the arbitrators should differ, than that the question should be referred to me, because you are upon the spot, and you have the means of obtaining information, which I should want.

‘The decision will also be given at an earlier period, which appears to me to be an object; if, however, you should not think that necessary, I beg you to refer the subject to his Excellency the Governor General.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Hon. M. Elphinstone.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘I propose to send to Major Kirkpatrick a copy of this letter. I send you a copy of one which I have written to him.’

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose English and Marhatta copies of the treaties concluded by Colonel Murray with the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte, respecting which I had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the 25th March. I have transmitted copies of these treaties to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and I shall deliver the originals to the Governor of Bombay.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter from Colonel Murray, which has likewise been transmitted to Major Malcolm, with a letter, of which I also enclose a copy.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

‘ As I find that you are much distressed for forage, which is enormously dear, I think it would be desirable to move the army towards Panowullah, and then up the valley of the Poonah river towards Loghur. You will get forage there much more easily, and at a much cheaper rate than at Poonah, where you might leave such of your carriages as are in want of repair, and two battalions, viz., the 18th and 12th.

‘ I have written to Ahmednuggur to desire that arrangements may be made for bringing down the captured guns to Bombay, and that you might be informed what number of bullocks would be required for that purpose.

‘ As soon as you shall receive the necessary information from Captain Lucas or Captain Fisher, I request you will send to Ahmednuggur to bring down these guns, as many of the Bombay bullocks as may be fit for any service ; and make up the deficiency of the numbers from the bullocks in Captain Young’s department.

‘ I have ordered the disabled men down to Bombay. Let Robertson look out for feeding them on the road, in case the surgeon should require his assistance.

‘ Let me know if I can do any thing for you at Bombay. I have in contemplation an arrangement for the relief of the



distress of our followers. Let me know whether they suffer materially.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose English and Marhatta copies of the treaties concluded by Colonel Murray with the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte.

‘ I likewise enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Murray, in which he explains more particularly from what Rajahs and others he received assistance during the war; and who are entitled to the protection of the British Government, under the tenth article of the treaty of peace.

‘ I rather imagine that it would be more advantageous to these persons not to give a list of their names to Scindiah’s durbar, but to protect them when occasion may require. To give the list may be attended by many bad consequences to those whose names are included in it, and who, it may be expected, will not be so correct in their conduct as not to afford a pretence for attacking them. On the other hand, those who will know that their names are included in a list of this description, as persons who are protected by the Company, are not likely to be very good subjects to Scindiah.

‘ Another inconvenience which will attend the delivery of this list will be, that it may be fairly argued by Scindiah’s ministers that it includes all who are entitled to the Company’s protection, under the tenth article of the treaty of peace. The complaints which I lately forwarded to you regarding the conduct of Scindiah’s servants towards the people employed in the destruction of Powanghur, show that this may not be the case; and upon the occurrence of every fresh complaint of this description there will be a discussion with Scindiah’s ministers, which, in the present state of the Company’s connexion with that prince, will be very unpleasant.

‘ Upon the whole, I do not think that to give the list will

be attended by any good consequences ; and I have above shown that it may be inconvenient ; therefore, unless you should receive orders from his Excellency the Governor General upon the subject, I wish you to withhold it ; but to attend to the conduct of Scindiah's government towards the persons who are the objects of the tenth article of the treaty of peace, and to remonstrate immediately if you should find it to be inconsistent with that article.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Bombay, 18th April, 1804.

‘ I have considered for some days past the question put to me in your letter of the 9th, which I received yesterday, viz., whether you shall give up Asseerghur, if General Lake tells you privately that Hindustan has been evacuated ; but that he cannot report it officially without orders from the Governor General. The consequence of reporting it officially is that Scindiah, by the treaty of peace, is to have certain forts ; and although the evacuation is certain, General Lake refuses to make the report, because he fears to interfere with the Governor General's arrangements. Ought I not to entertain the same fears ? Ought I not to entertain them to a greater degree, knowing that General Lake and you do not choose to act ? Has any thing occurred to give me a reason to believe that I may act with confidence in a case in which you and General Lake entertain doubts ?

‘ So far for the question abstracted from other considerations. I have given the Governor General my opinion, in very strong terms, upon the consequence which I apprehend from his pushing one of his favorite projects, and I have told him that he must expect a war with Scindiah. If this war occurs, it must be carried on with disadvantage, if we have not Asseerghur ; and will not the Governor General have some reason to complain of me, if, foreseeing that war, I should urge you to give up Asseerghur on an occasion in which you and General Lake entertain doubts ? In fact, to adopt this measure is tantamount to an anticipation of his final opinion on the subject of Gwalior.

‘ I am aware that to retain Asseerghur is a breach of

treaty, but that is a measure which will much annoy Scindiah's government.

‘ But this is as much the affair of the Commander in Chief and yourself as it is mine ; and where you doubt, I can have no confidence, and cannot venture to act.

‘ These are my deliberate sentiments upon the subject. I see clearly that Asseerghur ought to be given up, but I cannot venture to give an opinion upon it.

‘ Confound these red boxes and the gentlemen in Bengal ! The delays they occasion will send us to the devil.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 18th April, 1804.

‘ I enclose a letter for Webbe, which I beg you to peruse and forward to him, if he should have quitted Poonah.

‘ I have received the report upon the mohurs. The truth of the matter is, that they have not been issued to the troops at a rate higher than that at which they ought to exchange in the bazaar.

‘ They have been paid to the troops as fourteen Company's rupees. A Company's rupee passes in the bazaars in the country generally for four pice less than a Chandore rupee. You gave us the mohur at thirteen Chandore rupees, which, valuing a Company's rupee at fifty one pice, is one pice more than fourteen Company's rupees. We issue Chandore rupees at the same rate as Pondicherry rupees or Rajah's rupees ; the difference between them and Company's rupees, according to that rate, is three pice. Thus thirteen Chandore rupees, according to that rate, would be thirteen Company's rupees and thirty nine pice, or about a quarter of a rupee less than fourteen Company's rupees. From this statement you will observe that the Pay Office is not very far in the wrong.

‘ I enclose with this an extract of a letter from the Superintendent of Supplies, from which you will observe that the exchange of a new mohur, in Poonah, is not more than twelve and a half Chandore rupees ; that of some old mohurs not more than eleven Chandore rupees ; and that of others not

so much. All these were received at thirteen Chandore rupees. This will not answer for the troops ; it will occasion perpetual disputes, whether I arrange the issue by striking an average, or by issuing each kind according to its particular value. The first thing to do, therefore, is to take no more of these inconvenient coins from the shroffs, excepting a few of those which are quite new. The next is, if possible, to exchange all the mohurs, now in the hands of the Paymaster, which are of an inferior value, and to get other coins from the soucars in lieu thereof. I shall be much obliged to you if you will consider this subject, and let me know whether this plan is practicable.

‘ I had already ordered that the mohurs should be withdrawn from the troops. I have now ordered that they may be withdrawn from the bazaar people. If I can receive your answer before the next issue of pay, I will order that none may be issued, if you should find it practicable to give other money in lieu thereof. If you should not find it practicable, I must regulate the issue in such a manner as that the troops and bazaar people will not be losers ; at the same time that there shall be no disturbance in the country. The loss must, however, fall upon the Company.

‘ Upon this point, I think a remonstrance might be handed in to the Peshwah, regarding the unaccommodating spirit of the regulation of the bazaar of Poonah, by which the Company must eventually suffer very great loss.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I have just received your letters of the 16th. Send down Holkar’s officer to Bombay.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 19th April, 1804.

‘ The enclosed letter will show you that, after the fullest experience, we do not understand these Marhatta matters. The order sent to Kellinjah was as positive as words could make it ; but it was never intended that it should be obeyed. However, the matter is now settled.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE, ‘ Bombay, 19th April, 1804.

‘ The killadar of Loghur was with me this morning, and informed me that the order I before sent to you for the surrender of the fort of Kellinjah was not perfect, and required another order, which I now enclose.

‘ I trust that this order will arrive in time to enable Captain Gurnell to get the fort on the day he shall have appointed. Send it to him by express, and desire him to take particular care of all the killadar’s property.

‘ There is no occasion for your marching, unless the killadar of Kellinjah should refuse to give up the fort, after he shall have received the enclosed order. He has a carkoon here, and I am certain he will give it up.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘ Bombay, 20th April, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters of the 10th, 13th, and 14th.

‘ I long ago drew the attention of the Governor General to the subject of your memorandum; and I learn from a late letter from Major Shawe, that it is likely to be taken up in the manner I have proposed. When it will be taken up I cannot determine.

‘ Your letters of the 13th and 14th contain much important intelligence. The most important of any is that General Lake cannot quit Hindustan, and depends upon the exertions of the troops to the southward to defeat Holkar.

‘ The troops to the southward shall do every thing that is possible. But the General forgets the nature of our tenure, and our present state in the Deccan; the distance we are from Holkar; and the difficulty, amounting almost to an impossibility, of subsisting an army to the north of Poonah, owing to famine. I can certainly take Chandore, at least I think so; and I will do every thing else that I can. But I cannot venture to move the troops from the Deccan; and even if the measure were safe, I doubt whether it would be practicable, in the present state of general distress, to move

even a small detachment to the northward of the Taptee: indeed I may say that I am certain that it would not be so.

‘ The operations of the war with Holkar will rest between General Lake, Colonel Murray, and the troops in Bundelcund. Colonel Murray is fully prepared to move at an hour’s notice. I should have no difficulty about a plan for the war, if I had an idea what the Governor General intended to do respecting a subsidiary force for Scindiah. But the total silence in Bengal upon every point that has been referred for consideration, renders it impossible to produce with confidence any plan.

‘ Supposing that matters remain as they are, it is my opinion that General Lake ought to move upon Holkar with all celerity, leaving in Hindustan a large proportion of his infantry, with some of his cavalry, if he should find that Holkar returns, as in that case his force will immediately begin to fritter away. Having thus provided for the security of Hindustan, he should follow Holkar, and push him as hard as he can.

‘ Holkar, in retiring, will either go towards Ougein or towards the northern boundary of Guzerat; and here will occur the difficulty respecting Scindiah’s subsidiary force. Scindiah’s troops ought to be joined by a British detachment, to be formed near Ougein, and then Murray’s corps might remain on the Myhie; but as we know nothing about Scindiah’s subsidiary force, Murray’s corps ought to go towards Rutlaum, at which place it might be joined without difficulty by Scindiah’s army. From Rutlaum it can operate upon Holkar, whether he may attempt to escape by Guzerat, or by Ougein, and Indore.

‘ But if General Lake be tied down in Hindustan, it stands to reason that we have no means of pushing Holkar, or of bringing the war to a close, unless I should be able to get to the north, of which, at present, I do not see the smallest prospect. Indeed, unless General Lake follows Holkar, our situation will be very unpleasant, either in Guzerat or at Ougein. If we should draw Murray out of Guzerat, to join Scindiah’s army, Holkar will soon overrun that province; and, on the other hand, if Scindiah’s army be not supported by a British corps, they are not equal to the contest with Holkar.

‘ If the General should vigorously push Holkar, the war will not last a fortnight ; if he should not, God knows when it will be over. As for my part, I do not think it quite clear yet that we shall have a war. Before I form any opinion, I wish to see what Holkar will do when General Lake shall move. If he should return, he may rally to all eternity, but there is an end of him.

‘ These intrigues with Patans, &c., are the natural consequence of the sudden growth of our power, and have but little to do with the main question.

‘ You have acted quite right in giving up Asseerghur.

‘ I wish that you would communicate my opinion upon the plan of the operations in general to General Lake. Of course you must not send him a copy of this letter.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Bombay, 21st April, 1804.

‘ You have done quite right about Captain Gurnell, and in giving Webbe his horses.

‘ You must send me an extract from the registers of the regiments, describing the nine horses which you drafted, and a description roll of the nine horses received, specifying by what regiments, and then I shall issue an order which will bring all into shape, and consistently with the regulations of Government.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Walker, Resident at Baroda.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 21st April, 1804.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 12th of April, and I am very sensible of the trouble you have taken with Amrut Rao’s claim on the Guickwar government, which I recommended to your attention, and of the civility of the Dewan towards myself, for which I request you to make him my acknowledgments.

‘ After I had written to you, I had a full communication with Amrut Rao’s vakeel on the subject of this claim; and

although I cannot say that I convinced him that it had no foundation in justice, he had nothing left to urge in its favor.

‘ The vakeel is not now with me, but in case I should see him again, I shall request Amrut Rao not to send to claim this debt; and if I should not see the vakeel, and Amrut Rao should again send on the subject of the debt, I beg to recommend that his messenger may be sent back to him again as soon as may be practicable, with a refusal, in civil terms, to pay any thing.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Walker.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a report received from Lieut. Colonel Lang, of the defeat of a body of freebooters in Berar, by the troops under his command. Lieut. Colonel Lang has been employed in Berar since the month of January last, in command of a body of troops to support and establish the authority of the officers of the Soubah of the Deccan in that province; and he has conducted himself throughout the service with great activity, discretion, and propriety.

‘ I have the honor to enclose herewith the copy of a letter which I have written upon this occasion to Mr. Elphinstone.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a report which I have received of the defeat of a party of freebooters in Berar, by Lieut. Colonel Lang. The chiefs of these freebooters, viz., Denajee Desmaoh, Nayeram Pundit, and Ismail Khan Patan, have fled into the territories of the Rajah of Berar, and, of course, Lieut. Colonel Lang, in conformity to the orders he has received, has not followed them.

‘ I request you to apprise the Rajah’s ministers of these circumstances. You will observe to them that I should be



fully justified in insisting upon the seizure, by the Rajah of Berar, of those three persons, in order that they might be delivered up to me to be punished as they deserve. But I refrain from making this justifiable demand, and I only request that the Rajah will take care that they do not collect troops and enter Berar again; as, if they do, his government shall be considered responsible for the mischief they may cause, and the British troops must enter his country. The Rajah of Berar has been frequently apprized of my determination to revenge the injuries done to the inhabitants of the country, on those who encourage their troops to commit these enormities; and if the freebooters fly to and receive an asylum in his country, I must consider him as the person who encourages them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Hon. M. Elphinstone.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, which I have addressed this day to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, which will point out the present state of the Deccan, and the means in my power of assisting his Excellency, in case he should be obliged to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General Lake.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

‘ I learn from Major Malcolm that you are desirous of receiving accounts of the strength and position of the troops in the Deccan, in order that you may send me instructions in what manner to co-operate with you, in case you should be under the necessity of attacking Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ There are at Poonah one regiment of dragoons, the 19th; and three regiments of native cavalry! the 74th and 78th regiments, and seven battalions of native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery. There is, besides, one battalion of native infantry in garrison at Ahmednuggur.

‘ All these corps are weak, having suffered much during the war, and they have had neither time nor opportunity to recruit or refit.

‘ The subsidiary force, serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, is posted as follows: Two regiments of native cavalry, the 94th regiment, and four battalions of native infantry, in the neighbourhood of Jaffierabad; and two battalions of native infantry in Berar, near Oomrawutty; the whole with a due proportion of artillery. These corps are strong: they were stronger than the common establishment of the army of Fort St. George at the commencement of the war; and they did not suffer so much as the others in its operations.

‘ In Guzerat there are two regiments, the 65th and 86th; and six battalions of native infantry, one of these battalions 1600 men. Of these, the two regiments and four battalions are encamped at Cupperwungee, beyond the river Myhie, about seventy miles north of Baroda. The remainder are, one battalion at Surat, and one at Baroda.

‘ A battalion landed about a week ago at Surat from Goa, and another on its march from Poonah will join Colonel Murray’s camp on the Myhie.

‘ I now proceed to detail to your Excellency my ideas regarding the operations of these troops, in case there should be a war with Holkar.

‘ The possessions of this Chief, in the Deccan, are but very limited; they consist of the district of Umber, situated between Jalnapoor, Aurungabad, and the Godavery; half of the district of Sieugaum, south of the Godavery, (the other half belongs to Scindiah;) the fort of Chandore, and a few districts in Candeish. The operations of the troops in the Deccan ought, in the first instance, to be directed to obtain possession of these districts and of the fort of Chandore, which, I imagine, must be regularly attacked.

‘ I should have no doubt of being able to accomplish these objects at a very early period, if I had not received within these last two days very distressing accounts of the state of the countries through which the troops must march to the northward; and in which they must be stationed while these operations are carrying on.

‘ Your Excellency is, I imagine, aware of the scarcity

which prevails throughout the Deccan, and which has produced a famine. By a report which I have received from the commander of the Mysore horse, whom I had sent with his corps to forage in districts on the Nizam's frontier, which were supposed not to have suffered equally with those farther to the westward, I learn that the distress is extreme; that he can scarcely procure forage or grain for his horses; that that which is procured is at an enormous expense; that he had been some days without food, and that he had lost one hundred horses in one day. The horses of the British cavalry have been for some time eating rice at Poonah, a food which, it is well known, is unwholesome for them; but as that is the only grain which Bombay could supply, and as the grain for horses and cattle could always, till now, be procured in the country, it is the only grain in the magazines which I have collected at Poonah and Ahmednuggur for the troops. Under these circumstances, I very much doubt whether I should not incur the risk of destroying the equipments of the army, and, of course, of failing even in these operations, if I were to attempt to move them from Poonah, where forage can always be procured, at least till a very advanced period of the rains, when the new grass will have begun to spring up, and the new crops will appear above ground. But if the war should begin with Holkar, your Excellency may depend upon it that I shall do every thing in my power to support your operations, and that nothing but the state of the country, which I have above described, shall stop me.

‘ After passing Chandore, the country is a desert to the Taptee; it is inhabited by a half civilized race of Patans and Bheels; and it has been the scene of the depredations of the armies of Scindiah and Holkar for some years.

‘ After crossing the Taptee, the road to Ougein and Indore passes over mountains to Chooly Myhissur, on the Nerbudda, where, I imagine, the country again becomes fertile. The distance from Poonah to Indore is, I believe, six hundred miles, through a country in which there is a famine; and which, from the above description, you will observe, either from extraordinary circumstances or by nature, cannot afford subsistence for an army for one day.

‘ If it were possible to reach and to obtain possession of

Chandore immediately, which there is reason to doubt, I do not think that it would be proper to move the British troops out of the Deccan. Holkar's strength consists in freebooters, and the moment the British troops would pass Chandore, an army of this same description of people would be collected on the Soubah's frontier, and in the neighbourhood of Poonah, at least as numerous as that which is in Hindustan. A body of this description was collected at the close of the last war, which nothing but the British troops, by extraordinary exertion, could disperse.

' If the troops in the Deccan should not be advanced into Hindustan, Scindiah's army ought to be reinforced by the subsidiary force to be attached to that Chief, and placed in a forward position to the northward of Ougein. The corps under Colonel Murray, with the exception of two battalions, to be left as a reserve in Guzerat, ought to be moved forward, reinforced by the Guickwar cavalry. These two armies upon Holkar's rear, while your Excellency would push him in front, must destroy him in a short space of time. But if the operations are not to be active, till I can arrive in Hindustan to take part in them; and if it should be decided that the British troops are to quit the Deccan, it would be best to delay the commencement of the war, if that should be possible, at least till the month of August.

' In detailing the state of the troops under my command, my ideas of the operations to which they might be equal, and the state of the countries through which they would have to pass, and in which they would be stationed, I have delivered an opinion upon the general plan of the war; a liberty which, I hope, you will excuse. All that I can say is, that notwithstanding the difficulties to which I have above alluded, nothing will give me greater satisfaction than to contribute personally in forwarding any plan upon which your Excellency may determine.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *General Lake.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

' MY DEAR MALCOLM,

' Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

' I enclose a letter for General Lake, which I beg you to peruse and forward, together with the sealed private letter,



which relates to my not confirmed appointment to the staff.

‘Bistnapah Pundit is in very great distress, and I do not know to what quarter to move him. He cannot subsist at Poonah on account of the dearness of grain and forage.

‘I really do not believe I can venture to move the army from Poonah. You witnessed our distresses in the last year. I kept the army alive and together by grain. In this year there is less forage, and no grain; and there will probably be more rain.

‘The Governor General has sent the treaties of partition to the Peshwah, and Soubah of the Deccan, to which the former, in my opinion, will not agree; and I doubt much whether the latter will.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Malcolm.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘SIR,

‘Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

‘I have the honor to enclose a dispatch for his Excellency the Governor General. I request you to notice in a particular manner to the Durbar the fresh instance of the good conduct of Salabut Khan, as stated in the report from Lieut. Colonel Lang.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Bombay, 24th April, 1804.

‘I shall be able to let you know exactly, in three or four days, what number of new, what number of old, and what number of worn gold mohurs we have received from the Residency. We have got them from no other quarter, and I conclude that the paymaster has not exchanged new for old.

‘I do not see what end is to be answered by a comparison between the mohurs now in the treasury, and the Bombay mohurs. The question is, what will the former fetch in the bazaar, or in the country? The result of that question must determine the rate at which I must issue them to the troops.

‘A comparison of their value with the Bombay mohurs will not decide the rate at which they ought to be sold; as even the Bombay mohurs, the value of which is, in your opinion, so correctly fixed, are not current at Poonah, for that value. At your instance, I was obliged to lower the rate at which they were issued to the troops twice, before I marched from Poonah, in the year 1803. If the Bombay mohur is to be the standard, the first operation ought to be to fix its value, and then it will not be difficult to compare with the Bombay mohur any other gold coin.

‘However, supposing that the value of the Bombay mohur was fixed, and the relative value of our mohurs ascertained, still that value would not be the fair sale price for these mohurs to the soucars, who gave them to you. They gave them at thirteen Chandore rupees; and if they are an inconvenient coin to us, (which a mohur is, at all events,) they ought to take them back at that price, if they can take them back at all. If they cannot take them back, or if they will not take them back, at that price, I must issue them to the troops at a lower rate of exchange, as I did the Bombay mohurs in the former year.

‘The purchase of mohurs by Mr. Frissell, to send to Mr. Forbes, at twelve and three quarter rupees each, is not a fair criterion to judge of the value of the mohurs in the bazaar. He was a purchaser; the soldiers, and the dealers in camp, are sellers, who must sell or starve; and the demand of the number which Mr. Frissell bought must have increased the price.

‘You will be able to judge of the Peshwah’s disposition respecting Calpee, &c., by his conduct regarding the partition treaty, and can bring forward the Ahmednuggur question accordingly.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Bombay, 25th April, 1804.

‘I have received your letter of the 22nd; you will have observed, that I had received Mr. Edmonstone’s dispatch of the 30th of March.

‘ The districts remaining in our hands to be ceded to the Peshwah are not of the value of sixty thousand rupees, but I do not know of any others that could be ceded to him.

‘ I suggested some time ago, to the Governor General, the propriety of reckoning the value of the lands ceded by Amrut Rao, and the amount of Amrut Rao’s pension, as gains by the Peshwah during the war ; but I have received no answer to this suggestion, and I cannot venture to desire you to rely upon this point. There can be no doubt but that in this respect, and in his late gains of forts, &c., the Peshwah is in a more powerful state than he has ever been in before.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 25th April, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th instant, and I insert in the margin the dates of all the letters received from you of a date posterior to the 1st of February.

‘ Gungaram Pundit may have given over the districts ceded by the 5th article of the treaty of peace, since the 1st of April ; but the arrangement respecting those districts was concluded in the beginning of February, and he was then ordered to deliver them up.

‘ He omitted to do so, till he found that his disobedience of orders was not likely to be supported at Hyderabad, and retained the districts for six weeks at least. I cannot, therefore, acquit him of disobedience of my repeated orders.

‘ As far as I am personally concerned, it is a matter of indifference to me whether he is punished or not ; but if it is to be a principle of British policy to introduce among the native powers, the allies and dependents of the British Government, the principles of good faith and political moderation ; and if it is intended effectually to check the depredations of the Marhatta powers, not connected with the British Government, and of all freebooters, it is necessary to begin by preventing the nominal servants of our allies from infringing the treaties of peace, and from com-

mitting hostilities, and carrying on petty warfare under the shadow of the British power, in direct disobedience of orders. This object can only be effected by punishment, where it is deserved.

‘ In respect to villages and districts in Berar, seized by the Rajah’s servants, I know of none, excepting those for which Rajah Mohiput Ram gave sunnuds, If the result of an inquiry into the subject should be, that they have possession of such villages for which they had not sunnuds, it will be easy, by a correspondence with Mr. Elphinstone, to procure their release of them. I beg to observe, however, that the Peshwah has some villages in Berar which are held by the Rajah’s servants, for which, of course, they have no sunnuds from any authority acting on the part of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 27th April, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 24th, enclosing one of the 22nd from Captain Gurnell; and I beg you to express to Captain Gurnell that I am well satisfied with the manner in which he has carried into execution your orders for obtaining possession of the fort of Kellinjah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 27th April, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 23rd. I do not see what can be done at present respecting Severndroog, and it is certainly best to endeavor to obtain possession as you have done, by negotiation. I learn from Captain Kennedy, however, that Severndroog is not strong: if your negotiation should not succeed, it will not be difficult to obtain possession of it by force at the opening of the season.

‘ I think that you will do well to bring in carkoons, and settle affairs between the Bheel Rajahs and the Peshwah.



You shall have the guns for the Peshwah. Indeed, it is rather extraordinary that they have not been sent before this time.

‘I have in some manner mislaid the book of accounts, which I had received at the Sungum, of the revenues of Ahmednuggur. It is possibly still at the Sungum, and if it should be so, Mr. Frissel will give it to you. If not, I beg you to write to Major Graham for the accounts of the revenue which you require. The killadar is very anxious about the cowle from the Peshwah.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘SIR,

‘Bombay, 28th April, 1804.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th instant.

‘Since the arrival of the army in the neighbourhood of Poonah, in the year 1803, a great part of its expense has fallen upon the resources of the government of Bombay; and combined with other causes has reduced this settlement to a degree of poverty which is very inconvenient and disadvantageous in all its financial transactions, and may be attended by the very worst consequences. It is accordingly my duty to relieve this government from the expense of the army at a period as early as may be practicable.

‘This can be done only by drawing specie either from Bengal, or from the Company’s provinces in the Peninsula, to defray the expense. There appears to be no prospect of obtaining specie from Bengal; and I must therefore depend upon that which will be sent from the territories under the government of Fort St. George.

‘I conclude that the government of Fort St. George must have made provision for the payment of the pesheush and the pensions due at Hyderabad, to the amount of nine lacs of rupees; and I do not think that I should be justified in consenting to divert from the purposes of the army, and from the relief of this settlement, such a sum of money; more particularly, as it is probable that the government of Fort St. George will have provided other means of defraying this charge.

‘The sum for which Major Malcolm has drawn upon you stands upon other grounds. The government of Fort St. George knew nothing about that charge, and could have made no provision for it; and I conclude that the expense of the two corps at Hyderabad must be defrayed out of the sums sent from the Company’s territories for the general service of the army. Accordingly, I request you to retain at Hyderabad the sum of money which will be necessary to discharge the bills which Major Malcolm has already drawn upon you; and to defray the expense of the two corps stationed at Hyderabad for the month of May, and to send to Ahmednuggur, by Perinda, the money which will remain of the sum of three lacs and five thousand pagodas, lately sent from the ceded districts, by Major General Campbell.

‘I am much obliged to you for having ordered the rice to Colonel Halyburton. I have desired him to send to the magazine at Ahmednuggur for a supply.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Bombay, 28th April, 1804.

‘Much inconvenience is experienced at Bombay from the drafts made upon their treasury, and from the rate of exchange at which we draw upon Bengal; which I believe is higher in proportion to the rate at which bills are drawn upon Bengal at this place, than is supposed by Mr. Frissell, from a mistake which he has made in his reasoning upon that subject in a letter to Mr. Forbes.

‘There is a sufficient sum at present in our treasury to pay the troops for May; and I expect from Hyderabad a sum sufficient to pay them in June, which will be followed, I hope, by another sum to pay them in July. That being the case, I think that it would be advisable, in reference to the state of finance at Bombay, to cease to give bills to the soucars at Poonah, either upon Bombay or Bengal, for a month or two. We shall in this manner apply a temporary remedy to the distress experienced here, and we shall be able to re-establish the exchange on its former advantageous rate.

‘I have received your letters of the 25th, and I will speak

to Mr. Duncan on the subject of the purchase of stores by the marauders \* of Severndroog.

‘ I must consider the case of Manowly and Chichoory.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 28th April, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 16th instant, and I see clearly the embarrassment in which you must be, on account of the manner in which you have received the requisition from the Residency at Poonah, to give assistance to the Peshwah’s servants in Savanore.

‘ I foresaw this embarrassment in January last, and wrote to the Resident at Poonah letters, of which I now enclose you extracts : but I observe that instead of giving you detailed information, to which you could recur upon every point that might arise, Mr. Waring has only copied from my letter what I wrote to the Residency, to avoid the inconvenience which you now experience. I conclude that now that Colonel Close has arrived at Poonah, you will receive such information as will enable you to act.

‘ I am obliged to you for having sent the money.

‘ I was in hopes that I should have been able to break up the army before this time ; but the conduct of Holkar in Hindustan has been rather ambiguous ; and although I could do nothing to injure him, I have thought it proper not to disperse the troops till I shall receive the orders of the Governor General. I still hope, however, that I shall be able to send the troops away, so that they may be across the Kistna before the rivers swell.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 29th April, 1804.

‘ In my opinion it will not answer to make an advance to Goklah, unless the Peshwah should desire it, or consent to it ; and his Highness must fix the amount of the sum to be

\* Pirates on the coast of the Konkan.

paid, and the number and description of troops to be kept by Goklah. The sum which he now demands is double the amount of what was paid to him the last campaign.

‘ After having ascertained that point, the question which remains will be, whether such a sum of money can be afforded out of our funds. Adverting to this demand, and to that for the payment of Amrut Rao and the pensioners, I much fear that it will not be possible to discontinue to draw bills upon Bengal, and upon Bombay, according to the terms of my letter of yesterday: I shall, however, be glad to hear from you upon this subject, before I make up my mind.

‘ This settlement is really in the greatest distress. Our bills upon Bengal and Bombay distress it equally, and nothing can relieve it, excepting to discontinue our drafts for a time, which I had hoped might have been effected by the arrival at Hyderabad of a large sum in specie from the Company’s territories in the Peninsula.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 30th April, 1804.

‘ Since I had the honor of addressing you last, appearances have changed in respect to Holkar. At that time, I had learnt that he had opened a negotiation with General Lake by means of agents, who had, in fact, thrown their employer upon the General’s mercy; but in the beginning of this month, General Lake received a letter from Holkar, which demonstrated an intention of proceeding to hostilities.

‘ Holkar’s army is so badly composed, and his power and even his existence appear to depend so much upon his avoiding a contest with the British armies, and his conduct shows so plainly that he is fully sensible of the state of his affairs, that I think there is reason to expect that he will have retired from the position which he had taken up near Ajmeer, so soon as he shall have heard of General Lake’s movement to the westward on the 6th of this month.

‘ If this should be the case it will remain with the British Government to determine the line of conduct which is to be adopted respecting Holkar; and at all events, unless some



blow should have been struck long before this time, it is probable that nothing will be done till towards the month of August.

‘ At whatever period hostilities may commence with Holkar, it will be necessary that your corps should move into Malwa. You will observe, therefore, the necessity of keeping it prepared, at least till the exact state of affairs in Hindustan shall be known; and when you break it up for the rains, you will take care to occupy such positions as will be most useful to enable you to advance with celerity into Malwa, as will at the same time cover Guzerat from invasion, and as will enable you to collect in strength whenever that may be necessary. It appears to me, that all these objects will be attained by the disposition proposed in your letter of the 23rd instant; and accordingly I recommend to you to adopt it when you find it necessary to break up.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 1st May, 1804.

‘ I have received application from Bappojee Goneish Goklah that I should request you to interest yourself at the Peshwah’s durbar, that effectual and permanent provision might be made for the support of the body of troops under his command; and as Bappojee Goneish Goklah always conducted himself to my satisfaction during the late war, I now forward his request.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 1st May, 1804.

‘ Having fully considered the contents of the paper transmitted with your letter of the 25th of April, on the subject of the Rajah of Kolapoor’s claim to Chickoree, I deem it most proper to decline giving my opinion upon it, and to request you to forward it to be laid before his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ Some time has now elapsed since I referred the whole

question regarding the southern jaghiredars, and the Rajah of Kolapoor, to his Excellency; and as I am entirely unacquainted with his Excellency's sentiments upon that reference, I cannot venture to recommend that any measure be adopted which may afterwards prove inconsistent with what he may order.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Bombay, 2nd May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have thought it necessary to write to Major Graham, containing orders to make provision for feeding the poorer classes of the inhabitants of Ahmednuggur, who were suffering from famine. I am sorry to inform your Excellency, that notwithstanding the arrangements directed in that letter have been carried into execution, nearly fifty people in that town die daily: the distress in all parts of the country is extreme.

‘ The commander of the Mysore horse, who has gone in search of food within the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, informs me that his horses are entirely unfit for service from want of food; that several have died; and that he fears the troops will disband, unless removed to a country which suffers less from famine.

‘ In the camp near Poonah, all, excepting the fighting men, suffer great distress: by great exertion grain is procured, but it sells for two and a half seers for a rupee; a price which was exceeded only for two or three days, and was not equalled for more than a week, during the siege of Seringapatam in the year 1799. This price bears so heavily upon all the public and necessary followers of the army, and upon the officers, that I much fear that I shall be obliged to make issues of grain from the magazines for the consumption of the followers, as well as for that of the fighting men\*.

\* ‘ Nothing can more strongly mark the different systems pursued by the Marhatta governments and ours, than the total carelessness with which they undertake their expeditions, and their want of foresight and precaution with respect to resources, depôts, supplies, &c. When I was at Poonah last week, the commissary there assured me that he had under his charge rice enough to

These issues will increase the drain on the magazines to a very great degree ; and as, in the present state of the country, it does not appear practicable to undertake any military operation to the northward till the next harvest, I very much doubt whether it will not be proper to send towards the Company's frontiers all the troops excepting the subsidiary force, and thus to decrease the consumption near Poonah, as far as may be in my power. The cavalry, in particular, ought to be sent away, as their consumption is very great ; at the same time, that the only grain which I can give them is supposed to be unwholesome for the horses.

‘ The forage is very scarce in all parts of the country, excepting between Poonah and the Bhore ghaut, where I have stationed the army for the present. But even there, it is of a bad quality, and it is expensive.

‘ I should probably be enabled to relieve the troops from many of the distresses which they suffer, if I could receive any intimation of your Excellency's plans in the present crisis. Till I receive this required information, I am apprehensive that any steps which I may take for the relief of the distresses of the army may prove inconsistent with your Excellency's objects.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Frissell.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 2nd May, 1804.

‘ In the transaction of public business, there is nothing so unpleasant, or which takes up so much time unnecessarily, as for those who are obliged to correspond upon it to draw nice logical distinctions upon words, or to give them a meaning that they never were intended to convey. In my letter of the 28th, I said that you had been in an error, and

give to General Wellesley's army the customary allowance for a year and upwards. The want felt in Scindiah's army, and at Poonah, I have noticed. The natives must surely see and acknowledge the wisdom of such provident arrangements, extending also to provisions of other kinds, medicines, money, ammunition, &c. Yet few of those now in power seem to be capable of the exertion necessary to procure these advantages, or have means to purchase them ; or else they place their reliance upon different kinds of strength and warfare.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.* :

that our exchange had been more unfavorable at Poonah than it ought to have been. At Bombay, one hundred and three Bombay rupees are got for a government bill upon Bengal for one hundred sicca rupees, being a premium of three per cent. on a Bombay government bill. It appears that you imagined that, for one hundred rupees at Bombay, a bill was given on Bengal for one hundred and three sicca rupees: there was your error, and the consequent loss on the bills drawn at Poonah upon Bengal.

‘ It is useless to write any more on the subject. Should bills be again drawn at Poonah, the government of Bombay will furnish you with an account of the rates of exchange at which they draw their bills, and you can regulate their rates accordingly.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Frissell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Bombay, 2nd May, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters of the 24th April. You do not give me any intelligence relative to Holkar’s motions, which are so important at this moment; particularly as, according to them, I have still to determine whether or not to throw another corps into Guzerat.

‘ The letter from Mr. Edmonstone of the 8th April is terrible, and I am by no means satisfied with it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Graham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 5th May, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 29th April; and I am concerned to find that the number of persons employed at work and fed at Ahmednuggur exceeds so far the number which I had thought it possible would have offered themselves. I think it probable that many may have come in from the neighbouring country. If that should be the case, and if the value of the grain, and the money given, should exceed the money price of labor in the country, it will be necessary first of all to strike off the money, and afterwards



as much of the grain as may leave just sufficient to keep life and soul together, till the value of the quantity given may be no more than the money price of labor.

‘ I have desired Colonel Close to give you an answer regarding Jumander Bittall; but I am sure the Company’s troops have enough to do without protecting Cavy Jung. However, if you apprehend any inconvenience from the occupation of the fort at Nushin by Jumander Bittall, he must be driven out; although, if the Company’s troops are to be employed in re-occupying their tannahs, when the jaghiredars lose them, the Company ought to enjoy the benefit of the revenue of the country.

‘ I do not see any reason for detaining Lowe, or for interfering about Mondergaum.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Graham.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 6th May, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your private letter of the 3rd instant, and as I think it necessary that the subject to which it relates should be referred to his Excellency the Governor General, I adopt this mode of replying to it.

‘ In a letter which I wrote to Lieut. Frissell, on the 30th of January, I had the honor of submitting certain regulations for your consideration, as a guide for the conduct of the Residency, in the employment of the troops to assist the Peshwah’s amildars in taking possession of his Highness’s countries; as I was perfectly aware that his Highness and his servants would be desirous to take advantage of the assistance to be afforded, to obtain possession of that which might be deemed his right, and to oppress sirdars of the empire, and others whom it might be the policy of the British Government to support. I wished, also, by means of these regulations, to free the military officers who might be employed from detailed investigations, and trouble, and responsibility in matters in which they had no concern, and in cases in which they could be considered only as executive instruments.

‘ In a letter which I wrote to Lieut. Frissell on the following day (the 31st January), upon the subject of an appli-

cation to be made to General Campbell, for assistance to the Peshwah's amildar, in the countries south of the Kistna, I recommended that he should adhere to the rules proposed in my letter of the preceding day, and that he should take care not to interfere with the Putwurduns, the Rajah of Kolapoor, Goklah, &c., when he should apply to General Campbell.

‘ In a letter which I wrote to you on the 23rd of February, on the occasion of a communication from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, of a message from the Peshwah, proposing to give him the possessions of the family of Pursheram Bhov, I canvassed the state of the southern countries fully, and pointed out particularly the manner in which the interests of the Honorable Company would be affected by a contest in that quarter; and in two letters which I have addressed to the Governor General, one dated the 7th and the other the 21st March, copies of both which are in your possession, I have referred the whole question regarding the southern jaghiredars to his Excellency's decision.

‘ It appears by the list of places of which the Peshwah wishes that his amildar should be put in possession, that it includes every strong fort in the southern districts, excepting Darwar; that every sirdar of any consequence in the empire, who holds possessions in those countries, is to be deprived of them by the British troops; and that, of course, such sirdars will become the determined and active enemies of the British Government.

‘ Among those whose names are included in the list, is the Rajah of Kittoor, who is to be *dispossessed*!

‘ It is useless to point out the services of this person for a number of years, but particularly when I was marching to Poonah, which services would possibly have entitled him to the exertions of the British Government to obtain a remission of tribute. But the operations which I have conducted have led me into his country, and I beg leave to deprecate a contest with him, excepting in a case of very evident necessity, in which the whole force of the government can be employed. Like Wynaad, Koorg, Bullum, Bednore, and Soonda, Kittoor is situated in, and immediately to the eastward of, the range of western ghauts. It is, equally with them, difficult for troops; it is inhabited by a similar race

of people, and the operations of the war in it would possibly be attended with the same losses and disasters. The country is situated on a defenceless point of the Company's frontier. The fort of Hullihall has no garrison, because I have been obliged to draw the troops from thence to complete the corps at Goa; and the possession of that fort would give the Rajah of Kittoor a secure communication and entrance into Canara and Bednore, both provinces entirely defenceless; and the former, that upon the resources of which Bombay, Poonah, and the army, depend entirely for subsistence.

‘ These facts, however well founded, are not generally known, and point out clearly the necessity of avoiding to attempt to *dispossess* the Rajah of Kittoor of his country, till adequate means can be found to insure the object, and to guard against the modes of annoying us which he has in his power.

‘ The letters to which I have above drawn your attention show my sentiments upon the subject of dispossessing the southern jaghiredars, and as it is under reference to the Governor General, I cannot venture to decide upon it.

‘ If I were called upon to decide, however, I should absolutely refuse giving the Peshwah any assistance to forward these views in the southern countries till he should collect a body of troops to serve with the British troops, according to his treaty; and I should take measures to make known this refusal to the southern sirdars, in order to remove all suspicion from their minds.

‘ If I should be obliged to determine otherwise, I should think it necessary to suggest to the Government of Fort St. George to take more effectual measures to defend Mysore and the ceded districts, to throw a garrison into Hullihall, in Soonda, and to reinforce General Campbell, to enable him to undertake the offensive operations required from him; and, above all, to equip him for sieges. As all the sirdars in the southern countries would be concerned in this warfare, the communication of the troops in this part of India with Mysore would be destroyed; but as nothing is to be expected from the Peshwah or the Soubah of the Deccan, I should be at a loss to find out a mode to replace that advantage.

‘ When you write to the Governor General upon this subject, it would be desirable to point out to his Excellency the advantage which is ultimately to result to the British Government, or to the Peshwah, from this general confusion in the southern countries; to state to him whether the Peshwah has any means of carrying on the war in that quarter; whether he has any means of retaining possession of the countries after they shall have been given to him, supposing the result to be successful; and whether, now that Goklah and Appah Dessaye have been allowed to depart, there is any body of Marhatta troops whatever to co-operate with the British troops upon any occasion in which their services can be required.

‘ While writing upon this subject, I beg leave to point out to you the necessity of great caution and secrecy in your inquiries and measures, at least till you have received the orders of the Governor General, consequent to the different references which have been made to him since the month of January last, as I have received intelligence, from more than one quarter, of a communication among the southern Chiefs; and particularly, that measures had been taken to reconcile the Rajah of Kolapoor and the Chiefs of the Putwurdun family. These measures may possibly be attributed to the reports in circulation of the intention of the Peshwah, supported by the British Government, to attack the southern Chiefs.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 6th May, 1804.

‘ I have no objection to the payment of Amrut Rao’s people, in any manner you should think proper.

‘ I am afraid that to use the grain in the magazine will do but little good to the country; as we shall still require much for the cavalry and cattle.

‘ I enclose a return of the Shere Shaye mohurs now in the treasury in camp, which have been received from the Residency. It appears that the troops cannot pass them in the country at the rate of exchange, thirteen Chandore rupees,



at which they were received from the Residency ; and I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will endeavor to prevail upon the soucars to take them back, and to give other coins in lieu of them. If you should not be able to prevail upon the soucars to exchange the mohurs at that rate, they must be issued to the troops at the reduced rate at which they can exchange in the bazaar at Poonah.

‘I shall be obliged to you if you will send to Colonel Wallace a copy of your answer to this letter, in order that no time may be lost in paying the troops\*.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

\* *To Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Barrackpoor, 16th April, 1804.

‘ 1. I have the honor to transmit, for your information, the copy of a dispatch which I have this day addressed to his Excellency the Commander in Chief.

‘ 2. My letter to the Commander in Chief will apprise you of my determination to commence hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from Hindustan and the Deccan, at the earliest practicable period of time, and I hereby authorize and direct you to co-operate with his Excellency the Commander in Chief in the manner which may appear to you to be best calculated to make an early impression upon the power and resources of Holkar, and to afford the most effectual aid in facilitating the operations which the Commander in Chief may pursue, under my orders, against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from Hindustan. You will not, however, wait for the receipt of orders from the Commander in Chief, or for the notification of the commencement of hostilities by his Excellency, or Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; but you will, without delay, proceed to act against the resources and power of Holkar in the Deccan ; and you will direct such operations from Guzerat against Indore, and the possessions and interest of Holkar in that quarter, as may appear to you to be advisable.

‘ 3. You will hereafter receive my detailed instructions with regard to the plan for the reduction of Holkar’s predatory power. In the mean while, I think it necessary to apprise you, that I have fully considered the suggestions contained in your dispatch of the 18th of March, (received the 6th of April,) and that I entirely approve the disposition of the troops under your command, which you have detailed in that dispatch, as well as the plan of military operations which you have suggested in the event of hostilities with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ 4. This letter will be left open for the perusal of the Resident at Hyderabad, in order that he may be apprized of the probability of your taking the field against Juswunt Rao Holkar, and may be prepared to afford you such aid as you may require from the subsidiary force, or in furnishing supplies for the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘ WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor of Bombay.*

‘ HONORABLE SIR,

‘ Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Colonel Murray. In conformity to the in-

*To General Lake.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Barrackpoor, 16th April, 1804.

‘ 1. Having fully considered your Excellency’s dispatches as late as that of your Excellency’s letter, No. 134, of the 4th instant, which reached me yesterday, I think it necessary to apprise your Excellency without delay, of my intention to commence hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, at the earliest practicable period of time.

‘ 2. Your Excellency will hereafter receive my detailed instructions on this subject, and in the mean while I deem it to be expedient to authorize and direct your Excellency to adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable your Excellency to undertake active operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in the manner which may appear to your Excellency to be most advisable, and without waiting for further orders from me for that purpose.

‘ 3. A copy of this letter is transmitted to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley on this day, together with my orders, directing him to co-operate with your Excellency from the Deccan, against the resources and power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ 4. I also forwarded on this day similar orders to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, directing him to prepare Scindiah to act in concert with the British forces in Hindustan and the Deccan.

‘ 5. My dispatch to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley is enclosed, and my orders to Major Malcolm are left open for your Excellency’s perusal. I request your Excellency will issue, as soon as may be practicable, your instructions to Major Malcolm, conformably to the 5th and 9th paragraphs of my orders to that officer; and that you will direct Mr. Mercer to correspond with Major Malcolm on the subject of those paragraphs.

‘ 6. I request your Excellency to communicate with Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, and with Colonel Murray, in Guzerat, through Hindustan, as frequently as possible; and that you will also make such communications to the Residents with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and at Hyderabad and Nagpoor, as may appear to your Excellency to be necessary for the public service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ General Lake.’

‘ WELLESLEY.

*Extract of a Letter from the Governor General’s Private Secretary to the Resident at Hyderabad.*

SIR,

‘ Barrackpoor, 18th April, 1804.

‘ I am commanded by his Excellency the most noble the Governor General, to transmit to you the enclosed letter from his Excellency to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, and to desire that you will be pleased to forward it to Major General Wellesley with all practicable expedition, as soon as you shall have perused it.

‘ The Governor General’s letter to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley is left open for your perusal, for the purpose of giving you the earliest information

tention communicated in that letter, I have ordered the 1st battalion of the 1st regiment, with the exception of that part of the corps still in Malabar, to embark at Goa on the vessels which you have sent to transport the corps to Guzerat.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Duncan, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I have received intimation from his Excellency the Governor General, that he has given directions to the Commander in Chief to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and his Excellency has ordered me to make arrangements to co-operate with, and support the operations of, the Commander in Chief.

‘ It is impossible for me to say what the operations of the Commander in Chief will be, but Holkar’s power appears to consist principally in a considerable army in the field; and I imagine that his Excellency’s operations will, in the first instance, be directed to defeat that army; or, if Holkar should avoid an action by flying, to press upon him so closely, as to oblige his troops to disperse. This operation can be aided very materially from Guzerat, and I proceed to point out to you in what manner.

‘ In the course of a few days, the troops under your command will be reinforced by the arrival at Surat of another battalion, the 1st of the 4th from Goa, excepting a detachment which is still in Malabar.

‘ There is, however, no occasion for delaying your operations till the arrival of this battalion; they may be commenced immediately, and this battalion may be reckoned

of the probability that the army under Major General Wellesley will again take the field, and to enable you to be prepared to afford him, without delay, such aid as he may require from you in completing the supplies and equipment of the army under his command.

‘ Major General Wellesley will apprise you of the time when he may deem it advisable to make any communication on this subject to the court of Hyderabad.

‘ I am further directed to desire you will transmit a copy of this letter to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

upon as one of those to be allotted to the internal defence of Guzerat.

‘In my opinion, besides the corps necessary for the defence of Surat, and the troops at Baroda, it will be also necessary to leave in Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda, a disposable force of two battalions: this corps, to be placed under the command of such officer as you may select, must be considered as a reserve to your corps. They will be able to defeat any body of predatory troops that might pass round your corps; they will be of material service in keeping the country in your rear in a state of tranquillity; they will protect your communications; and they will give confidence to the Guickwar government.

‘The remainder of the troops under your command, according to my computation, and considering the 1st battalion of the 6th regiment of the strength of sixteen hundred men as two battalions, will be two regiments of European infantry, and five battalions of native infantry. But as the 1st of the 4th are not strong, and have many recruits, you may possibly find it necessary to leave behind you another battalion, and to take with you only four battalions.

‘If the operations of his Excellency the Commander in Chief should be directed to the defeat and dispersion of Holkar’s army according to the mode which I have supposed at the commencement of this letter, your object will be to post yourself in such a manner as to stop Holkar and embarrass and impede his flight as much as possible, and if you can, to engage him.

‘If the Commander in Chief should commence his operations in a short time, it does not appear to me to be probable that Holkar, who is now, I believe, about Ajmeer, will retire to the south westward, or towards Guzerat; but he will, probably, move towards Ougein. I have no ground, however, for this conjecture, excepting the knowledge that the rains will commence in June, and the probability that Holkar will be disinclined to trust himself in a country in that season of the year, in which his operations would be confined by the course of the rivers, the nature of the country, &c. If he should move towards Ougein, it will be your business to join Scindiah’s army at the earliest practicable period; and at all events, to move with celerity upon



Holkar, and attack him whenever you shall have an opportunity.

‘ You will take with you as large a body of the Guickwar cavalry as can be furnished to you.

‘ I write to the Resident at Scindiah’s durbar, to desire that heavy iron guns may be prepared at Ougein, in case, in the course of your operations in Malwa, you should find it necessary to attack any place regularly ; and I recommend that the iron 18 pounders, which are, I believe, at Baroach, may be brought with their stores to the most forward station in Guzerat before the rains commence, in order that they may be ready at your call, in case such an operation should be necessary. I recommend, however, that, unless you find that the Commander in Chief should adopt that plan of operations, you should not think of attacking any strong place, excepting such as may necessarily fall in your way, till Holkar’s army shall have been defeated.

‘ I understaud that he has some strongholds in Malwa, particularly at Rampoorra, or Brampoorra, to which he has lately sent his infantry and guns ; but it will not be difficult to obtain possession of them, and to make a final conquest and settlement of his country, as soon as his army shall have been beaten and dispersed ; and to employ our troops in sieges till this object shall have been effected will only give Holkar leisure for his predatory operations, will enable him to distress the troops by operating on their communications during such sieges, and will delay his final defeat.

‘ But I repeat that your plan of operations must, in this respect, be conformable to that of the Commander in Chief. It is difficult to point out the place to which you ought in the first instance to direct your march. Doongurpoor, by Lunawara, it appears would most effectually cover Guzerat ; on the other hand, Rutlaum, by Dohud, would bring you nearest to Ougein, and to that part of the country to which it is my opinion that Holkar will in the first instance direct his flight. Your local knowledge may possibly enable you to fix upon a station in the Banswarrah country, from which you will have a ready communication to either flank, accordingly as circumstances may render it necessary.

‘ You will commence your march as soon as may be practicable. In the course of your operations, you will give

every protection to the inhabitants of the country, and you will encourage them, as far as may be in your power, to assist you with provisions, and the Rajah's zemindars, &c., to protect your convoys and aid you with their troops. You will be cautious, however, not to enter into engagements with any of them.

‘ It is probable that the greatest part of Holkar's territories will be given over to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and you will therefore avoid entering into engagements with any of his tributaries, without previous communication with the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. You will make such temporary arrangements of the countries which may come into your hands as will be most convenient to your own operations, bearing in mind that it is desirable that you should not weaken your force, at least till Holkar's army shall have been defeated, or in a great measure dispersed.

‘ I propose to communicate a copy of this letter to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to request that a person may be sent on the part of Scindiah to reside in your camp, and who shall have authority in the country to call for such supplies as you may require. You will be so kind as to correspond with the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ Before you will have received this letter, I shall have joined the army, when I shall carry on the operations which may be necessary to deprive Holkar of his possessions in the Deccan. But you will have heard that there is a famine in the Deccan, and I much doubt whether I shall be able to give any aid to the operations of the Commander in Chief north of the Taptee.

‘ I propose to suggest to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that the troops of that Chief should take possession of Chooly Myhissur, Indore, &c. &c., without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

‘ You will have received copies of the letters from his Excellency the Governor General, addressed to his Excel-

lency the Commander in Chief and myself, containing directions that hostilities should be commenced against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ I propose to join the army immediately, and to do every thing in my power to destroy the power and resources of that Chief in the Deccan ; and I have the honor to enclose a copy of the instructions which I have sent to Colonel Murray. I beg you to be so kind as to forward a copy of this paper to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and to give me such information of his Excellency’s plans as you may be able to afford.

‘ I beg you will also endeavor to communicate with Colonel Murray, and to prevail on Scindiah’s ministers to send to the Colonel a person who shall have full power to draw forth the resources of the country, in proportion as the Colonel may have occasion to call for them, and to take possession of such of Holkar’s districts in Malwa as Colonel Murray may think proper to give over to his charge. It will be proper, however, that this person should be particularly instructed to avoid interfering with Colonel Murray’s arrangements in any districts which the Colonel should not think proper to deliver over to his charge. You will observe by the enclosed instructions that I have desired Colonel Murray to endeavor eventually to join Scindiah’s army.

‘ I do not know of what that army consists, or where it is situated ; but, although I have no doubt that Holkar’s strength will fritter away as soon as he shall be pressed by the Commander in Chief, I conceive that it would be desirable that Scindiah’s army should be reinforced by a body of British troops. It would be most desirable if that body were distinct from that under the command of Colonel Murray, as more numerous means of annoying Holkar would thereby be afforded ; but even under present arrangements I think that the war cannot last long.

‘ I request you to urge the durbar to have in readiness, at Ougein, four iron guns, 18 or 24 pounders, with five hundred rounds of powder and shot for each gun, in case Colonel Murray should have occasion to call for that assistance.

‘ I beg leave to suggest to you to urge Scindiah’s ministers to attack Chooly Myhissur, on the Nerbudda, and In-

dore, without loss of time; I imagine that they will be able to get possession of these places without difficulty.

‘ They will observe the liberal manner in which his Excellency the Governor General proposes to dispose of Holkar’s possessions, supposing them to be conquered; and they will, of course, exert themselves to bring the war to a speedy and honorable conclusion.

‘ In communicating with Scindiah’s ministers on the subject of the disposal of Holkar’s possessions, I beg you to take care not to give them any hopes that Scindiah shall have Umber. This place is situated north of the Godavery, between that river, Aurungabad, and Jalnapoor. It is in the midst of the possessions of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, by whose father, I believe, it was ceded to the Marhattas at the peace of Kurdlah; I imagine that the Governor General could not have adverted to its situation when he wrote on the 16th of April.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Resident with*  
*Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Colonel Coleman, and which I beg you to lay before the Governor General when you shall have an opportunity. I have nothing to say upon the subject of the letter, excepting that Colonel Coleman conducted himself in a very satisfactory manner when in command of the troops at Poonah during the war.

‘ You will have seen by my letter to the Commander in Chief, a copy of which went to the Governor General, the state in which we are in the Deccan. The accounts which I receive are every day worse. Mr. Webbe has been much distressed in passing through the country with his small escort, and has been obliged to make forced marches to get water, without forage or grain. The subsidiary force are living upon the borders of Berar, and cannot venture to move to the westward. I have received a letter from Colonel Close, in which he desires me to take measures for



supplying the troops with grain, without making purchases in the country, as we shall use the seed grain.

‘ I do not usually make complaints ; I struggled through difficulties in the last year, the report of which, through another channel, created much alarm in Bengal. But in this year I really fear that I shall not be able to keep the army together.

‘ I shall join the army immediately.

‘ I have ordered another corps into Guzerat from Goa ; and I send a corps from the army to Hullihall, in Soonda. This corps will go to Goa eventually : but as nothing can happen to Goa, at least till the month of August ; and as there is a good deal of alarm among the southern chiefs, occasioned by the Peshwah’s threats to deprive them of their country, and an appearance of a general concert to leave Hullihall without a garrison would be ruinous ; and I think it best that the corps should garrison Hullihall, at least till the season shall open.

‘ You will see, by Malcolm’s letters, that there is a good deal of ill temper at Scindiah’s durbar. The newspapers are full of the complaints both of Ragojee Bhoonslah and Scindiah.

‘ I send to the Secretary of Government, this day, an answer on the subject of the Governor General’s desire to return the money contributed by the inhabitants of Burhampoor.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I have received intimation from the Governor General that he has ordered General Lake to attack Holkar, and he has desired me to co-operate with him.

‘ In conformity with the plan communicated to you in my letter of the 17th of March, of which you approved, I have ordered that part of the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment stationed at Goa, into Guzerat ; and I propose to send to Hullihall, in Soonda, one of the battalions now at Poonah.

I think it will be better that the battalion should remain at Hullihall till the opening of the season. It will not be wanted till that period at Goa; and by being stationed at Hullihall, it will check any freebooter plan that might be founded upon the knowledge of the weakness of our post at Hullihall.

‘ However, I shall order the battalion to consider itself liable to the requisition of Sir William Clarke; and of course it can be ordered at once to Goa, if you should think it proper.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter that I have written to General Lake, which will show you our situation and our prospects in the Deccan. Indeed, they have become worse since I wrote that letter. However, I shall join the army immediately, and I shall see what I can do. In the mean time I have sent instructions to Colonel Murray, of which I enclose a copy, and a letter to the Resident with Scindiah, of which likewise you have a copy.

‘ If General Lake would make a good dash at Holkar, the war could not last a fortnight; but if he should stand upon the defensive in Hindustan, it will last for a length of time. If it should happen that Holkar passes into the Punjaub, which is a line of conduct that I have not taken into consideration in the enclosed letter to Colonel Murray, for obvious reasons, Colonel Murray and Scindiah’s army will deprive him of all he has in Malwa, in the same manner as I shall in the Deccan; and I propose to instruct Colonel Murray upon this subject hereafter.

‘ I shall be obliged to you, if you will desire that the clothing for all the corps with this division of the army may be sent to Ahmednuggur; and that for the subsidiary force to Hyderabad, from whence it can be forwarded.

‘ I think I shall be able to send the 2nd of the 12th to Hullihall in Soonda, so that the clothing of that corps may be sent there. As all the corps are in want of clothing, and as I saw clearly that they could not receive their clothing probably before the end of the rains, and that, whatever might be the result of General Lake’s negotiations with Holkar, the troops could not get into quarters in this season, I applied to Mr. Duncan for cloth from the warehouse here, and I have sent up as much as will make a comfortable plain

jacket for each man. These will be made before the rains set in. I hope you will approve of this arrangement, as I really could not venture to expose the troops to the rains without clothing. Some of them have only white jackets; and to every corps in the line clothing is due from the year 1800.

‘I have given no cloth to the cavalry, as they have cloaks, and are not so much exposed to the weather as the infantry. The 74th regiment have their new clothing, and the 78th regiment are tolerably well off; and their new clothing is making up: so that, upon the whole, I hope that we shall do.

‘Between the cotton trade and the army, the precious metals have disappeared at Bombay, notwithstanding all the money introduced since the war. But I hope that we shall continue to receive supplies of money from the provinces under the government of Madras.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Bombay, 9th May, 1804.

‘Since I wrote to you last, I have received letters from the Governor General, which give every reason to believe that we shall have an immediate contest with Holkar, and I am therefore about to join the army again without loss of time.

‘I cannot say when the operations against Holkar will commence, or how far we shall be concerned in them; but the fact that we are to attack Holkar, and the present state of the Peshwah’s military force, will show that I cannot, at present, allow Bistnapah to return to Mysore.

‘However, if I should find that the operations are delayed for any length of time; or if, by the state of the country, I should be obliged to delay commencing them, I shall send Bistnapah towards the Kistna, where he will have a better chance of finding subsistence than he has in his present situation.

‘I learn by letters from him that he is in very great distress; but I have told him that I shall either join the army, or give him leave to go to Mysore, before the rains set in;

and I have offered him all the assistance which he might think I could afford. These assurances, as they will give him hopes, will in some degree relieve his feelings.

‘ I request you to apprize Purneah of these circumstances, and tell him to send money to Bistnapah. In the mean time, I shall take care that he shall not want until his money shall arrive.

‘ I flattered myself that I should have had the pleasure of seeing you before this time, but I am much disappointed. However, if General Lake attacks Holkar vigorously, and with activity, the war will not last a fortnight. My share of it will be very trifling. If the General should stand upon the defensive, the contest will be long, and may lead to unpleasant consequences.

‘ Webbe was to leave Aurungabad on the 3rd.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Wilks.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Graham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 9th May, 1804.

‘ I beg that you will inquire judicially into all the circumstances of the robbery you have mentioned; report the evidence, and your opinion of the guilt, to me; and I shall send orders to hang the patel and the plunderers. We must keep these rascals in order, or they will drive us out of the place. I beg you to do as you wish about the wall of the pettah.

‘ You have done right about the Bheels. I think that this would be a good opportunity to clear all the aqueducts leading either to the fort or pettah of Ahmednuggur. I wish you to communicate with the engineer on this subject, and let some of the work people be employed on the work.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Graham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Bombay, 11th May, 1804.

‘ I have written to Captain Young, at Panwell, to request him to take the bales of cloth to pieces, and forward them to you; but you may as well allow the elephants to come on



till they shall meet his messenger to stop them, lest he should still be unable to send the cloth.

‘ You have done quite right about the carriages.

‘ Allow Captain Campbell, Captain Langlands, and Major Swinton to come to Bombay.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 12th May, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th instant.

‘ Since I have had any knowledge of Marhatta affairs, I have been of opinion that it was necessary that his Highness the Peshwah should settle his country ; and I have repeatedly taken the liberty of suggesting, recommending, and urging different modes of accomplishing this object. I have also been fully sensible of the necessity of making a settlement with the serinjaumy sirdars ; and above two months have elapsed since I have drawn the attention of his Excellency the Governor General to that subject.

‘ I cannot interfere in it without his Excellency’s orders, because I am ignorant of the principle on which he would choose to act in this instance ; and I cannot interfere in any manner without adopting a distinct line of policy respecting these southern jaghiredars, upon which I cannot venture. I have also to observe, that if I should interfere, I must support my negotiations by a commanding body of troops, unless I should choose to run the risk of involving General Campbell singly in a contest with all the southern chiefs ; and I cannot venture upon this course of operations until I shall have been made acquainted with the plans of his Excellency the Governor General for the campaign against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ I have forwarded, to be laid before his Excellency the Governor General, a copy of my letter to the Commander in Chief of the 23rd April, in which I have pointed out the circumstances which prevent the march of the troops under my command to the northward at present ; and I conclude, that when he shall receive that letter, he will send me orders to undertake the settlement of the Peshwah’s affairs with

the southern jaghiredars during the rainy season ; or possibly before he shall have received it he will have made me acquainted with his sentiments respecting the jaghiredars, and I may find it possible to undertake the operation during the rainy season, under the circumstances which must prevent me from marching to the northward, till the season shall have been far advanced, and the new crops will begin to appear. But the question respecting the southern jaghiredars is one of increasing difficulty, and it is not possible to settle it without the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, regarding the principles to be adopted.

‘ At present, and for nearly a year and a half, a large British army has been employed in the Peshwah’s territories ; and as his government has been in a state of security, at least since the month of September last, it might have been expected that some measures would have been adopted, by means of which its operations could have been carried on independently of the British troops, who must at some time or other be allowed some leisure, in order that the corps may be refitted, recruited, and re-equipped with arms, clothing, and other necessities, of which they are entirely in want.

‘ It now appears that the Peshwah is not supported by a single Marhatta sirdar or horseman, that he does not enjoy any revenue, and that he has no means whatever of supporting his own authority. The records at Poonah will show that he lately applied to me to take measures to catch thieves who had taken refuge in the jungles ; and it now appears that, in order to enable the Peshwah to carry on his government at all, the country must be conquered again by the British troops.

‘ I do not mean to urge the difficulty of this operation, but I allude to these circumstances, in order to show the possibility that the Governor General might determine to adopt a mode of settling the question with the jaghiredars which would not occasion a necessity of employing the British troops to the southward at the present crisis.

‘ In respect to the list of talooks, of which the Peshwah requires that the British troops should put his amildars in possession, it contains the names of all the strong forts, excepting Darwar ; and of districts belonging to every Chief, particularly a large tract belonging to Madhoo Rao Rastia.

‘ In respect to Goklah, he naturally refuses to give up the districts which are to support his troops, till other means of support shall have been assigned to him, upon which subject the Peshwah will not, or has not, satisfied him. At the same time, Goklah was the only chief on whom his Highness could rely, and his the only body of troops whose services he could command, either to support the ordinary operations of his government, to overawe the southern jaghiredars, or to perform his treaty with the Company. This sirdar, and these troops, have slipped through his hands. Goklah has crossed the Kistna, and is gone to the southward; and his Highness now calls upon the British Government, not only to support him against his foreign enemies, and to guard his person, but to perform these services without the assistance which he is bound to afford, to support the ordinary operations of his government, to undertake an extensive service against certain of his subjects, whose allegiance, by common management, might have been secured, and, at last, to punish and destroy the chief who has served for years with the British troops, whose conduct has always been satisfactory, and whom I left at Poonah two months ago in a disposition to undertake any service for the Peshwah’s government, provided he should be treated with common justice.

‘ All these facts are so strong, they prove so much incapacity in the Peshwah’s government, and point out so clearly the aversion to it of all the principal chiefs, and show the probable grounds of that aversion, that I think it much to be doubted whether his Excellency the Governor General will choose to give his support to his Highness’s authority.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 13th May, 1804.

‘ The Governor General having communicated to me his intention to order General Lake to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar, I have ordered the 1st battalion of the 4th regiment from Goa into Guzerat. It appears, however, that at this season of the year, it will be necessary to land the corps in the neighbourhood of Bassein, and to march it to Surat; a

necessity I wish you to announce to the Peshwah's government, and to procure an order addressed to the soubahdar of Bassein, to receive the corps with hospitality, to supply their wants, and to forward their march.

'Be so kind as to send a duplicate of this order to Mr. Duncan. No time ought to be lost, as we may soon expect the corps.

'I shall join the army immediately, and leave this in two or three days. I wait only till my baggage gets round.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Col. Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY

*To Colonel Murray.*

'SIR,

'Bombay, 13th May, 1804.

'The last letters which I have received from General Lake's camp rather indicate an intention to delay the attack upon Holkar till the rains shall have commenced, as there is a great want of water in the countries which Holkar would probably make the seat of war. I calculate upon receiving the plan according to which General Lake will carry on the war, in the course of three or four days; and then I shall be able to tell you, more decidedly than I can at present, the particular line which you ought to follow.

'In the mean time, I think that at present you will do well not to pass the frontier, lest you should be exposed singly to Holkar's operations. I shall be enabled in two or three days to relieve you from the state of uncertainty in which this letter will necessarily place you.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Bombay, 14th May, 1804.

'I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant. The Peshwah's districts in Ahmedabad, or, in other words, the Ahmedabad farms, have been in the hands of the Guickwar government for some years. The rent from them was 500,000 rupees, and 50,000 rupees annually as durbar khurch, payable to the Peshwah. But some of the pergunnahs belonging to the farm, of the yearly



value of 165,000 rupees, have been ceded to the Company by the Peshwah, under the treaty of Bassein ; and the remainder of the sum due annually, including 50,000 as durbar khurch, is 385,000 rupees.

‘ There is now due to the Peshwah, by the Guickwar government, a sum of money amounting to 459,000 rupees, on account of this farm ; which sum of money the Guickwar government would at this moment find means to pay, if the Peshwah would renew their lease of the farm.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter and an account that I have received from Mr. Duncan, which will explain more clearly the state of this transaction. Two objects are to be accomplished in the arrangement under contemplation of the Peshwah’s pergunnahs in Ahmedabad ; one is to provide the means of paying Goklah’s troops, the other to provide for the peace of Guzerat, by preventing the establishment of one of the Peshwah’s amildars in Ahmedabad.

‘ In respect to the means of paying Goklah’s troops, I am decidedly of opinion that the interest and honor of the Company’s Government equally require that Goklah should be provided for ; and I see no means by which that sirdar can be provided for at present excepting by a money payment. This can be made only by the Company’s assistance ; and the revenue of the Peshwah’s districts in Ahmedabad will be ample security for the repayment of the sums advanced.

‘ If the Peshwah were to make over to the Company his interests in Ahmedabad, it would only be for the period during which it would be necessary to make a money payment to Goklah ; and till the Company should receive the sums now due, and which may hereafter become due, beyond the revenue received for money paid on the same account. After the Company shall have collected the money which it may have advanced, the pergunnahs will fall again into the hands of the Peshwah. His Highness will then dispose of them as he may think proper, most probably not to the Guickwar government.

‘ If the Guickwar government should hold the farm under the Company’s security and guarantee, we are equally certain of realizing its resources, as if it were in the hands of the Company’s servants. By taking the pergunnahs into

the hands of the Company, therefore, at present, we do not increase our security for the repayment of the advances made or to be made ; we leave the disposal of the pergunnahs hereafter to the chance of future negotiations ; and we incur the risk of having a disturbance in Guzerat, whenever his Highness may think proper, and place the management of the pergunnahs in Ahmedabad in the hands of strangers.

‘ I am therefore clearly of opinion that we ought, in the first instance, to settle that the pergunnahs in Ahmedabad shall be let for a term of years to the Guickwar government.

‘ You will observe, by the enclosed account, that the value of the pergunnahs is far short of the sum stated by the Peshwah. However, upon this part of the subject, as well as upon the term of years for which the pergunnahs shall be held, I shall request you to correspond with Mr. Duncan or Major Walker.

‘ The pergunnahs ought to be let under the security and guarantee of the Honorable Company, and the rent of them to be disposed of in such manner as the Peshwah may order from time to time.

‘ In respect to the sum of 459,000 rupees due from the lands for the late farm, which, you will observe, there are means of realizing, I will request you to decide whether that money shall be paid to the Peshwah, or whether it shall be applied to the liquidation of his debt to the Company.

‘ It is probable that the necessity will not long exist for continuing to Goklah a money payment, and therefore the Company will have the means of paying themselves from the future revenue of the farm. There is no doubt but that to pay this sum to the Peshwah immediately will materially facilitate the arrangement for the Guickwar government, which, as I have already observed to you, I consider important in respect to the future peace of Guzerat. I also think that it might forward other objects, and therefore I am of opinion that it would be most for the general advantage to pay the sum of 459,000 rupees into the Peshwah’s hands.

‘ I request you also to arrange with the Peshwah the sums which are to be paid from time to time to Goklah ; and to procure from his Highness orders upon the Guickwar government to pay into the hands of the Company’s servants, from time to time, the revenues of the Ahmedabad farm, until the

advances made shall be cleared off. After the first year, or sooner, if the money payment to Goklah should be discontinued, the account might be settled, and an order taken for a specified sum to be paid in a certain number of years. In this manner the account will stand clear.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Browne.*

‘ MY DEAR BROWNE,

‘ Bombay, 14th May, 1804.

‘ I received only last night your letter of the 9th.

‘ The order given out respecting prize money was formed upon the necessity of drawing a line somewhere ; and there appeared to be no difference so striking as that between those troops who had, and those who had not, been engaged with the enemy. The orders were formed upon this principle, and the circumstances attending the cases of individuals were not adverted to.

‘ You will do me the justice to believe that I should be happy to have an opportunity of serving you, and I certainly think your case is attended with peculiar circumstances, well deserving consideration. I shall therefore wish you to state it publicly, and I can only tell you that what you may write shall not be read with any bias against you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Browne.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. In your public letter, rely particularly upon your being part of the army, under the orders of nobody at Poonah, receiving your orders directly from me, and employed in a service essential to the army, from which you derived no advantage.’

*To General Lake.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter, which has been given to me by the Governor of Bombay, from a man who has made himself exceedingly useful to the troops in Guzerat. On this ground I take the liberty of recommending him to your favor and protection.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shaue.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 20th April. When I wrote to you on the 25th March, many points were undecided, respecting which I have since received orders; but that which bore most heavily upon me was the want of orders respecting the position of the subsidiary forces.

‘ The troops are all in want of clothing and arms. Some of the corps had no coats; and it was impossible for me to answer the daily applications which I received from the public officers at Madras, for information to what places the supplies of the articles should be sent, without having the Governor General’s instructions regarding the subsidiary force; the time at which I should establish that with the Peshwah, and return to Hyderabad; that with the Nizam, and many other matters connected with this subject.

‘ Let it be recollected that we are at the distance of one thousand miles from Madras, between six and seven hundred farther on than the troops of that Presidency ever were before. The communication must be kept up by land carriage entirely, and difficulties of all kinds, which tend to interrupt it, must be provided against.

‘ You will thus see the reasons for which I am anxious to receive the earliest intimation of the Governor General’s intentions, in order that I may make the details correspond with his plans. Luckily, some arms have arrived here from Madras, some of which I have got; and I have also procured cloth for the clothing the troops, which they will make into coats for themselves\*. These arrangements, the difficulty of procuring even a few thousand rupees to pay my own bills at Bombay, and the necessity of waiting three or four days to allow my baggage to get round to Panwell, have detained me here since the 7th, the day on which I received the Governor General’s orders respecting the war with Holkar.

‘ Every day’s post brings me fresh accounts of the misery

\* ‘ Major General Wellesley has provided new clothing for his army, not in an usual way, to be sure, but it was too much wanted to wait, or rather delay, for form’s sake. He sent up cloth, which was divided into the quantities necessary for each Sepoy’s jacket, to each of whom they were given, and they have managed to clothe themselves. It was no small matter to clothe upwards of 5000 men in a few weeks, in this manner, who must otherwise have passed the monsoon in rags.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*



in the Deccan, on account of the famine; and I am convinced that I shall not be able to move in a northerly direction. If I were acquainted with the Governor General's plan respecting the southern jaghiredars, I think my time in settling with them, till I could march to the northward, would be well employed.

‘ This subject becomes every day more pressing. The Rajah of Kolapoor has again extended himself, and he is now close upon Goa, where he would be a most unpleasant neighbour. I refer you to Sir William Clarke's dispatches upon this subject. But supposing the state of the Deccan is as I suppose, and that it will be impossible for me to march to the northward, I cannot enter upon the southern questions till I shall know the Governor General's opinion.

‘ The manner in which you purpose to give me that opinion, upon the points as they shall arise, will answer my purpose as well as detailed instructions.

‘ I really believe it will be necessary to send money round to Bombay from Bengal. The distress is grievous. Sometimes the treasury does not contain one thousand rupees. Colonel Murray is living from hand to mouth. The importation of money has lately been very great; but the inland trade, by means of which so much money was procurable for bills, is at an end, in consequence of the wars and the misfortunes of the Deccan; all the money of the settlement is now vested in the cotton trade, and goes to Guzerat and the countries to the northward.

‘ I have done every thing in my power to bolster up the credit of this government.

‘ I have stopped my bills at Poonah for the present, excepting for small sums for the convenience of individuals; I have prevented Heshmut Jung from laying violent hands upon the specie coming from the provinces under Fort St. George; and I intend to put a stop to a financial plan of the government of Fort St. George to raise money at Poonah by bills from Bengal, at the same rate as they are drawn at Madras, which is much more disadvantageous than that at which we now draw them in concert with the government of Bombay. But nothing but money from Bengal will answer.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th instant. I agree in opinion with you, that it will not now be proper to urge the minister to punish Gungaram Pundit on account of his misconduct in Berar.

‘ I am obliged to you for the money, as well as for the pains you have taken respecting the rice. I beg that you will continue to forward to Colonel Halyburton’s camp any rice that you may be able to procure.

‘ I am much concerned to hear of the minister’s indisposition, which, however, I trust, will not be of long continuance.

‘ I beg leave to take this opportunity of congratulating you upon the ratification of the treaties of peace by the Soubah of the Deccan, and upon the signature by his Highness to the treaty of partition. There are some villages in the Puttun pergunnah still held by the Company, which I have desired Major Graham to give to Rajah Mohiput Ram. They are the deshmooky villages of Puttun.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.,

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

‘ I have received and perused your letter of the 12th instant, relative to the fortifications of Kaira. I am of opinion that that post is of importance ; that it was proper to retain it ; and that, although it may not be possible to place in it, immediately, a garrison for its effectual defence, it will be necessary to keep the fort in repair, and to place in it the ordnance and stores which may be deemed necessary for its defence. I should imagine that the small garrison there, at present, would very sufficiently secure the ordnance and stores.

‘ In respect to the description of ordnance that should be sent to Kaira, I have to observe that it is impossible to form an opinion of the description of ordnance required for any work, without inspecting it ; or without receiving from the officer who has inspected it a report of its dimensions, of the

nature of its foundation, and of the materials of which it is constructed.

‘ Captain Williams, the only officer who has surveyed Kaira, appears to be of opinion, that the large towers in the fort will answer for 12 or 18 pounders ; and that in the small towers 3, or 6, or 9 pounders would answer ; and that each tower would hold two or three pieces of ordnance. They must be very large towers to be capable of admitting that number of guns to be worked in them at the same time ; and I must observe that if they have not the capacity to admit of more than one gun being worked at the same time, they ought not to have more than one gun in them.

‘ In respect to the size of the guns most fit for Kaira, I have to observe that our information is very deficient ; and I am inclined to be of opinion with Major General Nicholson, that the *revêtement* would not bear those pieces of a heavy *calibre* ; but I observe that Captain Williams mentions one well-built work, which it is probable would bear large ordnance.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I recommend that at present two 18 pounders may be sent for the heavy work above alluded to ; and that seven 6 pounders, and four 3 pounders, may be sent for the eleven towers capable of receiving ordnance, being one piece for each tower. This supply will answer for the present ; and Colonel Murray may be desired to have a more accurate report made of the state of the works of Kaira, when an opportunity may offer ; after which a greater number of pieces of ordnance, and of larger *calibre*, may be sent to him, if he should require them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 12th, with the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry on the murderers. There is no doubt whatever of the case ; however, I should wish to consider the subject before I give any further orders. In the mean time let the gentleman and lady be kept in irons. I shall leave this for camp the day after to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Bombay, 16th May, 1804.

‘ I intended to have given bullocks to the Peshwah, with the guns; and a certain number have been kept at Ahmednuggur purposely for him. These were selected from the largest and best of the bullocks taken from Scindiah; they were all of one color, white, and of the same caste. I wish, therefore, that Captain Richardson had left these cattle at Poonah, according to the orders I believe he received.

‘ Even as circumstances are at present situated, it appears to me that it would be best to delay giving the bullocks to the Peshwah, till those which were originally intended for him shall return from Panwell, and I doubt very much whether we should be able to find in the kirkanah another set equally good.

‘ I shall possibly meet Captain Richardson on the road, and I shall desire him to send back the bullocks immediately.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Bombay, 16th May, 1804.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 6th instant. My last letter will have explained to you the present state of affairs in the Marhatta empire, and I think it probable that it will have determined you to send off the treasure, &c. The recruits for the cavalry might join the convoy. Maunsell's battalion shall go back.

‘ A rahdarry will go to you this day for the convoy. The only reason for which I wished to keep secret the possibility that I should remain some time longer in the Marhatta territory was, that I understood that the report of my speedy arrival at Seringapatam had had very good effects in Malabar; and I wished to give Colonel Montresor an opportunity of relieving the posts in Wynaad. I imagine that he has by this time effected that object; and that it is no longer necessary that we should lose any advantage in order to keep secret the state of affairs in the Marhatta empire.

‘ I shall leave this place to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Wilks.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bombay, 16th May, 1804.

‘ I have written to Captain Wilks, to apprize him of the state of affairs here, which has obliged me to keep the army in the field; and I requested him to send money for Purneah’s troops. The one hundred and thirty troopers may be part of the escort of this treasure, and they may as well come by the usual route of Meritch.

‘ I shall leave this place to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Partition Treaty of Hyderabad, between the Honorable English East India Company and his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, concluded at Hyderabad, 28th April, 1804.*

‘ Treaty for the settlement of general peace in Hindustan and the Deccan, and for the confirmation of the friendship subsisting between the Honorable English East India Company and its allies, his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Peshwah Behauder, settled between the said Honorable Company and the said allies, by Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, Resident at the court of Hyderabad, in virtue of the powers delegated to him by his Excellency the Most Noble Richard, Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious Order of St. Patrick, one of his Majesty’s most Honorable Privy Council, Governor General in Council of all the British possessions, and Captain General of all the British land forces in the East Indies.

‘ Whereas, by the terms of the treaties of peace, concluded by Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, on the part of the Honorable Company and its allies, with the Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah, Rajah of Berar, at Deogaum, on the 17th December, 1803, and with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at Surjee Anjengaum, on the 30th of that month, which treaties have been duly ratified by the Governor General in Council, and by the allies of the British Government, certain forts and territories have been ceded by Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah, and by Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the Honorable Company and its allies, the following articles of agreement for the settle-

ment of the said forts and territories have been concluded by the British Government and by the said allies.

‘ Art. 1. The province of Cuttack, including the port and district of Balasore, and all cessions of every description made by the second article of the treaty of Deogaum, or by any treaties which have been confirmed by the tenth article of the said treaty of Deogaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the Honorable English East India Company.

‘ 2. The territories of which Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah formerly collected the revenues, in participation with his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and those formerly possessed by Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah, to the westward of the river Wurda, ceded by the third article of the treaty of Deogaum, and the territory situated to the southward of the hills on which are the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur, and to the westward of the river Wurda, stated by the fourth article of the treaty of Deogaum to belong to the British Government and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, with the exception of the districts reserved to Senah Saheb Soubah in the fifth article of the said treaty of Deogaum.

‘ 3. All the forts, territories, and rights of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in the Dooab, or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud, ceded by the second article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the Honorable Company.

‘ 4. The fort of Baroach, and territory depending thereon, ceded by the third article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, shall belong in perpetual sovereignty to the Honorable Company.

‘ 5. The fort and city of Ahmednuggur, together with such part of the territory depending thereon as is ceded by the third article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum to the Honorable Company, and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Peshwah.

‘ 6. All the territories which belonged to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, before the commencement of the late war,

situated to the southward of the hills called the Adjuntee hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapoor, the town and district of Gandapoor, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery, ceded by the fourth article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, to the Honorable Company and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

‘ 7. All cessions made to the Honorable Company, by any treaties which have been confirmed by the ninth article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the Honorable Company.

‘ 8. This treaty, consisting of eight articles, being this day, the 17th of Mohurru, corresponding with the 28th of April, settled and concluded at Hyderabad, by Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick, with his Highness the Nawaub Asoph Jah Meer Akber Ali Khan Behauder, Soubahdar of the Deccan, the said Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick has delivered to his said Highness a copy of the same in English and Persian, under the seal and signature of the said Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick; and his Highness the Nawaub Asoph Jah Meer Akber Ali Khan Behauder has delivered to the said Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick another copy, also in Persian and English, bearing his Highness’s seal and signature; and the aforesaid Major James Achilles Kirkpatrick has engaged to procure and deliver to his said Highness, without delay, a copy of the same, duly ratified by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, on the receipt of which, by his said Highness, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honorable the English East India Company, and on his Highness; and the copy of it now delivered to his said Highness the Nawaub Asoph Jah shall be returned.

‘ Done at Hyderabad, this 28th day of April, A.D. 1804, or 17th day of Mohurru, A.H. 1219.

*Partition Treaty of Poonah, between the Honorable English East India Company and his Highness the Peshwah, concluded at Poonah, 14th May, 1804.*

‘ Treaty for the settlement of general peace in Hindustan and the Deccan, and for the confirmation of the friendship subsisting between the Honorable English East India



Company and its allies, his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Peshwah Behauder, settled between the said Honorable Company and the said allies, by Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, Resident at the court of his Highness the Peshwah, in virtue of the powers delegated to him by his Excellency the Most Noble Richard, Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the most illustrious Order of St. Patrick, one of his Majesty's most Honorable Privy Council, Governor General in Council of all the British possessions, and Captain General of all the British land forces in the East Indies.

‘Whereas by the terms of the treaties of peace concluded by Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, on the part of the Honorable Company and its allies, with Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah, Rajah of Berar, at Deogaum, on the 17th of December, 1803, and with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at Surjee Anjengaum, on the 30th of that month, which treaties have been duly ratified by the Governor General in Council, and by the allies of the British Government, certain forts and territories have been ceded by Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah, and by Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the Honorable Company and its allies, the following articles of agreement for the settlement of the said forts and territories have been concluded by the British Government and by the said allies.

‘Art. 1. The province of Cuttack, including the port and district of Balasore, and all cessions of every description made by the second article of the treaty of Deogaum, or by any treaties which have been confirmed by the tenth article of the said treaty of Deogaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the Honorable English East India Company.

‘2. The territories of which Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah formerly collected the revenues, in participation with his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and those formerly possessed by Maharajah Senah Saheb Soubah to the westward of the river Wurda, ceded by the third article of the treaty of Deogaum, and the territory situated to the southward of the hills on which are the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur, and to the westward of the river Wurda, stated by the fourth article of the treaty of Deogaum to belong to the British Government and its allies, shall belong, in per-



petual sovereignty, to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, with the exception of the districts reserved to Senah Saheb Soubah in the fifth article of the said treaty of Deogaum.

‘ 3. All the forts, territories, and rights of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in the Dooab, or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud, ceded by the second article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the Honorable Company.

‘ 4. The fort of Baroach, and territory depending thereon, ceded by the third article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the Honorable Company.

‘ 5. The fort and city of Ahmednuggur, together with such part of the territory depending thereon as is ceded by the third article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum to the Honorable Company and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Peshwah.

‘ 6. All the territories which belonged to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, before the commencement of the late war, situated to the southward of the hills called the Adjuntee hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapoor, the town and district of Gandapoor, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery, ceded by the fourth article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum to the Honorable Company and its allies, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

‘ 7. All cessions made to the Honorable Company, by any treaties which have been confirmed by the ninth article of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, shall belong, in perpetual sovereignty, to the Honorable Company.

‘ 8. This treaty, consisting of eight articles, being this day, the 14th of May, 1804, A.D., corresponding with the third of Suffer, 1219, A.H., settled and concluded at Poonah, by Lieut. Colonel Barry Close, Resident with his Highness the Peshwah, Lieut. Colonel Close has delivered to his said Highness a copy of the same in English, Persian, and Marhatta, under the seal and signature of the said Lieut. Colonel

Barry Close ; and his Highness the Peshwah has delivered to the said Lieut. Colonel Close another copy, also in Persian, Marhatta, and English, bearing his Highness's seal ; and Lieut. Colonel Close aforesaid has engaged to procure and deliver to his said Highness, without delay, a copy of the same, duly ratified by his Excellency the most Noble the Governor General in Council ; on the receipt of which, by his said Highness, the present treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on the Honorable the English East India Company, and on his Highness ; and the copy of it now delivered to his said Highness shall be returned.'

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Bombay, 17th May, 1804.

' In answer to your letter of the 13th, which I received yesterday morning, I have to inform you, that two lacs of rupees will be sent to Poonah for the use of the Residency from Bombay in a very few days.

' The good effects of ceasing to draw bills upon Bengal at Poonah appear already, as I am informed ; and I am very desirous, if possible, to avoid drawing bills at Poonah again, till the exchange shall have become more favorable ; I therefore request you to apprise Mr. Duncan from time to time of your wants, and he will endeavor to supply them. If he should not be able to supply them, I shall request you to supply them by drawing bills upon Bombay, rather than bills upon any part of the territories under the government of Fort William ; and to draw bills upon Bengal only in case of the last extremity.

' I propose to address you to-morrow on the subject of the letter from the Accountant General at Fort St. George.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Bombay, 17th May, 1804.

' My letter of this day will inform you that you will get the two lacs of rupees which you required, so that we shall avoid drawing the bills, which is a great object to Mr. Duncan. If you should want money before it may arrive, Captain Frissell has in his hands nearly two lacs of Chan-

dore rupees belonging to the prize fund, of which you may make use; and you can replace it when the money shall arrive from hence.

‘ I shall leave this place to-day. I congratulate you upon your promotion, and upon the ratification of the treaty of partition by the Peshwah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Bombay, 17th May, 1804.

‘ I have been conversing with Mr. Duncan on the means of supplying your corps with money during the campaign; and I learn from him that it is probable that Major Walker can give you immediately six lacs of rupees. It is my opinion, however, that you will do well to renew the contract with Serwaddy, the soucar, if you should have broken it off. I have no doubt whatever of the utility of the contract, as affording some means of supplying you with money while you shall be in Malwa, even although the amount supplied should be no greater than that thrown into Serwaddy’s hands by the Company’s servants at Surat and Baroda. However, upon this point your local knowledge must enable you to form the most correct opinion; and I must leave it to you to act as you may think proper.

‘ I have received a letter from General Lake, from which it appears that Holkar has marched to the southward from the frontiers of Hindustan; and the General had not determined upon his plan for the campaign. I must, therefore, omit for the present, to give you any positive instructions; but you will do well to have an eye towards Ougein.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Right Hon. Lord William Bentinck\*, Governor of  
Fort St. George.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Chowke, 18th May, 1804.

‘ The Accountant General at Fort St. George has lately forwarded to the Resident at Poonah a plan, according to

\* The late Governor General of India, who had at that time relieved Lord Clive in the government of Fort St. George. Although the resignation of

which he is desirous that money should be raised at Poonah for the service of your Lordship's government, upon which I take the liberty of addressing your Lordship.

‘ Since I have conducted a service on the western side of India, I have been obliged to depend, in a great measure, upon the resources of the government of Bombay for the extraordinary supplies required to carry on that service. The nature of those resources has become an object of my particular attention ; and it occurs to me that the plan of the Accountant General, as detailed in his letter to the Resident at Poonah, of the 28th April, will not raise any money at Poonah at the present moment ; at the same time that the introduction of the bills drawn by your Lordship on Bengal and England, and the loans of the government of Fort St. George, at Poonah, will materially impede the financial operations of the government of Bombay.

‘ The expenses of the government of Bombay far exceed the means afforded by their revenue of defraying it ; and the deficiency is made up principally by money procured by bills drawn upon Bengal. It does not appear that the trade, by means of which these bills are negotiated, is carried on by sea, from port to port ; on the contrary, as the money received by the government of Bombay for bills comes from the soucars, and the bills are negotiated through the means of their connexions with Poonah, Nagpoor, and other great cities in Hindustan and Benares, Lucknow and Calcutta, it is to be supposed that these operations are supported by the inland trade. But if this were not sufficient to prove that the inland trade was the support of these operations, it might be proved by the state of the trade of the port of Calcutta with the ports of Bombay, Surat, &c., on the western coast.

‘ Till within little more than a year, the government of

Lord Clive (now living as the venerable and respected Earl of Powis) forms no part of the history of India, as referrible to the dispatches of the Duke of Wellington, still the important letter dated 21st of February, 1803, which Lord Clive wrote on that occasion to the Court of Directors, is of such interest, as containing the detailed financial and political history of the Presidency of Fort St. George, whilst under his Lordship's government, from 1798 to 1803, that the Compiler regrets its length has prevented the insertion of it in an appendix to this volume.



Bombay drew upon Bengal to great advantage. They generally received one hundred and seven, and one hundred and eight Bombay rupees at Bombay for a bill for one hundred sicca rupees. Since the last year, from a variety of causes, the exchange has fallen. One of these causes has been the increasing disturbances in the Marhatta empire; another was the great fire at Bombay; a third was the late war, which for a moment interrupted the commercial intercourse between the provinces under the government of Fort William, and the great cities in the Marhatta empire; and a fourth was, that in consequence of the authority which I received from the Governor General, I drew bills upon Bengal which were negotiated at Poonah; and although endeavors were made to draw those bills at the same rate of exchange with the bills drawn by the government of Bombay, the fact that bills of exchange were to be procured from two quarters, instead of from one, had a tendency to depreciate the value of the bills of both, and to expose the drawers to the effects of a combination among the soucars, all of whom are connected by caste, if not in trade, and thus, to lower the rate of exchange. The knowledge, that by drawing bills at Poonah, notwithstanding the utmost care of the Resident, by whom the transaction was managed, we should always be liable to these evils, had induced me to determine to grant no more bills upon the government of Bengal till I should be obliged by necessity to adopt this measure.

‘Notwithstanding these causes tending to produce a depreciation of the value of bills by exchange drawn by the government of Bombay, they have not yet fallen below *par*; and there was reason to hope that, as soon as the drain of money to Guzerat for the purposes of the cotton trade should have ceased, and the soucars should have seen that they had no chance of procuring bills at Poonah, the exchange would have risen.

‘Upon a calculation made of the value of Arcot rupees, in respect to Chandore rupees, the currency at Poonah, and the rate at which the latter are issued to the troops, it appears that the terms upon which your Lordship proposes to draw upon Calcutta are less favorable to the money holders by one per cent. than the bills now granted by the government of Bombay. It is therefore probable that your Lord-

ship's bills would not be taken; particularly as the holder of the money must wait about a month after he shall have paid his money into the Poonah treasury, before he will receive his bills from Madras. If, however, we should be able to raise the value of the bills drawn by the government of Bombay one per cent. above par, those drawn by your Lordship will immediately come in competition with them. The difference between the two will be in favor of the Bombay bills, from the disadvantage of waiting for a month for those drawn by your Lordship, which may be reckoned at about one per cent.; so that if your Lordship's bills on Calcutta should be introduced into the market at Poonah, the utmost advantage that can be expected at Bombay in the drawing of bills upon Bengal, will be one per cent., instead of seven or eight per cent., as it was two years ago.

‘ Besides this inconvenience at Poonah, the negotiation of your Lordship's bills upon Calcutta may affect the state of the exchange between Bombay and Poonah, which is now at par, and will possibly rise in favor of Bombay.

‘ Your Lordship's bills upon the Court of Directors are upon more favorable terms to the money holders than those granted by the government of Bombay, but it is not probable that they will produce any money. First, because a month must elapse after the money is paid at Poonah before the bill can be returned from Madras; and next, because the gentlemen at Bombay who might have money to dispose of in that manner must employ agents both at Poonah and at Madras: at the former, to pay the money into the treasury at Poonah; at the latter, to produce that certificate of the payment of the money, and receive the bill at the office of the Accountant General of Fort St. George.

‘ The loan will not, in my opinion, produce any money from the settlement of Bombay, because the government paper of Bombay can be purchased at a cheaper rate.

‘ To allow money to be received by the Resident at Poonah, on account of bills upon the Court of Directors, or of this loan, may be advantageous to those of the officers of the army serving in this country who may have any money to dispose of in such a manner; but this advantage must be deemed only a private one at best: it is very improbable that it will be enjoyed by many, and will bring but a small

sum of money into the treasury; and will not compensate for the evil of introducing the financial plans of the government of Fort St. George, in places in which those of the government of Bombay alone have been hitherto in operation.

‘From what I have above stated, it will appear to your Lordship that the plan, however well intended, is likely to create competition between the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to be attended by all the effects of competition between borrowers, viz., to increase the demand of those who have any thing to lend. It will not affect your Lordship’s financial arrangements, as those are founded upon large revenues and resources, and framed upon principles entirely different from those of the government of Bombay; and they are independent of the expected supplies of money at Poonah; but it will affect the financial arrangements of the government of Bombay, and, through them, those of the Indian empire; and therefore I conclude the plan ought to be relinquished.

‘Under these circumstances, I have taken the liberty of requesting the Resident at Poonah to suspend the publication of the advertisements forwarded to him by Mr. Smith till he shall have received your Lordship’s further orders.

‘When at Bombay, I gave much attention to the mode of supplying the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah with money hereafter, in consequence of orders which I received from Lieut. General Stuart; and I had much conversation upon the subject with the mercantile gentlemen there, particularly with Mr. Forbes \*, a gentleman of great respectability, who is at the head of one of the principal houses, and who has frequently come forward in aid of government when his assistance has been required.

‘I should have been able to arrange the supply of the funds for the support of the subsidiary force, so as to have precluded the necessity of sending money from the territories under your Lordship’s government, if I could have stated precisely the monthly demand of cash at Poonah for the public service; but, in the present state of affairs, the demand is very uncertain, and no private merchant could have

\* Now Sir Charles Forbes.

ventured to contract to supply an uncertain amount. On the other hand, no merchant would undertake to supply a part of the funds required at Poonah. He must supply the whole sum required at that place, or he is liable to a competition with government in procuring the funds, in which competition he must be a loser. However, I have no doubt whatever but that, when affairs shall become more settled, and the amount of the demand upon the British Government, payable at Poonah, shall have been defined, the government of Bombay will experience no difficulty in arranging with the merchants there a mode of defraying the expense more consistent with the general advantage than to draw the specie from the provinces under your Lordship's government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord William Bentinck,*  
*Governor of Fort St. George.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Chowke, 18th May, 1804.

‘ I arrived here this morning, and shall continue my march to-morrow. I took the opportunity, on my arrival at Panwell, to see Nana's widow, in consequence of the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, which was put into my hands by a person belonging to Byajee Naig, as soon as I landed. I had a very long conversation with her, at which no person belonging to Dhoondoo Bullall was present. She had a Moorish woman interpreter, and as I heard her give orders to her interpreter in the Moorish language, and receive her reports in the same, I must consider the conversation of the first authority. The result of it, in my opinion, is, that she will not go to Poonah; and, certainly, she cannot be forced to go there contrary to her inclination.

‘ I began by explaining that, as I was passing through Panwell, I had paid her a visit to ascertain from herself her real wishes and intentions regarding the place of her future residence. I said that I had heard she had wished to go to Poonah; and I told her that if that was her wish, I would take her there with me, and would see her settled in honor and security. She answered, that the Peshwah had ex-



pressed a wish that she should go to Poonah ; but that she could not go there unless her carkoons were to be in security, as to their lives, their persons, and their property. I told her that if she meant, by her carkoons, all the adherents of Nana, I could not converse about them ; but if she meant her household servants, I would take a list of them, and would ascertain the Peshwah's intentions respecting them : that she might, in the mean time, set out with me, and that if the Peshwah should not act as she might wish respecting her servants, she should return, and stay where she pleased, or she might send them away, or, in short, she could act as she might think proper.

‘ After some conversation upon this subject, in which she declined to set out with me, she repeated the names of her carkoons, which are as follow : Junardan Punt, who had charge of the janda khannah in Nana's time ; Appojee Punt, who had charge of the lady's own personal affairs ; Ball Kischen Bhow, who was killadar of Loghur thirty years ago, and is now a servant about the house ; Nagoo Punt, who had charge of the provisions in Nana's family ; and Gungur-dur Punt, her own brother. After having given this list, she said her pension was not sufficient, and that the Peshwah had sent her word that she should have 25,000 rupees per annum. I told her that I had had a great difficulty in prevailing upon the Peshwah to give her 12,000 rupees, for which the Company were the guarantee ; but unless the Peshwah should desire me to promise that she should have 25,000 rupees, in which case care would be taken that the money would be forthcoming, I could not guarantee such a payment merely upon her saying that the Peshwah had promised it. I then pointed out to her that, in her situation as a widow, 12,000 rupees must be considered a handsome provision.

‘ There was much conversation upon this subject, and other matters connected with, or provided for, under the treaty, such as her property, &c. ; and, at last, I summed up the result of the conversation, and told her that, if I should be able to prevail upon the Peshwah to promise security to the five persons she had mentioned, I expected that she would set out for Poonah, and that an escort should be in readiness to attend her. She answered that, besides this

the killadars of Loghur and Kellinjah, and the son of the former, must be allowed to accompany her and live with her. I answered, that they might go where they pleased; and that, so long as they should conduct themselves with propriety, they would be considered under the Company's protection. She then said that her menial servants and their menial servants also must be secure. I told her, of course.

'She then reverted to the increase of her allowance, and said that she should never be secure until she should be permitted to adopt a child; and desired that her brother, Pursheram Punt, might be released from his confinement in Sevaghur. In answer, I said that I could not interfere in these matters, but that the latter request should be mentioned to the Peshwah.

'Upon the whole, I am convinced that she will not come to Poonah; but it is as well to prevail upon the Peshwah to allow us to engage for the security of the five persons, at all events; and to promise an increase of pension, if she would reside at Poonah, and then possibly she may be prevailed upon to comply.

'She is very fair and very handsome, and well deserving to be the object of a treaty.

'After this conversation, I spoke rather sharply to Dhondoo Bullall, and told him that he would forfeit the Company's favor if he should interfere with the Baye, or should thwart her wishes in any manner whatever. She must have overheard what I said.

'I have this day written to her to desire that she will not move from Panwell until she shall have heard of the result of my application upon her business to the Peshwah, and I desired her to consider herself in perfect safety at Panwell, and not to allow herself to be frightened. I wrote this, because Byajee Naig's son, who was with me at midnight, after I had quitted her, told me that endeavors had been made to terrify her.

'Write to me by the Karly road. I shall be at Karly on the 20th.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 19th May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a memorandum which I have received from Captain Moor, the garrison storekeeper of Bombay, whose request I take the liberty of laying before your Excellency, although I have reason to believe that it has already been recommended by the Governor of Bombay, as the service which occasions it was rendered to the army in the field, and I have reason to be satisfied with Captain Moor’s exertions.

‘ This officer is Garrison Storekeeper of Bombay ; and it appears that the duty which he performed for the service of the army was one entirely foreign from that required from a person in his situation. It does not appear necessary that I should consider the reason which induced the Governor of Bombay to employ Captain Moor in this manner, excepting to observe that the arrangement ensured the three great objects of secrecy, expedition, and economy.

‘ As Captain Moor performed these duties, it will be proper that he should be rewarded in proportion to the trust reposed in him, to the qualities he has displayed in executing this agency, and to the benefit which the public have derived from employing him.

‘ As he was employed in this agency before the month of July, 1803, at which period your Excellency’s orders were received, that the mode of rewarding agents, by commission on the account of their purchases, should be discontinued by the Government of Bombay ; and as there does not appear any other mode of rewarding Captain Moor adequately, I beg leave to recommend that he may be allowed a commission upon his agency in the last service, in the same manner as upon his agency in the expedition to Egypt.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Irton.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Cundalla, 19th May, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant. I referred your letter, on the subject of the claim of the troops stationed at Hyderabad to share in the distribution of the property captured during the war, to his Excel-

lency the Governor General; and his Excellency was pleased to decide that they ought not to share.

‘ In the course of a few days I propose to publish to the army the detailed orders which I have received from the Governor General upon the subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Irton.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Worgaum, 21st May, 1804.

‘ I hope you will excuse the liberties I take so frequently in recommending to your favor officers of the army, but their services give them undoubted claims upon me; and I judge, from the manner in which you have always disposed of the patronage of the army, that you are desirous to promote and reward those who merit it.

‘ It is reported in this quarter, upon what grounds I do not know, that it is your intention to abolish the office of gram Agent General, and to establish the gram agencies with corps, in the same manner as heretofore.

‘ In consequence of this report, Lieut. Young of the 19th dragoons has requested me to apply to you to appoint him gram agent to the 19th. This officer was recommended to me by Lord Cornwallis, and came out at the same time that I did. He has always done his duty in his regiment to my satisfaction, particularly in the late war, during which he has had charge, in the 19th, of this same department. I beg leave, therefore, to recommend him to you.

‘ I have sent out to have the country particularly examined to the northward, and if I should find it to be practicable, I shall march to attack Chandore, as soon as the troops shall be clothed, and shall have received their arms, which will be in about ten days. I have put all the carriages into repair again, and we shall be well equipped. I have a large quantity of dry grain of different kinds from Bombay.

‘ There is no news, excepting that the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan have ratified the treaties of peace, and have agreed to the treaty of partition. This treaty gives Berar, and Scindiah’s possessions between the Godavery and



Adjunttee, to the Soubah of the Deccan ; Ahmednuggur to the Peshwah ; and all the rest to the Company.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Worgaum, 21st May, 1804.

‘ You have seen the Governor General’s dispatch to me, dated the 21st of April, containing his orders addressed to General Lake and myself, to commence hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar. In the present exhausted state of the Deccan, I very much doubt whether I shall be able to move from the neighbourhood of Poonah till the new grass shall have appeared above ground ; and, in that case, I think that it would not be proper to announce my intention to attack Holkar’s possessions in the Deccan. However, I do not mean to lose any advantage by this kind of secrecy ; and therefore I trouble you with this letter.

‘ If the result of certain inquiries, which I have set on foot throughout the country towards Chandore, should be that I can march the army there, I shall set out from Poonah as soon as I shall have clothed and armed the troops, which will be in about ten days. In that case, I shall require the co-operation of the subsidiary force, under Colonel Hallyburton, and the Soubah’s contingent ; and I may possibly draw to the westward Lieut. Colonel Lang’s detachment, which is at present in Berar.

‘ If I should be obliged to delay my march to the northward, I shall leave Colonel Hallyburton where he is for the present, as well as the Soubah’s contingent. I fancy that no very great preparations will be required to draw out the Soubah’s contingent at any time.

‘ Holkar has not now any troops in the Deccan ; and if I should be able to march immediately, the conquest of his possessions will not be difficult. If I should not be able to march till a late period, it will be desirable that the contingent should be complete, as it may be expected that, as soon as he shall be attacked in Hindustan, he will prepare for his defence in this quarter.

‘ As soon as I commence hostilities, I propose to desire

Colonel Hallyburton to take possession of the town and district of UMBER. The fort is of no strength : in my opinion, the killadar will give it up, when he shall receive my orders to do so, and the Colonel can take possession of it as he marches to the rendezvous. I propose that UMBER should be given over to the Soubah's servants.

‘ From the perusal of this letter, you will be the best judge whether it will be necessary to announce to the Soubah's servants the intention of attacking Holkar in the Deccan, in order to make it certain that the Soubah's troops will be prepared.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Worgaum, 21st May, 1804.

‘ I believe that while you were at Bombay I wrote to Chintomeny Rao, to desire that he would give up the person of Baba Phurkia, and send him to the Peshwah, and I promised that Baba Phurkia should preserve his life and his honor. The vakeel has returned from Meritch, and says that Chintomeny Rao is ready to act as I have desired; but the Peshwah has sent orders that Baba Phurkia may be kept in confinement at Meritch, where he now is. What is to be done on this subject ?

‘ Since I wrote to you last, I have received a letter from the widow, in which she desires to have Manowelly, where, she says, she has a palace. This is true, I believe. She also desires to have her house, stables, and garden at Poonah; and she wishes to be allowed to keep certain lands and villages for which she has sunnuds from different people. I have desired her to let me have a list of all the lands and villages; and of the names of the persons from whom she has the sunnuds, which I will send to you. In the mean time it would be well to speak to the Peshwah about the house in Poonah, and the village of Manowelly. I think that the manner in which you propose to settle the Ahmedabad affair will answer well.

‘ I shall be in camp to-morrow.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

‘ The rate at which you announce, in your letter of the 20th instant, that you have drawn on Benares, is exactly that at which the government of Bombay drew their bills on the 16th instant. In fact, as there is a difference in the rate of exchange between Benares and Calcutta, amounting to two per cent., these bills are considered to be equivalent to bills drawn on Calcutta at *par*.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

‘ I joined the army this morning. Your letters of the 20th and 21st have reached me.

‘ Upon the subject of the arrangement with Nana’s widow, the thing to be done is to obtain security for her carkoons, and possession of her house and gardens at Poonah, and her palace at Manowelly. The treaty provides for other essential objects, such as the residence of Dhoondoo Punt with her, the security of her person and of her property. If the Peshwah chooses to increase her allowance, that is his own affair.

‘ As for Dhoondoo Punt, we have nothing to do with his demands ; nor, indeed, with those of the lady, excepting in consequence of the Peshwah’s desire that she should reside at Poonah ; for the gratification of which desire he ought to make some sacrifice.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 13th, I have learned that General Lake marched in the beginning of May, and intended to take possession of Rampoorah, a post which, I imagine, is to the southward of Jyenagur. You may therefore proceed to carry into execution, as soon as you please, my instructions of the 7th instant.

‘ By the last accounts, Holkar’s army appears to have

been at Raujgur Pultam, and Meer Khan at Bhilsah: the former situated on the borders of Rutlaum; the latter on the borders of Bopal; and neither very far to the northward of Ougein. Bappojee Scindiah (Dowlut Rao's sirdar), who is between them, does not much like his situation. He has been directed to communicate with General Lake, and to obey his orders; and if he should be unable, on account of the position of the enemy, to effect that object, he has been desired to join himself with you. He will, most probably, adopt the latter course.

‘ All this will show you that Rutlaum, and towards Ougein and Indore, is your point; and I recommend you to join Bappojee Scindiah as soon as possible, if you should find he is not gone towards General Lake.

‘ You have now a great game in your hands, but all will depend upon your management of the natives with whom you will have to co-operate. I have only to recommend to you to conciliate them as much as possible; to treat them with the greatest kindness and attention is the only mode of drawing from them any assistance. At the same time you must not lose sight of the fact that they are Marhattas; that there is not one of them who can be implicitly trusted; and that, most probably, all are in correspondence with the enemy's camp. You must not allow them to perceive that you distrust them.

‘ You will excuse me for saying this to you. I have acted successfully as I now recommend to you; and my conduct and this recommendation are the result of long experience. I have not yet received General Lake's plan of his campaign.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

‘ I return Shawe's letter, which has annoyed me as much as it can have annoyed you. That plan of abusing and bullying the Marhattas will never answer, even supposing it should be possible to prevail upon any gentleman to conduct the public business in that manner. The fact is, that till lately the Governor General has never read real statements of conversations; and he is exceedingly offended with



the freedom with which the natives canvass all public subjects, and which has now, for the first time, been brought before him. The only remedy is to state to him results of arguments instead of their details; for I must be of opinion with Arsito Jah, that "it is not possible to close people's mouths as the gates of the city are closed." I propose to give Webbe a hint upon this subject.

' Scindiah wrote to me upon the subject of Gohud and Gwalior, and I have drawn up an answer to his letter. It is not yet translated, but I hope to be able to send it to Webbe this evening, or to-morrow morning.

' Although I am convinced I should not have made the peace if I had insisted upon Gwalior, I wish that I had had that point clearly explained before the treaty was signed.

' I have joined the army, which I have completely clothed, armed, and equipped. The clothing will be finished in a few days, and by that time I shall have reports of the real state of the country to the northward respecting forage. The corps are, I am sorry to say, very weak, but in good order. I am obliged to detach one of them to Goa, where an army is locked up.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Major Malcolm.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

' SIR,

' Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th instant.

' My letter of the 7th instant will have apprized you of the orders which I had received from the Governor General relative to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and of the nature of the measures which I had adopted in consequence.

' I have now joined the camp; the troops will be clothed, and will have their arms in a few days. The Europeans have new tents, and the carriages are better than they ever were. To all this, I add, that I am sanguine in my expectations that I shall be able to march at an early period in the rains, which I am determined to attempt, if the accounts of the country that I shall receive should give any encouragement. I believe I must wait till the rains for water.

' I want nothing at present. The cattle with the rice

would do best to remain for some time longer in the Ceded Districts. They would die, if they should march at this season. I shall write to General Campbell for them in due time. If the war should last, which I think very improbable, I shall want every thing, particularly arms, horse accoutrements, ordnance carriages, carts, &c.

‘ I conclude that the clothing will be sent to Ahmednuggur. The other articles mentioned might be sent by sea to Bombay, from whence I can have them transported to Ahmednuggur. Both infantry and cavalry will want recruits. I hope, however, that the war will not last. Some time may elapse before Holkar may be caught; but not much, I hope, before we may leave our allies to pursue him.

‘ General Lake marched about the beginning of the month; although, in a letter, of which I enclose a copy, he appears to intend to stand upon the defensive. Colonel Murray also will have marched by this time.

‘ Holkar had moved to the southward by the last accounts; and the commander of Scindiah’s army was apprehensive that he should be placed by this movement between Holkar and Meer Khan, and that he should be cut off from General Lake. But he has orders to join Colonel Murray, which I acknowledge I prefer.

‘ I have desired Colonel Murray to watch Holkar’s movements towards Ougein, and yesterday to march to that quarter.

‘ I am much obliged to you for the attention you pay to our wants. One lac and 25,000 pagodas will not pay us and the subsidiary force; but I shall always be able to pick up something at Poonah and Bombay. The greater part of the money which the Governor intended, on the 8th instant, to send to Masulipatam by sea, will be wanted to answer political demands at Hyderabad; such as peshcush, pensions, &c., due to the amount of ten lacs of rupees. I wrote to Major Kirkpatrick about these demands some time ago, and referred him to the government of Fort St. George for the discharge of them. However, I am convinced that you and the Governor will not forget us; and I shall always be able to get some money for bills upon Bombay and Bengal.

‘ I shall be able to arrange the payment of the batta to the officers of the army, in the manner that you and the

Governor wish. I think that if I had permission to issue treasury notes in payment of this donation, it would give great satisfaction to the officers, and would create no inconvenience. Therefore, the smallest sums would answer best, and they might bear date from the day on which they should be issued here.

‘ You will have seen a letter which I wrote to Lord William Bentinck on the 18th, on the subject of a financial plan of Mr. Smith. In this letter I have endeavored to throw some light upon the financial plans of the government of Bombay, with which this plan of Mr. Smith materially interferes; at the same time, that it will be of no use to the government of Fort St. George. You will see also that I have endeavored to arrange a mode of going on at Poonah without drawing money from the territories under Fort St. George. This endeavor failed on account of this new warfare, and particularly because Major Malcolm drew upon the Residency at Poonah for the sums he wanted at Scindiah’s durbar. Till the payments under the treaty of peace, &c., can be regulated, it will be impossible to fix the demands at Poonah; but when that is done, I shall be able to arrange with the merchants of Bombay a mode of supply which will be convenient to the public.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose Lieut. Colonel Close’s dispatch to you of the 12th instant, which was referred to my consideration by the Honorable the Governor in Council.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Governor of Fort St. George, on the subject of the financial plan proposed by Mr. Smith; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay my request before the Governor in Council, that all proceedings in conformity to this plan may be suspended until Colonel Close shall have received the further orders of the Right Honorable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st instant, containing the copy of a petition from Mr. San Martinho de Arango, late an officer in the service of the Marhatta states.

‘ In my opinion, it is necessary that Mr. de Arango should prove, in a satisfactory manner, the truth of the allegations in his petition; that he was in the service of the Marhatta states; that he held the rank of Captain; enjoyed 300 rupees a month; and quitted the service in consequence of the proclamation of his Excellency the Governor General at the period stated. If he should prove those facts, it will be proper to pay him 300 rupees per *mensem*, from the period at which he quitted the service of the Marhatta states, to the 30th of December, the date of the treaty of peace, and to send him to Goa.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

‘ After having taken fully into consideration the papers enclosed with your public dispatch of the 11th instant, and made inquiries at Bombay on the subject of them, I determined to write a letter to the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, of which I enclose a copy. Accordingly I have to request that you will suspend your operations under Mr. Smith’s letter of the 28th April until you shall hear from his Lordship.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

‘ I send sixty bullocks for the Peshwah. They are of the same size, caste, and color, and are good cattle, but much out of condition. However, that will not much signify for the Peshwah. They are in good health; and a little good



forage, and protection from the weather, will bring them about. The drivers who go with them are Mysore men ; they will not stay with the Peshwah, and if they would, I could not spare their services. They must, therefore, be sent back ; but I see no objection to their staying a few days till his Highness shall have tried other people to take charge of the cattle.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 24th May, 1804.

‘ Major Malcolm has informed your Excellency, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had written to me on the subject of his claim to the possession of the fort of Gwalior, and of the district of Gohud. I have the honor to enclose a translation of the letter which I received from that Chief on this subject, and a translation of my answer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Translation of a Marhatta Letter from Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated 9th Suffun, answering to the 20th May, 1804.*

‘ (After compliments,)—I have received your letter. (Its contents recapitulated)—I am much flattered by the confidence which you are pleased to express in me, but there was no occasion to refer yourself to my opinion on a question in which you have already received the opinion of his Excellency the Governor General, through the Resident at your durbar. Mr. Webbe is the proper channel for your communications with the British Government, and in him you may have full confidence. However, as you have desired to have my opinion on a question in which you are concerned, which arises out of a treaty that I negotiated, I shall not refuse to give it to you.

‘ The point on which you have desired to have my opinion is, whether you ought to confirm the treaties made with certain Rajahs and others, lists of whose names have been presented to you by Major Malcolm, and among whom is included the name of Boot Poonjie, the Ranah of Gohud.

‘ The ninth article of the treaty of peace says positively, that treaties made by the British Government with Rajahs and others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah are to be confirmed; and that the Maharajah is to renounce all claims upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made, and declare them independent of his government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharajah, situated to the southward of those of the Rajah of Jeypoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, of which the revenues have been collected by him or his amildars, or have been applicable as serinjaumy to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such treaties.

‘ It appears that the territory of the Ranah of Gohud was held by Rajah Ambajee Ingolia, who made a treaty with General Lake, by which he ceded that territory to the Company. There is no doubt but that the territory held by Rajah Ambajee Ingolia was not of the nature described in the ninth article, viz., situated to the southward of those of the Ranah of Gohud, of which the revenues were collected by you or your amildars, or were applicable as serinjaumy to the payment of your troops, and that the treaty with Rajah Ambajee Ingolia must be confirmed under the ninth article of the treaty of peace.

‘ The fact that Rajah Ambajee Ingolia broke his treaty afterwards does not affect the question. By breaking his treaty with the Company, he forfeits all the advantages which he would have derived from it; but it cannot be admitted that it is in the power of Rajah Ambajee Ingolia, by breaking his faith, to deprive the Company of the advantages they were to enjoy under the treaty.

‘ Besides this right to the territory of Gohud and Gwalior, obtained by treaty, the Company’s troops, and those of the Ranah of Gohud, conquered it; the Company made a treaty with the Ranah of Gohud, by which the territories in question were ceded to the Ranah.

‘ In the course of the discussion between your ministers and Major Malcolm, upon this subject, of which I have read the accounts, I observe that they rely much upon an assertion, that Boot Poonjie is not the Ranah of Gohud, and that there is no such person as the Ranah of Gohud. In fact Boot Poonjie is the lineal descendant of the Ranah of Gohud,

and his name and his territories are mentioned repeatedly in the treaty of peace.

‘ It is also asserted by your ministers that I understood, at the time I negotiated the treaty of peace, that you would not lose Gohud and Gwalior. I certainly understood that your loss of those places would depend upon the treaties which should have been made with General Lake; and upon the occasion of a difference of opinion respecting the meaning of the second article of the treaty of peace, your ministers having urged, that if the word Joudpoor were inserted in the treaty of peace as a part of the boundary, you would lose Jeypoor and Gohud, your ministers proposed that the Chumbul river should be the boundary; that every thing to the northward should belong to the Company, and every thing to the southward to the Maharajah. I replied that they positively could not lose Jeypoor and Gohud by the second article of the treaty, although they might by another, (meaning the ninth article,) and I positively refused to insert any thing in the treaty that should tend to defeat the arrangements which might have been made by General Lake with the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Gohud, or others.

‘ There can be no doubt upon this fact. Every day after I had conversed with your ministers, the whole conversation was written down; and what passed upon that occasion proves, in the clearest manner, the sentiments of the parties who made the treaty. I doubt not that your ministers will recollect this conversation, and that I drew a map for them, upon the same occasion, in which I pointed out the relative situation of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, and Gohud.

‘ But the intentions of two parties who agree to a treaty can be known only by a reference to the treaty itself, which must be considered an instrument, of which the meaning is the same throughout.

‘ In my opinion, the meaning of the treaty of peace is, that every thing to the northward of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, and Gohud, should belong to the Company: that those territories, and the serinjaumy, really belonging to you to the southward of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, and Gohud, were to continue in your possession; and that the future state of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, Gohud, Gwalior, &c., was to depend upon the nature of the treaties made by General Lake.

‘ My language to your ministers upon this subject has been uniformly the same. I said, whenever they spoke to me, that the possession of Gohud and Gwalior must depend upon the treaties which had been made with General Lake; and I think I have shown you in this letter, that the treaties which affect the possession of Gohud and Gwalior ought to be confirmed under the ninth article of the treaty of peace.

‘ Under those circumstances, you cannot suppose that the Company can or will relinquish their just demand that you should confirm the treaties which affect Gohud and Gwalior, as well as the other treaties: you are bound to confirm them by the ninth article of the treaty of peace; and, without being guilty of a breach of faith towards the Ranah of Gohud, the Company cannot avoid insisting upon your performing your engagement. I most anxiously recommend you to perform it.

‘ This transaction may be attended with greater loss to your government than you were aware of at the time you engaged to perform it; and it may have reduced your power to a degree much lower than I contemplated when I negotiated the peace, or than the Governor General ever intended. If you should feel the pressure of your difficulties, state them to the Resident at your durbar, and he will report them to the Governor General; and rely upon it that the British Government will not fail to adopt every measure, which is consistent with justice and propriety, to relieve the difficulties of a state with which its interest is so closely connected. But it is necessary, in the first instance, to perform the treaty of peace.

‘ *Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 25th May, 1804\*.

‘ I have received your letter of the 24th. I understand from it, that the Peshwah objects not only to the future

\* *The Governor General now records the following Notes of Instruction to the several Public Officers mentioned therein.*

‘ Fort William, 25th May, 1804.

‘ 1. Holkar’s force having been compelled to retire from the north western frontier of Hindustan, and no prospect appearing of danger to our possessions in that quarter during the approaching season, no reason appears to require the continuance of the Commander in Chief’s army in the field, for the mere purpose of security to our territories.

‘ 2. It



arrangement proposed for the Ahmedabad farm, but to the account of the former agreement between his Highness and the Guickwar state, as furnished by Major Walker.

‘ 2. It appears that war against Holkar cannot be prosecuted with advantage at present by the army under the Commander in Chief.

‘ 3. It appears that, at present, war against Holkar cannot be prosecuted with advantage, either by the forces under the immediate command of Major General Wellesley, or by the subsidiary force at Hyderabad; and that the forces from Guzerat cannot advance, with safety to the internal tranquillity of that country, or without hazard of suffering in their progress towards Holkar’s possessions, by the general distress of the country.

‘ 4. It appears that Holkar’s army and resources diminish daily, and that his reputation has suffered from his precipitate flight. It may be supposed that Scindiah’s troops in Malwa will endeavor to accelerate Holkar’s ruin, unless Scindiah should have formed some treacherous project against the English.

‘ 5. In any of these cases it is unnecessary and inadvisable that any part of the British army should attempt, in the present season, to advance farther towards the central or southern parts of Hindustan. The most effectual preparations which can be made, with a view to meet every possible contingency during the approaching season, will be to establish each of the new subsidiary detachments at their respective stations, and to employ the period of time which cannot advantageously be used for action in the field, in effecting such arrangements as may enable us to oppose the most powerful permanent restraint upon any possible designs of Holkar, or of Scindiah, or of Ragojee, at the least possible expense.

‘ 6. With these views, instructions will be transmitted to the Commander in Chief, to Major General Wellesley, and to the Governors of Forts St. George and Bombay respectively, to the following effect:—

‘ 7. The Commander in Chief to withdraw his army from the field, and to canton it in such a situation as he shall deem most eligible for the protection of our frontier on the right bank of the Jumna, leaving a sufficient force at Delhi, Muttra, Agra, and in Bundelcund; appointing and stationing the subsidiary force for the Ranah of Gohud, and stationing a strong garrison in Gwalior; making also such arrangements as may be requisite to establish good order within our conquests in the Doab.

‘ 8. The Commander in Chief will either withdraw the force now advanced under Colonel Monson, and actually stationed at the Boondy Ghaut, or will maintain that force in advance, and strengthen it with Europeans and cavalry, as his Excellency may deem most expedient. It would appear most advisable to withdraw that force altogether, unless a hope should be entertained of employing it actively against Holkar in the present season, of which operation no hope can now be reasonably formed.

‘ 9. The subsidiary force for Dowlut Rao Scindiah ought certainly to be stationed permanently in Guzerat; and it will therefore ultimately be furnished most conveniently from Bombay. Some time, however, must elapse before the Government of Bombay can establish the subsidiary force for Scindiah in Guzerat, and it is necessary to provide immediate arrangements for the establishment of a force in such a position in Hindustan as shall (under the denomination of the subsidiary force for Scindiah) serve either to protect Scindiah’s dominions against Holkar, or to frustrate Scindiah’s treachery, if Scindiah should pursue measures equally repugnant to his interest and public faith.

‘ As well as I can recollect, the account of the amount of the revenue payable by the Guickwar state for the

This army must be formed by the Commander in Chief for the present. The Commander in Chief will determine whether this separate army shall be formed by an addition to Colonel Monson’s detachment, or whether it shall be formed altogether from the army now remaining with his Excellency. The Commander in Chief will also determine the position which this force ought to occupy. Adverting to the necessity of forming and stationing the detachment in such a manner as to enable it to act offensively in any direction which in its services may be required,—the Commander in Chief and the Government of Bombay are to be apprized, that the subsidiary force for Scindiah must be supplied permanently from Bombay, and stationed in Guzerat until the Government of Bombay can complete the necessary detachment in Guzerat; it will be necessary, in the first instance, for the Commander in Chief to establish upon the frontier of our territories in Hindustan, or in those of our allies on that frontier, a force calculated to perform the service of the subsidiary force granted to Scindiah under the treaty of Burhampoor.

‘ 10. In considering a proper position for this provisional subsidiary force in Hindustan, the Commander in Chief may be of opinion, that it may be conveniently stationed at Agra, or Delhi, or in Gohnd, or Bundelcund, and that this force may therefore form a part of the general cantonment of his Excellency’s army. In this event a considerable reduction of expense might be effected. The provisional subsidiary force for Scindiah must, however, be regularly and separately formed by the Commander in Chief, under the command of an officer to be selected by his Excellency. This force must be equipped for immediate active service, and such temporary staff appointed as may be deemed necessary for that purpose. The particular station of this separate force must be determined by the judgment of the Commander in Chief.

‘ 11. In returning the army into cantonments, the Commander in Chief will, of course, abolish all such extraordinary and field establishments as it may not be deemed indispensably necessary to maintain.

‘ 12. The government of Fort St. George will be directed to recall all troops belonging to the establishment of Fort St. George, and now serving without the territories of that Presidency, and of Mysore, or the continent of India, with the exception of any troops belonging to Fort St. George, and now forming a part of the garrison of Goa, with the exception also of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and of one regiment of native cavalry.

‘ 13. The government of Bombay will, in the same manner, be directed to recall all its troops serving without the limits of its authority, and to provide the subsidiary forces for the Guickwar and for the Peshwah immediately; and also to station, in Guzerat, six battalions, with a due proportion of artillery, for the purpose of forming the subsidiary force for the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The troops intended to form the subsidiary force for Dowlut Rao Scindiah to be stationed in a body on the frontier of Guzerat, and to be maintained in a state of the highest equipment and efficiency. The officers for the chief command of each of the subsidiary forces will be ultimately appointed by the Governor General in Council, and are not to be removed without his express permission.

‘ 14. Under these arrangements the government of Fort St. George will therefore recall within its territories, and those of Mysore, the troops serving in Cuttack; the additional troops beyond the amount of the subsidiary force, now

Ahmedabad farm, as furnished by Major Walker, agrees with the account given by Ragonaut Rao in conversa-

serving at Hyderabad under Major Irton; the forces under the command of Major General Campbell; and those of the establishment of Fort St. George, under the command of Major General Wellesley, with the exception of one regiment of native cavalry, which must remain at Poonah to complete the subsidiary force for the Peshwah.

‘ 15. The government of Bombay will recall all its troops serving in Cochin, Malabar, and Canara, or at Goa.

‘ 16. The transfer of the troops of Fort St. George and Bombay will necessarily require some time; but it is desirable to effect it with the utmost practicable expedition, adverting to the necessity of precluding, during the operation of the proposed relief, any hazard of the security of Poonah, Goa, Malabar, Canara, or Cochin.

‘ 17. Bengal will supply the force to be stationed in the province of Cuttack, and the force necessary for the defence of Bundelcund, and of all our conquests upon the Jumna and in the Dooab, together with a subsidiary force for the Ranah of Gohud and the garrison of Gwalior; and, provisionally, the troops to be stationed in Hindustan, under the denomination of the subsidiary force granted to Scindiah by the treaty of Burhampoor.

‘ 18. The troops of Fort St. George to furnish the service in the northern circars, the Nizam's ceded districts, Mysore, Cochin, Malabar, and Canara, the Carnatic, Tanjore, &c., the garrison of Goa, and the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, with one regiment of native cavalry for Poonah.

‘ 19. The subsidiary forces at Poonah, and for Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Guickwar, to be furnished permanently from Bombay. Bombay is also to provide for all the service of the Bombay garrisons of and for Surat, and for all our territories in Guzerat.

‘ 20. Under these arrangements, with the exception of the subsidiary forces, all the troops are to be withdrawn from the field as soon as possible, and all extra establishments to be discontinued.

‘ 21. The army in Surat, with the addition of the subsidiary force for Scindiah will probably be sufficient to check Scindiah and Holkar, either separately or combined, in any event. This army, aided by the force provisionally appointed by the Commander in Chief, to serve in Hindustan, under the denomination of Scindiah's subsidiary force, by the subsidiary forces at Hyderabad and Poonah, by the troops in Cuttack, and on the frontier of Bengal, and Berar, and by those stationed in Bundelcund and Gohud, will completely check any treacherous disposition on the part either of Scindiah or of Ragojee Bhoonslah. The troops on the Jumna will be so cantoned as to afford effectual protection on that side, with the addition of proper arrangements at Gwalior, in Gohud, Bundelcund, Agra, Muttra, and Delhi, and within the Dooab.

‘ Fort William, 25th May, 1804.

‘ These notes have been transmitted to the Commander in Chief; the Governor of Fort St. George; the Governor of Bombay; Major General Wellesley; Lieut. General Stuart; Lieut. General Nicolls; the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah; the Resident at Poonah; and the Resident at Hyderabad; under flying seal to these officers.

#### CIRCULAR.

‘ To the Governor of Fort St. George; the Governor of Bombay; Lieut. General Stuart; Major General Wellesley; and Lieut. General Nicolls.’



tion upon this same subject. You may possibly recollect what he said. However, supposing that the Peshwah should persist in his objections to Major Walker's account, the question becomes one of difference between his Highness and the Guickwar state, which must be decided by the British Government, in the same manner as any other question of a similar nature.

‘By placing the question regarding the old account on this ground, we may immediately begin the discussion on the grant of the new farm. The only inconvenience which will result from this mode of settlement is, that which always results from postponing difficulties to future times and occasions, instead of meeting them as they occur. But the inconvenience is not to be balanced against that of keeping unsettled the question of the Ahmedabad farm; and I acknowledge that I am of opinion that the arrangement for the future disposal of that farm will be very likely to afford the means of settling the dispute for the past.

‘If, therefore, you cannot prevail upon the Peshwah to agree to the truth of the account furnished by Major Walker, you might inform him that the question becomes one of arbitration for the British Government, and that it would be considered and decided in course; in the mean time you might propose to him to agree to the new arrangement for the farm, receiving the balance due upon the old arrangement, as acknowledged by the Guickwar state. It may be settled that the Guickwar state shall hold the farm for ten, or a term of years, for a rent that shall be deemed equitable by the British Government, after a full examination of the value of the districts; and you might refer to Major Walker for the materials which would throw a light upon the subject.

‘These materials, and the discussions with the Guickwar government upon them, and the future arrangement of the farm, will very possibly discover the truth regarding the former agreement. According to this mode of proceeding our object will be gained, and the Peshwah will eventually have as good a revenue from his lands and rights in Ahmedabad, as he could have under any other arrangement; and very possibly we may be able to settle the dispute regarding the old farm.



‘ I received a letter from General Stuart some time ago, in which he informed me that the government of Fort St. George were desirous to have an account of the expense of the auxiliary troops during the war.

‘ The manner in which this transaction stands at present is, that the paymaster of the army has paid sums of money to the Peshwah’s troops, and you have received sums of money from the Peshwah’s Ahmedabad farm to defray that expense. These sums of money have, with others, been transferred to the paymaster of the army; but the transaction is not so clear as it ought to be in this matter.

‘ In my opinion, the advance to Goklah and Appah Dessaye ought to stand in the paymaster’s books as so much paid on your account to those sirdars. You will charge the payment to the Peshwah, giving him credit for the sums received from the Ahmedabad farm. So far the account will be settled with the Peshwah; and it will always show the state of the Peshwah’s debt to the Company.

‘ The statement of your payments to the paymaster, beyond the amount for which he will have given you my bills, will show the manner in which you have disposed of the sums received from the Peshwah’s Ahmedabad farm.

‘ I enclose documents of the sums paid here to Goklah and Appah Dessaye, specifying the amount for each month. Besides this, you paid some money to Goklah, I believe, in July and August, before he joined me; and also one month’s pay both to Goklah and Appah Dessaye, in the month of March, 1804, when they came to Poonah with me. I shall be obliged to you if you will add to these the sums paid by you to both sirdars, and acquaint me with the amount which you have received on account of the Ahmedabad farm, that I may let the government of Madras know the state of this transaction.

‘ I shall also be obliged to you if you will inform me whether you approve of the mode in which I have proposed to settle this business.

‘ Besides this, there is another account to be settled, relating to the advances made to Amrut Rao.

‘ These advances are on two accounts; on account of his treaty with the Company, and on account of payment of his troops. The payments consequent on his treaty with the

Company must stand in my name till the day on which I made him and his adherents over to you, under the orders of the Governor General. His troops were taken into the Company's service as three thousand of the five thousand which the Company were bound to provide for under the modification of the treaty of Bassein. The payment of these troops ought to be charged as so much expended on your account.

‘ The enclosed memorandum of the payments made at the office to Amrut Rao does not specify on what account. But I have detailed statements and accounts signed by Amrut Rao's vakeel, which will show clearly the state of the transaction. I will send you a translation of these, if I can get them made before this letter goes ; if I cannot I will send it to you to-morrow. Let me know whether you approve of the proposed mode of settling this matter.

‘ I think it will be best for Webbe to take no notice of the employment of Scindiah's troops at Nusserabad, excepting to urge that they may be sent into Malwa to oppose the common enemy.

‘ Scindiah will be ready enough to notice to Webbe that he has employed them for the service of the Peshwah, and to claim a remuneration for his expenses ; and there is no occasion for us to stand a fresh discussion with Scindiah's durbar.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I enclose a memorandum for Goorparah. He says that the Peshwah's order did not include every thing belonging to him ; this paper does.’

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 25th May, 1804.

‘ The letter from the lady did no more than acknowledge the receipt of mine. A few minutes before I received it, I got another letter from her, in which she complained bitterly of the conduct of Byajee Naig's son, in insisting upon reading to her the letter I had sent, and reading her answer. I think that Byajee Naig's son does no good at Panwell, and that he ought to be recalled.

‘ I think that he has not given a true account of the state of affairs there.

‘ I have settled that the dragoon is to have his provisions from Major Spens.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 26th May, 1804.

‘ I enclose a copy of a translation of a paper which Lingum Pundit put into my hands yesterday, as an account of what Goklah wished to have done for him by the Peshwah. I pointed out to Lingum Pundit the unreasonable nature of the contents of this paper; and after some conversation upon this point, I said that it was ridiculous to come to me with such a paper, as it must be well known that I never should interfere to obtain even a hearing to demands of a nature so exorbitant.

‘ After some argument, it was at last agreed that this was the object of Goklah’s ambition, but that he would be satisfied with less. I then asked what territory Goklah had in his hands, and they acknowledged to a certain number of districts, the value of which, according to their account, did not amount to one fourth the sum at which they had been given to the late Peshwah, by Tippoo. There we had another argument: I insisted upon it, that if Goklah intended to do justice by the Peshwah, (and unless he did, I should have nothing to do with his affairs,) it would be necessary, either that he should allow the Peshwah the full value of his districts, and render him proportionate service; or, if the districts were not worth the value so stated in the treaties, he should resign the districts, and receive a money payment for his service.

‘ I told him that I had gone upon this same principle with Amrut Rao, and that the result had been, that Amrut Rao gave up the country. I then pointed out to Lingum Pundit the distressed situation of the Peshwah’s countries. I desired him to point out a district which Goklah could get, for which he would not have to fight; and I brought to his view

the ruined state of each district after it would have been fought for, and the improbability which existed, that Goklah would for years get any thing for it; and at all events, I pressed him to say whether, under such state of things, the Peshwah had any reason to hope that Goklah would give him any service.

‘ I contrasted this statement with that which would exist, supposing that Goklah should receive a money payment, and I strongly pressed that he should defer to a future period the discussion of his claim to a provision in land, and that he should now take payment for his service in money.

‘ Lingum Pundit said that the Peshwah had promised money, but had given none; and that Goklah would starve if he depended upon the performance of his Highness’s promise. I then told him that the Company would engage for the regular payment of the money, provided that Goklah would *bonâ fide* relinquish Savanore, excepting Noolgoond, his old family jaghire. Upon this ground, Lingum Pundit is going over to speak to you.

‘ He then pressed that Goklah should be employed to the southward; and said that the scarcity was so great, that he could not serve upon the same pay, if he came to the northward. In answer, I told him that I could not go into that question at all; and that all I knew was, that if he received the Company’s money, he must serve wherever he might be ordered. Here the conference ended.

‘ I think that you will be able to get Goklah’s service upon the old bargain of seventy-five thousand rupees monthly.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Colonel Close.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 27th May, 1804.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 26th. I will go over to Poonah on any day that you will fix for the entertainment for the Peshwah. The sooner the better, as I hope to be able to march to the northward; and, at all events, I must go to Poonah to inspect the corps there, and the bridge carriages, &c.; and I should wish, if possible,



to make only one trip there. However, let all this be settled according to the convenience of the Peshwah and yourself.

‘ In respect to the entertainment, it is my opinion that you ought to preside at it. Your doing so may have permanent good consequences : my doing so can have none that will last beyond the period of my stay in this quarter.

‘ Mr. Duncan has forwarded a complaint of the conduct of the Soubahdar at Bassein ; however, I think it will turn out that there is no cause for it.

‘ Believe me, &c. .

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General Lake.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Panowullah, 27th May, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th instant, for which I beg leave to return you my thanks.

‘ I assure you that I have no intention of resigning the situation which I hold under the government of Fort St. George, in order to avail myself of your permission to return to Europe, until the service on which the troops are entering shall be brought to a conclusion.

‘ I have never received any letter from you ; but I concluded that you had been so much occupied, as to have wanted leisure to answer the letters which I addressed to you, or that your letters had been intercepted.

‘ I was very sensible of the favors conferred upon me and the officers who had served under my command, in the promotion of Lieut. Colonel Wallace and others, whom I had the honor of recommending to your notice. I now enclose the duplicate of a letter which I wrote to you from Bombay, which may not have reached you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 27th May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter addressed to your Lordship by the house of Forbes and Co., at Bombay, together with one to myself, and a private letter from Mr. Forbes, on the subject of a proposal from the house to pur-

chase the Company's sandal wood at Madras, and to pay the money into the treasury at Poonah.

‘ I am unable to give any opinion on the mercantile part of Mr. Forbes's proposal, as it refers to prices of sandal wood at Madras and in China, with which I am entirely unacquainted; but it will be very advantageous to the provinces under your Lordship's government to save the export of so large a sum in specie as five lacs of rupees; and it will be very convenient to the army to have the command of that sum at Poonah.

‘ Upon the occasion of addressing myself to your Lordship upon this subject, I cannot avoid adverting and drawing your Lordship's notice to the public spirit of Mr. Forbes, who seeks opportunities to render his private speculations, as a merchant, useful to the public service. By this conduct, he has upon a variety of occasions, and particularly in the last year, given most material aid to the cause of the British Government on this side of India.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General Lake.*

‘ SIR,

‘ 27th May, 1804.

\* \* \* \* \* ‘ The account you give of the state of Holkar's army is very satisfactory. I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description of freebooter; and I think that the best mode of operating, is to press him with one or two corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of operation is to oblige him to move constantly and with great celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plunder the country, and he does comparatively but little mischief: at all events the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious, the horsemen become dissatisfied, they perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily: the freebooter ends by having

with him only a few adherents ; and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

‘ In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed against a freebooter of this description, have the power of moving with celerity, will such freebooter be distressed. Whenever the largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages ; because their villages being in some degree fortified, they know well that the freebooters dare not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all their means of subsistence vanish, no resource remains excepting to separate ; and even this resource is attended by risk, as the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.

‘ You will have been informed by Mr. Webbe that Colonel Murray has moved before this time.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I have great hopes that I shall be able to move, and to make the siege of Chandore in the course of the month of June. Every thing is ready. The troops have been clothed and equipped, and I wait only for a fall of rain to insure water.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 27th May, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, upon the subject of the landing of the troops from the Ternate, at Bassein.

‘ Among the papers enclosed, I observed the copy of a letter from Mr. Denton, in which he complains of the conduct of the Soubahdar of Bassein ; upon which subject I should have made an immediate representation to the Peshwah, did I not observe a letter from Lieut. Frederick to Captain Nicolls, in which Lieut. Frederick notices the polite conduct of the Soubahdar towards him. However, polite conduct towards one officer affords no excuse for conduct of

a different tendency towards another; although it affords some ground to hope that the state of the officer who complains was not understood; and this requires further explanation.

‘ I therefore request that inquiry may be made, whether Mr. Denton went on shore in his uniform as an officer; the hour at which he reached Bassein; whether he was forcibly detained in the choultry, contrary to his inclination; or if he stayed there as a place of shelter, till he should have an opportunity of seeing the Soubahdar?

‘ If I should find that Mr. Denton, when known to be an officer, was treated with impoliteness or indignity, I shall consider it to be my duty to remonstrate with his Highness the Peshwah, in the most serious manner; and I make no doubt but that the Soubahdar will receive the punishment which he deserves, as in this instance he will have disobeyed the positive orders of his Highness, given to him at my earnest request.

‘ I have the honour to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 28th May, 1804.

‘ Since I had last the honor of addressing you, I have received a private letter from General Lake, written after he had received mine of the 23rd of April, in which he tells me that Holkar’s army is in the greatest distress; that his men were deserting daily, and were coming to the British camp by hundreds; that Holkar had fled to the southward and crossed the Chumbul; and that Colonel Monson, with a British corps, was at Boondy. These accounts are corroborated in a very satisfactory manner by the ackbars from Scindiah’s camp, and from Hindustan.

‘ From the position of Holkar’s different detachments and their movements, I judge that they intend to enter Bundelcund: when Colonel Murray shall have moved they must either do that, or cross the Nerbudda, or fight; and by all accounts Holkar has determined to avoid risking an action. However, if his force fritters away in his flight, which if he is pursued it will, the object is equally answered. He will



end by being too weak for Scindiah's army of horse, and then he must be destroyed.

‘ In my last letter I mentioned generally our wants in this quarter; if the war should last, I shall send a detailed list of them in a few days.

‘ I have strongly urged General Lake to continue his pursuit of Holkar, even although he should have no hopes of bringing him to action. If he does this, I have not a doubt but that the business will soon be over. Indeed if the Governor General had allotted a subsidiary force to Scindiah, it would probably have been over by this time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have received a letter from Mr. Duncan, of the 26th, in which he tells me that the Anne, extra ship, supposed to have been lost, had arrived. Three China India-men had also arrived at Bombay, having left England on the 13th of February. The Recorder of Bombay came out by this occasion. Mr. Duncan had not received any particular intelligence when he wrote; but he says that the appearances of invasion had not diminished when these ships sailed from England.’

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullah, 30th May, 1804.

‘ I have this instant received your letter of the 22nd instant. I sent Bistnapah a rahdarry for Maunsel's battalion, and the guns some time ago, and I conclude that they have marched. I do not know that Bistnapah has kept with him even the 100 men you mention.

‘ The 2nd batt. 12th regiment has marched to Hullihall, and I have desired the commanding officer to apply for the clothing. I was obliged to send this battalion to the southward, in order to relieve a Bombay battalion at Goa, which I have sent into Guzerat, to reinforce Colonel Murray's corps.

‘ I have clothed, as well as armed and equipped, the whole army. They are in high order and in good spirits, and, please God, when the rain shall set in, I shall commence my operations. The rain may do some injury to my cattle, but there will be no water in the country for the army till the rain shall supply it.

‘ Our prospect, from the famished state of the country, is bad, but I have resources which will save us. There is no occasion for delaying the convoy to send the clothing for the 1st of the 3rd or the pioneers. If you can find means of moving it, let it go to General Campbell’s division : and I will arrange to have it brought forward with grain, at a more advanced period of the season.

‘ I have given directions that the Mysore peons might be relieved from the road by Meritch to Poonah by runners hired at Poonah.

‘ I hear from General Lake that Holkar is in the greatest distress, his troops deserting from him daily, and coming by hundreds into General Lake’s camp. General Lake was in Jeypoor, I believe ; and Colonel Monson, with a British detachment, at Boondy. Holkar had fled with great celerity from the latter to the southward, and had crossed the Chumbul. From the position and movements of the different detachments of his army, I judge that he is going into Bundelcund.

‘ Colonel Murray must have marched before this time. He has a very strong corps of infantry and some cavalry, but he is weak in the latter. If Scindiah’s army, however, cannot join General Lake, which is supposed to be doubtful, they will join Colonel Murray, and then Holkar must quit Malwa entirely.

‘ Besides Colonel Murray’s corps, there is a reserve in Guzerat, which will keep all secure in that quarter. In short, every thing promises fairly excepting the famine in the Deccan ; and that I have provided against, as far as it was in my power.

‘ It is said that Scindiah is going to Ougein, which shows confidence, at least, in his and our strength : and I see by the ackbars that he has given orders to certain bodies of his troops to take possession of Chooly Myhissur, and Indore, in conformity with suggestions which I had made to him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Wilks*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. You will of course tell Purneah how much gratified I am by his continued attention to his troops.’

*To Major Graham.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,                      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 30th May, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter of the 27th, and I have no doubt of the right of Cavy Jung to Nushin. You will therefore make such arrangements with his agents, as you may think proper, for the security of that place, and for his enjoyment of the revenue of the district.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Graham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Panowullah, 30th May, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters of yesterday. I entirely agree in opinion with you about applying for further sunnuds for Goorparah; Soondoor is of no consequence in revenue. It is a place of some strength within the Company’s territories, and just affords security to the family that possesses it.

‘ Since I received Webbe’s letter, in which he mentions that Nusserabad was to be given over to Ballojee Koonger, it has appeared to me that it would be proper to go still farther, in respect to Scindiah’s operations against that place, than I proposed in my letter to you. However, I have omitted to write either to Webbe or to you upon the subject; because I think that we are not yet all agreed about the facts.

‘ If the Peshwah, or his servants, have called upon Scindiah to assist them in taking possession of Nusserabad, as would appear by your letters and your conversation with Munkaiseer, detailed in your letter to Webbe, of the 29th instant, it is not worth while to enter into a discussion with Scindiah on that subject at the present moment; and the best mode of proceeding would be, to prevail upon Scindiah to draw off the battalions for the purpose of the war in Malwa.

‘ The Peshwah and Scindiah choose at times to consider themselves in the relation of master and servant; and I do not think it is quite clear what the notions of our government are upon that subject. Until these notions are defined, I do not think it advisable to enter into a discussion with either government, in which the principal topic will be

this relation; and on that ground, as well as because I think it desirable not to multiply our subjects of discussion with Scindiah just now, I should prefer to settle the Nusserabad question in the manner above proposed.

‘ But Webbe writes to me that Nusserabad is to be made over to Ballojee Koonger, which entirely alters the state of the question. In that case, Scindiah is not acting at Nusserabad by desire of the Peshwah, or of his ministers or servants; in fact on behalf of another person, who the Peshwah says is not his servant; but who has been the servant of both the Peshwah and Scindiah, and who, we have reason to believe, is more attached to Scindiah than to the Peshwah.

‘ At all events, as far as I can judge from Munkaiseer’s conversation, the Peshwah has not assigned Nusserabad to Koonger and Scindiah. Interference to obtain possession of the place for him cannot be considered in any other light than as an act of hostility. If Webbe’s information should be correct, I think that he ought to do more than I first proposed, and to remonstrate strongly with Scindiah upon the subject of his employing his troops in this manner, and to insist upon his delivering to him an order immediately addressed to their commanding officer to withdraw.

‘ If this subject should strike you as it does me, I shall request you to forward a copy of this letter to Webbe, and let me know it, and I will also address him officially upon the subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I shall leave this place for Poonah the day after tomorrow, at daylight. I have never received any answer from you about Baba Phurkia.

‘ Has Lengun Pundit delivered my letter about Goklah?’

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Panowullha, May 31st, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th instant, with which you have transmitted one of the 20th, from the Resident at Baroda.

‘ It is very proper that endeavors should be made to



induce Arund Rao Powar to join the corps of British troops under Colonel Murray; and if Arund Rao should join Colonel Murray, he will be entitled to the consideration of the British Government. I beg leave to recommend, however, that the gentleman in Guzerat should cautiously avoid contracting any engagement with Arund Rao Powar.

‘The family of Powar was formerly equal with those of Scindiah and Holkar in its rank in the Marhatta empire; and it shared in the conquests made in the same proportion with those families and with the Peshwah. But in the course of time the family of Powar has fallen to decay; and in our recent transactions in the Marhatta empire, we found Arund Rao, the head of the family, a chief of no consequence, and serving in Scindiah’s army with a small body of horse at the battle of Assye.

‘It is my opinion that Arund Rao Powar cannot be considered in the light of an independent chief, because Scindiah and Holkar are so considered, and because the family of Powar were formerly of the same rank in the empire with those of Scindiah and Holkar. Those Chiefs are considered to be independent for a variety of reasons, which it is not necessary at present to detail; but principally, I imagine, because their acts had, for a series of years, been uncontrolled by the Peshwah, (the servants of whose government they were formerly,) or by any other power; and they were to all intents and purposes, in fact, independent.

‘This reasoning will not apply to Arund Rao Powar; he was formerly, like every other Marhatta chief, a servant of the Peshwah. We do not know of his independence, and we found him serving in Scindiah’s army. Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that we ought to avoid making any engagement with him, the formation of which must be an acknowledgment of his independence.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th of May, in which you have enclosed copies of letters received

from Mr. Crow, the magistrate at Surat, containing complaints of the conduct of Lieut. —, of the 1st battalion, 3rd regiment.

‘In consequence of those complaints I have given directions that Lieut. — may be put in arrest, for a crime, of which I enclose a copy ; and I have sent orders to Colonel Murray that he may be brought to trial before a General Court Martial, which is now sitting in Guzerat ; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay my request before the Governor in Council, that Mr. Crow may be directed to order the witnesses of the facts related in his letters to attend this General Court Martial, when their attendance may be required.

‘These frequent complaints against the officers of the army have given me the most serious concern ; and I trust that the Governor in Council will do me the justice to believe that I shall exert the power which is in my hands to restrain and punish these disorders and irregularities. As, however, the complaints are frequent, and have been made against many individuals, it is to be apprehended that the only power which is in my hands, viz., that of trial by court martial, will fail to produce the wished for effect, of deterring others by the example of the punishment of the prisoner who is now to be tried. If this should be the case, I beg to recommend that in future those officers of the army who may be guilty of riots, or who may oppose the execution of the laws, by acts of violence and outrage, or who may insult the magistrates, may be suspended from the service by authority of Government, or may be brought to trial before the Recorder of Bombay.

‘I am concerned to say that frequent complaints have been forwarded to me by Government, of instances of all these crimes ; and it will be ruinous, as well to the authority of Government, as to the discipline of the army, if, owing to the defects of the military tribunal, or to any other causes, they should hereafter be unpunished.

‘I conclude that, under the regulations for the civil government of Surat, all native inhabitants of that city, whether belonging to the military profession, or followers of the military, are liable to the jurisdiction of the magistrate. I am desirous of receiving information upon this point,

before I notice these disorders in the General Orders to the army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 24th of May.

‘ When I was at Bombay, finding that the letters were longer on the road to and from Madras than was necessary, and that the communication was not a daily one, I recommended to the Governor to make it so; and to use the camp tappall between Poonah and Hurryhur, and thence the Mysore tappall to Madras for this purpose. He attended to my recommendation and made arrangements accordingly, and the Postmaster at Bombay wrote to Mr. Piele.

‘ This arrangement was entirely independent of the relief of the runners on the road; and was done in order to let Purneah’s peons go back to Mysore. I shall send them orders from hence, to return to Mysore as fast as they shall be relieved.

‘ Orders will go to Hurryhur regarding the clothing.

‘ I learn from Hindustan that Holkar’s fort of Rampoorah has been taken by assault, with small loss on our side.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Wilks.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

‘ I have observed for some time accounts in the ackbars that a body of the troops in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah are employed in the reduction of the Peshwah’s fort of Nusserabad, in Candeish; and, from the private correspondence which I had with Colonel Close upon the subject, it appears that Scindiah’s assistance had been required by Dhoondoo Punt, the officer acting on the part of the Peshwah in Candeish.

‘ Although the demand of assistance by this officer, and the grant of it by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, appeared to be irregular, and might lead to demands and discussions here-

after, regarding compensation, which might be unpleasant, I did not think it necessary to notice the transaction any further at present, than to request you to urge Scindiah to recall the troops from Nusserabad, and to employ them against the common enemy in Malwa; because the Peshwah and Scindiah have been in the habit occasionally of considering each other as master and servant, and the Governor General has given no instructions regarding the manner in which that relation, when brought forward, shall be considered; and because I thought it desirable to avoid to enter upon any fresh discussion at Scindiah's durbar, till the question regarding Gohud and Gwalior should be decided. But I observe, in a late private letter from you, that Ballojee Koonger is to be put in possession of Nusserabad, and that that fort is attacked with a view to that object.

‘Ballojee Koonger was originally the servant of Scindiah, then of the Peshwah, and lastly of Scindiah again, particularly during the late war. The attack upon the fort cannot be considered to be made by desire of the Peshwah, or of his ministers or servants, under these circumstances, and it becomes an act of hostility.

‘If, therefore, you should find that the fort of Nusserabad is attacked with a view to give it to Ballojee Koonger, I request you to remonstrate immediately against the act, as one of direct hostility; to insist upon the troops being recalled, and to procure an order for this recall, addressed to their commanding officer.

‘But if you should find that the fort is attacked in consequence of the requisition of Dhoondoo Punt, it will be sufficient to observe upon the irregularity of the whole transaction, without the knowledge of the British Government, and to require that the troops should be sent into Malwa, at least till his Excellency the Governor General shall have given orders regarding the manner in which the relation of master and servant between the Peshwah and Scindiah shall be considered when that topic is brought forward.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Resident*  
*with D. R. Scindiah.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To the Envoy at Goa.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that the 2nd battalion 12th regiment marched from this place towards Hullihall in Soonda, 27th May.

‘ The object of sending this corps to the southward is eventually to replace at Goa the troops which I have been obliged to draw from thence to reinforce the army in Guzerat: but as it is not to be expected that you can be attacked, at least till the month of August or September; and as the fort of Hullihall is without a garrison, the troops having been withdrawn to reinforce Goa; I have given orders to the commanding officer of the 2nd batt. 12th regiment to halt at Hullihall, in Soonda, and to form the garrison of that post, until he shall receive a requisition from you to proceed to Goa.

‘ It is scarcely necessary that I should observe upon the importance of Hullihall, in Soonda, as a post. It is impossible to conjecture for what length of time the troops in the Marhatta territories may be employed to the northward of Poonah, or the effect which this employment may have upon the operations of the jaghiredars, polygars, and other chiefs to the southward, against each other, or against the Honorable Company and their allies.

‘ While we have a post at Hullihall, there is nothing to be apprehended in the provinces of Soonda or Canara; but when the troops are withdrawn from Hullihall, there is nothing to prevent an enemy from overrunning those provinces and Nuggur.

‘ To these observations, which will show you how desirable it is to leave the troops, if possible, in Hullihall, I have to add, that Canara is the province from which the grain has been supplied, in this season, for the consumption of Bombay, Poonah, and the army, and that it is more than probable that its produce will be required in the next season for the same purposes.

‘ Under these circumstances, I have to request that you will proceed with caution, in drawing the 2nd batt. 12th regiment from Hullihall to Goa; and that you will not order them to march to the latter, unless you shall be convinced

that their services will be required, and that no risk will be incurred by leaving Hullihall without a garrison.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Envoy at Goa.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp, Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

‘I enclose the copy of a letter which the Resident with Scindiah has written to me.

‘All the accounts from Hindustan agree that Holkar’s army is in the greatest distress. He has fled in front of Colonel Monson, with a corps of three native battalions and some Hindustanee horse. His troops desert him by hundreds, and, General Lake informs me, go to his own camp; and I judge, from the direction of Holkar’s march, and the position of his detachments, that he means to make a dash into Bundelcund.

‘A British detachment of two native battalions, under Lieut. Colonel Don, has taken Rampoorra by assault, with but small loss on our side. The whole garrison were destroyed. Bappojee Scindiah was likely to join Colonel Monson.

‘The operations of the war being in this state of forwardness, and it being not impossible that Holkar may speedily be destroyed, particularly if there should be a corps in Bundelcund capable of opposing him in front, while Colonel Monson and Bappojee Scindiah will press upon his rear; and if he should be already so far reduced as that Bappojee Scindiah can venture to act against him singly, I am more than ever anxious that you should have near you the means of carrying on sieges in Malwa.

‘I conclude that you have ordered forward your heavy guns, according to your intention and my wishes. There is but a small chance of your getting the assistance of any heavy guns from Ougein, notwithstanding my requisition.

‘If, upon your entrance into Malwa, you should find that Holkar has fled into Bundelcund, or to such a distance from you, as that by no direct operation upon his army, or by no operation upon his rear, while Colonel Monson will be in his front, you can form any hope of contributing to his destruction; or if you should not receive any orders to the contrary

from the Commander in Chief, I recommend that you should consult with the vakeel, who will have been sent to you on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, regarding the best mode of destroying Holkar's power and resources in Malwa, and that you should proceed to put Scindiah in possession of any places which belong to Holkar, in concert with his vakeel. If, however, Holkar should be near you, or should have any body of troops near you against which you can strike a blow, or if you should receive any orders from the Commander in Chief, I refer you to my instructions of the 7th of May.

‘Some rain has fallen here, and I propose to march immediately.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Sir William Clarke. It is my opinion that it will be very inconvenient should Sir William Clarke quit Goa at present; and I have told him that I did not propose to recommend to the Governor General that his request might be complied with.

‘ I have ordered a battalion to Hullihall, in Soonda, which will march to Goa eventually. I propose to send to the Governor General a copy of my letter to Sir William Clarke upon this subject, and of some other letters which I have lately written.

‘ Famine rages in the Deccan. But some rain has fallen, and I propose to march, and endeavor to get to the northward. We lose fifty persons every day at Ahmednuggur, where we feed to the number of five thousand. What must it be where the people are not fed?

‘ I have come over here to be present on the 3rd, at a feast given by Colonel Close to the Peshwah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1804.

‘ I had the honor of receiving your Excellency's orders of the 16th of April, on the 7th of May, and immediately

ordered from Goa the first battalion 4th Bombay regiment, in conformity with my intention which I had announced to your Excellency, and which had met your approbation. This battalion, of which a large detachment was still in Malabar, sailed from Goa in due course, and arrived, part of it at Bassein, and part of it at Bombay, since the 20th instant, and it is now on its march to Surat.

‘ I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the instructions which I gave to Colonel Murray as soon as I received your orders, announcing your intention that Holkar should be attacked, and a copy of my letter of the same date to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which you will observe the plan according to which I proposed to co-operate with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, in the reduction of the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ Since I wrote these letters, having received private information from the Resident with Scindiah, stating that Holkar had moved to the southward and eastward towards the frontier occupied by Bappojee Scindiah, the commander of the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in Malwa; and that it was to be apprehended that Bappojee Scindiah, unable to defend himself against Holkar, would find it impracticable to effect a junction with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, or any of the detachments of his army, I desired Colonel Murray to direct his march towards Ougein, and to make a junction with Bappojee Scindiah the first object of his attention.

‘ Within these few days I have received further information of the state of the war in Malwa, from his Excellency the Commander in Chief, from the Resident with Scindiah, and from other quarters, particularly of the capture of Ram-poor, by the detachment under Lieut. Colonel Don, and of the flight of Holkar to the eastward, and of the distresses and desertion of his army.

‘ I think it probable also that Bappojee Scindiah may have joined himself with Colonel Monson’s corps, and that both together may have pushed Holkar forward with such vigor, as to have increased the distress and dissatisfaction in his army, and consequently, his loss by desertion, to such a degree as that he can no longer be formidable.

‘ Under these circumstances I have urged Colonel Murray



to get forward his battering guns, and to commence, in concert with the vakeel, who will have been sent to him from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to put that Chief in possession of Holkar's territories in Malwa, unless he should see an opportunity of co-operating with Colonel Monson, or any detachment of the Commander in Chief's army, in the destruction of the army commanded by Holkar himself, or he should have an opportunity of striking a blow against any of Holkar's detachments, or he should receive any orders from the Commander in Chief; in all of which cases I have referred him to my instructions of the 7th of May.

‘ From the 7th of May, the day on which I received your Excellency's instructions, to the 17th, my time and attention were occupied at Bombay by a variety of points relative to the supply of money for Colonel Murray's corps, and to the supply of money, clothing, arms, and accoutrements and stores for the troops under my command in the Deccan. By the exertion and arrangements of the government of Bombay, Colonel Murray will march into Malwa with a supply of treasure amounting to ten lacs of rupees.

‘ From the state of uncertainty in which affairs have been since the month of February last, it was impossible to inform the officers of the government of Fort St. George to what quarter the supplies of clothing, &c., should be sent for the different corps, and the troops were in want of every thing. However, they have been clothed, armed, and equipped since I received your Excellency's orders, and are now fit for any service which can be undertaken by their numbers.

‘ I have ordered one corps, the 2nd battalion 12th regiment, from Poonah, to Hullihall, in Soonda, which corps I intend should eventually replace at Goa the 1st battalion 4th Bombay native infantry, which has recently arrived from thence. But your Excellency will have observed, in my reports and my correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, the state of confusion and uncertainty in which affairs are in the southern parts of the Marhatta empire, and you will probably approve the directions given to Sir William Clarke, in the letter of which I transmit a copy, to avoid, if possible, to draw the 2nd battalion 12th regiment from Hullihall, in Soonda.

‘ Besides this reduction of the force under my command,

for the purpose of defending the Company's possessions and Goa, I have detached one battalion of Bombay infantry as I before informed your Excellency, from the Deccan into Guzerat, and have sent the 84th regiment and another battalion of Bombay infantry into Bombay, by which that important settlement is secured. But I have still force sufficient to accomplish every thing in the Deccan which it is in my power to undertake.

‘ My former dispatches will have apprized your Excellency of the state of distress to which the inhabitants of the Deccan were reduced by want of provisions, and of the measures which I had adopted to relieve this want. At the Company's possession at Ahmednuggur, I am concerned to say, that the distress and the evils of famine must increase till the next harvest; and that at Ahmednuggur, where five thousand people receive provisions daily under the plan heretofore laid before your Excellency, fifty people die daily.

‘ However, as I find that the operations of the war are advanced in Hindustan, I am anxious to commence them in the Deccan, and I was in hopes that I should have been able to march as soon as a sufficient quantity of rain should have fallen to ensure a supply of water: but the accounts which I receive of the state of the country to the northward, of the absolute want of forage and grain, and the reports which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton, of the state of his supplies,—in which he declares it to be his opinion, that, if he should be moved to a greater distance than he is from Berar, the difficulty which he experiences in procuring supplies of provisions must increase, and that his corps will be reduced to great distress,—have induced me to doubt the expediency of undertaking any operation to the northward at present, lest I should entirely destroy the equipments and efficiency of the army. I propose, however, to send on a heavy train of cannon, and if it should be possible to effect any thing, I shall follow it.

‘ The delay occasioned by the famine in the Deccan will not, I hope, be of any material consequence in the end. It does not appear to be possible for Holkar to bring his army into the Deccan, and his possessions in this quarter must be in the power of the British Government.

‘ In this state of affairs I am anxious to receive your Excellency’s sentiments regarding the settlement with the southern jaghiredars, which I might now undertake.

‘ I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a correspondence which I have had with the Resident at Poonah, on the subject of a financial plan which had been transmitted to him by Mr. Smith, the Accountant General of Fort St. George, including the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George.

‘ I have likewise the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Resident with Scindiah, on the subject of an attack made on the Peshwah’s fort of Nusserabad, in Candeish, by Scindiah’s troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of the Supreme Government, Fort William.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Poonah, 3rd June, 1804.

‘ Major Kirkpatrick will have informed you that the dawk runners who were carrying the letters which left Calcutta on the 11th May, were robbed at Warrungaul, near Hyderabad, on the 26th May. The packets were recovered, but one of the letters had been opened, and the papers torn and destroyed.

‘ Your dispatch to me of the 10th May was in the packet, and it was opened, and one of the papers is missing; I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will send me a duplicate of that dispatch.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sec. to Gov., Fort William.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 4th June, 1804.

‘ After the receipt of my letter of the 1st, you will have been surprised to see, in my letter of the 2nd to the Governor General, that I could not move.

‘ The reason for which I was obliged to alter my determination was, that I lost many cattle on the 31st May, 1st and 2nd of June. I received dreadful accounts of the want

of forage, and also the reports from Colonel Hallyburton of his state, and prospects of supplies. All these induced me to determine to wait, at least for a time, as a measure of prudence, if not of necessity.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Chinchore, 4th June, 1804.

‘ I have just got a letter from Colonel Murray, in which he tells me that Kaleb Khan, a Patan, who has a jaghire in Candeish, has offered to join Colonel Murray with his troops, provided he is allowed to keep his lands. This point will, I believe, belong to the Peshwah; and I request you to find out the quality of the land possessed by Kaleb Khan, and to let me know what the Peshwah will wish to be done about this man. Whether he joins Murray or not, the result of his holding lands in Candeish must be obedience to the Peshwah’s orders, and devotion to his service.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. We killed another fox after you left us.’

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,    ‘ Camp at Chinchore, 5th June, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd May. I hope that the money is now upon the road, as neither Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton nor I have more than will pay the troops their arrears for the last month.

‘ You will render a most acceptable service to Colonel Hallyburton, by sending on the seven thousand bullock loads of rice which you mention, and you may enable us to commence our operations at an earlier period than I have expected.

‘ I am happy to find that you have consented to hire the five thousand bullocks offered; and I beg you to hire for the trip to Aurungabad, or any other place within the Soubah’s territories, the two thousand bullocks offered, or



any others that may offer upon the same terms, for which you may have loads of rice.

‘The eight thousand bullocks offered at Balcondah will be a most acceptable supply, and it would be very convenient to pay for this rice at Hyderabad, as Colonel Hallyburton is at the present moment in some degree pressed for money. However, if that should be inconvenient to you, or to Rajah Mohiput Ram, or to Surreput Ram, I will take care that Colonel Hallyburton shall have the money in camp to pay for the rice before he can receive it.

‘I am much obliged to you for having sent forward the carriages with Captain Dalrymple.

‘Since I addressed you a private letter on the 21st May, I find that Colonel Hallyburton has requested Rajah Sookhroodoor to attack Umber, in consequence of receiving intelligence from Major Malcolm, that the Governor General had given directions that Jeswunt Rao Holkar should be attacked. There is no longer any reason to conceal from the Soubah’s government this intention to attack Holkar, as to announce it will certainly occasion preparations. I beg you to announce it whenever you may think proper.

‘I had hoped that I should be able to march immediately, and intended to march about the 8th of this month. But the accounts I received from Colonel Hallyburton on the 2nd instant, of the state of his supplies, the general distress throughout the Deccan for want of forage and grain, and the great mortality among the cattle, have induced me to determine to delay my march for some time longer.

‘It is fortunate that I have come to this determination, as I find, by accounts received this day from Colonel Hallyburton, that he was obliged to draw off still nearer to Bishwunt, in Berar, above the ghauts, the district from which he has been supplied hitherto, and from which alone he can expect to receive regular supplies in future.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Camp at Chinchore, 7th June, 1804.

‘I enclose a letter that I have received from Munro, which will give some information regarding affairs in the ceded

districts, which probably had not before reached you. The first part of the letter relates to a man introduced to me by Goorparah. The latter part is that which is interesting: I beg you to return this letter.

‘ The Peshwah had some fine villages in Berar, which he had given in jaghire to Sereedhur Pundit, Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, and others, the ministers of the Rajah of Berar. When the province of Berar was ceded by the treaty of peace, I prevented the ministers of the Soubah of the Deccan from interfering with these villages, which I left in the hands of the ministers of the Rajah of Berar, where I found them.

‘ Sereedhur Pundit has mentioned to Mr. Elphinstone, that he has heard from Poonah that designs are entertained to deprive him of his enaum or jaghire villages held under the Peshwah in Berar, and he wishes that I should speak to the Peshwah in his favor. No names are mentioned; and it is more than probable that this is an attempt to obtain from the Peshwah a fresh confirmation of the grants. However, it is certainly desirable, under present circumstances, to keep the Rajah’s ministers in good humour with us; and I shall be obliged to you if you will inquire quietly into the business, and interfere in their favor, if you find that a design is entertained to deprive them of their advantages in Berar.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gore.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Chinchore, 7th June, 1804.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 25th of May.

‘ I was much concerned to hear of Mr. M<sup>r</sup>Roberts’s death, and I beg you to recommend for the situation whomsoever you may think best, provided it is not Mr. —, with whom I am acquainted. Colonel — has before now favored the 33rd with officers of whom he did not entirely approve; but I think it as well that, if we can do so, we should choose for ourselves, particularly medical men. Mr. Christie is a very able man, but of course the 74th will not part with him; indeed he is now senior assistant surgeon of that regiment,

and I think has a better chance of promotion than he would have in the 33rd. At all events, supposing him to be removed to the latter, I could not allow him to quit the army.

‘ I do not understand how you manage Ensign ——’s sale of his Ensigncy ; however, I conclude it is all right.

‘ We cannot enlist Major Davison’s band at the rate proposed. In respect to a purchaser *vice* Captain West, you must settle that matter as you think proper.

‘ According to Knox’s account, there are now three companies for sale, viz., Gaff’s, Collington’s, and West’s. He has made his arrangements for the purchase of Gaff’s, and he is the senior Lieutenant ; he has therefore good ground to expect that he should be first recommended, and stand first as Captain. If Gaff has resigned his commission, I see no reason for delaying to recommend Knox for the company ; and I wish you to send in the recommendations, and afterwards you will recommend the officers next in succession who will purchase the two other companies for sale. This mode of proceeding will be entirely consistent with justice to all parties.

‘ If Captain Gaff’s commission is not to be sold, Knox must then decide whether he will take Captain West’s or Captain Collington’s ; and if he does not choose to do so, then the next in succession must be recommended.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gore.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 7th June, 1804.

‘ I have received your private letter of the 30th of May. My last public letter will have shown you that I had determined to delay my operations against Chandore, in consequence of the want of supplies in Colonel Hallyburton’s corps, and the distressed state of the country in general ; but that, as Colonel Hallyburton had authorized the attack of Umber, the design to commence operations against Holkar could no longer be concealed, and therefore that the best measure to be adopted was to call upon the Soubah to provide his contingent.

‘ I now intend to send the battering train to Ahmednugur, and thence to Aurungabad; and to desire Colonel Hallyburton to move as soon as he shall have a sufficient supply of provisions for his followers: he has plenty for his fighting men; and I propose to join his division either with the whole or a part of this, according to the prospect I may have of being able to feed them upon the march, as soon as I shall hear that Colonel Hallyburton is ready to advance. Holkar has no force in the Deccan, and he can bring none to interrupt us.

‘ The jaghiredar system is known to be so bad, that it is a waste of time to notice its defects. It is particularly defective in times of scarcity, and when the troops are to be employed upon distant expeditions, as the jaghiredars have no money, and the troops get no pay, and desert to the enemy, or return to their homes.

‘ The remedy for this evil is certainly that which you propose, viz., to supply the jaghiredars with small sums of money occasionally; but the supply must be given with the knowledge and consent of the persons employed on the part of the Soubah’s government, otherwise it will never be repaid: however, if, in the course of this service, I should see occasion to make advances of cash, and I should be able to afford it, I shall certainly make them.

‘ In respect to the person to be in charge of the Soubah’s forces, I acknowledge that I have no objection to Mohiput Ram. It appears that he possesses the confidence of the Soubah’s government; and although I have had some reason to complain of him occasionally, I believe that upon the whole any other person would have given at least equal ground for complaint. He may therefore as well remain at the head of the army.

‘ You will have heard that I had put Captain —— in arrest, in consequence of a complaint of Rajah Mohiput Ram; and I have assembled a General Court Martial for his trial. I should have sent you the papers upon this subject, only that I did not wish to make it the subject of public correspondence and remark, till the General Court Martial should decide upon it.

‘ As Captain —— had been employed upon some important occasions both by Colonel Stevenson and me; and as I



mentioned him more than once in a favorable point of view to the Governor General; and as I entertained a good opinion of him, I requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to reconsider his first complaint; and if he had no ground for it, excepting a trifling misunderstanding, which might occur between friends at any time, I should take no further notice of it; but that, if he should persist in it, Captain —— must be brought to trial. He did persist in making very serious complaints of Captain ——, whose explanations were by no means satisfactory, and he is now I believe before a General Court Martial.

‘ I am obliged to you for the good intelligence you send me about money. I hope you will have sent the six lacs of rupees to Ahmednuggur.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 8th June, 1804.

‘ I wish you to take an opportunity of mentioning to the Governor General, that having a very strong desire to return to Europe, I applied lately to the Commander in Chief for leave to quit this country when circumstances will permit it; and General Lake has given me his permission to go whenever I may think proper.

‘ My principal reason for wishing to go is, that I think I have served as long in India as any man ought, who can serve any where else; and I think that there appears a prospect of service in Europe, in which I should be more likely to get forward.

‘ Another reason is, that I have been a good deal annoyed by the rheumatism in my back, for which living in a tent during another monsoon is not a very good remedy; and a third is, that I do not think I have been very well treated by the King’s government.

‘ It is now about two years since I have been a Major General, and nearly as much since I was appointed to the staff at Fort St. George, by General Stuart. Since that time, it has been perfectly well known that I had led a body of British troops into the Marhatta territories; and suppos-

ing that I had no other pretensions to be placed on the staff, I might have expected a confirmation of General Stuart's act, under those circumstances. The staff in India had been under consideration, and another officer had been appointed to it.

‘ This last reason for wishing to go to Europe is the only one which I have stated to General Lake, although it is the least strong; as I am very certain that I shall have been appointed to the staff, as soon as it was known in England that I had reached Poonah with the army; and General Lake has consented to my departure.

‘ If the war with Holkar had not broken out, there would have been no difficulty in the business; and I should have been able to go in October, being the first period at which I could sail. As affairs are situated, I think it probable that the Governor General will have no objection to my departure, and this is the principal reason for which I trouble you.

‘ In the present state of affairs, I can do but little in the Deccan, and that little may as well be done by any body else. The siege of Chandore, when it can be undertaken, is a military operation of but little importance; and the operations of the troops from Guzerat are already beyond my guidance.

‘ Under these circumstances, I wish that the Governor General would allow me to relinquish the command in the Deccan. If I should be able to go to England in October, it must be supposed that I have money matters to arrange in Mysore, and at Madras; particularly at the latter: my accounts of the late war, which, although sent up regularly every month, have not yet been passed.

‘ I am, therefore, very anxious to receive your answer to this letter, at an early period, in order that I may arrive at Madras, if possible, early in September.

‘ I need scarcely add, that, if the Governor General should have any desire that I should remain in this country, or should think that I can be of the smallest use to his plans, I shall remain with pleasure.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, 8th June, 1804.

‘ I return Webbe’s letter, from which it appears that the Nusscrabad question is involved in all the obscurity that is possible. However, there appears to be an end of it.

‘ I send you a letter and memorandum, and translations of them, received from Joor Baye. What shall I answer about money for the lady? If she will not come to Poonah, I suppose she may go to Culwah; but I can arrange that she shall be supplied at Panwell, if it should be thought best to keep her there during the rains, supposing that she should determine not to go to Poonah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Chinchore, 9th June, 1804.

‘ I have made arrangements for supplying the bazaars in camp with grain drawn from the depôt at Poonah; but it is to be feared that the rivers will soon fill, and, in that case, I must either change my position and cross the Moota Moola, which would be very inconvenient, as I am in a capital camp, and well situated for forage, or I must request you to prevail upon the Peshwah to allow the bazaar people of the camp to pass through the town of Poonah from the depôt, and over the bridge, and thence over the bridge at Kirky, without molestation, and without asking from them any duties.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will endeavor to arrange this matter; and I have to observe that a compliance with my request is only to act in conformity to the treaty of defensive alliance.

‘ I have desired that the bazaar people may go to you, if they should find themselves under the necessity of passing through the town of Poonah, and find any difficulty, or that they are detained for the payment of duties.

‘ We have had some very heavy rains; but I do not know that they have yet done much mischief. The green forage begins to appear above ground, and, at all events, the weather is fine enough for our field days, &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah,  
9th June, 1804.

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ You will have heard that the Governor General has given orders that Jeswunt Rao Holkar might be attacked, and that I have consequently rejoined the army by his directions.

‘ The Commander in Chief is in the field against Holkar in Hindustan, and has had some success, having taken the fort of Rampoorah by assault, with a detachment under Lieut. Colonel Don ; and having pushed Holkar so hard with another detachment under Colonel Monson, that many of his men had deserted from him, and had gone to the Commander in Chief’s camp. Holkar was in the greatest distress for provisions, and every necessary which an army could require.

‘ I have delayed writing to you in hopes that I should be able to apprize you of the nature of the operations which I intended to adopt ; but such is the state of distress in the Deccan from the want of provisions, that I am obliged, for the present at least, to remain inactive. I hope, however, that I shall be able to attack Holkar’s possessions in Candish before the rains are over.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton was in the district of Jalnapoor, north of the Godavery, but he has been obliged to fall back towards Urumah in Berar, to secure provisions for his camp. However, I trust I shall be able to weather through the rains.

‘ I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to order forward the rice and bullocks, which have been so long in readiness at my call. Let them cross the Kistna, and come by the road of Culburga to Perinda, and thence to Ahmednuggur. I shall be obliged to you if you will send a small escort with them. If the officer in charge of them should find the Kistna full, I recommend that he should not keep the bullocks collected at the ghaut, but allow them to lay down their loads, and then either cross the river, or separate in different villages in the neighbourhood, either on the north or south bank of it. He may then have the rice bags passed over, and as soon as he shall



have got them all over, he may call in his bullock men with their bullocks and carry them off.

‘ My reason for suggesting this measure to you is, that I know well that such a number of bullocks collected in any one place for the length of time that will be necessary to cross over with this rice, will suffer distress ; and it is probable that, if the bullocks are separated, their owners will be able to get some shelter for them in the villages, by which their lives will be saved in case of a violent fall of rain. If the officer should adopt this plan, he ought to keep the principal owners or their head servants by him, in order to know where he can find the bullocks when he may require them.

‘ I shall keep you informed of every thing that occurs. Colonel Murray has marched with a detachment from Guzerat into Malwa towards Ougein ; and Scindiah’s army has, I believe, joined Colonel Monson.

‘ The southern jaghiredars are all in tranquillity, but their conduct must always be closely watched.

‘ I have lately sent the 2nd battalion of the 12th regiment to garrison Hullihall in Soonda, and eventually to replace at Goa the corps of Bombay native infantry, which I had drawn from thence into Guzerat.

‘ There is no occasion for the escort with the bullocks and rice hurrying on the march to Ahmednuggur.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 9th June, 1804.

‘ Since I wrote to you last I have received very bad accounts of the state of the countries to the northward ; and particularly of Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton’s resources and supplies. He had been obliged to draw nearer to Berar, in order to save the troops from the greatest distress. I have also been obliged to draw grain from the dépôt formed at Poonah, a measure, however, to which I had long expected to be reduced ; but at the same time that the necessity for it exists, and that consequently, in case I should march, there will be much work for the cattle. I am sorry to say

they are sadly reduced in condition, and die in numbers, owing to the late rains. †

‘ However, I do not yet give up all hopes of marching, at least with a part of my corps, and of being able to make the siege of Chandore during the rains. I shall immediately send on the battering train to Ahmednuggur, if not to Aurungabad, and shall try to march as soon as Colonel Hallyburton is prepared.

‘ The depôt at Poonah is large and will hold out till the harvest ; I have another at Ahmednuggur, and I have more supplies coming up from Bombay. God knows how the unfortunate inhabitants of Poonah and of this wretched country are to live through the rains. Since they have commenced, the most common grains have sold there for two seers for a rupee ; and even at that price they are with difficulty procured.

‘ You will have before you, in a public form, the mode in which the rice is issued from our depôt. It sells in the camp for six seers for a rupee, which is well enough, considering that the remainder of the country is starving. But I am forced to restrict the sale of rice to the followers of the army, otherwise all the starving wretches in the country would flock to camp for subsistence, and would soon reduce us to the same state with themselves.

‘ Gram and all common grains are at two seers for a rupee. In short, such is the state of the country, that it will require some ingenuity to keep the troops together, and in an efficient state, till the rains are over. There is nothing new from Hindustan.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Harvey.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

‘ I received only last night your letter of the 25th of April, and I assure you that the respect and regard which you profess for your late friend, Colonel Harness, have tended to increase the good opinion I had already entertained of your character.

‘ I am much concerned to hear that detailed and accurate accounts of the circumstances attending the sickness and

death of Colonel Harness had not been sent to his regiment; and I certainly should have written to Mr. Christie or yourself, if I had not had reason to believe that one of the officers of the staff, attached to Colonel Harness, would have given you those details.

‘Colonel Harness was taken ill a day or two before the battle of Argaum, on the 29th of November; and he was so unwell upon that occasion as to be delirious when the troops were going into the action, and I was obliged to order him into his palanquin.

‘After the battle of Argaum, the army made some rapid marches towards Ellichpoor, in order to prevent the enemy from taking a new position under the protection of the fort of Gawilghur, which did Colonel Harness no good; and on our arrival at Ellichpoor, he went into that place for the benefit of his health. He remained there during the siege of Gawilghur, and I saw him afterwards as the army was marching through Ellichpoor towards Nagpoor, and he was much recovered.

‘Peace having been concluded with the Rajah of Berar, the army returned to the westward through Ellichpoor, and I saw Colonel Harness again much recovered; but he appeared to have a shortness of breath, which I attributed to weakness; particularly as he had no complaint at that time; yet he said that he did not find himself sufficiently recovered to join the army, a measure to which I earnestly urged him. A few days afterwards I heard of his death.

‘It appears by the papers which I enclose that his disorder was in the heart. He was attended by Mr. Gilmour, the head surgeon of the army, and by Mr. Baird, the surgeon of the hospital at Ellichpoor. Every attention was paid to him, and he had every comfort about him which he could have had in any situation. But these gentlemen appear to be of opinion that the disorder was one of long standing, and of a nature not to be got the better of in any situation.

‘I had heard for some time before Colonel Harness’s death, that he intended to quit the army, and I gave particular directions that his papers might be examined, to see if he had signed his resignation. I enclose a copy of a

paper which was found a considerable length of time after his decease. It was immediately sent to me, and I forwarded it to the Commander in Chief, with a request and recommendation that Colonel Harness's commission might be sold. I have received no answer to this application; but I see that Colonel Harness's commission is given to another officer, and therefore I conclude that the Commander in Chief had determined not to attend to my recommendation.

‘You will see that this paper is dated in December, and that Colonel Harness died in January.

‘I enclose the copy of an order to Colonel Wallace, regarding the disposal of Colonel Harness's effects, and a statement of the measures taken in consequence of those orders.

‘It is probable that nothing can tend to diminish the regret and grief of Mrs. Harness for the loss she has sustained, and she must have been well acquainted with the merits of the person who is the subject of this letter. But it may be satisfactory to her to know that, in the late arduous contest in the Deccan, Colonel Harness filled an important station in the army, that he conducted himself upon every occasion in a manner most satisfactory to me and honorable to himself, and that his death was lamented by the whole army, and by no person more than by myself.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Captain Harvey.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

‘I have the honor to inform you that a person, by name Dermanauth Naig, of Puttun, is detained or in confinement at Hyderabad. He belongs to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or that Chief is interested about him; and I shall accordingly be much obliged to you if you will exert your influence that he may be released; unless what may appear to you good reasons should exist for keeping him in confinement.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

‘ I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the —, relative to the offer made by Kaleb Khan Patan to Mr. Crow. The lands held by that person are situated in Candesh, south of the Taptee, and are not in that part of Holkar’s territories which will go to Scindiah, in the event of a successful termination of the contest. They are situated in the territories which will go to the Peshwah.

‘ This being the case, I have consulted the wishes of the Peshwah regarding Kaleb Khan Patan’s offer, and the result is, that I consider myself authorized to instruct you as follows :—

‘ You will inform Kaleb Khan, that the object of the British Government, in its preparations for hostilities against Holkar, is to obtain security for the peace of the British territories, and for the territories of the allies, which Holkar had determined to disturb. That the British Government has no desire to increase its possessions; and that therefore there will be no objection to adopt an arrangement with him of the nature of that which he has proposed, provided he serves cordially in the war, and provided he engages to serve the Peshwah with zeal and fidelity hereafter.

‘ You will then call upon Kaleb Khan to give you a list of the talooks which he possesses, stating the value of each. If they do not exceed the value of one lac and fifty thousand rupees annually, you will tell Kaleb Khan that he may keep them, on the ground of giving the service of a proportionate body of them. If they should exceed that sum, however, you must avoid to engage that Kaleb Khan shall keep the whole of them. You will in that case give him assurances that he shall have a handsome provision at the end of the war, in the service of his Highness the Peshwah; and if he should press you to come to particulars, you will tell him that he shall have a jaghire of the value of one lac and fifty thousand rupees annually.

‘ I acknowledge that I think it very doubtful whether Kaleb Khan will ever join you under any circumstances; particularly with a body of men even of one fourth of the numbers he has stated. All the natives are in the habit of

exaggerating the numbers of their troops; the Patans, of all others, are the most prone to falsehood and deceit of every description.

‘The Patans are better and more expensive troops than the Marhattas, and all Holkar’s possessions in Candeish would not defray the expense of the body offered by Kaleb Khan. It is impossible, therefore, that the offer was only made to try his ground, and to have a plea for a favorable consideration hereafter, in case the war should be concluded successfully. The mode proposed, however, of conducting the negotiation, will be attended with many advantages, and cannot cause future inconvenience.

‘I hope soon to hear that you have marched into Malwa, according to my letter of the 22nd ultimo.

‘I have no news for you from this quarter. My prospects are very bad indeed.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General Lake.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Shawe, of the 74th regiment, and I beg leave to recommend him to your favor and protection. He is an officer with whose conduct I have had every reason to be satisfied, and he was wounded at the battle of Assye.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General Lake.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

‘I have the pleasure to inform you that I have recommended your brother, Lieut. Shawe, to General Lake, to be appointed a Captain in the 74th regiment, in the room of Major Sutherland, appointed Major of the Newfoundland Fencibles. I think it will be advisable for you to urge the Commander in Chief to promote your brother; and therefore I give you this intelligence.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Colonel Murray.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Chinchore, 15th June, 1804.

‘I have received your letters of the 26th and 27th May, and 1st and 2nd June.

‘I have no doubt but that you will be well supplied with money, in consequence of the arrangements made for that purpose by Mr. Duncan. You must be the best judge of the benefit of Serwaddy’s contract; but I should have thought it a convenient arrangement.

‘The Joudpoor and Oudepoor Rajahs are in direct communication with the Commander in Chief. The former has made a treaty with him. I refer you to my instructions upon this point.

‘Ahmedabad is not and will not be ours.

‘Beware of all engagements with the tributary Rajahs, without communication with the Residents at the durbars of Scindiah, the Guickwar, and the Peshwah. These are the three principal powers in that part of India.

‘Communicate the offer from the Kutch Rajah of Burham-poor to Major Walker and to Mr. Duncan.

‘If Canojee’s brother is to have personal liberty, I am afraid we shall have no hold of him, or security for his good behaviour, unless his personal liberty should be confined to the island of Bombay or Salsette; and that we should keep him nuzzerbaud, or, in other words, in sight of an hircarrah: however, Major Walker will give you an answer upon this subject.

‘I can give you no hopes of the 84th. It is the only corps which garrisons Bombay, and I cannot venture to ask Mr. Duncan to send it to you. I have long considered our game, as it affected our situation at Bombay, to be very desperate; and particularly as we know that the French are strong in European India, and their squadron, when joined with that of the Dutch, not inferior to our own, we ought to beware to weaken that settlement too much.

‘The allied troops generally plunder for themselves, and carry nothing to account. We carry every thing to the public account, and Government gives order for the disposal of the captured property; and, in consideration of a variety of circumstances in the late war affecting the allies as well as ourselves, the Governor General did not order that any



thing should be given to the allies. However, this depends entirely upon Government.

‘The plan which you must pursue is, to have an account taken of every article of property captured, and a valuation made. You must report on the subject, and the Government will order the disposal of the property. This is the mode in which I have proceeded.

‘I am afraid that you can get no artillery; however, I will inquire upon the subject from Mr. Duncan. Scindiah is most anxious for your approach to Ougein; he will, I believe, join you himself.

‘I have been obliged to relinquish all hopes of marching for some time; the country is entirely destroyed, and I do not think a company would find subsistence in it, much less an army.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Chinchore, 18th June, 1804.

‘I conclude that you will have received the Governor General’s notes of the 25th of May; and I proceed to inform you of the measures which I shall take in consequence of them.

‘First, I propose to request Mr. Duncan not to stop Colonel Murray’s march into Malwa.

‘Secondly, to send H.M. 78th regiment to Bombay; and to get from thence the battalion of the 7th regiment reinforced to 1000 men. By the arrival of this battalion I shall be able to relieve two of the coast battalions; and I propose to march two of them to the southward, with the 19th dragoons and the 4th regiment of cavalry, and the greater part, if not the whole, of the coast artillery. I shall only put these corps in motion towards Mysore, expecting that you will give orders as to their destination.

‘Thirdly, I propose to order two of the battalions of the Nizam’s subsidiary force to march towards Hyderabad; which will enable you to order either those two battalions, or the two battalions now at Hyderabad, into the Company’s territories.

‘ The weakest of the corps shall go from that place; and the 1st of the 4th, and the 1st of the 10th, from hence.

‘ I shall leave here the 5th and 7th regiments of cavalry, as both together they do not make more than one regiment of the strength which the Peshwah ought to have.

‘ You have thus the outline of my plan for sending away the troops. By marching the four corps, ordered to go immediately to the southward into Malabar, or Canara, or Goa, it will be possible to bring up the Bombay corps in the month of August, and thus to effect the relief at a very early period indeed.

‘ But I shall write to you in detail upon all the points connected with the Governor General’s notes as soon as possible. I only now give you notice of the outline of my plan for carrying into execution the order of the Governor General. I shall proceed to Mysore as soon as possible.

‘ I am afraid that this arrangement of the subsidiary force at Poonah will alter those which I had made for it, and that Lieut. Bellingham will lose his office: that being the case, therefore, if you should not already have appointed an officer to fill Captain Cunningham’s office, I shall be obliged to you if you will appoint Lieut. Bellingham to be Deputy Quarter Master General in Mysore.

‘ I omitted to mention, that as all the corps are weak, and as the siege of Chandore must still be undertaken, I propose to leave with the subsidiary force at Poonah the 74th regiment, till your orders shall be received.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor of Bombay.*

‘ HONORABLE SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 18th June, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I have received from his Excellency the Governor General notes which are to form the basis of instructions to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, to his Excellency the Commander in Chief and myself, dated the 25th May; in which I observe that his Excellency has given orders that the troops should not be moved from Guzerat into Malwa.

‘ The movement of Colonel Murray’s corps has been made into Malwa, by this time, under my instructions to Colonel Murray of the 7th of May, a copy of which was laid before you; and it is to be apprehended that many bad consequences may result from withdrawing that corps from Malwa at present.

‘ I therefore take the liberty of suggesting to you the propriety of delaying to carry into execution that part of the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General, till you shall receive his Excellency’s further directions.

‘ In respect to the other part of the notes, it appears to be the intention of his Excellency the Governor General, that the subsidiary force of Poonah shall be composed of Bombay troops, and that those in the service of the government of Fort St. George shall occupy Malabar, Canara, and Goa.

‘ It is obviously necessary that the government of Fort St. George should in the first instance be enabled to relieve the Bombay troops in those provinces, which can be done at an early period only by placing at their disposal some of the corps now at Poonah. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting the following plan to you:—that the 78th regiment should be sent to Bombay, and that the 1st battalion 7th regiment should be sent to Poonah. As the corps to form the subsidiary force with the Peshwah must be each one thousand strong, this corps might be completed to that number by drafts from the 2nd of the 9th, or the Fencible battalion.

‘ The arrival of the 1st battalion 7th regiment at Poonah will enable me to send two battalions belonging to the government of Fort St. George to the southward; and with these and two others, which I purpose to order from the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the relief can be commenced in Canara and Malabar immediately.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether you approve of this suggestion, and whether it will be carried into execution? I also request to be informed what is the earliest period at which vessels can be sent to the coast of Malabar and Canara to bring up the corps from those provinces.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

SIR,

‘Camp at Chinchore, 19th June, 1804.’

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th instant, with which you have sent the copy of the petition of Mr. Christovaõ da Costa Maquiras to the Honorable the Governor in Council. It is my opinion that that person has no claim whatever upon the bounty of the British Government, under the proclamation of his Excellency the Governor General, of August, 1803; and accordingly, I beg to recommend that he may be disposed of in such manner as the Honorable the Governor in Council is accustomed to dispose of vagabond Portuguese, by taking care to prevent his return to the territories, or the service of the Marhattas.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Major Shaue.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

‘I received, only the day before yesterday, your letters of the 23rd and 25th May, and the Governor General’s letters of the 26th; and yesterday the Governor General’s of the 30th.

‘I am carrying into execution, in some degree, the instruction of the 25th May, reducing as far as possible the expense without diminishing the efficiency of the troops; and in the course of three or four days, I shall send to Bengal a full account of all my measures, and of the reasons which have induced me to adopt them.

‘Colonel Murray is, I hope already in Malwa, and I have not recalled him, for reasons which I think will be thought sufficient. The Governor General will also have an account of the plan of operations for the troops in the Deccan in this campaign.

‘I hope to be able to quit the army on the day after to-morrow. I must have an interview with the Peshwah, and then I shall not stop anywhere, till I shall arrive at Calcutta; excepting for a day or two at Madras. I go by that place, first, because I shall lose but little time in doing so; and next, because I should not have the means of giving the Governor General the information which he will require, without seeing General Stuart.



‘ I shall be at Calcutta, I think, by the 1st of August: if the Governor General should have gone up the country, I shall join him most expeditiously by dawk. Give orders that a palanquin may be made for me; let it be very light, with the pannels made of canvass, instead of wood, and the poles fixed, as for a dooley. Your Bengally palanquins are so heavy, that they cannot be used out of Calcutta.

‘ I shall be much obliged to you if you will urge the Governor General not to alter the arrangement for the command of the subsidiary force at Poonah till I shall have seen him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major Shawe.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

‘ Since I addressed you last, I have received the Governor General’s instructions of the 3rd of May, in which I am ordered to proceed to Bengal. I should imagine that the object in calling me to Bengal is to communicate with me upon several subjects connected with military affairs in this country; and as I cannot speak with information or confidence upon any subject, without being acquainted with your sentiments and those of the Governor of Fort St. George; and as I shall lose but little time by going to Madras, and certainly derive advantage from it, I purpose to go by that place through Mysore. I write, therefore, this day to Lord William Bentinck, to request that he will order that palanquin boys may be posted on the road for me from Seringapatam, and that a vessel may be prepared to sail with me to Calcutta. I hope to be at Madras in the middle of July.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Lieut. General Stuart.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th instant; and I shall avail myself of the means which you have adopted for my convenience. I should be happy to

have an opportunity of meeting you, only that I think it necessary to go to Madras; and I believe my journey will be more expeditious through Mysore than through the Soubah territories. I hope to hear from you if you should be of opinion that I can be of any service to you in Bengal.

‘ I have commenced carrying into execution the Governor General’s instructions of the 25th May, in some degree; and in order to enable General Stuart to draw from Hyderabad the two battalions now stationed there, without inconvenience to you, I have ordered two battalions, the 1st of the 6th, and 2nd of the 9th from Colonel Hallyburton’s camp towards Hyderabad; and I have desired Colonel Hallyburton to draw the two battalions of the 11th out of Berar to his own camp. I am preparing a dispatch for you, which will point out my ideas regarding our operations in the Deccan.

‘ I shall be obliged to you, if you will give directions that the money coming from Masulipatam may be sent forward, as soon as it may arrive at Hyderabad. It is desirable that it should be divided into two equal sums, each having an equal proportion of the different coins. Let Colonel Hallyburton know when you will send it off, in order that a detachment from his corps may meet the sum for his use, at any place on the road to Ahmednuggur that you may appoint; and the remainder might proceed on to Ahmednuggur. This will save time, and the detachment at Hyderabad the trouble of making a march to Colonel Hallyburton’s camp.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord William Bentinck.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

‘ Your Lordship will have received from his Excellency the Governor General the copies of his orders to me of the 25th and 30th of May; and Lieut. General Stuart will have laid before you the outline of the measures which I proposed to adopt in consequence of the receipt of the former. From the nature of the subjects on which it is his Excellency’s wish to communicate with me personally, I judge that I shall appear before him with very defective information, unless I should be previously made acquainted with your Lordship’s sentiments, and those of General Stuart.

‘ I therefore propose to go to Madras on my way to Calcutta, that I may pay my respects to your Lordship, and receive your orders; and because I think I shall lose but little time, and shall derive great advantage by this deviation from the direct route.

‘ I propose to go through Mysore: I shall therefore be much obliged to your Lordship if you will direct the officers of the police at Madras to send bearers for me on the road to Seringapatam, and if you will give directions that a vessel may be ready to transport me from Madras to Calcutta, or the mouth of the Hoogley.

‘ I hope to reach Madras in the middle of July.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord William Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

‘ I beg you to inform Purneah, that in consequence of orders from the Governor General, I have broken up the army, and have established the subsidiary force at Poonah; and that I propose to commence my march to Seringapatam on the day after to-morrow. I shall proceed by Hurryhur, &c., and I shall lose no time upon the road.

‘ I have also ordered Bistnapah into Mysore; but I cannot tell whether he will join our troops near Meritch, and cross the Kistnah at Erroor, or cross it lower down by Beejapoor.

‘ I shall be obliged to you if you will ask Purneah to give orders that I may be supplied on my march through Mysore.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Wilks.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Graham.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your private letter of the 16th instant, containing a copy of the evidence against the freebooter impostor Seyd Sultaun Aly. I know nothing about that person; and I do not believe that he has ever been even a menial servant of mine. I desire that he may be publicly whipped in the pettah of Ahmednuggur, for having made use of my name to plunder the country; and

that he and his followers may be put in irons, and employed for six months at hard labor upon the works of Ahmednuggur.

‘I desire that you will make inquiry into the circumstances of the murder committed between Coraygaun and Soupah; and if you should find that the persons who are now in confinement in the main guard at Ahmednuggur are guilty of it, I beg you to give orders that they may be hanged in a public place.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Graham.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,      ‘Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

‘In consequence of the arrangement settled with you, I have given directions to the camp post master to hand over to the post master at the Residency the camp dawks, which are to be paid by you from the 1st instant. It is my opinion, that it will be necessary to keep up the line of communication between Poonah and Hurryhur, by Meritch; and as long as the hospital shall remain at Ellichpoor, the line of communication with that place.

‘But the line with Major General Campbell’s camp by Beejapoor may be discontinued; as it is probable that his division will have marched to the Company’s territories.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘SIR,      ‘Camp at Chinchore, 22nd June, 1804.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th instant. The arrangement which you have made for sending on the treasure which you say had arrived at Hyderabad is very satisfactory, viz., four and a half lacs of rupees to Colonel Hallyburton’s camp, and six lacs of rupees to Ahmednuggur.

‘When the sum of money, which you mention left Masulipatam for Hyderabad on the 1st instant, shall arrive, I request you to have it divided into two equal sums, each containing an equal number of the same description of coins, of



which one sum is to go to Colonel Hallyburton's camp, the other to Ahmednuggur, for the use of the troops in this quarter. I request you to fix a place on the road, to which Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton shall send a detachment to meet the money intended for his use. He will thereby receive it at an earlier period, and the detachment from Hyderabad will be saved the trouble of making a very long march.

'I am concerned to hear of your disappointment in the hire of cattle. General Campbell has informed me that he has dispatched four thousand bullocks loaded with rice to Hyderabad; and I request you to send them to Colonel Hallyburton's camp.

'I also request you to forward to Colonel Hallyburton's camp, or to Aurungabad, any quantity of grain that may be collected at Hyderabad, whether from Masulipatam, by order of the Commander in Chief, or by your own exertions in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad.

'I shall apprise Colonel Hallyburton of the resources still existing in the Soubah's forts.

'I am much obliged to you for the offer of elephants, in the postscript of your letter; but this part of the equipment of the troops is in the most efficient state, and the assistance proposed will not be required.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

'Camp at Chinchore,  
22nd June, 1804.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has requested me to give him a letter to you. His object is to have a ground for troubling you with his master's affairs in Chumargoonda, &c., should it be necessary to give you any trouble; and I have only to request that you will listen to him.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

'SIR,

'Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

'I have the honor to transmit herewith a letter which I have addressed to you and the Resident at Poonah, upon

the subject of the future operations in the Deccan, in which both will be concerned.

‘ Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I cannot omit to express the extreme satisfaction which I have had in the various communications which the service has required that I should have with you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Hill.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

‘ As soon as the troops, departments, &c., shall be prepared to move, you will march to the southward, by a route which is enclosed.

‘ You will be so kind as to take care to keep up the most strict discipline among the troops and their followers, and to pay for every thing you may receive or require.

‘ In passing Meritch, or any other fortress, you will avoid approaching it so closely, or encamping so near it, as to occasion any alarm.

‘ You will be pleased to report to me, and to head quarters your progress on the march.

‘ You will have with you 500 bullock loads of rice, to be issued to the native troops at the rate of half a seer *per diem* each man; gram for the cavalry horses for one month; and pay for the troops for the month of June. You will be so kind as to avoid issuing the pay till a late period in July; but I shall take measures that you may receive a further sum of money on your march.

‘ In case you should have reason to apprehend that you cannot reach Hurryhur till the month for which you will have gram shall have expired, a sum of money amounting to 1000 star pagodas is sent, which you will advance to Lieut. Young, in charge of the gram department, to make purchases of gram where it can be got.

‘ You will march upon the tappall road, and you will take care to communicate daily with the tappall stages, so as to get any letter that may be addressed to you.

‘ There are boats upon all the rivers to transport the troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Hill.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

‘ In consequence of the orders of his Excellency the Governor General contained in his letter to me, and notes of instructions sent therewith, copies of which you have got, dated the 25th of May, I have broken up the army, have ordered some of the troops to the southward, and have made arrangements with the Government of Bombay to commence the proposed relief of the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George, stationed in the Peshwah’s territories.

‘ I have, by this day’s orders, established the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, and have placed the subsidiary force serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan under the authority of the Resident at Hyderabad, and have relinquished my authority over the troops which composed both those corps, and all the political powers with which I have been trusted by his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ The season will soon come round, in which the military operations in the Deccan will be renewed, and it is probable that you will be desirous to possess my opinion regarding the object to which they ought to be directed, and I proceed to give it to you.

‘ The object to which the military operations ought to be directed, is to deprive Jeswunt Rao Holkar of his possessions in the Deccan, and to deliver them to the Peshwah’s officers, according to the orders of the Governor General of the 16th April.

‘ The principal of these possessions is the fort of Chandore, which must, I imagine, be attacked regularly. I have accordingly prepared a battering train at Poonah, which is now in readiness to be sent to the northward.

‘ I recommend that the subsidiary force serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan may be immediately prepared and equipped for active service, and joined by the Soubahdar’s contingent. The corps at present encamped near the Godavery, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton, will be joined by the 11th regiment from Berar, under the orders which I have already given, and will still consist of two regiments of cavalry, one of European infantry, and four

battalions of native infantry, notwithstanding the march of the 1st battalion, 6th regiment, and 2nd battalion, 9th regiment, towards Hyderabad.

‘ The heavy train prepared at Poonah ought to be sent forward to Ahmednuggur, and thence to Aurungabad, as soon as the weather may permit; the stores for the train may be carried by the grain bullocks attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, which, after having laid down their loads, can return to receive rice at Poonah or Ahmednuggur.

‘ As soon as Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton shall hear that the heavy train has left Poonah, and has crossed the Beemah, he ought to move to the westward, towards Aurungabad, if his corps should be in a state of equipment; if it should not be so, he ought to move as soon as he shall be ready, and join the heavy train at Aurungabad.

‘ If Colonel Hallyburton should be able to move as soon as he shall hear of the march of the heavy train, a detachment consisting of two regiments of cavalry, the 74th regiment, and the two battalions of native infantry with the pioneers, and a large proportion of the artillery, and the Peshwah’s contingent of cavalry, ought to march from Poonah towards Aurungabad, soon after the heavy train shall have marched. If Colonel Hallyburton should not be ready immediately, this detachment ought to march from Poonah, whenever the accounts shall be received that Colonel Hallyburton is ready: the two detachments will join at, or in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, and ought to proceed in concert to the siege of Chandore, and to the other operations which may be necessary in order to put the servants of his Highness the Peshwah in possession of Holkar’s territories in the Deccan.

‘ From the preceding detail, you will observe that my idea is, that the objects in the Deccan are to be effected by the joint operations of detachments from the two subsidiary forces serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Peshwah, and by the contingents of those powers, and that those troops are to be put in motion, and are to join in concert, and in consequence of a previous communication. This cannot readily be effected, if the subsidiary forces should each continue, as at present, to act under the autho-



city of the Resident at the durbar of that power in whose service each subsidiary force is employed : I therefore take the liberty of recommending that the Resident at Hyderabad should place the troops under Colonel Hallyburton, under the authority, and at the requisition of the Resident at Poonah, for the purposes of the proposed service ; and should desire that officer to attend to all directions which he may receive from the Resident at Poonah : as the service to be performed is in the territories of the Peshwah, the objects, when attained, are to be made over to the Peshwah's officers, and the Resident at Poonah is stationed much nearer the scene of action than the Resident at Hyderabad.

‘ It will be necessary, however, that the Resident at Poonah should communicate constantly with the Resident at Hyderabad, and with the British authorities at Scindiah's durbar, at Fort St. George, Bombay, and in Mysore, in order that he may be able to form a judgment regarding the necessity of withdrawing some or all of the troops from the proposed service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *To the Residents at Hyderabad  
and Poonah.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to transmit herewith a letter which I have addressed to you and the Resident at Hyderabad, upon the subject of the future operations in the Deccan, in which both will be concerned.

‘ Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I cannot omit to express the entire satisfaction which I have had in the various communications which the service has required that I should have with you.

‘ It is very evident that the confidence of the Peshwah in the British Government is increasing daily ; and I am sanguine in my hopes that in a short time such a change will be produced in the state of his Highness's country, and the power of his government, as will render the former a valuable possession to him, and the latter an addition of strength to the British Government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General Lake, in India.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Chinchore, 24th June, 1804.

‘I have the honor to inform you, that in consequence of the orders which I have received from the Governor General, dated the 25th May, I intend to send, without loss of time, into the Company’s territories, the 19th dragoons and 1st regiment of cavalry, and two battalions of native infantry, and the Mysore horse from this camp, and two battalions from Hyderabad. I had already sent one battalion from hence to Hullihall in Soonda, eventually to replace at Goa the battalion of Bombay native infantry which I had ordered from thence into Guzerat, to reinforce Colonel Murray.

‘I shall send the 78th regiment to Bombay, and shall draw from thence a battalion of Bombay native infantry; and then there will remain in the territories of the Peshwah, all assembled near Poonah, excepting one battalion at Ahmednuggur, two regiments of native cavalry, the 74th regiment, and six battalions of native infantry; and in the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, two regiments of native cavalry, the 94th regiment, and six battalions of native infantry, of which force, the cavalry and four battalions are collected to the northward of the Godavery, and two battalions will be at Hyderabad.

‘A battering train is prepared at Poonah; and as soon as the state of the country will permit, the Soubah’s subsidiary force collected north of the Godavery, and the cavalry, the 74th regiment, and two battalions from the force collected near Poonah, will proceed to the attack of Chandore.

‘In consequence of the orders of the Governor General, I have established the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, and have placed that, and the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under the authority of the Residents, with the powers with which these troops are serving respectively; and I am about to proceed to Madras in obedience to his Excellency’s orders of the 30th of May.

‘I have not recalled Colonel Murray from Malwa; on the contrary, I have urged Mr. Duncan, under whose orders he falls, to allow him to continue his operations in Malwa according to my instructions of the 7th May, a copy of which

the Resident with Scindiah will have transmitted to your Excellency.

‘ I am of opinion that no inconvenience will result from these arrangements ; on the contrary, the troops will be relieved from great distress and inconvenience ; and the relief of the troops in Malabar and Canara, proposed by the Governor General, will be accelerated by these measures.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor of Bombay.*

‘ HONORABLE SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that in consequence of the Governor General’s instructions of the 25th May, I have broken up the army in the Deccan, and have established the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah ; and have placed that force, and the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, under the authority of the Residents at the durbars of those powers respectively.

‘ I have the honor to enclose extracts of orders which I have issued respecting the troops in Guzerat.

‘ I have requested the Resident at Poonah to send to Bombay the 78th regiment, in case you should consent to the arrangement proposed in my letter of the 18th instant ; viz., to send the 2nd of the 7th to Poonah, reinforced to one thousand rank and file.

‘ Upon the occasion of relinquishing the command of the troops in this quarter, and consequently of giving up the immediate communication which I have held with your government upon all points connected with the public service, allow me once more to return you my thanks for the many instances of your confidence, favor, and kindness, which I have received since I have conducted the service in this part of India. Although at a distance, I shall ever be anxious for the honor and prosperity of your government, and I shall be happy to have any opportunity to evince my zeal in your service.

‘ I propose to take an early occasion of addressing you on the subject of the relief at Poonah, of the troops in the

service of the government of Fort St. George; and of the establishment of the troops of Bombay, as the subsidiary force to his Highness the Peshwah\*.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

‘ I have to draw your attention to the state of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, in respect to its supplies of provisions.

‘ Some time has elapsed since the brinjarries who accompanied the troops when they marched from Mysore have returned thither, and the bazaars have been supplied by the exertions of the dealers attached to them. These are also Mysore people; they have made much money during the war, and they are very desirous to return to their homes, as they have but little expectation of profit at present, and the expense of feeding their cattle is very great.

‘ It is my opinion that it will not be possible to prevent a very large proportion of them from returning with the troops now about to march.

‘ Under these circumstances, it will be necessary to endeavor to obtain a substitute for the service of the subsidiary force. It does not appear to me that it will be possible to prevail upon the brinjarries in the Peshwah’s territories to attend the camps as dealers on their own account; and supposing them to be inclined to enter into the trade, that they have property to enable them to carry it on. To give them money or grain in advance will not answer. They are notoriously dishonest, and they would run away with the

\* ‘ Bombay Castle, 2nd July, 1804.

‘ The Honorable the Governor in Council is pleased to publish the following extract of Orders, by the Hon. Major General Wellesley, under date the 24th June, 1804 :—

‘ “ Colonel Murray and the troops in Guzerat will receive further orders for their guidance from the authorities at Bombay.

‘ “ Major General Wellesley takes this opportunity of expressing his approbation of the conduct of the troops serving under the government of Bombay, in Guzerat, during the late war.”

‘ R. BARCLAY,  
‘ Dep. Adj. Gen.’



former, and would sell the latter in any place at which they could find a more ready or a more advantageous market than the camp.

‘ I should therefore recommend to you to hire four or five thousand of the brinjarry bullocks, to carry grain from the depôt formed at Poonah, or Ahmednuggur, to the camp, on account of the Company, where it will be thrown into the bazaars, by order of the commanding officer, or otherwise disposed of, as may be found most advantageous.

‘ If this mode of supply be adopted, and I think there is reason to apprehend that, for some time, no other mode will answer, it will be necessary to take care to keep the depôts full at Ahmednuggur and Poonah, and when the harvest shall be reaped, to throw into them a quantity of grain.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I enclose a copy of a letter to Major Graham.’

*To Major Graham.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Chinchore, 22nd June, 1804.

‘ When I was at Poonah, in the end of February last, you sent me a report on the revenue of Ahmednuggur, made up in a book, which I have by accident mislaid, and I request you to send me another copy of it.

‘ You will be so kind as to send me your accounts to the end of June; and afterwards to send them and make your reports to the resident at Poonah, from whom you will receive further directions.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Graham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

‘ I learn from Mr. Strachey, that he has some reason to believe that he will be appointed to a situation in the Judicial Department of Fort William; and he is desirous of availing himself of the opportunity afforded by my journey to the southward to see that part of the country on his return to Fort William.

‘ Under these circumstances, I request you to give Mr. Strachey permission to be absent from the Residency at Poonah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 24th June, 1804.

‘ I have omitted to mention to you, that I have requested Mr. Duncan to commence the relief ordered for the Bombay troops as soon as possible, by sending to Poonah the 2nd battalion 7th Bombay regiment, completed to one thousand rank and file. If Mr. Duncan should comply with this request, of which I will apprise you, I beg that the 78th regiment may be sent to Bombay.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

‘ The orders which have been issued will have made you acquainted with the arrangements made for the establishment of the subsidiary force, and the equipment of the troops under your command.

‘ I have written a letter to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, on the subject of the operations of the troops ; and a letter to the Resident at Poonah, on the subject of the supplies of provisions for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, copies of which will be sent to you hereafter.

‘ You will observe, in the general orders, that ample provision is made for the carriage of grain in the grain department; and I have to inform you that the depôt at Poonah now contains about twenty two thousand bullock loads of rice, and that at Ahmednuggur six thousand bullock loads. Besides this quantity there are about five thousand bullock loads at Panwell, which will probably be sent up to Poonah when the present rains shall cease; and I have applied to Mr. Duncan to send up an additional quantity of ten thousand bullock loads, and this will be sent in the course of the season.

‘ I recommend that you should continue the system

adopted by the general orders of the 4th instant, for the food of the followers of the army, as long as the grain of the country and flour remain above the price of one rupee for six seers. As soon as the price of grain shall fall, this system ought to be abolished.

‘ By this time there ought to be, at Ahmednuggur, a sum of money amounting to six lacs of rupees, one half of which is to be sent to Colonel Hallyburton, according to the orders already given; the remainder will come here for your use. Another sum, amounting to ten lacs and a half of rupees, has been sent from Hyderabad; four lacs and a half of rupees to Colonel Hallyburton’s camp, and six lacs to Ahmednuggur, for the use of the troops stationed in this quarter. This last sum of money is upon platform carts, and you will be so kind as to make arrangements for bringing it to your camp.

‘ The draught bullocks allotted to your corps are three hundred more than the carriages you have will require, including the heavy ordnance; viz., two 18 and two 12 pounders, and the spare cattle for each piece of cannon, according to the regulations of Government. It is scarcely necessary that I should point out to you the necessity of making every exertion to keep these cattle in condition. In fact, the existence of the detachment under your command may depend upon the state of this part of your equipment.

‘ I cannot close my letter to you upon this subject, without earnestly recommending to you the strictest attention to the discipline of the troops, and to keep them and their followers in order. In this distant station, as the troops can but seldom come under the eye of the superior officers of the army, it will require the most constant and regular attention to preserve their discipline and order; and, it is certain, that in no part of India will those qualities be required in a greater degree than in the detachment serving with his Highness the Peshwah.

‘ The licentiousness of the followers of the troops, particularly when those troops have been successful, is an evil of the greatest magnitude, and of quick growth. I therefore anxiously recommend the conduct of these people to your attention; and that you should suppress at once, by decided measures, any attempts which they may make to depart from

the rules of good order, and to shake off the restraint under which they have been hitherto held.

‘ I also recommend to your attention the state of all the public establishments, and the establishments kept by commanding officers of corps, for the carriage of the camp equipage and stores. There is a tendency in the service, particularly when troops are employed at a distance, to admit abuse, which, if not checked in time, must be attended in every instance by the most inconvenient consequences ; and which can be checked only by a constant attention on the part of the commanding officer.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

‘ It has already been arranged that no bills shall be drawn on Bengal or Bombay in favor of the soucars at Poónah, excepting in consequence of a previous communication with, and at the desire of, Mr. Duncan ; and you have accordingly made known to Mr. Duncan the monthly demands upon your Residency, exclusive of payments to the troops, for which provision has been made by the government of Fort St. George, to the following amount : viz., six lacs and twenty thousand rupees, now at or near Ahmednuggur, one half of which sum is ordered to Poonah, the other to Colonel Hallyburton’s camp, for the service of the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan ; ten and a half lacs of rupees which left Hyderabad about the 15th instant, four and a half of which have been ordered to Colonel Hallyburton’s camp, the remainder to Ahmednuggur, for the use of the troops in this quarter ; and ten and a half lacs of rupees, which left Masulipatam on the 1st instant, one half of which sum I have requested Major Kirkpatrick to send to Ahmednuggur for the service of the troops here ; the other half to Colonel Hallyburton’s camp.

‘ But besides the bills given to soucars, other bills have been drawn on Bombay in favor of the officers of the army for small sums. These bills are always drawn according to the rate at which the Government issue the different de-



scriptions of coins ; and the exchange is entirely independent of that in the money market.

‘ I have positively ordered the Paymaster never to draw them, excepting in favor of officers and the suttlers attending the corps, in order to afford to the former a mode of paying their bills at Bombay, and to the latter an opportunity of remitting their money to that place. It would be inconvenient to the officers of the army to stop the drawing of these bills ; and, as the road to Bombay is not safe, if the suttlers had not this mode of remitting their money, they would no longer attend the camps.

‘ At the same time it is a convenience to the public, that the treasury in camp should be the medium of remitting this money to Bombay ; and it is a cheap mode of procuring money to pay the troops. Upon the whole, therefore, I think it advisable that it should be continued.

‘ The bills have hitherto been countersigned by me ; hereafter it will be proper that they should be countersigned by you ; and the Paymaster in camp may give credit for the amount, as so much received on account of bills drawn by him on the government of Bombay.

‘ If you should approve of this arrangement, I shall make the governments of Bombay and Fort St. George acquainted with it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Brunton.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Seroor, 26th June, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letter enclosing the copy of a bill for loss of exchange on bills drawn on Bombay.

‘ When the troops arrived at Poonah, every thing was in the greatest confusion, and some time elapsed before the common mercantile intercourse between that city and Bombay was re-established. In addition to this inconvenience, the soucars at Poonah and Bombay knew well, that, as there was a large body of troops at Poonah belonging to the Madras and Bombay establishments, a large sum of money would be required ; and they became exorbitant in their demands of premium on bills of exchange, whether drawn on Bombay at Poonah, or on Poonah at Bombay. In this

manner the premium on bills of exchange came to the rate stated in the bill you enclosed ; and, indeed, Mr. Duncan was obliged to acquiesce in incurring the same loss on bills which he purchased at Bombay, drawn on soucars at Poonah for the purpose of paying the Bombay troops.

‘ Notwithstanding this great loss, we were obliged to draw the bills, as no money could be procured at Bombay, excepting mohurs, which we were obliged to issue to the troops at a depreciated rate of exchange, thereby incurring a greater loss than by drawing the bills.

‘ In the state of uncertainty of the times, and the doubt on men’s minds respecting the result of the war, till the battle of Assye, every man was suspected ; and we did not know how long we should be able to keep up the communication between Bombay and Poonah : I therefore took care to keep the treasury full at Poonah by taking up in bills on Bombay all the money that could be got, even at this loss. The sums procured in this manner defrayed the extraordinary expenses of the war, and those of the Bombay troops, for which no other provision was made. The transaction was always managed by the Resident at Poonah ; the Paymaster and I having nothing to do with it, excepting to sign our names to the bills.

‘ The loss certainly appears, and is, very large ; but there ought to be a set off against it of about 2 per cent. on the issue of the Chandory rupees to the troops. Those of my division received them according to the Mysore nerrick, at the same rate as Rajah rupees, or Pondicherry rupees, which are about 2 per cent. better than the Company’s rupees.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Brunton.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Tiraloo, 27th June, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant, upon the subject of an application from Colonel Murray, that provision might be made for the silladar horse who might be wounded in the service ; and for the families of those who might be killed.

‘ It is not reasonable to expect that persons of this description, who have no means of subsistence, excepting those

afforded by military service, will risk their lives, or being disabled, unless made certain of a provision hereafter. The want of this provision is the great defect of all the native military services ; and is the cause of the frequent instances of misbehavior before an enemy of the country troops. The truth of this observation is proved by the fact, that the troops in the service of Hyder Aly, and his son Tippoo, and those now in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, for whom provision is made, in case they should receive wounds, and for their families, in case they should be killed, have uniformly behaved better in battle than any other native troops of whom we have a knowledge.

‘ I therefore strongly recommend to government, that the measures proposed by Colonel Murray may be adopted. It would be necessary, however, in the first instance, to submit the claims of those disabled by wounds, and of the families of the horsemen who may be killed in the service, to the decision of a committee of officers, in the same manner as the claims of persons actually in the military service of the Honorable Company.

‘ With the same view of rendering more efficient this body of cavalry attached to Colonel Murray’s corps, I beg leave to suggest to the Governor in Council the expediency of paying for the horses which may be killed, or rendered unfit for service by wounds received in action. This is another measure which has been practised by Hyder and Tippoo, and the present Mysore government, and with the best effects.

‘ There are two modes of paying for these horses. One, which has always been practised by the Mussulman and Hindu government of Mysore, is to pay the horsemen 200 rupees for every horse killed or disabled, whatever may be his value : the other is to register a description and value of the horse when the horseman is entertained ; and when the horse is killed or disabled, to pay for him at the rate at which he shall be valued in the register. I rather believe that the horsemen would prefer the latter mode, and it will probably prove equally cheap to the Honorable Company, as but few of their horses can be valued at a higher rate than 200 rupees. If this measure should be adopted, a committee ought to be assembled to ascertain the claims of the horsemen.

‘ When all these measures shall be adopted, the Silladar horse with Colonel Murray ought to be a most efficient body.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Tiraloo, 27th June, 1804.

‘ I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th June, for which I return you many thanks. My public letter of the 24th will have made you acquainted with the mode by which I propose to carry on the operations in the Deccan during my absence. With this, you will receive a dispatch to the Governor General, which will make you acquainted with all the arrangements made, and the reasons for which I adopted them.

‘ I have received a letter from Colonel Hallyburton, from which I learn that he still fears that he will not be able to move till after the monsoon. It is most desirable that the operations against Chandore should be begun in August, so that they may be concluded before the rivers fall ; otherwise, as all our disposable troops will be employed at this siege, a very small body of the enemy would be able to do a great deal of mischief in the country. The siege of Chandore\* once concluded, and the troops at liberty to act where they may be required, no mischief can happen.

‘ I shall write to Colonel Hallyburton upon this subject, but I now mention it to you, that you may urge the durbar to exert themselves to induce the brinjarries to attend Colonel Hallyburton. As he will have grain in July, the want of carriage for it will be the only impediment to his march.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ It is but justice to the Governor General, and to you, to mention that I have had no private correspondence with him on any subject. I have done you justice in my public correspondence, upon subjects which must, at all events, have attracted the notice of the Governor General.’

\* Chandore was taken on the 12th of October, by the army under Lieut. Colonel Wallace, in the absence of Major General Wellesley.



*To Major Macauley.*

‘ MY DEAR MACAULEY,                      ‘ Camp at Tiraloo, 27th June, 1804.

‘ I have only this day received your letters of the 24th and 28th of March. They had been sent to Cannanore, and Mr. Baber detained them. I rejoice at your success in the defeat of the intrigue, the particulars of which you relate.

‘ In consequence of orders from the Governor General, I have broken up the army in the Deccan ; I have established the subsidiary force at Poonah, and sent some of the troops to the southward, and I am now on my way towards Seringapatam.

‘ I do not apprehend any inconvenience from these arrangements. I have provided for the operations of the war against Holkar, and if they can be begun before the end of August, all will answer.

‘ The Bombay troops are to be relieved in Malabar by those belonging to Fort St. George. The former are to be the subsidiary force at Poonah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Macauley.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘ SIR,    ‘ Camp at Tiraloo, 27th June, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th instant. In consequence of the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General, of which the Right Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George has sent you an extract, I have ordered the Mysore troops under Bistnapah Pundit to march towards Mysore.

‘ I cannot at present say exactly by what route Bistnapah will enter Mysore, or the period at which he will arrive on the frontier ; but I hope to be able to give you information on these points in the course of a few days.

‘ I expect to meet the convoy on the road, and shall give them instructions ; and I shall bring away with me the detachments of troops stationed between the rivers Kistna, Gutpurba, and Malpoorba.

‘ I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you soon at Seringapatam, and to have a conversation with you and the Dewan regarding the future disposal of the silladar horse.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain Wilks.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp at Tiraloo, 27th June, 1804.

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s orders of the 25th and 30th May; and I proceed to detail the mode in which I have carried into execution your Excellency’s instructions, together with my reasons for adopting the measures which I have carried into execution, or have recommended to others.

‘ 2. Before your Excellency’s instructions of the 25th May arrived, Colonel Murray had marched towards Ougein, according to the orders which I had given him, as reported to your Excellency in my former address.

‘ It is probable that he had arrived in Malwa before I received your Excellency’s orders; or, at all events, he would have arrived in that province before any orders written in consequence of the receipt of your Excellency’s instructions could reach him.

‘ 3. When I received your Excellency’s instructions, Holkar’s army and that of Hurry Naut Sing threatened Ougein. Scindiah was apprehensive of the consequences to his capital by their being in its neighbourhood; and his ministers were earnest in their solicitations for assistance, and were anxiously looking for the arrival of Colonel Murray, which they had been taught to expect.

‘ 4. To have withdrawn him from Malwa at that moment would have exposed Scindiah in a defenceless state to Holkar; more particularly as his own army, under Bappojee Scindiah, had joined Colonel Monson, in consequence of the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, and was near Kota; would have damped the spirit of Scindiah’s durbar; and as the Colonel’s retreat would have had the appearance of a flight from Holkar’s forces collected near Ougein, it might have been attended by inconvenient consequences in Guzerat.

‘ 5. It did not appear that Colonel Murray was likely to meet with the difficulties which your Excellency apprehended, when you gave orders that he should not advance; and your Excellency was not aware that I had provided for the irruption of any freebooter into Guzerat, during Colonel Murray’s absence, by the formation of a reserve, which I desired him to establish, in my instructions of the 7th May.

‘ 6. Upon the whole, therefore, as to have withdrawn him would have been attended with inconvenience, and to detain him in Malwa was not likely to be attended by those difficulties which you apprehended, I determined to suspend that part of your instructions ; and I wrote a letter to Mr. Duncan, in order to provide against his carrying them into execution, of which I enclose a copy.

‘ 7. It does not appear that Jeswunt Rao Holkar has, at present, any force in the Deccan ; it is not probable that he will be able to prevail upon his troops to move into Candeish, which is at present a desert ; or that he will have any means of opposing the operations of the British troops in that quarter. But there is no immediate prospect of being able to commence those operations till a very late period in the rainy season.

‘ 8. On these grounds it was desirable to diminish the number of the troops, in order to get rid of the expense, to save the grain that was consumed by those troops, and to relieve some of them from the distressing situation in which they were placed in consequence of the famine. I was also aware that, till I should send the troops from the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan and the Peshwah, the government of Fort St. George could not commence the relief of the Bombay troops in Malabar, and Canara, and at Goa ; which must be the first step towards the final relief of the troops of the government of Fort St. George, in the territories of the Peshwah.

‘ 9. I determined, therefore, to send away from the Peshwah’s territories all but the subsidiary force and the 74th regiment, and from those of the Soubah of the Deccan two battalions, leaving there likewise only the subsidiary force. In order to provide for the duties at Hyderabad, I have ordered two battalions from Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton’s camp ; and I have ordered the 11th regiment out of Berar to reinforce Colonel Hallyburton, whose corps is destined to co-operate in the attack on Chandore, whenever the state of the country and of its equipments will permit it to advance.

‘ 10. In order to complete with native infantry the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, I have requested Mr. Duncan to send to Poonah from Bombay the 2nd batt. 7th regiment, completed to one thousand rank and file ; and I have pro-

posed to reinforce the garrison of Bombay by the 78th regiment : this corps, unless Mr. Duncan shall consent to this arrangement, must form part of the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, till some of the battalions in Malabar or Canara can be relieved.

‘ 11. I have also left with the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, two regiments of cavalry, instead of one ; as both are weak, and do not consist of more men than the Peshwah ought to have in one regiment.

‘ 12. The troops withdrawn from the territories of the Peshwah are the 19th dragoons, 4th regiment of cavalry, detachment of 1st battalion of artillery, two battalions of native infantry (one had already marched to Hullihall in Soonda, according to my former report), the pioneers, excepting a detachment for the subsidiary force, and the Rajah of Mysore’s horse ; and from the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, two battalions of native infantry. The 78th regiment will likewise be drawn from the Peshwah’s territories, if Mr. Duncan should consent to send to Poonah the battalion which I have required ; and there will remain only the 74th regiment more than the troops which the Company are bound to furnish his Highness.

‘ 13. I have discontinued all establishments and expenses of every description, not immediately required to render the troops efficient.

‘ 14. I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah, in which I have made them acquainted with the mode in which I think the operations against Holkar’s possessions in the Deccan ought to be carried on ; from which your Excellency will observe that there will be a very large force of British troops for active operations in the field, a reserve of nearly four battalions at Poonah, a garrison in Ahmednuggur, and two battalions at Hyderabad. I likewise enclose copies of several letters to Colonel Close and Colonel Wallace, upon the subject of the supplies for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, and various matters connected with the service.

‘ 15. I have likewise the honor to enclose copies of orders which I have issued upon this same subject.

‘ 16. The establishments are not reduced so low as they



might be hereafter. There is a grain establishment at Ahmednuggur, and another at Poonah, both under European superintendence, which might be managed by the Commissary of grain to the subsidiary force. But he must have managed these departments by means of native servants; and in time of famine, a native could not have been trusted with the charge of grain.

‘ 17. The store departments at Ahmednuggur and Poonah are also larger than is absolutely necessary in ordinary times. The captured ordnance, and the stores for the heavy train, are at Ahmednuggur; and the stores belonging to the separate detachment which marched up from Bombay under Colonel Murray are at Poonah. But when there shall be time and leisure to move to Bombay the ordnance and stores which may be supernumerary to the quantities required for the service of the subsidiary force, that measure ought to be carried into execution; and then the store establishments may be reduced.

‘ 18. The establishment of carriage cattle in the grain department will appear large, but that number is absolutely necessary, at present, to insure the subsistence of the troops; and they must be kept up in the Peshwah’s territories till it shall be possible to make an arrangement with the brinjaries for the supply of the troops, upon which dependence can be placed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. In enumerating the troops which will remain in the Peshwah’s territories, I have omitted thirty men belonging to the 84th regiment, who have done the duty of additional gunners at Ahmednuggur; likewise a company of Bombay native infantry, stationed in posts on each of the rivers, Kistna, Gutpurba, and Malpoorba, and one company of coast native infantry in a post on the Werdah. These posts have been useful in keeping up the communication with the southern countries; and I think that they ought to remain, at least till the Peshwah’s affairs with the southern chiefs shall be settled.’

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Tiraloo, 27th June, 1804.

‘ I enclose a dispatch, which I request you to forward to Major Kirkpatrick with the letter to his address, as soon as you shall have perused it.

‘ We get on well, and I expect to be at or near Meritch on the 30th.

‘ I have received a letter from Colonel Hallyburton, from which I learn that he does not expect to be able to move till after the monsoon. This will be ruinous to us. At that time the rivers will have fallen, the whole country will be open, all our disposable troops will be employed in the siege of Chandore, and a very small body of the enemy will do a great deal of mischief. This must not be, if possible.

‘ I have mentioned the subject in the enclosed letter to Kirkpatrick, and I shall write to Colonel Hallyburton upon it. You must have our troops at liberty by the end of August, and then nothing can happen in the Deccan.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ SIR,    ‘ Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

‘ I received, some days ago, your letter of the 8th, and I was prevented from replying to it by the multiplicity of my occupations at the time I received it. I trust that this letter will find you established in Malwa, and in perfect communication and harmony with Scindiah’s durbar.

‘ You will have heard that the Governor General has ordered me to break up in the Deccan, and to establish the subsidiary force with the Peshwah. I have done so, and have sent you the orders of the 24th instant, by which you are placed under the authorities at Bombay.

‘ I am concerned to hear of the sickness of your Europeans; and particularly so, as there does not appear any prospect of being able to increase your force in Europeans, or in cavalry; Mr. Duncan may possibly send you some artillery, respecting which I have written to him.

‘ You have a larger body of European soldiers than the Commander in Chief, or than I have ever had ; and Colonel Monson has driven Holkar before him out of the territories of the Rajah of Jeypoor, of Boondy, and of Kota, without a single European soldier or horseman, excepting the irregular horse of the country. You will be joined by a large body of Scindiah’s cavalry.

‘ From your frequent allusions to this subject, I should be induced to believe that you do not deem your force sufficient to perform the service on which you are employed, if I was not aware of the circumstances to which I have above referred ; and it is, therefore, necessary, that I should request you to explain yourself fully to Mr. Duncan upon it.

‘ Your explanation of your sentiments ought to be full ; as, by allusions to your weakness, and expressing your hopes that you will be reinforced, you expose the Government to the severe responsibility of omitting to reinforce you on the one hand, if it should be necessary ; or of reinforcing you, on the other, if it should not. I have written to Mr. Duncan on this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray,*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

‘ As the best mode of making you acquainted with all the measures which I have adopted, in consequence of the Governor General’s orders of the 25th and 30th May, I have the honor to enclose a copy of my dispatch to him of yesterday’s date.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th instant. I hope soon to pay you my respects at Madras ; but, notwithstanding that, I shall take an opportunity of addressing you upon the subject adverted to in your letter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart,*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace\*.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,                      ‘ Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

‘ I have not yet been able to send you the copies of my letters to the Resident, which I promised you, but I shall send them as soon as I shall have a leisure moment.

‘ I have got on well; but nothing can be more erroneous than Captain Johnson’s route. He was wrong eight miles between Poonah and Kichaire, and between that place and this about twenty miles!!! He did not even measure the route correctly from his own map. The road is very good, and Hill will get on well.

‘ I beg you to let me hear any reports that may reach you about your own situation. You need be under no apprehension. You may depend upon it that I will take care that you shall not lose it.

‘ I believe that in my public dispatches I have alluded to every point to which I should wish to draw your attention, excepting one, which I will mention to you—that is, the secrecy of all your proceedings.

‘ There is nothing more certain than that, of one hundred affairs, ninety-nine might be posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public interests; but the misfortune is that, where the public business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept secret, as a matter of course, upon every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that

\* A characteristic trait of this officer is recollected by those who served with the army in the Deccan (Vol. II., p. 655). At the siege of Gawilghur he had been charged with the execution of certain details, necessary to the capture of that place. A heavy gun had been directed to be conveyed by night to an important point, and its transportation over the most rugged mountain so long baffled all endeavors, that the artillery officer, in despair, reported the accomplishment of it to be impossible. ‘ *Impossible, Sir!* ’ exclaimed Colonel Wallace, who had all his life maintained the most rigid adherence to obedience, ‘ *Impossible! Let us see!* ’ He then called for a light, pulled the instructions from his pocket, and, having read them, said, ‘ *Oh, no! not impossible; the order is positive.* ’ The result evinced the efficacy of the order; and also afforded another proof that implicit obedience, when accompanied by devoted zeal, will in general overcome every difficulty.

The expression attributed to Napoleon, on a similar occasion, was more poetical—‘ *Monsieur! faire l’impossible c’est Français!* ’ This was more chivalrous, and no doubt particularly exciting, when addressed to a Frenchman; but the expression of Colonel Wallace had its source in the higher yet more sober military feeling of duty, that WHAT IS ORDERED MUST BE EXECUTED.



occasion on which it is necessary. There is an awkwardness in a secret which enables discerning men (of which description there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it out; and it may be depended upon that, whenever the public business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is exposed to public view.

‘ For this reason secrecy is always best, and those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs are in the habit of never making public business of any description, that it is not necessary that the public should know. The consequence is that secrecy becomes natural to them, and as much a habit as it is to others to talk of public matters; and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not, as they may think proper.

‘ I mention this subject to you because, in fact, I have been the means of throwing the public affairs into your hands, and I am anxious that you should conduct them as you ought. This is a matter which would never occur to you, but it is essentially necessary.

‘ Remember, that what I recommend to you is far removed from mystery: in fact, I recommend silence upon the public business upon all occasions, in order to avoid the necessity of mystery upon any.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Bellowra, 29th June, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of the instructions which I have given to Lieut. Colonel Hill, who commands the detachment of troops on their march from Poonah. The road by which Lieut. Colonel Hill will march is by Meritch, and the different posts of Erroor, on the Kistna; Goorgerry, on the Gutpurba; Sungoly, on the Malpoorba; Deogerry, on the Werdah; and Hurryhur. He may arrive on the Kistna about the 12th or 13th of July; so that your orders addressed to him at Erroor, or at any of the other posts, will reach him.

‘ He will require money in the beginning of August, to the amount of about 30,000 pagodas; and I dare say that,

if he should enter Mysore by Hurryhur, the Dewan will supply him with that sum, if you will make Captain Wilks acquainted with your wishes.

‘ The rice, reduced to 1000 bags, will last Colonel Hill two months ; and the provisions, till the dragoons shall enter the Company’s territories. He will get gram on his advance to the southward. But I shall write to the commanding officer at Hullihall in Soonda, to endeavor to procure some there, and to send it to meet Colonel Hill at Sungoly on the Malpoorba.

‘ In a letter which I received last night from Mr. Duncan, he informs me that he shall send the native battalion to Poonah. He also tells me that the earliest period at which vessels can be sent to the southward, to bring up the troops, will be the 28th of August.

‘ I conclude that you will write to him, to let him know which of the posts you intend to have relieved first, and the period at which you expect that the Coast troops will arrive to make the relief; in order that he may make his arrangements to send down vessels to bring up the Bombay troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Camp at Bellowra, 29th June, 1804.

‘ I received my sword this morning, and am much obliged to you for it.

‘ Mr. Duncan has consented to send the 2nd battalion, 7th regiment, so that the 78th regiment may go to Bombay whenever you please. They had better take advantage of the first fair weather. Correspond with Mr. Duncan on this subject.

‘ By sending the tents of the 78th regiment down upon the elephants of the 74th, Colonel Wallace could send the camels of the 78th to carry up the tents of the battalion.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Meritch, 1st July, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that Hurry Pursheram, commonly called Baba Saheb Putwurdun, one of the family of Pursheram Bhow, paid me a visit yesterday, in my camp at Rajahpoor, which I returned this morning on my road through Tasgaum.

‘ He took the opportunity of this visit to talk to me in private. He said that he was entirely at the mercy of the British Government, and it must rest with them either to destroy him, or to allow him to retain his possessions. I desired him to explain himself; he then said he heard that the Peshwah was offended at his conduct, and that he was at the mercy of the British Government. That all he was desirous of was to serve the Peshwah’s government, as in former times; and that all he hoped for was the favor of his Highness and the British Government, in proportion to his zeal and fidelity.

‘ In answer, I told Baba Saheb that it was perfectly true that the Peshwah was offended with him, and that his Highness certainly had reason to complain of his conduct; however, it was possible that his Highness might be induced to forgive and forget what had passed; but that it must be in the confidence that he should have no cause to complain in future; and that that confidence must be founded on acts,—not professions of service. I therefore urged him earnestly, if he had any regard for his own honor and situation, to endeavor to reconcile himself to the Peshwah, and to serve him hereafter with zeal and fidelity.

‘ I pointed out to him the state of the Peshwah’s government at the present moment; I observed that it was stronger in his Highness’s own opinion, and in reality, than that of any Peshwah had ever been; and I hinted to him, that it was not to be supposed that the British Government, which had done so much for the Peshwah, would cease its endeavors in his support, till his power and authority should be completely established and acknowledged in all parts of his territories. I observed that the Peshwah was not, in fact, so bent upon revenge as people supposed; that I had found him to be an indulgent master, when he had reason to

believe that his servants were in earnest in their profession of repentance and future good conduct ; and that he might depend upon it that there was nothing that the British Government wished so much, as to see his Highness surrounded by his sirdars, and his government supported by its natural strength, and the chief men of the empire in the enjoyment of their rights and possessions.

‘ In answer, Baba Saheb said that he wished and intended to serve the Peshwah according to ancient custom ; and I told him that I should consider what he had then said and so frequently repeated, as binding upon him in any future discussion which might take place upon this subject.

‘ I observed that I had no instructions to discuss the subject at this time, and did not know what the ancient custom was ; but that it appeared that the intention expressed by Baba Saheb was fair and would be satisfactory.

‘ Baba Saheb then asked me what should be done about Baba Phurkia, whom he had kept in confinement at Tasgaum. I told him that the Peshwah had intended that Baba Phurkia should go to a place in the Konkan, belonging to the Phurkia family, where he was to live in security as long as he should not molest the Peshwah’s government ; that I did not recollect the name of the place, and did not know the particulars of the arrangement, but that he ought to refer himself to Poonah upon the subject. In the mean time I told Baba Saheb that it was incumbent upon him to keep the person of Baba Phurkia in security.

‘ Baba Saheb then alluded to his affairs with the Kolapoor Rajah. I told him that he ought to consider those affairs as the concern of the government, and not his ; and when he would really be the servant of the government, it was probable that the government would see the necessity of settling them.

‘ He then said that he had a brother whom it was the wish of the family to send to Benares to reside there, and I referred him to you for passports, letters, &c. &c.

‘ He asked me with whom he should communicate at Poonah, in my absence, on the different points on which he had spoken to me ; and I referred him to yourself, and have given him a letter to you.

‘ The conversation then became more general, and, in the



course of it, it was very obvious that Baba Saheb is extremely apprehensive of the consequences of his omission to serve the Peshwah. He said that I should see Appah Saheb and Madhoo Rao Rastia on my road to Seringapatam; and that the latter was particularly desirous of the forgiveness of the Peshwah, and he pressed to know what could be done in his case.

‘ I answered that the British Government could have but one wish upon this subject, and that was to see the Peshwah surrounded by all his sirdars; but I recommended to Baba Saheb to be satisfied with the trouble he would have in his own case, and to leave Madhoo Rao Rastia’s affairs to his own exertions.

‘ The circumstances that I have above detailed, which passed at the meeting with Baba Saheb, appear to hold out a favorable opportunity of settling the Peshwah’s affairs with the Putwurdun family, and eventually with all the southern chiefs; and I proceed to give you my opinion regarding the mode in which that settlement ought to be effected.

‘ In respect to Baba Saheb, it is my opinion that, if he should open himself to you upon the subject, you ought to urge the durbar to accept his offers of service; and if he should require that the British Government shall guarantee the security of his person, while he shall be at Poonah on the service of the Peshwah, and his possessions while he shall serve his Highness with fidelity, it is entirely consistent with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General to give that guarantee.

‘ As the arrangement which there is a prospect of making with Baba Saheb will be made in concert and communication with the Peshwah, and as his Highness is well aware that the British Government will not permit him to break engagements into which he may enter with his subjects or servants, through their mediation, it is probable that he will have no objection to this guarantee, and it is desirable that it should be given with his knowledge and consent.

‘ If the arrangement should be made with Baba Saheb, as I hope it will, it is probable that offers to the same purport will be made by the other southern chiefs; and I anxiously recommend that you should encourage them all, and urge

the durbar to accept them; and that you should give the sirdars the Company's guarantee for the security of their persons and their possessions, on the ground of their faithful services to the Peshwah's state.

'In case the conversation which I have above detailed should lead to an arrangement with Baba Saheb or the other southern chiefs, it will be necessary to ascertain exactly the amount of the serinjaumy, enaum, or jaghire possessions, to which each chief has a right from former grants; and to insist that each shall absolutely resign all other lands of which he may have possession, that belong to the Peshwah, for which he may have no sunnuds.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp at Nugar Manowly, 3rd July, 1804.

'Since I addressed you on the 1st instant, on the subject of the conversation which I had with Baba Saheb Putwurdun, I have received the orders of the Governor General of the 3rd of June, on the subject of the settlement to be made with the southern jaghiredars. I conclude that you will have applied to his Highness the Peshwah for his consent to the interposition of the British Government in his affairs with the southern chiefs.

'I think it probable that I shall see Appah Saheb and Madhoo Rao Rastia on my journey through the province of Savanore; in which case I propose to commence the negotiation with them. If I should not see them, I propose to write to Appah Saheb a letter, which will lay the ground of the negotiation.

'In the mean time, if Baba Saheb should apply to you, you will do well to settle his affairs, in the manner pointed out in the Governor General's orders to me of the 3rd of June.

'Baba Saheb Putwurdun, the possessor of Meritch, and Chintomeny Rao and many others of the family of Purcheram Bhow, paid me visits at Meritch; but nothing passed except general professions, and a reliance on the favor of the Company, although they conversed with me in private.

‘ As it is probable that the Peshwah will hear that I have had interviews with the chiefs of the Putwurdun family, I recommend that you should apprize his ministers of the fact, and relate what passed at each meeting.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ 3rd July, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th of June.

‘ I have never had an opportunity of considering in detail the military establishment of Fort St. George. I have never served in any division excepting Mysore ; and of course my ideas regarding the force, required for the defence or security of other parts of the Company’s possessions, must be very general, and cannot be founded on original or very accurate information. I cannot, therefore, reply to your letter as I could wish.

‘ I wrote to you fully in February or March of the year 1802, on the subject of the forces required for Mysore, Malabar, Canara, and Goa. The forces then thought necessary were not with a view to foreign war, but to the preservation of domestic tranquillity ; and nothing has occurred in these countries or elsewhere, to induce me to be of opinion that one man less would answer the purpose. Indeed, the number ought to be increased in proportion to the increased number of troops required for the protection of Goa.

‘ You have my sentiments on the increase of the army of Fort St. George, in the event of the Bombay troops furnishing the subsidiary force at Poonah ; and those of Madras the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, in letters which I wrote to you on the 14th of February, and from Bombay. I have nothing to add to those letters, upon the subject of the local affairs of the division which I command, or of the increase of the army of Fort St. George, in reference to the relief of the Bombay troops on the western coast of the Peninsula.

‘ The only part of the disposition which I have proposed in my letters of 1802, to which I think it probable there may be an objection, is the large garrison in Seringapatam. But

I have always been of opinion that that place was the main point of our strength in the Peninsula, and that a strong garrison there would keep Malabar and Canara in order. The justness of this opinion will soon be experienced. I suspect that it will be found that, as the troubles in Malabar became serious when the troops marched from Seringapatam, notwithstanding there were, at that time, as many troops in Malabar as there will ever be, so order will be restored when they shall return to that garrison.

‘ In respect to the general question of a military establishment, it has always appeared to me that Government has made an erroneous calculation of the value of their conquests, as those were to tend to the decrease of the military establishments and their expense. They have adverted only to the fact that, by the success of their arms, they have diminished the number of their external enemies; and they have imagined, that in proportion as they have become secure abroad, they ought to have the means of reducing their armies at home. This appears to be particularly the error of the Court of Directors.

‘ They have not adverted to the fact that all government in India, excepting perhaps that in Bengal, is held by the sword; that, in order to carry on their foreign wars, they have been obliged to weaken the means of their internal government, that is to say, the power of the sword in their own provinces, by which, till this last war, they have invariably suffered; and that the conclusion of the most successful foreign war in India, that by which the most formidable enemy may have been subdued, if it gives an accession of territory, must bring with the territory a necessity to increase the army; because the government must be established in the new territory, and supported, as well as in the old, by the power of the sword. The want of knowledge, or rather of recollection, of these facts, is the cause of all the complaints of high military establishments and expenses, and of all the difficulties in which you must have found yourself, from the want of troops.

‘ This want, however, it is to be hoped, will not hereafter be so severely felt. For the last five or six years, great exertions have been made, and the Company’s power has been vastly extended, without any very great increase of their



military resources. What has been done has been by great military activity and exertion ; for I believe it will be found, upon an examination of the Company's military establishments, that, excepting in cavalry, they are but little larger than they were in Lord Cornwallis's time, and not so strong in European troops. Accordingly, every thing has been on the stretch, and every nerve has been exerted, to support the authority of government in its extended provinces, as well as to provide the means of making foreign conquests. But now I believe that we can conquer no more, at least on the establishment of Fort St. George ; and the troops and military resources of this Presidency will be applicable to the defence of the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to provide for the peace of the country.

‘ I have never had much apprehension of the attack of an European enemy in India, and least of all in this war ; because the enemy appear to have turned their resources to that kind of naval equipment which, it must be obvious, they could not use in an attack on this country.

‘ In respect to the internal peace, I have great hopes of it, from the operation of the systems of government adopted in the latter end of Lord Clive's time. All arguments founded on theory are in their favor ; and we have also in their favor the practical example of a long course of peace and increasing prosperity in the provinces under Fort William, administered by the same system ; and that of the peace and tranquillity of the provinces under the government of Fort St. George (excepting always Malabar) in the late war, being the only foreign war in which the Company have ever been engaged, during which the people in all their provinces in the Peninsula from which their troops were withdrawn were not in rebellion. It is true that the circumstances and events of the war were favorable to internal peace, and all ought not to be attributed to the system of civil government lately established. But, on the other hand, a Marhatta war is one during which, above all others, the country is likely to be disturbed, as the Marhattas have their agents and intrigue every where ; and therefore I think it but fair to attribute the general tranquillity, excepting always in Malabar, throughout the late war, to something more

than chance, or than to the circumstances and events of the war itself.

‘ Still, however, the sword is the main support of the government; and it is necessary now to provide a military establishment adequate to defend the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to preserve the internal tranquillity: and I have adverted particularly to the state of the civil government, as in my opinion that must influence in a great degree, not only the amount of the force in each of the military divisions, but the mode in which that force ought to be disposed.

‘ It is difficult, if not impossible, to point out that place on the great extent of coast, for the defence of which you have to provide, on which it is most probable that the French would make an attack. After providing for the defence of Goa, on the western coast, and Masulipatam, and Fort St. George on the eastern, that distribution of the army which would best provide for the support of the internal government, and would preserve tranquillity, would probably answer best to defend the Peninsula against the attack of an European enemy. I shall proceed, therefore, to state my opinion upon this part of the subject.

‘ In the countries in which the new systems of government have been introduced, there can be little occasion (or at least it is probable that in a short time there will be little occasion) for the constant interference of the military in the support of the civil government and of the police. In those districts it will be possible to collect the troops allotted to the division in one or two great stations.

‘ This arrangement will be advantageous to discipline; it will be attended by the advantage of giving you the ability to move the troops, at once, to any point on the coast which may be threatened or attacked; you will always have a force ready to move to suppress insurrection or rebellion; and supposing that it should be necessary to keep troops in these districts, at all times, for the support of the civil government, those which you might withdraw from a great station, in which some troops would be left, would not be missed, as they have been heretofore, when the troops, being scattered in numerous small posts, have been withdrawn from the

whole, and all have been left unoccupied in time of war, when to hold them would appear most important.

‘ But although I thus recommend the assembly of the troops in each division, where the new systems of government have been established, generally in one large station, I am by no means an advocate for the destruction of the forts. You have my opinion already upon that subject; and I shall only mention here that the forts in these countries ought either to be made over to the civil government, or held by small detachments made from one corps at the principal station.

‘ In the countries in which the new system of civil government has not been introduced, I fear that the old mode of distributing the troops must still continue. But even in these, I should recommend, as a general principle, to draw the corps together as much as possible, and to make detachments only in case of very evident necessity.

‘ If this principle can be carried into effect in every division of the army, and I conceive that it might in some degree, it will give you in each division a small disposable force. This may not be equal to all the demands which may arise, but it will give you some strength every where; and considering the great extent of coast you have to defend, and of the Company’s territories under the government of Fort St. George, I should prefer that to the concentration of your force in one position.

‘ In the present state of the army equipments, I conceive that, for the purposes of defence against an European enemy, or even of preserving internal tranquillity, and suppressing insurrection and rebellion, there is but little occasion to have the troops constantly in the field. Both native and European troops have their camp equipage always in readiness; and I can speak with certainty of Seringapatam, and I should think it probable, of other principal stations of the army, that the time which would be required to bring in the cattle belonging to the ordnance, and for the carriage of the camp equipage of corps, would be sufficient to procure the bullocks which might be necessary to carry any stores that might be wanted, and the provisions for the European troops. The cattle for the carriage of the gram for the horses of the cavalry can always be procured as soon as the gram.

‘ Even if you were to form a field force, it is probable that you would not give it a gram department; and, therefore, when it would move, it would depend upon its bazaars and the country for its supplies, as must the troops when they move suddenly from these great stations.

‘ The only advantage in point of equipment that the field force would have would be carriage for the sick; but even some of that is always to be procured: and it is to be supposed that the troops moving suddenly, for which event the field force would be provided, would leave their sick behind them in their station.

‘ The objections to the centrical field force are, that with the expense of an army in the field, they become, in a short time, not much better than troops in a cantonment. The field force at Hyderabad, and those at Cawnpore and Futtyghur in Bengal, are examples of the truth of this observation. Those troops are in barracks and the officers in bungalows; and it is as difficult to move them, as it is to move a similar number from a garrison, and a proportion of them must be left to take care of the cantonment.

‘ But in respect to an invasion by the French, I should suppose that your mode of defence would be to collect, as speedily as possible, a body of troops in the neighbourhood of the spot on which the French might land, with directions to watch and circumscribe their movements as much as possible, to cut off their communications with the country, and to prevent them from receiving supplies of cattle, provisions, &c.

‘ Supposing the landing to be made in the Carnatic, and the number of men the French should land to be as large as any they have been able to bring out to India, I should imagine the disposable troops in the eastern division of the Carnatic, collected, I would suppose, at Wallajahbad, to be fully equal to the service proposed for them. It is probable that the centrical field force, unless reinforced by the disposable troops in the other divisions, would not be equal to more; and the troops at Wallajahbad would have the advantage over them, that the enemy would feel them at an earlier period than they would the field force.

‘ On the other hand, supposing the enemy to land on the western coast, the measures to be pursued would be the same.



The troops would collect in Malabar in their neighbourhood ; they would be joined by those from Seringapatam ; and they would certainly be felt before the field force could approach.

‘ When preparations are to be made for a great foreign war, such as the late war with the Marhattas, the mere readiness of the troops is nothing, in comparison with the preparations required for the departments of the service. You could march the troops from the most distant garrisons before these would be ready, and therefore here again the field force would be of no use.

‘ I acknowledge that I have altered my opinion upon this subject : but the state of the country has altered much since I formed it ; the equipments of the army have been much improved ; I have gained more experience and knowledge of the real benefits of these field forces ; and I acknowledge that I am sanguine in my expectations, that the improvements of the civil government have established tranquillity in the districts in which they have been made, upon a basis more firm than has hitherto existed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Padshappoor,  
4th July, 1804.

‘ I enclose the copies of the letters to Appah Saheb and Mohiput Ram. I have every reason to hope that I shall see Appah Saheb at Hoobly.

‘ I get on well, and the weather continues fair.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp near Sungoly, 5th July, 1804.

‘ Appah Dessaye came to me this day to pay a visit. He told me he had gone as far as Gokauk, on his way to Poonah, and that there he received a letter from Succoo Punt, his vakeel, who informed him that you had said there was no occasion for his coming in immediately, and that he might wait a short time.

‘ I pointed out to Appah Dessaye, in strong terms, the necessity that he should obey the Peshwah’s orders, and hinted that those who had not been in the habit of obeying them hitherto, appeared now to be inclined to be obedient.

‘ I think you will do well to write to Appah Dessaye, to rectify the error into which Succoo Punt has fallen, respecting your orders about Appah Dessaye going to Poonah.

‘ I shall see Goklah to-morrow, and I shall urge him forward ; I believe Appah Saheb and Madhoo Rao Rastia next day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Yadwar, 6th July, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th of June, in which you have enclosed the copy of one from Messrs. Forbes and Co., containing their offer to pay immediately the money which they had agreed with the government of Fort St. George should be paid for certain quantities of sandal wood, when they should be received ; provided interest should be paid for the money at the rate of three-quarters per cent. *per mensem*, from the time they should advance it, to that at which they shall receive the sandal wood.

‘ Such ample provision has been made for the payment of the troops, that it is my opinion they will not require the money till after the month of August, when it is supposed that Messrs. Forbes will have received the sandal wood.

‘ However, I beg leave to refer you to Colonel Close upon this subject. If the money should be immediately wanted from Messrs. Forbes, it can be only on account of the distance from which that must be carried which was expected from Hyderabad, and of the difficulty of moving in the Deccan at present.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Hoobly, 7th July, 1804.

‘ I enclose a letter for the Secretary of Government of Bombay, which I request you to peruse and forward.

‘ Some time ago, I received from the house of Messrs. Forbes and Co., at Bombay, a proposition to purchase from the government of Fort St. George a quantity of sandal wood, for which they were to pay five lacs of rupees into the pay office at Poonah, as soon as they should receive the sandal wood.

‘ The government of Fort St. George have accepted the proposition, and Messrs. Forbes and Co. have made arrangements to send vessels to receive the sandal wood at Fort St. George and Mangalore. Still, some time will elapse before it will be received; and Messrs. Forbes and Co., supposing it would be a convenience to the military operations, that the money should be lodged at Poonah immediately, have offered to send it there, provided they receive for it the usual interest of three quarters per cent. per mensem, from the time they shall pay the money, until that at which they shall receive the sandal wood.

‘ I have referred the government of Bombay to you for an answer on this subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Strachey.*

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp at Bindegherry, 8th July, 1804.

‘ 1. I enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have received from his Excellency the Governor General, from which you will observe that it is his Excellency’s desire that the British Government should interpose its arbitration for the purpose of settling the differences between the Peshwah and the southern jaghiredars; and that I should appoint a person to conduct the inquiries and negotiation connected with the proposed settlement.

‘ 2. I have fixed upon you for the performance of this service, and I proceed to give you my instructions.

‘ 3. The persons who are the objects of the Governor

General's orders are not properly jaghiredars. They are the serinjaumy sirdars of the Poonah state; and it is peculiarly the case with serinjaumy lands, that the possession of them may be changed annually. The chiefs in question, however, have held their lands of this description for many years; and they have other possessions under the Poonah state, some in jaghire, others in enaum, and others held only as comavisdars or amildars of the government.

‘4. Serinjaumy lands are granted for the payment of troops employed in the service of the state, and it stands to reason that the condition of the tenure of serinjaumy lands is, that the holder should render service to the state; but the chiefs in question have long been in the habits of rendering no service to the Peshwah, under various pretences; the principal of which is, that the Rajah of Kolapoor has attacked them, and has plundered their possessions; and that their troops are employed in the defence of the territories from the revenues of which they are to be supported.

‘5. In order to deprive the serinjaumy sirdars of this pretence for a failure in their engagements, I some time ago wrote a letter to the Rajah of Kolapoor, of which I enclose a translation, and I have lately apprized his vakeels, that the British Government will not permit him to attack the Peshwah's territories; and I have proposed to them that the Rajah should refer to the arbitration and decision of the British Government, all his disputed claims on the Peshwah and his sirdars; and that till the British Government shall have leisure to decide on them, hostilities should cease on all sides.

‘6. The Governor General has lately directed that a remonstrance to the same purport with a letter from myself, of which the enclosed is a translation, should be made to the Rajah of Kolapoor by Sir William Clarke; and I am sanguine in my expectations that the Rajah will accept the offered mediation of the British Government. At all events, whether he does or not, this appears to be a favorable period for effecting a settlement with the southern chiefs.

‘7. The principal of these chiefs are Appah Saheb and Baba Saheb, the sons of Pursheram Bhow; Chintomeny Rao Pandoorung, the nephew of Pursheram Bhow; Madhoo Rao Rastia, and Punt Prittee Niddee. There are others of



inferior note, depending on these, who will, of course, follow their example.

‘8. In my opinion, the best mode of arranging these affairs is, to commence settling with Appah Saheb, who is commonly supposed to be the head of the Putwurdun family. I have accordingly written to that chief, to inform him that I was desirous of communicating with him on business of importance, and had requested you to go to him; and I have desired him to write to you at Deogerry, on the Werdah, and to fix the time and place at which you will meet him.

‘9. I have the honor to enclose with this a letter of introduction for Appah Saheb.

‘10. When you shall see Appah Saheb, I recommend you to apprise him of the extreme displeasure of the Peshwah, that he should have omitted to serve him in the late war, or to take any steps in his service since the conclusion of the peace. You will point out to Appah Saheb the nature of his situation under the Poonah state; and you will observe to him that the Peshwah has just and urgent claims upon his services. You will apprise him of the favorable opinion which the Governor General entertains of him and the sirdars of his family, and of the wishes which his Excellency therefore has formed to settle, by the mediation of the British Government, all existing differences between the Peshwah and his principal subjects, that his Highness may enjoy the benefit of their services to which he has a just claim, and that they may enjoy in peace and security the benefits which they hold under the Poonah state. You will then inform him that I have sent you to confer with him on an arrangement to be founded on that basis, and you will desire to know his sentiments upon the subject.

‘11. Appah Saheb will probably bring forward a variety of claims upon the Peshwah’s government, and of complaints of injuries which he has received from his Highness. You will reply to these, that, till he renders service for the serinjaumy lands which he holds under the Peshwah’s state, no claims can be taken into consideration; that his complaint cannot be listened to till he shall place himself in the situation of a faithful servant; and that if his complaints are of such a nature that he cannot serve the Peshwah without dis-

grace to himself, (which he has before hinted,) he ought to resign the Peshwah's lands and to give his Highness those means of supporting his government.

‘ There is one claim in particular which Appah Saheb will bring forward, viz., to hold the Savanore country till its revenues shall have discharged a debt pretended to be due to Pursheram Bhow for expenses incurred at Seringapatam.

‘ You will answer to this claim, that the debt must have been discharged long ago ; but that, at all events, supposing it is not, he cannot be permitted to allot to its payment the revenues of the serinjaumy lands, which every body knows are invariably applied to the payment of military service actually rendered.

‘ 12. If Appah Saheb should urge that he cannot serve the Peshwah, because the Rajah of Kolapoor has attacked him and will continue his attacks, you will apprise him of the measures which I have adopted to insure at least a cessation of hostilities on the part of the Rajah, and those which have been adopted by order of his Excellency the Governor General. You will point out to Appah Saheb, that in his situation of a servant of the Poonah state, he cannot be permitted to wage war against the Rajah of Kolapoor ; that if he has any complaints to make of that chief, he ought to state them to his sovereign, the Peshwah, who would consult with his allies upon the subject ; and that, according to this mode of proceeding, justice would be done. You will observe to Appah Saheb, however, that the first object to be obtained is, that he should place himself in the situation of a servant to the Peshwah, and really serve his Highness in return for the serinjaumy lands which he holds under his Highness's government.

‘ 13. If you should find that Appah Saheb is disposed to serve the Peshwah, you will lay open the following propositions as the articles of an agreement for settling all differences between the Peshwah and his family, and for defining their respective claims and benefits hereafter.

‘ First : There shall be a mutual oblivion and pardon of all injuries on both sides. The British Government will guarantee the security of the persons of Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, and adherents, so long as they shall serve the Peshwah with fidelity, and refrain from intriguing

or holding any communication with his Highness's enemies.

‘Secondly: Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, and adherents, shall hold the lands of which they have possession by virtue of sunnuds, or legal grants from the state, whether as serinjaumy, or enaum, or in jaghire; and the British Government will guarantee to them the possession of all those lands as long as they shall serve the Peshwah zealously and faithfully, and shall hold no communication with his Highness's enemies. In order to ascertain the lands, the possession of which the British Government are to guarantee to Appah Saheb, and his brothers, relations, &c., a list of them is to be given in by Appah Saheb, which list is to be referred to his Highness the Peshwah, who will make such objections as he may think proper to Appah Saheb's retaining any particular portion of those described in the list. Appah Saheb is to reply to the Peshwah's objections to his list: and the British Government is to decide between the parties. In the mean time, till the decision shall be made, Appah Saheb is to remain in possession of the lands.

‘Thirdly: The condition on which the Honorable Company will guarantee to Appah Saheb, &c., the possession of their lands is, that they shall serve the Peshwah zealously and faithfully. In consideration of the injuries which the country has received from long wars, and having been frequently plundered, and lately a famine, Appah Saheb, &c., shall not be required to produce, at any time, more than two thirds of the forces; for the support of which they will retain the serinjaumy lands. But that reduced number must be produced whenever it may be called for, otherwise the guarantee in the second article shall be null and void. Also one third of the number of the forces Appah Saheb, &c., are bound to supply, are always to be at Poonah, under the command of one of the members of the Putwurdun family. The person who shall command this force shall be under the guarantee of the Company, in respect to the security of his person.

‘The number of troops which Appah Saheb will have to furnish according to this arrangement shall be ascertained and decided by the British Government, in the same manner



as the quantity of lands which Appah Saheb, &c., are to hold till the decision shall be made. Appah Saheb, &c., are to supply for the Peshwah's service that body of troops which they will allege they ought to furnish according to the present arrangement.

‘ Fourthly: Appah Saheb, &c., are to restore to the Peshwah's government all lands, &c. &c., which they may hold, for which they have no sunnuds.

‘ In this article are included all lands of which they may be the comavisdars or amildars—unless the possession of such lands should be material to their safety, or to enable them to collect the revenues of their serinjaumy, enaum, or jaghire lands: in which case, the British Government will interest themselves with the Peshwah, that the comavisdars may be continued to the Putwurdun family, provided they give security that the Peshwah shall regularly receive the revenue.

‘ 14. You will call upon Appah Saheb to give you a list of the lands described in the second article, which the Company are to guarantee, and to communicate to you the sunnuds or other grants by which he holds them; and to make known to you the amount of the services done to the state for these lands. I request you to investigate these papers minutely, and then to refer them to Colonel Close, with your opinion and report upon them.

‘ 15. I propose to send Colonel Close a copy of this letter, and to request him to communicate with the Peshwah's durbar, and gain all the information of which they are in possession, relative to the points into which you will have to enquire, particularly the opinion of the Peshwah and his minister, regarding the lands for which Appah Saheb may allege that he and family have claims; and the amount of the force which he will pretend they ought to furnish for those lands.

‘ 16. I beg you to correspond with Colonel Close upon every point which may occur in your mission; and to attend to any suggestions that you may receive from him.

‘ 17. If the result of your investigation into the subject of the lands to which Appah Saheb shall lay claims for himself and family, and the services which they are to render in return for them, should be, that the difference between the



Peshwah's statement and Appah Saheb's be trifling; or if the difference in the statements being great, you should have been able to ascertain clearly which party is in the right, you will decide between them without further reference; and draw a treaty according to the tenor of the propositions in the thirteenth paragraph of this dispatch, in the second article of which you will include the denomination of the lands, the possession of which the British Government shall guarantee; or if the list should be too long, you will place in a schedule to which the article may refer, and you will include in the third article the amount of the services which Appah Saheb and his family are to render.

‘18. If you should think it proper not to decide these questions yourself, you will refer them to his Excellency the Governor General; but you will still draw and sign the treaty according to the propositions in the thirteenth paragraph, binding Appah Saheb to abide by the decision of the British Government whenever it should be made, and to sign hereafter an article specifying the lands to which, according to that decision, the Company's guarantee is to extend, and the amount of the service which Appah Saheb and his family are to render.

‘19. After having settled with Appah Saheb, you will know from the tenor of that settlement, and from your inquiries from him, whether it will be necessary that you should have distinct and separate interviews, and make separate settlements with his brothers and relations. In case it should be so, you ought to go to them, and I enclose letters for each.

‘20. If you should find Appah Saheb entirely disinclined to come to the proposed or any other settlement with the Peshwah, you will take your leave of him, and there will be no necessity for seeing his relations. I request you, in that case, to give him notice that he shall not be permitted to attack the Rajah of Kolapoor: and that he must beware of his measures towards the Peshwah's government.

‘21. After having settled, or failed in your settlement with the Putwurdun family, you will go to Madhoo Rao Rastia, and pursue the same course with him. If, however, you should fail in your negotiations with the Putwurdun family, and with Madhoo Rao Rastia, there will be no

occasion for your going to Prittee Niddee. If you should succeed with both, or either, you will pursue the same course with Prittee Niddee, for whom likewise you have a letter.

‘ 22. If you should not go to Prittee Niddee, you will go to some place on the frontier and report to the Governor General, and wait his further orders.

‘ 23. You will be so kind as to report your proceedings regularly to his Excellency the Governor General. I shall be glad to hear from you as long as I may be in this part of India, and I will assist you to the utmost of my power with all the information which I may have.

‘ 24. You will be so kind as to communicate by means of a tappal with the post on the Kistna, or any other that may be convenient to you; you will transmit your letters to the Governor General by Poonah.

‘ 25. You will keep an account of your expenses on this mission, which will be paid by the public.

‘ You will communicate your wants of money to Colonel Close, who will take measures to supply you; and in case you should be able to procure any money for bills, you may draw upon Colonel Close, or Mr. Duncan at Bombay.

‘ 26. I have appointed Mr. Assistant Surgeon Scott to attend your mission, and have ordered a company of the 2nd battalion 12th regiment under a European officer, from Hullihall, in Soonda, as your escort, to meet you at Sungoly, on the Malpoorba. I have also directed that twenty of the Mysore horse may attend you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *To Mr. Strachey.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Bindigherry, 8th July, 1804.

‘ When I passed Darwar in the last year, it appeared to the Commander in Chief and myself to be an object of the greatest importance that I should arrange matters with Bap-pojee Scindiah in such a manner as that I might leave the fort of Darwar in his hands; as the person whom the Peshwah has desired that the British army should put in possession of that fort, Ball Kischen Gurgurdhur, had not communicated with us. I therefore opened a communication

with Bappojee Scindiah, the result of which was, that he engaged to remain faithful in his allegiance to the Peshwah, and not to impede the communication of the British army with the Company's territories, and he sent his son to my camp as a hostage for the performance of his engagements.

‘He expected that his son, Ricknaje Scindiah, would have been permitted to return to Darwar when I should return to Mysore; and although I do not recollect any positive promise to that effect, certainly, the tenor of the arrangement gives ground for belief that it was intended that Ricknaje Scindiah should return; accordingly, I request that he may be allowed to return to Darwar, unless the Peshwah should think proper to provide for him in his service.

‘I am happy to inform you that I have every reason to be satisfied with Bappojee Scindiah; he behaved well during the war, and on my moving to the southward, he treated me with the greatest civility; and as an extraordinary instance of liberality in a Marhatta killadar, I mention that he invited me, and I went to an entertainment inside of the fort\*.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Camp at Deogerry, 9th July, 1804.

‘I have received a letter from Mr. Webbe, of the 26th June, in which he sent the memorandum of a conference which he had had on the preceding day with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his ministers.

‘The object of this conference was to prevail upon Mr. Webbe to urge me to take measures to protect the districts south of the Godavery, which had been ceded to Scindiah by the peace, from disturbances created by persons in the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. I made inquiries respecting these alleged disturbances before I left Poonah, and the result was, that they did not exist. A person had taken possession of the principal place in Cavy Jung's jaghire, from whence he was driven by Major Graham, and his baggage plundered.

\* This mark of confidence of Major General Wellesley in the killadar of Darwar was a matter of surprise to every one, even to the killadar himself, who, in remarking afterwards that he had not taken advantage of it, said, ‘For I am still a Marhatta!’

This person, however, made use of the name of the Peshwah, as I believe I informed you when I was at Poonah.

‘ I know of no disturbances in the countries south of the Godavery, but it is very desirable that Major Graham should protect Scindiah’s districts from plunderers, as far as may be in his power, particularly as Scindiah is prevented by the treaty of peace from sending troops into those districts himself.

‘ Robberies are certainly very common, but the amildars of towns and districts must take their own measures to protect the inhabitants from robberies.

‘ When I was at Poonah, I apprized you that I had told Mr. Webbe that Scindiah’s officers in Sieugaum should be put in possession of Holkar’s share of that district. My reason for making this arrangement, liable to the future orders of the Governor General, was, that I thought he was more likely to keep the districts in tranquillity, if he should hold it entirely, than if it were to be held with the officer either of the Peshwah, or of the Nizam.

‘ I request you to make your arrangements accordingly, when you shall take possession of Sieugaum. This is a place of no strength, and it may be taken at any time by a body of British troops. I intended to have taken it by means of the detachment which I proposed to send to Aurungabad with the heavy guns; and I would recommend the same arrangement now, if that detachment should consist of four or five companies, should have field pieces, and should be well commanded. If it should not be so equipped and commanded, it is better that the attack should be deferred till Colonel Wallace shall march up with the detachment destined for the siege of Chandore.

‘ The possession of Sieugaum was another subject of Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s conference with Mr. Webbe.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Deogerry, 9th July, 1804.

‘ Mr. Elphinstone has transmitted to me a copy of his letter to you, of the 20th June, relative to the claim of the Rajah of Berar to collect the revenues of the districts ceded



by the article of the treaty of Deogaum, from the date of that treaty. You will observe from the extract of my letter to Mr. Elphinstone, of the 19th January, that I gave the Rajah reason to hope that he should collect those revenues from the date of the peace; and I wrote a letter to Rajah Mohiput Ram, stating my wishes upon this subject: but exclusively of these reasons, which I hope will induce you to urge the Soubah of the Deccan to restore to the Rajah the sums which have been collected from the districts, it appears but fair that he should have the revenues from the date of the peace; particularly as the delay in fixing upon the districts, and afterwards in giving possession of them to the Rajah's servants, could not be attributed to the Rajah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp at Akowla, 11th July, 1804.

‘ I wrote to you from Poonah, to apprise you, that in consequence of the orders of the Governor General I had broken up the army, and had put some of the troops in motion to the southward, and intended myself to move on the 25th. I hope you will have been induced to withdraw on the receipt of that letter, as I find, from a letter from General Stuart, dated the 12th of June, which I received only this day, that he trusted to me to give you notice of the period at which I should think you might withdraw the troops which you command into the Company's territories.

‘ It is my opinion that you may withdraw them whenever you may think proper, and that no inconvenience will result from the measure.

‘ All is quiet in this country, and I have every hope that I shall be able to effect a satisfactory arrangement of the Peshwah's affairs with the Southern chiefs.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. I have been delayed by the rain the last two or three days, but I shall be at Hurryhur to-morrow.’

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Akowla, 11th July, 1804.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 9th, I have continued my march to the southward, and have seen all the principal persons in this part of the Marhatta empire, by all of whom I have been received in such a manner as to convince me that the settlement of the Peshwah’s affairs with the Chiefs in the southern districts will not be difficult.

‘ Appah Dessaye waited upon me between the rivers Gutpurba and Malpoorba. His army was at Gokauk, as he said, for the purpose of crossing the river on its way to Poonah ; but he said that Succoo Punt, his vakeel at Poonah, had informed him that it was your opinion that there was no necessity for his being in a hurry to advance ; and that you would let him know at what period his services would be required. I told him that Succoo Punt must have misunderstood you, and that he would do well not to discontinue to pass his troops over the river. Appah Dessaye assured me of his entire obedience to the Peshwah, and he made no complaints. But I understood from him, that he had been reconciled to Sirjee Rao Ghautky : he brought the son of Sirjee Rao, by name Hindoo Rao Ghautky, to visit me, and since I saw him I have received a letter from him, in which he has desired me to give him a passport for Sirjee Rao Ghautky to go to Burhampoor. I told Appah Dessaye that I should not give this passport unless I should learn that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was desirous of seeing Sirjee Rao Ghautky, and that the Peshwah would permit him to pass through his territories, and that the Kolapoor Rajah had such a reliance upon his future good behaviour as to allow him to depart from his territories.

‘ The Dessaye of Kittoor met me on the 6th in the morning, at Sungoly, on the Malpoorba. He complained sadly of the difficulties of his situation : he said that both Goklah and the sirsoubah claimed his tribute, and both plundered his country to obtain it ; and he promised to pay it to whichever of the parties I should name. He also complained that Appah Dessaye’s troops plundered his country. I have prevailed upon Goklah and the sirsoubah to arrange this affair in a manner which I shall detail in this letter ; and I have

written to the Dessaye of Kittoor a letter, of which I enclose a copy.

‘ Goklah called upon me on the evening of the 6th. He complained of the distress of his troops ; and endeavoured to justify, on that ground, his march to the southward, contrary to the orders of the Peshwah. I, of course, resisted this justification, and pointed out the just grounds which the Peshwah had for being displeased with him. He then adverted to the arrangement which had been made for him, as communicated by Lingum Punt, and expressed his satisfaction at it, and declared his intention to march to Poonah immediately. I told him to recollect that the condition of the arrangement was, that he should relinquish the Savanore country, his claim and exactions upon the Dessaye of Kittoor, and every thing which he held in these countries, for which he had not a positive grant from the Peshwah, and his Highness’s positive permission to retain. He said that he should certainly ; but observed, that he should be of no use at Poonah unless he should be able to bring with him his army ; and also said that the army would certainly disband if he were to give up the country before the orders were discharged which he had drawn upon the amildars, and had given to the horsemen and soucars, for the pay of the troops for the last four months. He said that, during that time, his Highness the Peshwah had made no provision whatever for their payment, excepting to give them an order upon the Rajah of Solapoor, who would refuse to pay unless compelled by a force much larger than that of which he had the command.

‘ After a long discussion upon the subject of these orders, I was convinced that Goklah could not keep his army together unless some arrangement was made for discharging them ; and that, whatever he might promise, he certainly could not relinquish the Savanore country till they should be discharged. In this manner you would be obliged either to stop the payment of his troops, during the campaign, or to submit to his retaining the Savanore country contrary to his agreement.

‘ In either case the settlement of the country under one authority would be delayed ; and the sirsoubah on the one hand, and Goklah on the other, would each draw from it whatever they could get, to the loss of the Peshwah, and the



certain destruction of the resources of the country for a long period of time, I therefore deemed it best for the Peshwah's interest to propose to Goklah, that I should endeavor to prevail upon the sirsoubah to take upon himself to discharge the orders within a reasonable space of time, on the positive condition that he should withdraw his troops, amildars, &c. &c., from the whole country in fifteen days from the date at which the agreement should be made. Goklah agreed to this proposal; and an agreement has been settled between the sirsoubah and him, of which I enclose a copy.

‘ In the same agreement it is settled that Goklah is to have the tribute of Kittoor, for the last year, according to the old arrangement; and that the sirsoubah, who wants possession of the Kittoor country, and expects that the Company will give him possession, shall have the tribute in this year, and afterwards according to the orders of the Peshwah.

‘ You will readily believe that I did not recommend this arrangement without the fullest conviction of its necessity; and I beg that you will explain all the circumstances of the case to the Peshwah's ministers. I fear that the arrangement will not be satisfactory to his Highness, as I find that he and his servants expected that the Company's armies should be employed in the settlement of his Highness's government. Upon which point you will observe the instructions of the Governor General, in his letter of the 3rd June; but it is to be observed, of the arrangement, that, from this time, his Highness may expect the resources of Savanore, if he will proceed upon any principle of steadiness with the sirsoubah. If this arrangement had not been made with Goklah, the Peshwah never would have rooted out his officers and troops.

‘ Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, met me outside of his fort, on the morning of the 7th, and invited me to an entertainment within it. In the course of the conversation which passed, he expressed his attachment to the Company and the Peshwah. He wishes that his son may be sent back to him; upon which subject I have given him a letter addressed to you, of which I now enclose a duplicate.

‘ I arrived at Hoobly on that day, and there met the sirsoubah's carkoon, Ramchunder Tantea, with the Peshwah's pagah. His business there was to get possession of old



Hoobly, a ruined village, before which he had been for about six weeks.

‘ Old Hoobly is a possession of the Phurkia family ; and before I had been in the neighbourhood half an hour, the persons within the fort sent out a letter from the Peshwah, addressed to the sirsoubah, desiring him to give old Hoobly and its dependencies to Bappoo Phurkia, his Highness’s brother in law. His people were within the fort at the time, and were resisting the attack of the sirsoubah, also made by the Peshwah’s orders, and with his troops. I recommended to both parties to desist from hostilities, and to write to Poonah for an explanation of the Peshwah’s real intentions respecting this place. This fact exemplifies, in a strong manner, the modes of proceeding of the Peshwah’s government, and the difficulty of the task of settling the country, which is to be under its immediate authority.

‘ I gave the sirsoubah a letter to the killadar of Missery cottah, a small place immediately upon the borders of Soonda, which the killadar refused to give up, although Appah Saheb, to whom the fort belongs, has given him orders to evacuate it. If I should find that he does not evacuate the fort, I shall send orders to Lieut. Colonel Hill, as he will pass, to put the sirsoubah in possession, which will be a matter of no difficulty.

‘ This point being arranged, and the sirsoubah getting possession of the Savanore province, by the arrangement with Goklah, and of the tribute of Kittoor, there will remain only the districts in possession of the great chiefs, which must be the subject of further arrangements.

‘ Madhoo Rao Rastia came from Sirhitty, across the Werdah, to meet me at Deogerry on the 9th, and I saw him on the morning of the 10th ; after a short time, he expressed a desire to converse with me in private.

‘ He began with a general discourse on the strength which the Peshwah’s government had acquired by his Highness’s alliance with the Company, and general professions of his attachment, and of his desire to be considered a friend by the Company’s servants ; and the result of his conversation was, the expression of a strong desire to serve the Peshwah on the old footing.

‘I answered, that nothing would give the British Government greater satisfaction than to see the Peshwah surrounded by his principal subjects. I observed, that as these held lands under his government, it was but reasonable that they should serve him, or resign their lands; but that if they did serve him with fidelity and zeal, it was reasonable that they should enjoy, in peace and security, the benefits which they then held. I said that the British Government’s wishes were confined to an arrangement between the Peshwah and his subjects on those principles.

‘Madhoo Rao Rastia said, that he had advanced to the Peshwah’s state above forty lacs of rupees, and that in return for the money so advanced, the districts of Baugracottah, Badamy, and Jellahall had been given over to him many years ago, as camavisdar; that the sirsoubah of Savanore had sent him orders, requesting him to give up those districts, and he wished to know what arrangement could be made regarding them. I answered that it appeared that the possession of these districts was attended by claims of debts due by the state, and other circumstances upon which I had no information, and into which I could not enter at that period; but I said, that if Madhoo Rao Rastia chose to refer the question regarding the possession of those districts to the Company, I would undertake to have it decided, and would send a gentleman to converse with him on the subject, who should have full information and instructions.

‘Madhoo Rao Rastia replied, that he had no objection to go to Poonah, to settle his affairs there, if I would give him a letter to you; and he said that all he wished was to be allowed to serve the Peshwah, and to have the Company’s countenance and friendship. I answered, that as the Company’s countenance and support would be a lasting benefit to him, it would be necessary that he should understand clearly that, in return for it, he must really serve the Peshwah with zeal and fidelity.

‘The Dewan, who was present, observed, that in former times the sirdars of the Marhatta state afforded ample service in return for the benefits they enjoyed under the Peshwah’s government. But that since the government had lost its power the country had been in confusion, and had been

destroyed in various modes; and that a country which formerly supported any given number of troops, could not now support anything like that number.

‘ I said that nobody knew the state of the whole country, from the Taptee to the Toombuddra, better than I did, as I had been with armies in all parts of it, and that I was perfectly aware of the truth and justice of the Dewan’s observations; that, at all events, the Company’s governments were strong, and a few horsemen, more or less, could make no difference to them or to the Peshwah; that both powers were liberal, and did not desire to make a strict bargain for services, the value of which would depend upon the zeal and fidelity with which they should be rendered.

‘ Madhoo Rao Rastia then desired that I would give him a letter to you, which I have done; and one addressed to himself, in the nature of a cowl of protection to go to Poonah.

‘ Appah Saheb had gone to Jaumkoondy, on the Kistna, at about the time I quitted Poonah, and he missed me on the march. I have therefore determined, in conformity with the orders of the Governor General, to send Mr. Strachey to him, and, eventually, to the other serinjaumy sirdars in this part of the Marhatta empire; and I now enclose to you a copy of the instructions which I have given to Mr. Strachey for his guidance.

‘ You will observe, by the Governor General’s orders upon this subject, that his Excellency is desirous not to be obliged to have recourse to force to make this settlement; and I am of opinion that no time can be more favorable to effect it than the present. As far as I can judge from their professions, the southern chiefs are inclined to settle their affairs with the Peshwah’s government, on the principles proposed in my letter to Mr. Strachey; and the march of the troops to the southward for the relief will have the effect of accelerating the negotiations.

‘ It is also very obvious that the settlement cannot be delayed to a later period, without doing great injury to the Peshwah’s government. In fact, till it is effected, his Highness possesses no authority beyond the limits of Poonah; and instances have lately come to my knowledge of successful re-



sistance to the authority of the sirsoubah of the Carnatic, by the amildars of an open village. Were the British Government to interfere to support his Highness's authority any further than I have done on my passage through the country, viz., by advice of bringing the different parties to an agreement for their mutual benefit, an army ought to be collected which would at once establish the authority of the sirsoubah, and would keep the country and the Company's frontier in tranquillity till the government of the sirsoubah would come into operation.

‘But even before this measure can be recommended, it would be necessary to come to an understanding with the Peshwah, regarding the duration of the power of the sirsoubah, as, if he goes on in the old mode of appointing a new sirsoubah and new officers, before those previously appointed have got possession of the forts and the territories, as in the case of Hoobly mentioned in this letter, the work for the British troops will be endless. The only remedy for this state of affairs is to effect a settlement with the southern Chiefs; by which there will be an unity of authority in the empire, and some strength to carry the measures of government. I beg you to let Mr. Strachey know the result of your application to the Peshwah, for his consent that the British Government should settle his affairs with the southern Chiefs, and to correspond with him upon the points referred to in the 15th and 25th paragraphs of his instructions, and upon any other point to which you may think it proper to draw his attention.

‘You will observe that I have referred to the settlement with Madhoo Rao Rastia, in the enclosed letter to Mr. Strachey, and particularly to Rastia's camavisdary tenure of Baugracottah, Badamy, and Jellahall. It is probable that Rastia will negotiate his affairs with you; and, in that case, I beg leave to suggest to you the expediency of examining particularly the real state of the case of the debt said to be due by the Peshwah's government; to ascertain whether any real debt ever existed; its amount; whether the lands were granted to discharge it; and whether it ought to have been discharged by this time from the lands.

‘If you should find that Mr. Strachey undertakes the



negotiation of the settlement with the Rastia, I request you to communicate to him the result of your inquiries upon those points.

‘ At all events, supposing that Rastia should have no claim to hold the lands, founded upon a loan of money made to the Peshwah’s government, I deem it advisable that he should continue to hold them as camavisdar, on the condition stated in the last part of the 13th paragraph of the instructions to Mr. Strachey ; as Badamy is a place of some strength, which can be taken only by a regular siege, that will require a heavy equipment. It would also be desirable to procure for Mr. Strachey all the information that can be obtained regarding the debt alleged to be due by the state to the Putwurdun family.

‘ While I was between the rivers Kistna and Gutpurba, a person, by name Hybut Rao Guickwar, came to me on the part of the Rajah of Kolapoor, and I had a full conversation with him and Soubarrow Ghautky respecting the Rajah’s affairs. They earnestly urged me to enter into an examination of the Rajah’s claims upon the Peshwah and his sirdars ; and I told them that such an examination would be an useless waste of time, unless the Rajah should consent to leave the decision of the whole case to the British Government. I observed, at the same time, that whether the Rajah was right, or otherwise, the British Government would not allow him to disturb the public peace by attacking the Peshwah or his sirdars.

‘ At length they agreed to take to the Rajah a proposal to agree to the arbitration of the British Government, and I enclose a copy of the paper which I have given to Soubarrow Ghautky upon this subject. At all events, I told the vakeels that the Rajah must not invade the Peshwah’s territories ; and you will observe, in the instructions to Mr. Strachey, that I have desired him to forbid Appah Saheb to attack the Rajah.

‘ In the same conference with the Rajah’s vakeels, they earnestly urged me to settle a mode by which the blockade of the Rajah’s ports might be raised.

‘ After long discussion upon the subject, in which I insisted upon the payment of the money due to the Company and to the British merchants at Bombay, on account of

former piracies, as the only condition on which their request could be granted, I agreed to defer to enforce those claims to a future period, and that the ports should be opened on the conditions stated in the enclosed draft of a treaty. I also enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Duncan on this subject.

‘ The fact is, that the blockade of the Rajah’s ports by a Company’s cruiser has always been inconvenient and expensive; and in time of war it is attended by the risk of losing the cruiser, which is never of sufficient strength to fight an action with one of the enemy’s privateers. The capture of the cruiser stationed on the coast to prevent piracy would be a most disgraceful event, and would tend to the increase of the evil which the measure of stationing the cruiser upon the coast is intended to prevent: this treaty, therefore, appears to be a desirable mode of putting an end to piracy for the present; and if it should be broken by the Rajah, which appears not to be very easy, his breach of his engagement will afford ample ground for the Government to get rid effectually of an evil, the existence of which, in the present state of its power, is not creditable.

‘ If the Rajah should agree to the proposed mode of settling his political affairs, I propose to authorize Mr. Strachey to sign the treaty on the part of the Company, or to sign it myself, and refer it to the Governor General.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Sir William Clarke, Envoy at Goa.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Akowla, 11th July, 1804.

‘ I received this morning your private letter of the 6th, and this afternoon your dispatch of the 5th. It was unfortunate that these papers did not reach me at an earlier period, as I dispatched only yesterday, to the Rajah of Kolapoor, the vakeel who had been in my camp since April, 1803, with propositions to the Rajah which, if agreed to, will settle all questions in which he is concerned.

‘ Nothing can be more scandalous than the system of piracy which has long been carried on on the coast of Malabar; and I am convinced that the measure which I have proposed to the Rajah is an expedient which will answer the

purpose expected from it, only for a time. I indeed doubt much, whether the Rajah of Kolapoor or the Bhoonslah have the power, supposing them to have the inclination, to prevent piracy; and that object is, in my opinion, to be effected only by severe instantaneous punishments of pirates on their coasts, and in sight of their own people; and if it should still be persisted in, by sending strong armaments within all the creeks and rivers, with orders to destroy boats, vessels, the fortifications which protect them, and even the habitations of the pirates. In this manner the business would be done effectually, otherwise nothing less than the occupation of the whole coast by the Company's troops would answer the purpose.

‘ The Governor General is aware that the Rajah of Kolapoor has occupied Raree, and he knows the situation of that port in respect to Goa. I have reason to believe that his attention has been drawn to these circumstances before he wrote his instructions to you, of which you have sent me a copy. It is probable that, as he has not noticed them in that paper, and as he has expressed his desire and hope to remain at peace with the Rajah of Kolapoor, he was desirous to defer to notice this act of ambition on the part of the Rajah, till the season should be more favorable to military operations in this country, and till circumstances will allow of the notice given of the Rajah's conduct being attended by military dispositions and arrangements which will scarcely fail to procure the Rajah's respect for the Governor General's remonstrances, or will enable his Excellency to enforce obedience to his orders, if the Rajah should hesitate respecting the line of conduct which he should adopt.

‘ In the present state of the Company's power, the Rajah of Kolapoor cannot be considered a formidable enemy; but it may be observed of him, as well as of others, that he is formidable, or otherwise, in an inverse proportion to the arrangements made for bringing the Company's power into action. The contest with him would be long, and possibly some of its effects doubtful, if he were to be attacked by a small force; and very probably it would be but momentary, if the circumstances of the time should permit the government to bring to act upon the Rajah the disposable forces which must be in his neighbourhood.



‘ The considerations which most probably have had their weight with the Governor General would have induced me to decline adopting any measures in respect to the Rajah of Kolapoor at the present moment, even if the season were favorable, and I had not reason to believe that the Governor General had determined that he would not notice at present his conduct in the territories of the Bhoonslah.

‘ I have the honor to enclose you copies of two papers which I have sent to the Rajah by his vakeel, with a view to the settlement of his political and his maritime concerns.

‘ In respect to the first, I have intimated to the Rajah distinctly, that he would not be allowed to disturb the peace of the Deccan ; and that, at all events, he must not enforce his claims by arms : his conduct at Raree will come under the Governor General’s cognizance if he should sign this treaty.

‘ In respect to the second, I certainly wished to force the Rajah to pay for the piracies of which he had been already guilty ; but I am well convinced that he has not the means of paying one fifteenth part of the sum claimed by the Company, and the British merchants of Bombay.

‘ The question is, whether the mode proposed by the agreement will prevent piracy ? My opinion is, that after the soucar, who is to be security, shall have paid the value of one or two captures, he will declare that he can be security no longer ; and for this reason, I deem the measure only an expedient which will afford leisure to the government to consider of others which will be more permanent. Still, if the soucar should withdraw his security, it will be in the power of the government of Bombay to blockade his ports again ; and in the mean time, the inconvenience, the expense, and the risk of that measure, which after all is not effectual, will be avoided.

‘ If I had received your letter before I had dispatched the vakeel, I should have insisted upon payment for the vessels lately captured ; and I shall still write upon the subject to him, and to the Rajah.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that I have appointed Mr. Strachey to a mission to the Southern Marhatta Chiefs, in consequence of orders from the Governor General, the object of which is to settle their affairs with the Peshwah. I request you to communicate with Mr. Strachey, by Erroor.



‘ I have to mention to you, that Nepauneeur (mentioned in your letter to your servant) is Appah Dessaye, who served with the army in the last war. He is related to Ghautky.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sir William Clarke.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor of Bombay.*

‘ HONORABLE SIR, ‘ Camp at Mooty Bednore, 13th July, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose you English and Marhatta translations of a treaty which I have proposed to make with the Rajah of Kolapoor, with a view to enable you to raise the blockade of the Rajah’s ports on the coast of Malabar.

‘ I did every thing in my power to induce the Rajah to pay the money which he owes to the Company, and to the British merchants residing in Bombay, on account of former piracies; but I was not able to effect this object, because the Rajah has no means whatever of defraying the expense; but this treaty decides nothing upon these claims; on the contrary, I explained particularly to the Rajah’s vakeels, that the British Government delayed to enforce them only till the Rajah should be able to discharge the debts which were so justly due.

‘ I have requested that the Rajah should send you a copy of the treaty signed by himself, with this letter, and that he should at the same time propose, for your approbation, the person who is to be security for the payment of the value of any vessels which may be hereafter taken on the coast. If he should comply with these requests, and you should approve of the security which he may offer, I hope that you will raise the blockade of his ports.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Address of the Native Inhabitants of Seringapatam, presented to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding the Troops in Mysore, &c. &c., on his return from the Field.*

‘ Seringapatam, 16th July, 1804.

‘ We, the native inhabitants of Seringapatam, have reposed for five auspicious years under the shadow of your protection.

‘ We have felt, even during your absence, in the midst of battle and of victory, that your care for our prosperity had been extended to us in as ample a manner as if no other object had occupied your mind.

‘ We are preparing to perform, in our several castes, the duties of thanksgiving and of sacrifice to the preserving God, who has brought you back in safety, and we present ourselves in person to express our joy.

‘ As your labors have been crowned with victory, so may your repose be graced with honors. May you long continue personally to dispense to us that full stream of security and happiness, which we first received with wonder, and continue to enjoy with gratitude; and, when greater affairs shall call you from us, may the God of all castes and all nations deign to hear with favor our humble and constant prayers for your health, your glory, and your happiness.

‘ MEER HUSSAN FIAZEE.

‘ HUBBEEB ULLA.

‘ POOTOO BAUL SETTE.

‘ ROSHIN LALLA.

‘ In behalf of all the Inhabitants.’

*Answer of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Address of the Native Inhabitants of Seringapatam.*

‘ In every situation in which I have been employed, it has been my uniform wish and endeavor to conduct the public affairs intrusted to my management, according to the orders and intentions of the Government which I am serving, and under whose protection you are living.

‘ I have always been particularly interested in the welfare and prosperity of the inhabitants of Seringapatam, and have been anxious that they should enjoy the full benefit of the security which the laws and regulations by which the British Government is administered afford to every individual.

‘ The attention which I have given to your affairs, in every situation in which I have been placed, has been a part of my duty, and a necessary consequence of my desire that you should not cease to feel the benefit of the Company’s government; and it is very gratifying to my feelings to find that my conduct has been satisfactory to you.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 17th July, 1804.

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s orders of the 3rd June, relative to the chiefs in the southern part of the Marhatta empire. It did not reach me, however, until after I had had an interview with Baba Saheb, the son of Pursheram Bhow, at Tasgaum, and with Chintomeny Rao and Baba Saheb, his nephews, at Meritch.

‘ 2. I judge from what passed at these interviews and at one which I had with Madhoo Rao Rastia, and from the manner in which I have been received by all the chiefs throughout the southern part of the empire, that the present moment is favorable to undertake the proposed settlement of the Peshwah’s affairs with these chiefs; and I have, therefore, appointed Mr. Strachey, who had accompanied me from Poonah, to make it.

‘ 3. I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch to Colonel Close upon the subject, which contains all the information which I can give your Excellency, and a copy of my instructions to Mr. Strachey.

‘ 4. I have likewise the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Sir William Clarke.

‘ I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

*The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. —.*

‘ DEAR —,

‘ Seringapatam, 17th July, 1804.

‘ I have received your letter, in which, among other things, you reproach me with having withdrawn from you my confidence. A man must have been stout indeed in his confidence in any body who would continue to repose it, after having received such complaints as I have received against you.

‘ In respect to your money concerns, I do not wish to inquire into them, and I shall not notice them, excepting to observe, that a person trusted as you were ought to have refrained from such practices when you held a public trust.

‘ It is not the fact that you did Major —’s duty without receiving his salary. You received the allowance for the

duty you did, and your own allowance for the duty done by another person in the field.

‘ I shall close upon this subject by telling you, that it is useless to go into long proofs of matters entirely irrelevant to the charge brought against you. You have been accused, on oath, in a public trial, of having received, through your moonshee, 1200 rupees on corrupt grounds. The moonshee positively received the money. He must be prosecuted in the Phousdarry, and convicted of a breach of trust and duty, otherwise you must resign your office of —.

‘ I cannot go on with a man against whom there will be such a public imputation as there will be against you, if the moonshee should not be convicted of having taken and applied this money to his own use. I enclose answers to the memorandums sent.

‘ Yours, truly,

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ The letter for Colonel Hill shall go to-morrow : send the enclosed letters, marking, in Marhatta, upon each upon what subject it is.’

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 17th July, 1804\*.

‘ I have received your letters of the 6th and 8th, and I send an answer to Nana’s widow. Her pension must be

*\* Extract from the Governor General’s Minute on the Affairs of Mysore, Fort William, 5th October, 1804.*

‘ It now becomes necessary to consider, whether the expenses actually incurred by the Rajah of Mysore, in co-operating with the British power during the late war against the confederated Marhatta chieftains, equal the amount of the sum which the Rajah might be justly required to pay, under the provisions of the third article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore.

‘ With a view to the decision of this question, the Honorable Major General Wellesley \* passed through Seringapatam for the purpose of obtaining complete information with regard to the extent of the Rajah of Mysore’s resources, of the fixed disbursements of his government, and of the extraordinary expenses incurred by the Rajah of Mysore for the prosecution of the war.

‘ The result of Major General Wellesley’s inquiries at Seringapatam is distinctly stated in the annexed dispatch from that officer, under date 18th of July.

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\* On the 24th June, 1804, Major General Wellesley resigned the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor General on the 26th June, 1803, and proceeded, by Seringapatam and Madras, to Fort William, in conformity with the Governor General’s instructions.



paid by the Company, if the Peshwah should not pay it; but she must give up her lands to the Peshwah. You have done quite right about Amrut Rao, but warn him about plundering the Nizam's country.

‘ You will have received my letter of the 11th, about the affairs in the southern districts, in which every thing is detailed. I conclude that you will have sent Mr. Strachey copies of the papers in your public letter of the 8th.

‘ Goklah will certainly go to Poonah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 18th July, 1804.

‘ 1. On my journey from Poonah, in obedience to your Excellency's orders, I have passed by this place, in order

‘ The dispatch from Major General Wellesley, to which I have referred in this minute, contains a just and most honorable testimony of the zeal, judgment, and fidelity which regulated the exertions of the government of Mysore in co-operating with the British power, and of the degree in which those exertions contributed to the successful prosecution of the war. In my judgment, therefore, the government of Mysore must be considered to have afforded to the British Government and its allies in the late war, a degree of aid, greatly exceeding that which the British Government and its allies could have derived from a mere pecuniary contribution on the part of the Rajah of Mysore, equal in amount to the extra charges actually incurred by the Rajah of Mysore on the occasion of the late war.

‘ Under the operation of the treaties of Mysore and Seringapatam, in the course of five years, that country has acquired a degree of prosperity which could not possibly have been attained under any other system of political connexion, and has been enabled in some degree to repay, by the efficacy of its assistance in the hour of emergency, the benefits which it has derived from the protecting influence and power of the British Government.

‘ I discharge a satisfactory part of my duty in availing myself of this occasion to record the high sense which I entertain of the merits and services of the Dewan, Purneah. To the extraordinary abilities, eminent public zeal, integrity, judgment, and energy of that distinguished minister, must be ascribed, in a considerable degree, the success of the measures which I originally adopted for the settlement of Mysore, and the happy and prosperous condition of that flourishing country. The merits and services of the Dewan have been peculiarly conspicuous in the promptitude and wisdom manifested by him in the application of the resources of Mysore to the exigencies of the public service, during the late war with the confederated Marhatta chieftains; and I deem it to be an act of justice to acknowledge, that the expectations which I formed, in selecting Purneah for the important office of minister of Mysore, have been greatly exceeded by the benefits which have resulted from his excellent administration.’

that I might have a personal communication with the Dewan and the acting Resident, regarding the distribution of the cavalry belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, which have been serving under my command.

‘ 2. The total number of cavalry in the service of the Rajah is now 4000, of which 3000 have been with me ; the original number of 2000 having been reinforced at the commencement of the late war. The result of long discussions regarding the disposal of this body of troops has at last been, that their number shall be gradually reduced to 2000 ; and that one year shall elapse before those to be discharged shall be dismissed from the service.

‘ 3. As I had experienced the benefits to be derived from these troops in the service of the Rajah, I was desirous that some mode should be adopted of retaining the whole ; I found that the Rajah could not maintain a greater number than 2000, without breaking through the rules of economy, which have been laid down by the Dewan, with a view to enable the Rajah’s government to afford the assistance which the British Government may demand from the Rajah in time of war, under the third article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore, or without applying to the payment of the troops those funds which have hitherto been employed by the Dewan, in the construction and repair of tanks, water courses, roads, bridges, and other works, which will tend to the improvement and increase of the agriculture and resources of the country.

‘ 4. The number of 4000 horse will therefore be reduced to 2000 in the course of one year ; and this number is 500 more than the ordinary peace establishment of the Rajah’s government.

‘ 5. As your Excellency will probably be desirous to take into your consideration the situation of the Rajah’s government, and to ascertain how far that government has performed the stipulations of the third article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore, I proceed to give your Excellency an account of the ordinary resources and expenses of that government, and the extraordinary expenses it incurred during the war ; with such other information regarding it, as may be useful to enable your Excellency to review its situation. I have had a full communication upon the whole

of this subject with the Dewan and the acting Resident, and I write from authentic documents.

‘ 6. It appears the Rajah’s gross revenue is about twenty-four lacs of canterai pagodas. It has been raised to this sum by the superior management of the Dewan, by his attention to the repair of tanks and water courses, and the construction of roads and bridges ; by the encouragement which he has given to strangers to resort to and settle in Mysore ; and by his general endeavors to improve the agriculture of the country, and the situation of the people under the government of the Rajah.

‘ 7. The expenses for the repairs of tanks and water courses, and the construction of roads and bridges ; for the public buildings for the Rajah’s accommodation, and other public works ; the remissions for unfavorable seasons, and the military and civil expenses of the government, are liable to fluctuation. But the Dewan, at an early period of his administration, determined to provide means to enable the Rajah’s government to comply with any requisition which the British government might make for assistance in war, under the third article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore ; and he has saved annually a sum of money amounting to one lac of star pagodas. He has made this saving the criterion, by which he has endeavored to regulate his disbursements, and he has considered the sum resulting from that saving to constitute the fund for answering any eventual demand, under the third article of the treaty.

‘ 8. The peace establishment of Mysore, at the end of 1802, consisted of 1500 cavalry, 3000 regular infantry, in battalions, (to which number 1000 were added during the war,) 2500 peons in constant pay, at two canterai pagodas each, per month, (to which number 400 were added during the war,) and 12,000 Candachar peons, liable to do duty at their respective villages (to which number 1000 were added and called out during the war).

‘ 9. The Candachar peons constituted the ancient military force of the country ; and the necessity of providing against their becoming the instruments of commotion compelled the Dewan, in the first year of his government, to entertain so large a number as 20,000, which has been gradually reduced on better information and improved arrangement.

‘ 10. They receive a village pay of from two to three rupees per month, according to local circumstances, half in money, and half in lands; and three rupees and a half, in addition, when called out from their respective villages within the limits of Mysore; with batta when sent on foreign service.

11. The present establishment is fixed on the principle of having, at least, one individual of every family of the ancient military class in the pay of the state; and the family is permitted to relieve this individual according to its convenience. This arrangement appears well calculated to insure the allegiance of the whole; and in case of emergency, 20,000 men of this irregular description of force might be assembled at a few days’ notice.

‘ 12. As every Candachar peon is a cultivator, the Dewan is anxious to limit their services to local duty; which consists in being ready to obey the call of the officers of police, and take their tour of duty in the village fort to which they are attached.

‘ 13. The 2500 peons, kept in constant pay, do duty with the regular infantry in the more important forts and stations, or in the personal guard of the Rajah, the Dewan, or the principal officers of the government; they are select men, of respectable character, who have seen service, and are considered to be entirely trustworthy. They also are occasionally indulged with the privilege of relief, according to their domestic convenience.

‘ 14. The regular infantry are composed of the sepoys, who were formerly in the service of Tippoo Suldaun; they are paid at the same rates, and clothed and armed in the same manner as the Company’s native infantry; they are commanded by the sirdars of the state, and are a regular, orderly, and obedient body, and their discipline of a description to render them useful on service, in aid of the Company’s troops.

‘ 15. I have the honor to enclose a detailed account of the extraordinary expenses\* incurred by the government of Mysore, occasioned by the late war. This account, together

\* This account was afterwards corrected by Major Wilks, the acting Resident, and transmitted, together with his report.



with the preceding detail of the Rajah's resources, and his ordinary expenses, will enable your Excellency to form a judgment, whether the government of the Rajah of Mysore has complied with the stipulation of the third article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore.

‘ 16. Till the late treaties of peace shall have had their full effect, and the Marhatta empire shall have recovered its tranquillity, after the long and violent convulsions by which it has been disturbed, particularly until the Deccan shall have recovered in some degree from the effect of the existing famine, the Dewan proposes that the peace establishment of Mysore shall be 2000 horse, 4000 regular infantry in battalions, 2500 peons in constant pay, and 12,000 Can-dachar peons; being an increase, beyond the peace establishment of 1802, of 500 horse, and 1000 regular infantry.

‘ 17. Upon the occasion of bringing under your Excellency's review the state of the Mysore government, and of the expenses it incurred in the late war, I cannot avoid adverting to the material assistance it afforded upon that occasion. In consequence of the regularity of the system of government established by the Dewan, and the improvements of the country, its resources were so much increased as to enable him to provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the equipment of the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the subsistence of the army, on its march from the Carnatic to the frontier; for the supply of the magazines formed in Mysore, and of the department of the army, or for the large quantities of grain required by the cavalry and by the brinjarries, &c. All these supplies, which amounted to about 60,000 bullock loads of grain, principally rice, 60,000 head of sheep, &c., were furnished with a facility hitherto unknown in this part of India. The Dewan has since continued to forward supplies to the army under my command as fast as the brinjarries have been found to take them up; and, besides contributing to the subsistence of the corps\* under Major General Campbell, he has lately forwarded large quantities of grain into Canara, in order to enable the collectors in that province to export larger quantities for the supply of Bombay and Poonah.

\* The *corps de réserve* in the Doab of the Toombuddra and Kistna rivers.

‘ 18. Besides the troops employed with me, to whose services I have frequently drawn your Excellency’s notice, the Dewan had a respectable corps of troops on the Rajah’s frontier, from the time I marched from the Toombuddra till I returned, which he commanded in person as long as the war lasted ; and a detachment of those troops, under Khan Jehan Khan, distinguished themselves in the destruction of a band of freebooters, who had assembled in Savanore, and threatened Mysore.

‘ 19. I now take the liberty of congratulating your Excellency upon the success of all your measures respecting the government of Mysore, and upon the practical benefits which the British Government has derived from its establishments. I cannot avoid, at the same time, expressing an anxious hope, that the principles on which that government was established, and has been conducted and supported, will be strengthened and rendered permanent.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Hill.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 18th July, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that the killadar of Misse-rycottah has refused to deliver up his fort to the Peshwah’s government, notwithstanding that he has received the orders of his immediate employer, Ramchunder Pursheram, to deliver it up to the sirsoubah of the Carnatic, employed in the province of Savanore by his Highness the Peshwah.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter, addressed to the killadar of Misserycottah, in which I have called upon him, once more, to deliver up his fort to the Peshwah. You will be so kind as to send him this letter when you shall approach his fort ; and you will allow him half an hour to consider whether he will conform to the orders he has received or not. If he should not evacuate the fort within that space of time, you will attack him forthwith.

‘ If the killadar should evacuate the fort, he is to be allowed to depart in peace with his garrison ; and when the fort shall be in your possession, you will deliver it to Cashee Rao Ball Kischen, or to Ramchunder Tantea, or any other

person employed on the part of the sirsoubah to receive charge of it.

‘ Misserycottah is situated on the frontiers of Soonda, about twelve miles distant southerly from Hoobly. As well as I recollect, it is a mud fort, of some extent, but of no strength; and is commanded by the high grounds in the neighbourhood, and there is cover close to the gateway. It has now two hundred peons in it.

‘ I have directed the sirsoubah to prepare ladders for you to enable you to scale the walls. If you should be obliged to attack the place, I recommend that you should make several attacks, particularly one upon the gateway; that you should surround the place with your cavalry, to prevent the garrison from escaping; and that you should keep up a fire of cannon upon the place from all quarters.

‘ Hullihall in Soonda will be about thirty miles from you, in which place, in case they should be necessary, there are heavy guns.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Hill.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 27th July, 1804.

‘ Before the troops took the field in the late war, the Dewan of Mysore frequently represented to me the circumstances under which the Rajah’s government labored in respect to the mode of supplying straw for the Honorable Company’s bullocks in Mysore.

‘ Under the notion that a part of the straw of the country belonged to the sircar, and that it could not be used or disposed of, it was originally settled by the Resident, Lieut. Colonel Close, that the Company’s bullocks should have the straw which they might require for nothing.

‘ This notion was, however, erroneous; the fact is, that in Mysore, as well as in other countries, the straw belongs to the ryots, the government receiving the full revenue for the land in money, excepting in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and some others of the rice countries, in which the government receive the revenue in kind, and, of course, their share of the straw as well as of the other produce.

‘ At Seringapatam, however, and in these rice countries, as the demand for straw is constant, the price is high, and the whole produce would be sold ; and it is not reasonable that the Rajah should give that for the support of the Company’s bullocks for which he would receive a valuable consideration.

‘ On the other hand, in the dry grain countries, it is obvious that the notion under which the arrangement was made, by which the cattle have been supported hitherto, was erroneous ; and that the expense of their support falls upon the ryots, or, in cases in which they cannot afford the expense, upon the Rajah’s government.

‘ Notwithstanding this inconvenience, the Dewan, with the same desire to forward the service, which has uniformly marked his conduct, was willing to postpone the consideration of the claim of the Rajah’s government, that the straw should be paid for till the circumstances of the times should be such as to afford leisure for a consideration of the subject, and he pressed it upon my attention on my late visit to Seringapatam.

‘ There appears to me no doubt of the justice of the case : even if it were true that the straw belongs to the Rajah’s government, it ought not to be taken for nothing, unless it were certain that it could not be disposed of, and if not used by the public cattle, must rot. But as the straw belongs to the ryots, there can be no doubt upon the subject.

‘ I have the satisfaction to inform you, that in case the measure of paying for the straw should be adopted, the expense to the public will not be great. The price of straw in the Mysore is one rupee for four bullock loads ; which quantity will feed a bullock during forty-eight days.

‘ But as the bullocks are kept in Mysore in the neighbourhood of the hills, and the hill grass is cut for their consumption, they require straw but seldom, excepting when they are in the field.

‘ Accordingly I beg leave to recommend that authority may be given to the agent for public cattle to pay for the straw which he may require for the bullocks in the Mysore country, at the rate of one rupee for four bullock loads.

‘ The bullocks now coming from the territories of the



Peshwah will pass through a country which has been much exhausted by the march of convoys, in which the straw belongs to the ryots, and it is difficult to procure it.

‘ I have desired the public agent to give receipts for all the straw which he will receive on this march to Seringapatam; and I beg leave to recommend that, in consideration of the exhausted state of the country, authority may be given that the receipts may be taken up, valuing the straw at a rupee for three bullock loads.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Memorandum submitted to Lieut. General Stuart, regarding the relief of the Troops in Malabar, and settlement of Affairs in Wynaad.*

‘ The 80th regiment and two battalions of native infantry are to march into Malabar, to relieve the Bombay troops in that province; and it is proposed that they should march through Wynaad from Seringapatam for that purpose. It does not appear to be possible that this detachment should remain any time in Wynaad, as the troops must be eventually relieved upon the coast by part of those which will compose it, and the nature of the operations for this detachment becomes a question of some importance.

‘ There is reason to suppose that some of the inhabitants of Wynaad are disposed to submit to the authority of Government; and it is possible that they might come in when this detachment will appear in the district. But it is doubtful whether this partial submission will eventually tend to the complete establishment of the authority of Government in the district; as it may be expected that after the detachment shall have marched into Malabar, and there will be no longer in the district a sufficient body of troops effectually to protect the well disposed, they will suffer for their loyalty. On this ground, therefore, it is supposed to be advisable to defer taking any measures for the establishment of the authority of Government in Wynaad till a sufficient detachment can be spared to secure tranquillity, and effectually to protect those who may be well disposed.

‘ On the other hand, there is reason to expect that the knowledge that the troops have returned from the terri-

tories of the Marhattas, and that the garrison of Seringapatam is full, will have much effect in producing tranquillity in Wynaad; and it may be hoped, that when the detachment shall march into that district, such a general disposition to submit to the authority of Government will be found there, as will enable the body of troops allotted to the district to protect the well disposed.

‘At all events, it is desirable to march the detachment through Wynaad from Seringapatam. The Bombay troops in Wynaad must be relieved by coast troops; and it is probable that a detachment nearly of the strength of that which will march in, must effect the relief, and time will be saved by their entering from the eastward, instead of from Malabar.

‘As the troops will march from Wynaad, it is as well to endeavor to effect a settlement as they pass through. If it should succeed, it will save the necessity of forming another detachment; if it should not succeed, some inconvenience will be felt by individuals; but the difficulty of a settlement in future will not be increased; and upon the whole, I conceive that the chance of, and benefit to be derived from, success, are greater than the risk and evil to be apprehended from failure.

‘From the knowledge I have of the seasons in that part of India, I am of opinion that the troops ought not to enter Wynaad much before Christmas. Indeed, if the eastern rains should be late in Mysore, it would be advisable to defer the march of the detachment from Seringapatam till January.

‘Nothing can be done towards the settlement of the country without the presence of the collector; he ought to meet the detachment at Seringapatam with his cutchery, and to enter the district with it.

‘The detachment ought to be lightly equipped; two 6 pounder field pieces would probably be sufficient, but I recommend that four small mortars, which I had in Bullum, in 1802, may be sent with it. They may be of service, and are easily carried. I also recommend that a sufficient supply of provisions, to last the troops which will remain in Wynaad one year, with carriage for it, may be got in readiness at Seringapatam, and sent in with the detachment. By

taking this opportunity of throwing a supply into that district, the necessity of relieving the post in Wynaad before the opening of the next fair season will be avoided; and if the detachment should be pressed for provisions, they will have this stock to resort to.

‘The march of the troops from Seringapatam, is by Mysore to Ramkancotah, on the borders of Wynaad; the distance is sixty miles; from thence to Manuntwady, where the port is, twenty miles. The country is not very close from Ramkancotah to a river nine miles on the road to Manuntwady. For the last eleven miles, the country is more close; and there is a spot, about seven miles from Manuntwady, in which the road passes through paddy grounds, flanked on each side by thick jungle, where the troops, the 1st batt. of the 8th regiment, which were in the district in 1802, were always attacked. As far as I could learn, however, it was possible to avoid passing through this defile by going to the right.

‘At all events, if it should be possible, to communicate with the troops at Manuntwady, so that they might move towards the defile from their side, at the time the troops would march towards it from the eastward, the enemy would not remain in it.

‘Captain Heitland knows the country well, and if he should be sent in with the troops, will point out all the roads. After the troops shall have been in the country a short time, the collector will probably be able to judge whether he has any chance of effecting a settlement. If there should be none, the sooner the troops march into Malabar the better; as they will avoid consuming the provisions allotted for those to remain in Wynaad.

‘If there should be any hope of effecting a settlement, it would be desirable to detain in the district the 80th regiment, and the two coast battalions, for a short time; and the Bombay battalion, which will be relieved in Wynaad, and possibly that which the second coast battalion is intended to relieve in Malabar, and the Bombay European regiment might be sent away to Bombay.

‘In this case it would be necessary to throw into Wynaad further supplies of grain and provisions from Seringapatam, so as to secure the easy subsistence of the troops.

‘If the Collector should be able to make any settlement, I beg to recommend that he may be authorized to raise subundry troops. This measure will tend to re-establish tranquillity in two modes: first, it will increase his means of protecting the peaceable and well disposed inhabitants; and secondly, it will decrease the number of those who would otherwise certainly oppose the authority of Government.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘SIR,

‘Fort St. George, 1st August, 1804.

‘I have the honor to inform you, that when in the field during the late war, I had occasion to employ Soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan in a confidential manner, upon more than one occasion; but particularly on a mission to Jeswunt Rao Holkar: and although he did not reach the camp of that Chief, owing to the march of his army towards Ajmeer, the Soubahdar conducted himself with great propriety; and afterwards, by extraordinary skill and activity, rejoined me with his escort, having passed through the countries occupied by the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

‘Kawder Nawaz Khan lost the two surviving male relations he had, in the battle of Assye; viz., a brother and a son. His other relations had before fallen in the service; and he has been long distinguished for his good qualities as an officer, and has rendered essential services.

‘He is now worn out, and incapable of rendering any further services in his regiment; and I therefore take the liberty of recommending that he may be pensioned on the full pay of his rank, and that he may have an allowance for a palanquin. As he has been an example of zeal, activity, intelligence, and bravery in the army, I am anxious to recommend that he should be made an example of the generosity of Government, and of its desire to reward meritorious servants.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’



*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 2nd August, 1804. ]

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that if you should have no objection to the measure, I propose recommending to the Governor General, to give a gratuity of one month’s pay to the persons belonging to the public bullock department, who served with the troops under my command, during the late war. These persons marched from Seringapatam with the troops; they served throughout the war in a country in which grain, when cheapest, was in the proportion of twelve to one dearer than in Mysore; they always did their duty without grumbling; and I do not recollect an instance of desertion. They were necessarily present in the actions which were fought; some of them were killed, and others desperately wounded.

‘ Upon the occasion of laying before you my intention to recommend this description of the public servants of the army to the favor of his Excellency the Governor General, I cannot avoid drawing your notice to the benefits which have resulted from the establishment to which they belonged.

‘ It must be recollected, that in former wars, the utmost exertion which it was possible for the army to make, was to draw its train of artillery to Seringapatam. It was not possible and never was expected, that the guns and carriages which were drawn there, should be brought away again; and accordingly, notwithstanding the undoubted talents, and the great reputation of the officers, who have at different times led British armies to that place, it has invariably happened, that by far the greater part of the train and carriages have been left behind when the army marched away.

‘ Those who have seen the mode in which those armies made their marches, and were acquainted with the system under which cattle were, and must necessarily be, procured for the service, will not hesitate to allow, that the slowness of all our operations, and the necessity to which I have above alluded, of leaving our guns after they had been drawn about three hundred miles, were to be attributed entirely to the faults of the system under which the cattle were procured for the service.

‘ But although I am addressing myself to an officer whose experience reaches beyond the times to which I have alluded,

it is only necessary that I should advert, in proof of my assertion, to the circumstances of the late war. From a variety of causes, it was necessary, at the commencement of the war, to hire cattle to draw the train from Madras to the frontiers of Mysore ; and you will recollect the difficulties under which you labored ; and that in fact you could not have brought your carriages to the frontier without the assistance of the public cattle sent to join you ; and that if the circumstances of the times had required that the whole army should have advanced to Poonah, you would probably have thought it proper to have taken with you those carriages only for which you might have had a sufficient number of the public draught cattle.

‘ All the carriages attached to the division under my command, were drawn by the public cattle ; and I shall advert to a few facts, to point out the difference between this part of the equipment of the troops in the late and in former wars.

‘ We marched to Poonah from Seringapatam, the distance being nearly six hundred miles, in the worst season of the year, through a country which had been destroyed by Holkar’s army, with heavy guns, at the rate, upon an average, of thirteen and a half miles a day ; and if the twelve days on which we halted upon the Toombuddra for orders be included, we arrived at Poonah in two months from the time we marched. On this march we lost no draught cattle. I remained in the neighbourhood of Poonah, in a country which deserves the name of a desert, for six weeks ; and then marched again with the train, in the same state, as to numbers, as when it left Seringapatam, and the troops and cattle were in the field during the mousoon.

‘ It is needless to advert to the distance marched during the war, or to recapitulate the events, all of which must show the efficient state of the equipments ; but it has been frequently necessary for the troops to march for many days together, a distance from fifteen to twenty miles daily ; the heavy artillery always accompanied them, and I always found that the cattle could go as far as the troops. Upon one occasion, I found it necessary to march a detachment sixty miles in thirty hours, and the ordnance and provision carriages, drawn by the Company’s bullocks, accompanied this detachment.

‘ Instead of being obliged, as the Commanders in Chief of armies in former wars have been, to leave guns and carriages behind, such was the state of efficiency of this department throughout this severe service, that I was able, but with little assistance, to draw away the guns which the troops took.

‘ After all this service, in which so much country has been marched over, the number of cattle which have died is, I believe, really not greater than it would have been at the grazing ground; and the department is at this moment in a state of great efficiency.

‘ It would not be difficult to prove, that in point of actual expense, this establishment is cheaper to the public, than to hire cattle in the old mode; but the consideration respecting a public establishment of this description, is not referrible entirely to cheapness.

‘ It must be obvious to every man, that in a war, such as the late war, there could be no success, unless the officer commanding the troops was able to move, at all times, with the utmost celerity of which the troops were capable, and to continue his movements so long as was necessary. Rapid movements with guns and carriages cannot be made without good cattle, well driven, and well taken care of; and without adverting to what passed subsequently, it is more than probable, that if I had had the service of such cattle only, as served Lord Cornwallis and General Harris in former wars, I should never have reached Poonah, and that I should have been obliged to find my way back without the wheel carriages, in the best manner I could.

‘ I therefore take the liberty of recommending this establishment of cattle to your protection. It is founded upon the most efficient and most economical principles, and will never fail the army, so long as it is superintended and conducted, as it has been hitherto.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort William, 15th August, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter which has been sent to me by Mr. Mackenzie, with the desire that I should pre-

sent it to your Lordship: but it reached me after I had taken my leave of you.

‘ Your Lordship must be the best judge of the necessity of the reform proposed by Mr. Mackenzie. From the accounts which I received when in Mysore, I am induced to believe that the expenses attending the general inoculation of the natives with the cow pox, are greater than were expected; and that they are likely to increase in proportion to the success of the endeavors to propagate this mild disease.

‘ In case it should be your Lordship’s opinion that the reform proposed ought to be adopted, I beg leave to recommend Mr. Mackenzie to your favor. He has been strongly recommended to me by General Mackenzie of the 78th regiment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort William, 15th August, 1804.

‘ Your Lordship will have been made acquainted, by General Dowdeswell, with the misfortunes which Colonel Monson had met with on the frontiers of Malwa. It appears that the Colonel has made his retreat to Rampoorah; but I am not able to form a judgment whether his corps is in such a state of efficiency as to enable him to recommence his operations as soon as he shall be joined by the reinforcements which have been sent to him.

‘ However, the Governor General is convinced that nothing will put an end to this warfare, excepting active offensive operations, carried forward to the heart of the province of Malwa, if it should be necessary: and I judge from the Commander in Chief’s letters that he is of the same opinion; and accordingly arrangements are now in progress for collecting a force, and other means adequate to the object in view.

‘ Under these circumstances, I think that the Governor General has determined not to go up the country, being convinced that the Commander in Chief will not be able to meet him; that the troops must be diverted from active operations, in order to cover and secure his journey; and



that his presence in the northern provinces can answer no end, in proportion to the inconvenience which must result from drawing away from the military operations the attention and superintendence of the Commander in Chief, and from an alteration of the disposition of the troops. He has not yet announced this intention, but I consider it as certain.

‘ I apprized the Governor General of your desire to meet him, and he expressed the greatest anxiety to be able to accomplish that object, and to do any thing to assist your views in your government ; but however desirous he may be to have the pleasure of seeing you, he appeared to think that there were many reasons for which you should not, at present, quit Madras. He stated one reason in particular referrible to the Indian government at home, which had occurred to yourself when you had in contemplation a visit to Bengal, on your arrival in India.

‘ The Governor General tells me that he has written to you fully on all the points which you referred to his judgment.

‘ Colonel Murray has marched to Ougein. The Commander in Chief is much displeased with him, and attributes to his retreat Colonel Monson’s misfortunes.

‘ It appears by a return which I have received from the Adjutant General’s office at Bombay, that on the 1st of June, Colonel Murray had 5800 men present and fit for duty. This return excludes of course sick of all descriptions. How he could have lost 3000 men, in less than one month, remains to be accounted for.

‘ The Governor General had determined not to accept of the peshcush which I informed you that the Soubah of the Deccan had agreed to relinquish. Your Lordship will recollect that we thought it was desirable that he should not accept it ; although we thought it probable that the Governor General would not be able to refuse it.

‘ I write to you, by this post, a letter of recommendation for Mr. Mackenzie.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Dowdeswell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort William, 16th August, 1804.

‘ I return Colonel Clinton’s memorandum. I entirely agree with Colonel Clinton\* that an establishment of horse artillery, such as he proposes, would be highly useful to the army, and I concur in all the principles he has laid down. The artillery attached to regiments of cavalry is not an arm for general use ; and, as he observes on its present establishment, is likely to embarrass a regiment by providing for its security, or being liable to be lost. But still with these inconveniences it has given the British cavalry such a superiority over that of the natives, that I should part with it with much reluctance.

‘ The ordnance carriages of the army in general ought to be drawn by bullocks. They are the cattle commonly used in draught in the country, and if, by accident, they should be lost, they can be easily replaced. I have found them fully able to march as far, and with as much celerity, as infantry on march.

‘ The horses commonly used in India are not very hardy animals ; they lose their condition, when worked, as they must be, in drawing guns, unless more attention is paid to feed and take care of them, than can be expected in such a large establishment as must be formed, in order to draw all the guns and carriages of the army under the superintendence of one or even two European officers. My ideas, therefore, respecting an improvement in the mode of moving artillery in India, have never gone further than to have attached to the guns with the corps in line a sufficient number of horses to draw them upon extraordinary occasions, of forced marches, and of moving into action.

‘ The principles upon which I go are, that the bullocks are fully equal to the ordinary work, and that they are more hardy, and can be more easily replaced than the horses : but they are not so active, are more difficult to manage, and take up more space in a column than horses ; and therefore ought to be replaced by horses, upon occasions in which it would

\* The Adjutant General of the Forces in India, afterwards Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, G.C.B.

appear desirable to move the artillery with extraordinary celerity and accuracy, and not upon a beaten road.

‘ In respect to the details of my plan, I have considered them only in reference to the establishments of Fort St. George. They would possibly not answer in this part of India, and it would be useless to trouble you with them.

‘ Colonel Clinton’s plan is free from the objections which exists to drawing all the ordnance of the army by means of horses, and from those which exist to the formation of a large establishment for that purpose. He would have much European superintendence, and it is probable his horses would be taken care of and would preserve their condition. The horse artillery would also be an extraordinary arm in addition to the artillery usually with the corps in line; which would undoubtedly give the Commander in Chief great advantages in action.

‘ In respect to the details of the plan, I should recommend the employment of discharged troopers or sepoy as the drivers; for unless the common people of Hindustan have more spirit than those natives who have come under my observation, I should doubt whether many would be found to drive a gun into action.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Major General Dowdeswell.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort William, 22nd August, 1804.

‘ 1. I have the honor to enclose a copy of the order which I issued to the troops lately under my command, relative to the distribution of the property taken during the war, in conformity with the directions which I had received from your Excellency.

‘ 2. There are certain officers who have claims to the gratuity of a superior rank to that which they hold in the army, whose names I have the honor to lay before your Excellency in the enclosed paper.

‘ 3. The claims of the Deputy Adjutant General and Deputy Quarter Master General in Mysore, and belonging to the subsidiary force, to Major’s gratuity, are founded upon the fact, that officers in these situations received the gratuity of that rank, when a reward of this description was given to,

the army by Lord Cornwallis, and upon the fact that the regulated allowance to these officers is made up of Major's pay and batta.

‘ 4. The claim of the Staff Surgeons is of the same description, and Major Malcolm's claim is, that Sir John Kennaway received Lieut. Colonel's gratuity upon the same occasion.

‘ 5. The gratuity given by Lord Cornwallis affords no precedent, which can apply to the cases of Captain Beauman and Captain Burke commanding the artillery; of Captain Johnson, the chief engineer; and of Captain Heitland, of the pioneers; and these claims must therefore stand upon their own grounds. If these officers had been employed immediately under the Supreme Government, or under that of Bombay, the established regulations would have allowed them to draw the batta of Major, and they would have been entitled, under your Excellency's orders, to the gratuity of Major. But although I am desirous to forward the wishes of these officers, having had repeated occasions to report their good conduct and services to your Excellency, it is proper that I should apprise you, that under the established regulations of the government of Fort St. George, they draw only the batta of their regimental rank of Captain.

‘ 6. Captains Munt, Browne, and Dickson commanded corps, the Lieut. Colonels of which were in the command of brigades. If these officers had been employed immediately by the Supreme Government, or the government of Bombay, they would have been entitled to the batta, and, consequently, to the gratuity of Major; but, under the established regulations of the government of Fort St. George, an officer in command of a corps, a superior officer belonging to which is on the spot, although not exercising the command, is not entitled to the batta of a superior rank.

‘ 7. Your Excellency will observe, that I have ordered that Mr. Elphinstone might share prize money as a captain, and I beg leave to recommend that he may likewise have the gratuity of the same rank.

‘ 8. I have to request your Excellency's orders regarding the gratuity which I shall draw. As Commander in Chief, by your Excellency's appointment, of the army which served in the Deccan in the late war, I am entitled to one eighth of the property captured, and given by your Excellency to the



troops as prize, and I am desirous of knowing whether I shall draw gratuity upon the same principle.

‘ 9. I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter which I have addressed to General Stuart, on the subject of the bullock drivers of the gun bullocks, belonging to the Honorable Company; and as these people served with zeal and fidelity on very inferior pay, and under many disadvantages, and were present and exposed to the enemy’s fire, in all the actions in which the troops were engaged, I beg leave to recommend them to your Excellency’s favor, and that they may receive one month’s pay as gratuity.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Major Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Barrackpoor, 24th August, 1804.

‘ You may depend upon it that the Commander in Chief will not allow me to undertake the settlement of affairs in Malwa; indeed it would be improper to propose such an arrangement to him, and unreasonable to expect that he would propose it himself.

‘ It is now reported that Holkar is crossing the Chumbul; and if that report be well founded, the Commander in Chief will have a favorable opportunity of attacking him, and of bringing the war to a conclusion. If it is not soon brought to a conclusion, either in this manner or some other, it will be the most serious affair in which the British Government have ever been engaged, and one which will require the exertions of all of us. In such a case, I have no objection to go back to the Deccan: but otherwise I am very desirous to avoid the journey.

‘ I shall speak to the Governor General respecting the arrangements you propose for Close.

‘ I have read over with the greatest attention all Monson’s letters, and all the information which has arrived here respecting the late misfortunes; and I am decidedly of opinion that Monson advanced without reason, and retreated in the same manner; and that he had no intelligence of what was passing five miles from his camp.

‘ It is a curious circumstance that Monson and the Commander in Chief should attribute their misfortunes to Mur-

ray's retreat, and that Murray should attribute his retreat to a movement of the same kind, made by Monson. At all events both parties appear to have been afraid of Holkar, and both to have fled from him in different directions.

‘ I do not think that the Commander in Chief and I have carried on the war so well by our deputies as we did ourselves.

‘ There is no news. The countries to the northward are in great alarm; but it is to be hoped that the Governor General's luck will not leave him in this crisis: and that all will be settled before the late misfortunes can have any serious effect. Would to God that I had come round here in March, and Holkar would now have been in the tomb of all the Capulets!

‘ Ever yours,

‘ *Major Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Do not communicate my sentiments on this subject to any of your news (or, in other words, private letter) writers. You will have your gratuity. I shall be able to arrange the Mysore affairs as we wished they should be; and to settle all matters respecting your Residency, their expenses, &c. &c., on a proper and permanent footing.’

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort William, 29th August, 1804.

‘ The Governor General has desired me to inform your Lordship that it is his intention to send orders to Fort St. George, as soon as they can be prepared, to authorize you to add five regiments to that establishment. His Excellency, however, is desirous that no measures should be taken in consequence of this intimation of his intention till you shall hear further from him.

‘ He intends that the troops of the government of Fort St. George should occupy the territories and posts as detailed in his notes of instructions dated the 25th May, excepting Goa, which place he intends to occupy by Bombay troops. According to this arrangement, Scindiah's subsidiary force will be permanently formed of Bengal troops.

‘ This addition to the establishment of Fort St. George will probably appear large; but it is not so large within four battalions as that required by General Stuart; and the es-

tablishment will not be larger than that which existed in the end of the year 1802.

‘ After a full review of the military establishments since the year 1796, when they were first formed upon the model on which the army stands at the present moment, it appears clearly that all the additions which have been made to the armies of Fort St. George and Bombay, including this addition of five regiments, have been paid for by subsidies, or by revenues granted for the express purpose of supporting troops. I enclose a copy of a memorandum which I have given to the Governor General upon this subject, which will explain fully my sentiments upon it.

‘ It is difficult to say upon what principle the establishment of 1796 was formed. However, it was certainly not sufficient for any purpose, even in the limited state of our territories under Fort St. George at that time ; as besides the regular regiments, there were four extra battalions, which have since been formed into the 12th and 13th regiments, and there was a Madras battalion and several corps of sebundies in the northern circars.

‘ Even thus increased it was certainly not an establishment adequate to give protection against a foreign enemy, and to maintain internal tranquillity at the same time ; as in the first place, it is a well known fact that it was with the utmost difficulty that an army was assembled in 1798 and 1799 that could go to Seringapatam ; and in the second place, when that army was drawn together and marched into Mysore, a rebellion broke out in the provinces south of the Coleroon, and another in those north of the Kistna.

‘ The reduction of our great native enemy, therefore, which was the result of that war, could not be urged as a reason for the diminution of the military establishments to be stationed in the old territories, when it appeared that the moment the troops marched out of those territories the inhabitants were in rebellion. I therefore conclude that the establishment of 1796 was adequate only to the preservation of internal tranquillity in the Carnatic ; and that when additions of territory were made, additional troops were required.

‘ But supposing the establishment of 1796 to have been an adequate peace establishment, which circumstances have

proved it was not, I think the facts stated in the enclosed memorandum show that all the corps raised since (including the five new regiments) have been paid for by the means provided.

‘ If the new levies had not been made, the Company’s old territories would have been lost, or the Company must have failed to perform their part of the treaties, by which they have gained such large subsidies.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 29th Aug. 1804.

‘ The Governor General has desired me to inform you that he proposes to authorize the government of Fort St. George to add five regiments to that establishment, as soon as the orders can be prepared for that purpose; but he is desirous that no measures should be adopted to carry these orders into execution till they shall be received. I have written likewise to Lord William upon this subject.

‘ Of all the difficult negotiations in which I have ever been concerned, this has been the most difficult; and, after all, I fear that the orders which will be sent to Fort St. George will contain only an authority to increase the establishment to the number of five regiments, if the measure should be thought necessary. In that case you will have a contest of a disagreeable nature in the council; of the probability of which I have apprized the Governor General; and I still hope that I shall be able to prevail upon him to make the order positive. The orders will, at the same time, authorize the four extra battalions still wanting to complete the establishment which you will require.

‘ The Governor General intends that the Bombay troops shall still occupy Goa. His reason for this arrangement is that, in fact, the Bombay army could not afford to supply Scindiah’s subsidiary force, and at the same time allot a sufficient force for the garrison of Bombay. It would therefore have been necessary to add to it, to carry the orders of the 25th May into execution, and it appeared to me, upon the



whole, that that army was the least able to bear an increase ; from the great want of officers and men to complete the army which they have at present. I was also at all times of opinion that it would be most convenient to supply Scindiah's subsidiary force from Bengal. Under this new arrangement the Bombay army had two battalions more than were required, and as the Governor General was determined not to allow of an increase of more than five regiments, it was best to arrange that Goa should be placed under the government of Bombay.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a memorandum which I have given to the Governor General, which will show you the topics upon which our discussions on this subject have turned. I have besides proved to him, in the clearest manner, from the events which occurred in the old territories under Fort St. George, when the army took the field in 1798-99, that the military establishment of 1796 was never adequate to give protection against a foreign enemy, and to preserve internal tranquillity ; and therefore that when additions were made to the territory, and a fresh subsidy was paid by the Rajah of Mysore, additional troops were necessary to support the civil government in the new territories, and to defend and support the government in Mysore, and that if the new levies had not been made, the Company must have lost their old territories or their new, or must have broken their treaty with the Rajah.

‘ Affairs are standing still in the northern provinces. General Lake is at Cawnpore, and Colonel Monson at Rampoora, where he has been joined by the reinforcements. Holkar had not moved towards him. This campaign has been terribly unfortunate, but I hope that the plan which the Governor General has lately recommended to the consideration of General Lake will prove successful.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Fort William, 4th Sept. 1804.

‘ I have received your letters as far as the 3rd of August. I attached to Mr. Strachey a party of Mysore horse, and could

have attached an engineer to him, if I had received your letter in time, but it did not reach me till many days after I had arrived here.

‘ Affairs in Malwa have gone on very badly indeed, and a great effort is necessary to regain our character, and to place matters on the footing on which they should be. This effort will shortly be made, according to a plan contained in a letter which I wrote to the Commander in Chief dated the 23rd of April, a copy of which you have got.

‘ Since my arrival here, a detailed memorandum of that plan has been made out, of which General Lake approves, and he takes the field with his army in order to carry it into execution, and to prosecute the war seriously.

‘ I wish that it had been in my power to go into Guzerat when I first heard of Murray’s retreat, or that I could now get there in time to co-operate personally in the plan which is to be carried into execution; however, I hope to be permitted to leave Calcutta soon, and I shall be prepared to join either Colonel Murray or Colonel Wallace, according to circumstances. The report that I have this intention may have a tendency to revive confidence, and I think you will do well to announce it to the Peshwah’s durbar. I wish you also to write to Webbe and to Mr. Duncan, and announce to them the probability that I shall be able to come round, with the same view of inspiring confidence at Scindiah’s durbar and at Bombay.

‘ If I can procure it I will send you a copy of the memorandum which was sent to the Commander in Chief; the object of the operations will be to close Holkar in between a certain number of British corps stationed on the frontiers of Bundelcund, Hindustan, and in Malwa, and to hunt him with the Commander in Chief’s army.

‘ The Commander in Chief cannot carry the whole plan into execution, as he will not have a corps at Ougein, and another (Murray’s) on the frontiers of Guzerat. It is more probable, therefore, that the result of the operations will be that Holkar will bring some troops across the Nerbudda and Taptee, and that he may enter the Deccan. However, the body which he could bring will not be of any very great strength, as it is certain that he would lose his infantry and guns; and it is not very probable that the Rohillas, and

other northern nations composing his cavalry, will follow him a second time into the Deccan.

‘ It will be necessary, however, that Wallace should be prepared to take up the hunt, so soon as it shall come within his reach, and that he should follow Holkar with the greatest celerity. If Holkar should determine to come out of Malwa into the Deccan, he will come, most probably, by the Scindwah ghaut; he may come down by Burhampoor, or he may go farther to the eastward, pass the Nerbudda, about Hoosingabad, and enter the Deccan by the Gawile Hills and into Berar. It is not very probable that he will come by either of the last two mentioned routes without allowing time for Colonel Wallace to have notice of his intention, and to take measures to stop, or to have a fair start at him, if he should come through.

‘ I should therefore recommend, after the siege of Chandore and any other operations of that kind that may be necessary are concluded, that Colonel Wallace should take up a position for his camp nearly central in Candeish, from which he will be able to communicate with celerity with Webbe, and gain an early knowledge of Holkar’s movements and intentions towards the Deccan.

‘ By this proposed position in Candeish, Colonel Wallace will still be enabled to give countenance and protection to the Peshwah’s officers and servants, in taking and keeping possession of Holkar’s territories in that province.

‘ If Holkar should cross the Nerbudda to the southward he will certainly come into Berar, possibly, in the first instance, into those territories still belonging to the Rajah of Berar. If he should cross the Nerbudda, as here supposed, Colonel Wallace ought to move along the valley of the Poorna into Berar, and be prepared to follow Holkar even into the Rajah’s territories.

‘ Whenever the Colonel comes to operate upon Holkar, the mode of doing so is to keep up the pursuit: if possible, not to allow him to make a halt, and to run him as hard as may be practicable, consistently with the objects of marching on every day, and keeping the cattle in condition.

‘ I will take care that orders shall be sent to Murray, or whoever may command the corps which will be near Ougein, to communicate constantly with Colonel Wallace, to hurry

Holkar through the countries between the Nerbudda and the Taptee, and after he shall have passed the Nerbudda, and particularly if he should go by the eastern route, to seize Scindwah and all the other places belonging to Holkar situated in those countries, and to hand them over to Scindiah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I enclose the memorandum \* and the Commander in Chief’s answer, noted in the margin. Be so kind as to send a copy of these papers to Webbe.’

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fort William, 6th Sept. 1804.

‘ Accounts have been received this day from the Commander in Chief, from which it appears that Holkar, with his whole army, had drawn near to Colonel Monson, at Rampoor; and that he was encamped, on the 20th of August, at Merwah, about six coss from Rampoor.

‘ Colonel Monson had been joined by reinforcements of cavalry and infantry; of the latter of which he had seven battalions. He retired, however, on the evening of the 21st, towards Kooshalghur, where he expects to join Scindiah’s infantry and the Jeypoor army.

‘ I judge, from the private letters, that the Commander in Chief is not very well satisfied with this movement; indeed he complains of it. But he desired Colonel Monson, in a letter written on the 13th of August, to fall back towards Jeypoor, if he should find it difficult to procure provisions near Rampoor.

‘ Colonel Monson was not then pressed by Holkar, and it is probable that the Commander in Chief did not intend that the order should be obeyed, if Holkar should approach him; as, in all the letters written lately to the Governor General, he expresses an anxious hope that Holkar will approach Monson, and a certainty of a successful action, if he should do so.

\* This memorandum to the Commander in Chief was by the Governor General.



‘ I think it probable that the Commander in Chief will be at Agra in a day or two from this time.

‘ This fresh retrograde movement of Monson is much to be regretted. He has already caused the desertion of a part of Frith’s corps of cavalry, irregulars; and it is to be feared that the same spirit may reach the regular infantry. These retreats must also discourage our allies. On the other hand, it is to be hoped that they will encourage Holkar to stand a general action, for which the Commander in Chief has prepared, by ordering into the field the 76th regiment, and five battalions, besides Monson’s corps, and eight regiments of cavalry, of which three are of dragoons.

‘ I have no other news for your Lordship. I hope to be able to leave this place soon.

‘ A garrison has been left in Rampoor. I hope that Colonel Murray will now see no necessity for retiring again, as Holkar has gone so far to the northward.

‘ I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will communicate to General Stuart the circumstances which I have above related.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Wilks.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort William, 9th Sept., 1804.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter that I have written to the Commander in Chief, which will apprize you of the situation of affairs to the northward, and which may render it probably necessary for me and the Mysore horse again to take the field. I shall be obliged to you if you will make Purneah acquainted with this possible necessity, and request him to make arrangements to enable the Mysore horse to take the field at a short notice.

‘ Your letter of the 19th August reached me this morning.

‘ I am decidedly of opinion that we ought to be very cautious in our interference with the servants of the Rajah’s government; and I have always proceeded upon that principle. In the case of Govind Rao, in particular, I requested Purneah to fix upon the person who should be sent to the southern Chiefs, and the allowance which should be given to

the person upon whom he should fix. Accordingly, this allowance has been paid from that time by Purneah.

‘ I think, however, that it is not inconsistent with the principle not to interfere with the Rajah’s servants, to give rewards to those of them who may serve the Company usefully and with fidelity ; particularly if care be taken, as it will be in these instances, to bring forward the government of Mysore as much as possible ; and to provide that the rewards given shall go through the hands of the Rajah’s government, and shall be dependent upon the continuance of the faithful services of the receiver, and in a great measure upon the pleasure of the Dewan.

‘ Purneah, like other men, has his faults. He is particularly jealous of the intercourse between the servants of his government and the European gentlemen, and of the favors which the former may receive from the Company. This jealousy arises principally from ignorance of the European character, and partly from being insensible of the strong impressions in his own favor, which his conduct, his character, and his abilities have made upon all the persons who have at present any power in India. But I am of opinion that we should not act as we ought, if we were to allow that jealousy to prevent us from giving those rewards which are justly due, and which policy urges us to give as strongly as justice and gratitude.

‘ The persons who are the objects of these rewards are aware that I have recommended that they should receive them. By accident, Webbe employed Govind Rao to write the letter to Purneah, in March last, in which I apprized Purneah that I had recommended Bistnapah and Govind Rao to the Governor General for marks of the Company’s favor. I informed Govind Rao, when I sent him with Mr. Strachey, that he and Bistnapah would receive a reward for their services, and that the Governor General only delayed ordering them to be given till he should make certain other arrangements. The consequence, therefore, of now withholding the rewards would be, that these persons would believe that Government were insensible of their services, and that I had deceived them ; besides that, we should thus be guilty of an act of gross injustice and ingratitude.

Under all these circumstances I must therefore decline to attend to Purneah's wishes.

' You may explain all this to him, and tell him that, in fact, the business had gone so far, before I received his letter, that I was apprehensive, if I should urge the Governor General not to give these rewards, he would suspect Purneah of being insensible of the merits and services of the persons in question towards the Company, or that Purneah was himself jealous of their services.

' The Governor General is well satisfied with the services rendered by the Rajah in the war. He thought it best that I should write him a public letter to the same purport as yours to me, upon the subject of the Rajah's resources and expenses, in order to save time and enable him to review the Rajah's situation before I should leave Calcutta. I expect this will be done immediately. At all events, I shall urge it forward, and will bring back with me the settlement of this affair.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Captain Wilks.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL, ' Fort William, 9th Sept., 1804.

' I have just received your letter of the 16th of August. You will have known that I agree in the opinion which you have therein given respecting the Bombay troops. I had already prevailed upon the Governor General to keep Colonel Wallace in the command of the Poonah subsidiary force, and Agnew as his staff.

' I shall now arrange the other points to which you have drawn my attention.

' You will have heard of Monson's reverses : I tremble for the political consequences of these events ; and I have, therefore, written this day to Fort St. George to urge the General to prepare a regiment of dragoons and one of native cavalry to go forward with me, and the Mysore horse.

' I shall leave this for Madras, I hope, in a few days, and I purpose not to allow the grass to grow under my feet.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Colonel Close.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 9th Sept., 1804.

‘ I informed Lord William Bentinck on the 6th, that Colonel Monson had retired from Rampoorra on the 21st of August, towards Kooshalghur. His progress was impeded by a river which had swelled, and Holkar came up with him with his army on the 24th. An action was fought between the two armies on that evening, in which some loss was sustained by Colonel Monson. We know that four officers were killed, and Colonel Monson slightly wounded.

‘ After the action, Colonel Monson continued his march; but I cannot say whether on the night of the 24th, or on the morning of the 25th. It appears by the account, however, that Holkar’s cavalry had followed him, but had not been able to make any impression upon him; and Colonel Monson was at Kooshalghur on the 26th, intending to continue his march towards Agra. A detachment, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, and four battalions of sepoy, had marched from Agra to support him; and the Commander in Chief, with the army, left Cawnpore on the 31st of August, or on the 1st of this month.

‘ From the accounts which have been received, I judge that Holkar attacked Colonel Monson with his infantry, and his powerful artillery, on the 24th; and if this should be the case, and that the Colonel has effected his retreat in safety, in front of his cavalry, it is an event very honorable to the troops, although possibly it may be disastrous in its consequences in other respects.

‘ The succession of reverses in this contest with Holkar, although in reality none of them are of any consequence, and although it is probable that they may all be attributed to the mistakes of the persons charged with the conduct of the service, may have very unpleasant effects upon our general political situation.

‘ I have just had another conference with the Governor General on the subject of the increase of the army of Fort St. George, the result of which is, that I have hopes that he will send orders this day for the augmentation, for which I before apprized you that he would dispatch an authority.

‘ The Governor General, however, appears to be of



opinion, that preparations ought to be made to provide against the worst consequences of the late reverses, and that we should be strong again in the Deccan; he has expressed a desire that I should return there, and in the mean time, that I should suggest to you the measures which, in case of the recurrence of the worst, would be desirable.

‘In my opinion, all that can be necessary, will be to send forward cavalry: viz., a regiment of dragoons, a regiment of native cavalry, and the Mysore horse; and a battalion of infantry to accompany them till they shall be in reach of the corps at Poonah; which battalion might then return to its station. All that is necessary at present, is to order that the corps which you would propose to send should be in readiness.

‘I shall write to Captain Wilks respecting the Mysore horse. While writing upon this subject, I take the liberty of suggesting to you, that it may possibly be most convenient, in every respect, to send forward the corps of cavalry now in the ceded districts.

‘I shall keep you informed of events as they come to my knowledge. In the mean time, I propose to return to Madras as soon as a ship shall be ready to take me.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘SIR,

‘Fort William, 11th September, 1804.

‘Since I wrote to you on the 9th, further accounts have been received from Agra; but they are still very imperfect, as far as they relate to the operations of Colonel Monson’s corps, since the 21st of August.

‘The attack of the 24th was occasioned by Colonel Monson’s detention at the Banas river; and the operations of the enemy appear to have been directed against the piquets which were his rear guard on the southern bank of the river; and the 2nd batt. 2nd regiment, which had been sent to the support of the piquets. These corps had at one time possession of Holkar’s guns, but were overpowered by superior numbers, and suffered in their retreat across the Banas. The detachment marched on the night of the 24th, and reached Kooshalghur on the night of the 25th, the

distance about forty miles. They halted there on the 26th, and marched again at night. They halted on the 27th again, and either on that day, or the following night, were attacked again, and suffered some loss.

‘ There are various reports respecting the amount of their loss, to which I do not give credit; as on the 30th, the officer commanding at Agra wrote that the corps of Colonel Monson’s detachment were arrived there. Officers had come into Agra on the 29th, who reported that the detachment had been entirely destroyed on the 27th; but it was obvious that they were none of them in the action on that day; and it is certain that the corps came into Agra on the 30th. What the nature of the action of the 27th was, and what the loss, I cannot say.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,                      ‘ Fort William, 12th September, 1804.

‘ Some time has elapsed since I have written to you, but you will readily believe that I have had much to do; and I had nothing to say to you which could interest you.

‘ I have spoken to the Governor General regarding your situation when the Coast troops shall be relieved at Poonah; and he has determined that you shall continue to command the subsidiary force, and Agnew to retain his situation of Deputy Adjutant General.

‘ I have not yet had an opportunity of speaking to him regarding the other officers belonging to the Coast army, attached to the staff of the subsidiary force, but I will do so; and I have no doubt but that I shall be able to arrange that to their satisfaction. At all events, if I should not be able to fix them with you, I shall have no difficulty in providing for them elsewhere.

‘ I do not wish you to talk upon this subject; but if you should hear of any anxiety respecting their staff situations when the relief shall take place, I authorize and request you to say that you know I am not inattentive to their views.

‘ You will have heard reports of poor Monson’s reverses, but as I am on the spot, you will be glad to hear the truth from me; and as they give some important military lessons

to us all, I do not regard the trouble of writing them to you.

‘ When it became necessary to attack Holkar, Monson was detached from the grand army with three battalions and their guns, and a body of cavalry, under Lieut. Lucan. Holkar, who was then near Ajmeer, with an army composed only of horse (and as General Lake was at no great distance from Monson), retreated towards Malwa.

‘ After quitting the river Jumna, and passing through the flat countries depending on Agra, the first country going to the southward is a mountainous tract called Jeypoor, governed by the Rajah of that name, who had been tributary to Scindiah and Holkar previous to the late war, and who had been relieved from his tribute by the operation of the treaty of peace. Joining to the territories of Jeypoor is that of the Rajah of Boondy, of the same description; and joining to Boondy is the territory of the Rajah of Kota.

‘ These two last Rajahs had been, and are still, tributary to Scindiah; and Holkar has claims upon them which they hoped to get rid of by the British assistance, in consequence of their conduct in the war; at all events, they were desirous to obtain for a time the British protection against the demands of Holkar.

‘ Between Boondy and Jeypoor is a small territory and fort called Rampoor, which, at the commencement of the war, belonged to Holkar. This territory had formerly been part of the Jeypoor territory, and had been seized by the Holkar family in some of their former contests with the Rajah of Jeypoor.

‘ The whole of this country between Agra and the province of Malwa, which joins to the Kota territory, and which is entered through a pass called the Muckundra ghaut, is intersected by rivers and nullahs, which are either full throughout the western rains, or are filled at times by those rains, and become impassable for troops. Of these, the principal is the river Chumbul, which runs between Kota and Boondy, and the river Banas, which runs between Rampoor and Agra.

‘ When Holkar fled in front of the army of the Commander in Chief, Colonel Monson followed him successively to Boondy and Kota, the Rajahs of which countries were

very desirous to have the protection of the British troops against his exactions, and promised supplies and every thing which Colonel Monson could want.

‘ At the same time that Colonel Monson advanced, a detachment under Colonel Don, consisting of two battalions, was sent to take Rampoorra, of which place it got possession by storm, and this detachment afterwards joined and reinforced Monson’s corps, which then consisted of five battalions.

‘ In the month of June, the Commander in Chief withdrew his army into cantonments, leaving Monson’s corps in the Kota country. Monson, towards the end of that month, passed through the Muckundra ghaut into Malwa, accompanied by the troops of the Rajah of Kota, and some of Scindiah’s, under Bappojee Scindiah, and attacked, and took by storm, the hill fort of Hinglisghur ; and after this operation, he took up a position in Malwa, recommended to him by the Rajah of Kota, at some distance from the Muckundra ghaut, in which the Rajah told him he was likely to get supplies, and from which Monson expected to be able to communicate with Colonel Murray, at that time on his march from Guzerat towards Ougein.

‘ After his retreat in front of the Commander in Chief, Holkar had first threatened Ougein, and afterwards had gone to Mundissoor, a town belonging to Scindiah, situated to the north west of Ougein, and on the left of the Chumbul. Between the middle and latter end of June, he took and plundered this town ; and at that time the river Chumbul was between him and Colonel Monson, who was encamped about five coss from the river, on the right bank.

‘ Towards the beginning of July, Holkar passed the Chumbul with his army. Colonel Monson learnt that he was doing so, and intended to attack him. He moved towards the place at which he heard Holkar was, and found that the whole army had crossed the river ; nearly about the same time, he understood that Colonel Murray, who had made two marches towards Ougein from Guzerat, had recrossed the Myhie ; and upon the whole, Monson, having only two days’ provisions, thought it best to retreat.

‘ Accordingly, he sent off his baggage early on the following morning, the 8th of July (I believe), towards the Muckundra ghaut ; and he followed with the infantry at about



nine in the morning, meaning to reach Muckundra that night, the distance about seventeen miles. He left Lucan, with his irregular horse and Bappojee Scindiah's horse, to cover his rear, and to follow as his rear guard.

‘ After Monson had marched a few miles, he heard that Holkar had attacked, with his cavalry, his rear guard of irregular horse ; and shortly afterwards, he received intelligence that the rear guard was destroyed, and Lucan taken prisoner. He arrived at Muckundra unmolested, and took up a position that covered the ghaut ; but which, like all others that I have seen, had many passages practicable for cavalry.

‘ On the next day, or the next but one, Monson was attacked by the whole of Holkar's cavalry, in three separate bodies, who, however, could make no impression upon him ; and they were beat off. Towards evening he heard that the infantry was arrived at a camp within two or three coss of the Muckundra ghaut, with their guns, 175 in number ; and he determined to retreat again. He accordingly marched to Kota, the Rajah of which place urged him to stay there, but could not supply him with provisions, and then Monson marched on the following day, and crossed the Chumbul in boats, provided by the Rajah, which he sunk after he had crossed.

‘ The rain began about the 10th of July, and became incessant, and rendered Monson's marches much more difficult than they would otherwise have been ; particularly in that country, which is a black cotton ground. At last, after he had crossed the Chumbul, he was obliged to spike his guns and leave them behind, and he continued his march, getting but little provision on the road until he reached Rampoor. He was followed, but not much harassed, by a body of Holkar's horse, which overtook him at a nullah, which being full, stopped him. He twice beat up the camp of this body of horse, and then I believe they quitted him.

‘ On his arrival at Rampoor, Monson was joined by two battalions with their guns, and a body of Hindustany horse, under Major Frith, which had been sent from Agra to reinforce him, and he immediately began to collect provisions at Rampoor.

‘ The rains, which had been so distressing to Monson;

likewise impeded Holkar, some of whose guns remained to the southward of the Muckundra ghaut. His progress to the northward was likewise impeded by Monson having destroyed the Rajah of Kota's boats on the Chumbul. However, at last he advanced, and towards the 20th of August, again approached Monson at Rampoor.

‘ By this time, Monson had collected only about twelve days' provisions, and the Commander in Chief foreseeing the difficulty in which he might again be involved, desired him on the 20th of August to retire towards Jeypoor, if he should think it probable that he might be distressed for provisions.

‘ Monson, however, remained till Holkar approached him within six coss with his whole army, and on the 21st of August, in the evening, commenced his retreat towards Agra, by Kooshalgur, leaving Jeypoor on his left hand. He left fifteen companies as a garrison in Rampoor. He arrived at Banas river on the 23rd, and found that it was full: on the 24th in the morning, it fell, and became fordable, and he passed over his baggage and a battalion; and between twelve and three o'clock, he passed over three more battalions, leaving the piquets and one battalion to support them on the southern bank.

‘ Holkar's troops had appeared in the morning, and were seen crossing at different fords on the right and left flank; and towards evening, Holkar's infantry and guns appeared in front. They attacked the piquets, but were repulsed; and the piquets and battalion took eight guns; but afterwards our troops were overpowered by superior numbers, and were obliged to retreat across the river to the main body, in which operation they lost many men, being attacked on their rear, and also by the horse, who had crossed the river and moved up its bed.

‘ Monson retreated from Banas river on the night of the 24th, leaving his baggage, and arrived at Kooshalgur, about forty miles distant, on the night of the 25th. He was followed throughout the march by Holkar's horse, who, however, were not able to make any impression upon him. He halted on the night of the 25th and the 26th, at Kooshalgur, and on the 26th at night marched towards Agra. Something happened on the 27th, of which I have not received

an account ; but on the 30th, Monson and his detachment arrived at Agra.

‘ The Commander in Chief has taken the field, and it is to be hoped that he will have an early opportunity of wiping away the disgrace which we have suffered.

‘ It is worth while to review these transactions, in order that we may see to what these misfortunes ought to be attributed, that in future, if possible, they may be avoided.

‘ In the first place, it appears that Colonel Monson’s corps was never so strong as to be able to engage Holkar’s army, if that Chief should collect it ; at least the Colonel was of that opinion.

‘ Secondly ; it appears that it had not any stock of provisions.

‘ Thirdly ; that it depended for provisions upon certain Rajahs, who urged its advance.

‘ Fourthly ; that no measures whatever were taken by British officers to collect provisions either at Boondy or Kota, or even at Rampoor, a fort belonging to us, in which we had a British garrison.

‘ Fifthly ; that the detachment was advanced to such a distance, over so many almost impassable rivers and nullahs, without any boats collected, or posts upon those rivers ; and in fact, that the detachment owes its safety to the Rajah of Kota, who supplied them with his boats.

‘ The result of these facts is an opinion, in my mind, that the detachment must have been lost, even if Holkar had not attacked them with his infantry and artillery.

‘ In respect to the conduct of the operations, it is my opinion that Monson ought to have attacked Holkar in the first instance. If he chose to retire, he ought to have been the rear guard with his infantry, and to have sent the irregular horse away with the baggage.

‘ When he began to retreat, he ought not to have stopped longer than a night at Muckundra ; because he must have been certain that the same circumstances which obliged him to retire to Muckundra, would also oblige him to quit that position. The difference between a good and a bad military position, is nothing when the troops are starving.

‘ The same reasoning holds good respecting Monson’s halt

at Rampoorra, unless he intended to fight. As he had been reinforced, he ought to have fallen back till he was certain of his supplies; and having waited till Holkar approached him, and particularly as Holkar's army was not then in great strength in infantry and guns, he ought to have vigorously attacked him before he retired.

‘When his piquets were attacked on the Banas, he ought to have supported them with his whole corps, leaving one battalion on the northern bank to take care of his baggage; and if he had done so, he probably would have gained a victory, would have saved his baggage, and regained his honor.

‘We have some important lessons from this campaign.

‘First; we should never employ a corps on a service for which it is not fully equal.

‘Secondly; against the Marhattas in particular, but against all enemies, we should take care to be sure of plenty of provisions.

‘Thirdly; experience has shown us, that British troops can never depend upon Rajahs, or any allies, for their supplies. Our own officers must purchase them; and if we should employ a native in such an important service, we ought to see the supplies before we venture to expose our troops in the situation in which they may want them.

‘Fourthly; when we have a fort which can support our operations, such as Rampoorra to the northward; or Ahmednuggur, or Chandore, in your quarter, we should immediately adopt effectual measures to fill it with provisions and stores, in case of need.

‘Fifthly; when we cross a river likely to be full in the rains, we ought to have a post and boats upon it; as I have upon all the rivers south of Poonah, and as you have, I hope, upon the Beemah and the Godavery.

‘In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of Monson's, they must be decided and quick; and in all retreats, it must be recollected that they are safe and easy, in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps. But attention to the foregoing observations will, I hope, prevent a British corps from retreating.

‘These misfortunes in Hindustan will, I fear, take me



back to the Deccan. Indeed, I shall leave this immediately, and orders have been already given that cavalry may be prepared to reinforce the troops with you.

‘ Believe me, my dear Wallace, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S. Of course I mean this letter only for your own perusal, and that of your particular friends.’

*To Colonel Murray.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort William, 14th September, 1804.

‘ Mr. Webbe has transmitted to me copies of your correspondence with him, and I receive letters occasionally from Mr. Duncan, in which he communicates to me the substance of your private reports to Lieut. General Nicolls, from the tenor of all which information I am induced to judge that your corps is not in the state of equipment in respect to provisions in which I hoped it was, and in which it ought to be in the situation in which you are placed. But I cannot form any determined opinion upon the subject, as in some of your letters, particularly those written to Mr. Webbe, you do not mention your distresses or your fear of the want of provisions; and you have proposed two offensive expeditions, through that gentleman, for the consideration of Scindiah’s government.

‘ The object for which the corps under your command was first advanced from Guzerat was, that it might operate upon the rear of Holkar’s army, and watch and endeavor to impede its movements, while his Excellency the Commander in Chief should push him in front. A variety of circumstances prevented the operations upon Holkar, which I anticipated when I sent you your orders of the 7th of May; you have marched to Ougein for the protection of that city and Scindiah’s territories, and Colonel Monson, who had been sent forward from the Commander in Chief’s army, has been obliged to retire in front of Holkar, in consequence of a want of provisions.

‘ The Commander in Chief marched from Cawnpore on the 2nd of this month, and proposes to collect his army at Agra, which object he will possibly have effected by the

middle of this month. Our last accounts of Holkar's infantry, which is the only important part of his army, leave it to the southward of Jeypoor; and I think it most probable that Holkar will keep it there, with a view to force the Rajah of Jeypoor to pay a contribution; and that he will lay waste the country between Jeypoor and Agra with his cavalry, in order to impede, if possible, or, at all events, to distress the march of the Commander in Chief towards Jeypoor. It is probable that in this season he will not be able to do much in that way; but, on the other hand, the Commander in Chief may experience difficulties in his absence from the Company's territories, such as materially to retard his progress.

‘Notwithstanding his partial successes against Monson's corps, I doubt much whether Holkar will venture a general action with the army of the Commander in Chief. He is more likely to draw off to the southward, as the Commander in Chief will advance, and to operate upon your corps. Indeed if he had not such a tempting bait as the contribution to be levied on the Rajah of Jeypoor, I should suspect that he would move towards your quarter, and endeavor to operate upon you as he has upon Colonel Monson, as soon as he should have heard that the Commander in Chief was collecting his army.

‘Under these circumstances the situation of your corps becomes a consideration of some importance; and as I have had some experience in the warfare of these Marhattas, my sentiments upon it may not be disagreeable to you.

‘There are two modes in which the Marhattas carry on their operations. They operate upon supplies by means of their cavalry; and after they have created a distress in the enemy's camp, which obliges the army to commence a retreat, they press upon it with all their infantry and their powerful artillery. Their opponent, being pressed for provisions, is obliged to hurry his march, and they have no fear of being attacked. They follow him with their cavalry in his marches, and surround and attack him with their infantry and cannon when he halts, and he can scarcely escape from them.

‘That, therefore, which I consider absolutely necessary in an operation against a Marhatta power (indeed in any military operation in India) is such a quantity of provisions in

your camp as will enable you to command your own movements, and to be independent of your magazines, at least for that length of time which may be necessary to fulfil the object for which you may be employed.

‘ The next object to be considered is, the strength of your corps. Experience has shown us that the Marhatta cavalry are not very formidable when opposed to our infantry ; that of Holkar, in particular, made no impression upon Monson’s detachment in its long retreat. All the impression was produced by the infantry and cannon, the weather, and want of provisions. The infantry is the strength of Holkar’s, as it is of every other army, and to that I conceive your corps to be fully equal.

‘ It is probable that the Commander in Chief will not be at Kota till towards the end of October, and supposing that Holkar should adopt the plan of operations which I have detailed in the commencement of this letter, he will be near you about the beginning or middle of that month. You ought therefore to have at least a month’s provision in your camp.

‘ If he should bring his infantry and cannon near you, you ought to throw your baggage into any fortified village, or throw up a few redoubts to cover it, in any place in which there may be water, where you will leave a guard to take care of it, and march to attack his infantry. If you should beat that, the cavalry will not hold together.

‘ You must by all means avoid allowing him to attack you with his infantry. There is no position in which you could maintain your camp against such powerful artillery as all the Marhattas have. If you should not hear of their approach until they are close to you and coming to attack you, it would be better to secure your baggage in any manner, and move out to attack them. Do not allow them to attack you in your camp, on any account.

‘ Holkar may, however, possibly keep his infantry out of your way, surround you with his cavalry, and entirely cut off your communication. You have then only to beat up his cavalry camps as frequently as you may hear of their situation. Do not allow the enemy to lay near you with impunity, and you will soon clear the communication. Send constant accounts towards Kota of your situation ; and if you should

hear of the infantry camp, move upon it with celerity and attack it.

‘ In this consideration of the subject, I have supposed that you will have no cavalry. If you should have any, you will, of course, use it in attacks upon the enemy as often as may be practicable; and if you should support those attacks by your infantry and your cannon, you may be certain that they will be successful.

‘ If your provisions should fail you, and you should hear that Holkar’s infantry is near you, you ought to attack them before you think of anything else. If you should be obliged to draw off towards your magazines, make your regular marches at the regular hours; beat up the cavalry corps as frequently as you can; if the infantry, or any part of them, should approach you, attack them with vigor. Even if you should lose a day or two by it in the time of your arrival at your magazines, you will probably gain time in the period of your relief from your distresses, as the cavalry will cease to hang upon your flank when the infantry will be beaten. Burn all the baggage which you cannot carry on.

‘ But if you should have provisions in your camp in sufficient quantities to enable you to fulfil the objects for which your corps is employed, there is nothing which can oblige you to retreat.

‘ I do not know what orders you may have received from the Commander in Chief. His intention is, I believe, that you should act as I proposed in my letter of the 7th of May. At all events, whatever his intention may be, you must have a store of provisions in your camp, or you will not be in safety, must less be of any use to his operations.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To James Stevens, Esq.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort William, 17th September, 1804.

‘ I did not receive your letter of the 15th August till the day before yesterday. I had already taken the liberty of mentioning your name to Lord William Bentinck, when I was at Madras, and I have this day written to his Lordship to recommend your wishes to him, and have enclosed your letter.



‘ Whether you will succeed in attaining this object, I cannot pretend to say, but as I know that Mr. Duncan intends to appoint you the first Judge in Guzerat, I recommend that you should not, in the first instance, refuse that appointment, particularly as the removal of yourself and your family to Malabar will not be more difficult or inconvenient than your removal from Bombay.

‘ Pray present my compliments to Mrs. Stevens, and

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *James Stevens, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord William Bentinck.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Calcutta, 17th September, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to forward to your Lordship a letter with its enclosure, addressed to me by Mr. Stevens of the Bombay Civil Service, whose name I believe I mentioned to you when I was at Madras.

‘ The object of this gentleman is to be appointed Chief Judge in Malabar, as successor to Mr. Richards; a situation for which I believe him to be perfectly qualified. I knew him when he was superintendent of the northern division of Malabar, in which situation he must have acquired great experience of the affairs of that province; and he was always highly respected, and well spoken of. Mr. Richards, however, will be able to give you an accurate knowledge of his qualifications.

‘ In respect to Mr. Duncan, I believe that your Lordship is aware that he will recommend officially to fill the situations in Malabar, any of the servants of the Bombay government whom you may select; I know that he has a good opinion of Mr. Stevens, and that he intends to appoint him Chief Judge in the newly acquired territories in Guzerat. Mr. Stevens, however, as you will observe by his letter, prefers to serve in Malabar.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you, that the Governor General determined yesterday to appoint General Dowdeswell a supernumerary Major General on the staff of this Presidency, and his appointment will, I believe, appear in orders to-morrow.

‘ No accounts have been received from the northward from any authority, since I last wrote to General Stuart. The

private reports in circulation at Calcutta make matters very bad ; however, all agree that the troops behaved well ; that Holkar's cavalry made no impression upon them ; that the disaster is to be attributed to the incapacity of the commander, and want of provisions ; and that there has not been hitherto any defection of allies or dependents, that might not have been expected in the event of such a retreat.

‘ I understand from Captain Sydenham, that he has sent you a copy of the letter which I wrote to Colonel Wallace upon the subject of Monson's campaign, which will explain the whole story, and my sentiments upon every part of it. General Lake is advancing towards Agra, and it is supposed that Holkar has come through the Beana ghaut, and is in the plain between the hills of Jeypoor and the Jumna.

‘ I did not communicate to your Lordship any of the intelligence which came from England lately, as I knew that you would have received it from the Bengal and Asia, long before my letter could reach you.

‘ Believe me, my dear Lord, &c.

‘ *Lord William Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Fort William, 17th September, 1804.

‘ I return the papers received from Mr. Duncan. I have long been of opinion that Colonel Murray ought to be relieved from his command ; and his letter to Mr. Duncan, of the 19th July, renders it absolutely necessary now either to reinforce him with regular cavalry, which is impossible ; to withdraw his corps entirely from Malwa, which, unless it be to supply it with provisions, would be fatal to the operations of the war ; or to relieve him in the command by another officer. If one of these measures be not adopted, the Government, and not Colonel Murray, will be responsible for the misfortunes which may happen.

‘ I therefore recommend that Mr. Duncan may be ordered to send Major General Jones to relieve Colonel Murray without loss of time ; and Colonel Woodington, who is here, ought to be sent round to Bombay to join the corps of troops in the field. He is a gallant, forward officer, and they want some of that description.

‘ I shall be at Barrackpore in the morning.

‘ I send with this Colonel Ochterlony’s journal.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ 9th October, 1804\*.

‘ I take the liberty of drawing your Excellency’s attention to my situation in command of the troops in the Deccan in the late war, and to the inadequacy of the allowances which I received as a Major General of the staff of the army of Fort St. George, and to the trust reposed in me; or to the increased expenses which I was obliged to incur, by the necessity of augmenting all my establishments, and of forming them on a scale more consistent with the character with which I was invested by your Excellency, than with the situation of a Major General commanding a division of the army.

‘ These extraordinary expenses were necessarily incidental to the extended nature of my military command, and of my arduous political duties, which embraced the direction of the army throughout the whole extent of the Deccan, together with all the details of every important political negotiation connected either with the prosecution of the war in that quarter of India, or the conclusion of general peace; and I trust that your Excellency will be of opinion that I have a just claim to be reimbursed the charges which I was compelled to defray in the discharge of my public duty beyond the amount of my allowances.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

\* *Extract of a Minute of the Governor General.*

‘ Fort William, 10th October, 1804.

‘ The services and situation of those several persons are distinctly detailed in Major General Wellesley’s dispatch of the 9th of March, and appear to me to render the grant of those pensions in the highest degree equitable and expedient. I accordingly propose, that those pensions amounting to 2,700 rupees per mensem, or 32,400 rupees per annum, be granted in the manner recommended by Major General Wellesley, and that the necessary orders be accordingly issued for the purpose of giving effect to this arrangement.

‘ WELLESLEY.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Woodington.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Government House, 13th October, 1804.

‘ I submitted your letter regarding the line Adjutant to Lord Wellesley this morning, and he desired me to refer it to Mr. Duncan, which I have done.

‘ I also took the opportunity of speaking to him respecting your prize money, and the other subjects connected therewith referred to in your memorandum. He said that all the questions respecting prize property captured at Baroach had been decided some time ago; and he observed, what you had said in answer to two questions sent to you by Mr. Duncan, that the enemy had not taken possession of the property of the British merchants, of which, therefore, it must be concluded, that it never passed from their hands. It appears, therefore, that it would not be proper to call upon the British merchants to give you a remuneration by way of salvage; and all the circumstances do not exist which would afford a ground for the Governor General to order that a gratuity on the part of the public might be given to the troops employed at Baroach.

‘ The Governor General said, however, that if you would lay before him an account of the public property captured during the war, he would give orders regarding its disposal without loss of time. If you should have such an account you will do well to send it to me; if not, it ought to be prepared as soon as possible.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Woodington.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S.—I could not get the letter which I mentioned. I am not quite certain that it may not be in the secret department, and if it should be so, it cannot be seen without an order from the Governor General.’

*To Lord William Bentinck.*

‘ MY DEAR LORD,

‘ Fort William, 18th October, 1804.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship’s letter of the 23rd September.



‘ You will have observed that the augmentation of the army of Fort St. George, is only four regiments, instead of five—the number which I announced to you in my letter of the 29th of August ; and I sincerely wish your Lordship may find that augmentation to be sufficient, and to provide for all the calls for troops, after the Bombay army shall have been withdrawn from the territories under your government ; although I apprehend that you will not, and that you will still require some extra battalions.

‘ By the addition of the four regiments, the establishment of Fort St. George will consist of about the same number of regular battalions that it had in the year 1802, before the Marhatta war ; and of the same number of troops that you have had within the territories during the Marhatta war, including in that number General Campbell’s corps, the Bombay troops, and extra battalions.

‘ There is nothing new from the north westward. General Lake has collected a very strong and well appointed body of troops, with which he was to march from Agra, on the 1st of this month, to attack Holkar who was at Muttra.

‘ We expect to receive the accounts of the action tomorrow, or next day ; and I will forward them to your Lordship by express.

‘ I have been, and am still detained here, by the rain. The bearers are, however, laid upon the road, and I intend to set out as soon as I shall hear it is practicable to travel through the province of Cuttack. I fear that I shall have but an uncomfortable journey.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lord William Bentinck.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P.S.—Your Lordship will be glad to hear that Governor Farquhar is still here, and proposes to go by land to Madras in company with me. The Betsey remains here, and I imagine cannot go to Madras, even though the embargo is taken off. The Seaflower was sent with dispatches to Prince of Wales’s Island, when accounts were received that Admiral Linois was in the Bay of Bengal.’

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## THE TREATY OF BASSEIN.\*

*Treaty of perpetual and general defensive Alliance between the Honorable English East India Company, and his Highness the Peshwah Bajee Rao Ragonaut Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, his children, heirs, and successors, settled by Lieutenant Colonel Barry Close, Resident at the court of his Highness, by virtue of the powers delegated to him by his Excellency the Most Noble Richard Marquis Wellesley, Knight of the Most Illustrious Order of St. Patrick, one of his Britannic Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, Governor General in Council, appointed by the Honorable Court of Directors of the said Company to direct and control all their affairs in the East Indies. Concluded at Bassein on the 31st December, 1802.*

‘Whereas by the blessing of God, the relations of peace and friendship have uninterruptedly subsisted for a length of time between the Honorable English East India Company, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, and have been confirmed at different periods, by treaties of amity and union, the powers aforesaid, adverting to the complexion of the times, have determined, with a view to the preservation of peace and tranquillity, to enter into a general defensive alliance for the complete and reciprocal protection of their respective territories, together with those of their several allies and dependents, against the unprovoked aggressions or unjust encroachments of all or any enemies whatever.

‘Art. 1. The peace, union, and friendship, so long subsisting between the two states, shall be promoted and increased by this treaty, and shall be perpetual. The friends and enemies of either shall be the friends and enemies of both, and the contracting parties agree, that all the former treaties and agreements between the two states now in force, and not contrary to the tenor of this agreement, shall be confirmed by it.

‘2. If any power or state whatever shall commit any act

\* The treaty of Bassein is here introduced from the memorandum following having been written upon it, by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, when at Calcutta, in October 1804, in answer to a paper entitled “Observations on Marhatta Affairs,” sent to the Governor General from England by the President of the Board of Control.

of unprovoked hostility or aggression against either of the contracting parties, or against their respective dependents or allies, and, after due representation, shall refuse to enter into amicable explanation, or shall deny the just satisfaction or indemnity which the contracting parties shall have required, then the contracting parties will proceed to concert and prosecute such further measures as the case shall appear to demand.

‘ For the more distinct explanation of the true intent and effect of this agreement, the Governor General in Council, on behalf of the Honorable Company, hereby declares that the British Government will never permit any power or state whatever to commit, with impunity, any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights and territories of his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, but will at all times maintain and defend the same in the same manner as the rights and territories of the Honorable Company are now maintained and defended.

‘ 3. With a view to fulfil this treaty of general defence and protection, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder agrees to receive, and the Honorable East India Company to furnish, a permanent subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular native infantry, with their usual proportion of field pieces, and European artillerymen attached, and with the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition, which force is to be accordingly stationed in perpetuity in his said Highness’s territories.

‘ 4. For the regular payment of the whole expense of the said subsidiary force, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder hereby assigns and cedes in perpetuity to the Honorable East India Company, all the territories detailed in the schedule annexed to this treaty.

‘ 5. As it may be found that certain of the territories ceded by the foregoing article to the Honorable Company may be inconvenient from their situation, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, for the purpose of rendering the boundary line of the Honorable Company’s possessions a good and well defined one, agrees that such exchanges of talooks on lands shall be made hereafter on terms of a fair valuation of their respective revenues, as the completion of the said purpose may require; and it is agreed and covenanted, that the territories to be assigned and ceded to the Honorable



Company, by the 4th article, or in consequence of the exchange stipulated eventually in this article, shall be subject to the exclusive management and authority of the said Company, and of their officers.

‘ 6. Notwithstanding the total annual expenses of the subsidiary force is estimated at twenty five lacs of rupees, his said Highness hath agreed to cede, by article 4th, lands estimated to yield annually the sum of twenty six lacs of rupees, the additional lac being intended to meet possible deficiencies in the revenues of the said lands, and save the Honorable Company from loss.

‘ 7. After the conclusion of this treaty, and as soon as the British Resident shall signify to his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, that the Honorable Company’s officers are prepared to take charge of the districts ceded by article 4th, his Highness will immediately issue the necessary purwunnahs or orders to his officers, to deliver over charge of the same to the officers of the Honorable Company; and it is hereby agreed and stipulated that all collections made by his Highness’s officers subsequently to the date of this treaty, and before the officers of the Honorable Company shall have taken charge of the said districts, shall be carried to the credit of the Honorable Company; and all claims to balance from the said districts, referring to periods antecedent to the conclusion of this treaty, shall be considered as null and void.

‘ 8. All forts situated within the districts to be ceded as aforesaid, shall be delivered to the officers of the Honorable Company, with the said districts, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder engages, that the said forts shall be delivered to the Honorable Company, without being injured or damaged, and with their ordinary equipment of ordnance, stores, and provisions.

‘ 9. Grain, and all other articles of consumption, and provisions, and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together with the necessary numbers of cattle, horses, and camels, required for the use of the subsidiary force, shall be entirely exempted from duties, and the commanding officer and officers of the said subsidiary force shall be treated in all respects in a manner suitable to the dignity and greatness of both states. The subsidiary force will at all times be ready to execute services of importance, such as the pro-



tection of the person of his Highness, his heirs and successors, the overawing and chastisement of rebels or excitors of disturbance in his Highness's dominions, and the due correction of his subjects or dependents who may withhold the payment of the Sircar's just claims; but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor, like Sebundy, to be stationed in the country to collect the revenues, nor against any of the principal branches of the Marhatta empire; nor in levying contributions from Marhatta dependents in the manner of Mooluk-gheery.

‘ 10. Whereas much inconvenience has arisen from certain claims and demands of the Marhatta state, affecting the city of Surat, it is agreed that a just calculation shall be made of the value of the said claims by his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, and the government of Bombay, and in consequence of the intimate friendship now established between the contracting parties, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder agrees for himself, his heirs and successors, to relinquish for ever all the rights, claims, and privileges of the Marhatta state, affecting the said city of Surat, and all collections on that account shall cease and determine from the day on which this treaty shall be concluded; in consideration of which act of friendship the Honorable East India Company agrees that a piece of land, yielding a sum equal to the estimated value of the said claims of the Marhatta state, shall be deducted from the districts ceded by article 4th; and on the same principle, and from similar considerations, his Highness further agrees, that the amount of the collections made for the Poonah state, under the title of Nagabundy in the Purgunnahs of Chourassec and Chickly, shall be ascertained by an average taken from the receipts of a certain number of years, or by such other mode of calculation as may be determined on. And his said Highness doth further agree for himself, his heirs and successors, to relinquish for ever the Nagabundy collections aforesaid, and they shall accordingly cease from the conclusion of this treaty. And it is agreed and stipulated, that a piece of land, yielding a sum equal to the amount of the said Nagabundy collections, shall be deducted from the districts ceded by article 4th, in the same manner as stipulated in regard to the choute of Surat.

‘ 11. Whereas it has been usual for his Highness Rao

Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, to enlist and retain in his service Europeans of different countries, his said Highness hereby agrees and stipulates, that in the event of war breaking out between the English and any European nation, and of discovery being made that any European or Europeans in his service belonging to such nation at war with the English, shall have meditated injury towards the English, or have entered into intrigues hostile to their interest, such European or Europeans so offending shall be discharged by his said Highness, and not suffered to reside in his dominions.

‘ 12. Inasmuch as by the present treaty the contracting parties are bound in a general defensive alliance for mutual defence and protection against all enemies, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder consequently engages never to commit any act of hostility or aggression against his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah Behauder, or any of the Honorable Company’s allies or dependents, or against any of the principal branches of the Marhatta empire, or against any power whatever; or in the event of differences arising, whatever adjustment the Company’s government, weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may determine, shall meet with full approbation and acquiescence.

‘ 13. And whereas certain differences, referring to past transactions, are known to subsist between the sircar of his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, and the sircar of his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah Behauder; and whereas an amicable adjustment of those differences must be highly desirable for the welfare and benefit of both the said sircars, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, with a view to the above end, agrees, and accordingly binds himself, his heirs and successors, to fulfil and conform to the stipulations of the treaty of Mhar; and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder further agrees, that on the basis of the fulfilment of the said treaty of Mhar, and of the claims of his Highness the Nabod Asoph Jah Behauder, to be totally exempted from the payment of choute. The Honorable Company’s government shall be entitled to arbitrate and determine all such points as may be in doubt or difference between the sircars of their Highnesses afore mentioned; and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder further agrees, that in the event of any differences arising between

his government, and that of his Highness the Nabob Asoph Jah Behauder at any future period, the particulars of such differences shall be communicated to the Honorable East India Company before any act of hostility shall be committed on either side, and the said Honorable Company interposing their mediation in a way suitable to rectitude, friendship, and union, and mindful of justice and established usage, shall apply themselves to the adjustment of all such differences conformably to propriety and truth, and shall bring the parties to a right understanding; and it is further agreed, that whatever adjustment of any such differences, the Company's government, weighing things in the scale of truth and justice, shall determine, that determination shall, without hesitation or objection, meet with the full approbation and acquiescence of both parties. It is, however, agreed that this stipulation shall not prevent any amicable negotiations which the Honorable Company, and the courts of Poonah and Hyderabad respectively, may be desirous of opening, provided no such negotiation shall be carried on between any of the three parties without full communication thereof to each other.

‘ 14. Whereas a treaty of friendship and alliance has been concluded between the Honorable Company and Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar Behauder; and whereas the said treaty was meditated and executed without any intention that it should infringe any of the just rights or claims of his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, affecting the sircar of the said Rajah; his said Highness adverting thereto, and also to the intimate alliance now established between the contracting parties, doth hereby formally acknowledge the existence of the said treaty between the Honorable Company and Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar Behauder; and inasmuch as by reason of certain unfinished transactions, the conclusion of which has been suspended from time to time, various demands and papers of accounts are found to subsist between the government of his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, and the sircar of the Rajah above mentioned, his said Highness, placing full reliance on the impartiality, truth, and justice of the British Government, doth hereby agree that the said Government shall examine into and finally adjust the said demands and papers of accounts; and his said Highness further stipulates, and binds himself, his



heirs and successors, to abide by such adjustment as the British Government shall accordingly determine.

‘ 15. The contracting parties will employ all practicable means of conciliation to prevent the calamity of war, and for that purpose will at all times be ready to enter into amicable explanations with other states, and to cultivate and improve the general relations of peace and amity with all the powers of India, according to the true spirit and tenor of this defensive treaty. But if a war should unfortunately break out between the contracting parties and any other power whatever, then his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder engages, that, with the reserve of two battalions of sepoy, which are to remain near his Highness’s person, the residue of the British subsidiary force, consisting of four battalions of sepoy, with their artillery, joined by six thousand infantry, and ten thousand horse of his Highness’s own troops, and making together an army of ten thousand infantry, and ten thousand cavalry, with the requisite train of artillery and warlike stores of every kind, shall be immediately put in motion for the purpose of opposing the enemy.

‘ And his Highness likewise engages to employ every further effort in his power, for the purpose of bringing into the field as speedily as possible the whole force which he may be able to supply from his dominions, with a view to the effectual prosecution and speedy termination of the said war.

‘ The Honorable Company, in the same manner, engage on their part to employ in active operations against the enemy the largest force which they may be able to furnish over and above the said subsidiary force.

‘ 16. Whenever war shall appear probable, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder engages to collect as many brinjaries as possible, and to store as much grain as may be practicable in his frontier garrison.

‘ 17. As by the present treaty the union and friendship of the two states is so firmly cemented, that they may be considered as one and the same, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder engages neither to commence nor to pursue in future any negotiations with any other power whatever, without giving previous notice, and entering into mutual consultation with the Honorable East India Company’s government; and the Honorable Company’s government, on their part, hereby declare, that they have no man-



ner of concern with any of his Highness's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom his Highness is absolute.

‘ 18. Inasmuch as by the present treaty of general defensive alliance the ties of union are, with the blessing of God, so closely drawn, that the interests of the two states are become identified, it is further mutually agreed, that if disturbances shall at any time break out in the districts ceded to the Honorable Company by this agreement, his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder shall permit such a proportion of the subsidiary troops as may be requisite to be employed in quelling the same within the said districts. If disturbances shall at any time break out in any part of his Highness's dominions contiguous to the Company's frontier, to which it might be inconvenient to detach any proportion of the subsidiary force, the British Government, in like manner, if required by his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, shall direct such proportion of the troops of the Company as may be most conveniently stationed for the purpose, to assist in quelling the said disturbances within his Highness's dominions.

‘ 19. It is finally declared that this treaty, which, according to the foregoing articles, is meant for the support and credit of his said Highness's government, and to preserve it from loss and decline, shall last as long as the sun and moon shall endure.

‘ Signed, sealed, and exchanged at Bassein, the 31st of December, A.D. 1802, of the 5th Ramzaun, A.H. 1217.

‘ *The Seal of*  
‘ *Pundit Purdhaun.*

‘ *The Seal of*  
‘ *Lieut Colonel Barry Close.*

‘ The Peshwah's Signature.

‘ BARRY CLOSE,  
‘ Resident at Poonah.

#### MEMORANDUM ON THE TREATY OF BASSEIN.

‘ As the author of the “ Observations on Marhatta Affairs ” does not appear to me to have viewed the policy of the treaty of Bassein, in the light in which I have viewed it; and as I conceive that much of his reasoning upon the subject is to be attributed to the erroneous view, in my opinion, of the political state of India, at the time the treaty was made, I deem it necessary to advert shortly to the political

situation of the great powers in India, at different periods in which any important change has taken place, since the peace of Seringapatam, before I proceed to consider the amendments to the treaty of Bassein, which have been proposed.

‘ In the consideration of all questions of Indian policy, it is necessary to extend our views beyond those powers immediately possessing territory. It is well known that the French have never ceased to look to the re-establishment of their power in India; and although they possess no territory on the continent, they have at all times had some influence in the councils of the different native princes, and sometimes great power, by means of the European adventurers, introduced into the native armies. There can be no doubt but that the French government would avail themselves of an instrument, such as the influence or power of these adventurers would give them, to prosecute their favorite plan in India; and it is equally certain, that whether at peace or at war with Great Britain, the object of every French statesman must be to diminish the influence, the power, and the prosperity of the British Government in India. I therefore conclude that, in the consideration of every question of Indian policy, or in an inquiry into the expediency of any political measure, it is absolutely necessary to view it, not only as it will affect Indian powers, but as it will affect the French.

‘ When I establish this principle, I do not mean that the assertion that the French interest has been affected, is to be admitted in justification of every political measure of the government. It is necessary only that it should be recollected by those who are to judge of political affairs in India, that French power and French influence are important parts of every political discussion by the governments abroad; and it will appear by the view which I shall take of the political situation of the great powers in India, at different periods, that French influence was powerful; that to have omitted to guard against the French would have been ruinous to the Company; and that the necessity of guarding against French influence was one of the principal causes of the treaty of Bassein.

‘ In order thoroughly to understand the relations in which the different powers in India stood to each other, at the

period at which the treaty of Bassein was concluded, and to be able to comprehend the objects and benefits of that treaty, it is necessary to advert to the situation in which they stood at the peace of Seringapatam, in 1792; to trace their progress from that period.

‘ The three great powers, the English, the Peshwah, and the Nizam, having each received injuries from Tippoo Sultan, joined in the war, the result of which was that peace; and the object of the British Government was, if possible, to preserve the power of each in the situation in which it was left by the pacification.

‘ Lord Cornwallis, who foresaw the difficulties and dangers to which the alliance would be exposed, from the claims of the Marhattas upon the Nizam, endeavored to establish the alliance upon a more firm basis, by interposing the arbitration of the British Government in their disputes. But the Marhattas, who knew that their claims were without just foundation, that they depended entirely upon their superior strength, and that the result of an arbitration by the British Government must be unfavorable to them, declined to accept the offer made by Lord Cornwallis.

‘ I conceive this to be the real history of the refusal of Lord Cornwallis to allow the Marhattas to subsidize two British battalions, as mentioned by the Author of the “ Observations,” if such a proposal was ever made to him. His Lordship found that, without giving the British Government any additional strength or security, the Peshwah’s general wished to have the assistance of the British troops in the support of the Peshwah’s internal government; and his Lordship was not desirous of being involved in the internal disputes of the Marhatta, without having some corresponding political advantage.

‘ The result of the refusal of the Marhattas to allow the arbitration of the British Government, was exactly what his Lordship had foreseen. In the course of a very few years, the Marhattas attacked the Nizam for the purpose of enforcing their unjust claims. The British Government of that day did not interfere, and the Nizam was obliged, in a treaty signed at Kurdlah, on the —, to cede half his territory, to pay a great sum of money, and to give up to the Marhattas his prime minister, Mushire-ool-Moolk, and to appoint



another minister recommended by the enemies who had reduced his power to that low state. His Highness was obliged to consent to send out of his territories the two British battalions, which had continued with him since the peace of Seringapatam.

‘ In the contest which had just taken place between the Marhattas and the Nizam, the troops principally employed, and whose gallantry had been most conspicuous, were the corps of infantry in the service of Scindiah on the one side, and those in the service of the Nizam on the other. Both these corps were commanded, and, in general, officered by Frenchmen and other foreigners. The corps in the service of the Nizam, commanded by M. Raymond, had, in particular, distinguished itself in an extraordinary manner, although unsuccessful.

‘ After the experience of the war which had just terminated, the Nizam, seeing that he could not rely upon the assistance of the British Government against the Marhattas, determined to increase this corps of infantry to the greatest extent that his finances would admit, and to render it as efficient as possible. With this view, a large territory was granted in jaghire to Monsieur Raymond, from the revenues of which he was to pay the troops under his command; and the number of troops, and of French officers to command them, were vastly increased.

‘ In a short time after the peace of Kurdlah, the Peshwah Madhoo Rao Narain died, and a scene of intrigue and confusion ensued at Poonah, the object of which was the succession to the musnud of the Peshwah, and the possession of the power of the Poonah state.

‘ It is useless to the consideration of the question under discussion, to endeavor, and it would be impossible to succeed, in detailing the events which occurred on that occasion. The result was the establishment in the hands of Dowlut Rao Scindiah of all the power of the Peshwah.

‘ The predecessors of this chief had conquered the territories in the Dooab, of the Jumna and Ganges, and those on the right<sup>s</sup> of the Jumna. He was in possession of the person of the King, and of his power, by virtue of his office of Vakeel ool Mutuluk; and thus was established, in the hand of one Marhatta, all the territory and all the power on



the west side of India, extending from Hindustan to the Toombuddra, along the frontiers of the Company, the Nabob Vizier, the Nizam, Tippoo Sultaun, &c. &c.

‘ I have already observed that Scindiah had in his service a corps of infantry, commanded and generally officered by Frenchmen. This corps had conquered the territories in Hindustan, had rendered essential service in the war which preceded the peace of Kurdlah, and had been the principal instrument in the establishment of Scindiah’s power at Poonah. This corps, commanded and officered by Frenchmen, may therefore be fairly stated to have been the principal instrument and support of the enormous power thus established on the western side of India.

‘ On the other hand, a similar corps, officered in a similar manner, was the principal, indeed the only, support of the state of the Nizam. The difference between the two was, that that of Raymond was the most powerful; and Raymond had most influence in the councils of the prince whom he was serving, owing to the destruction of the power and authority of the Nizam in his own territories, occasioned by the disgrace suffered at Kurdlah.

‘ In this situation, the Governor General, Lord Wellesley, found the political affairs when he assumed the government in the year 1798. As Lord Cornwallis had foreseen, the state of the Nizam was nearly destroyed by the Marhattas. The policy of the British Government had obliged the Nizam to support his tottering authority by the service of a body of troops, commanded by French officers, in whose hands was the only power of the state. The Peshwah’s power was lodged by another train of events in the hands of Scindiah, who possessed, besides, all the power of the north and west of India, and whose principal support and instrument was a corps of a similar description, likewise commanded by Frenchmen.

‘ It is useless to detail the measures adopted by Lord Wellesley to remedy the evils which resulted from this state of the governments of the allies of the Company in the war with Tippoo Sultaun, of which he saw the probability in the year 1798. It is sufficient here to observe, that his Lordship relieved the Nizam from the state of dependence in which he was held by the commanding officer of the French corps in

his service; the French officers were dismissed, British troops were subsidized in lieu of the corps which the French officers had commanded, and the British Government enjoyed the advantage of the assistance of the Nizam in the war which ensued with Tippoo Sultaun.

‘ The measures by which the Governor General proposed to relieve the government of the Peshwah from the state in which it was held by Scindiah, failed to produce their effect; his Highness’s government was in Scindiah’s hands, and the British Government desired no assistance from this branch of the alliance.

‘ After the destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, on the 4th of May, 1799, a new combination of politics appeared in India. The native power, against whose enmity it had been necessary to provide, by an alliance with the Peshwah and the Nizam, was no more: and the Governor General was to determine the relation in which the British Government should stand in respect to the powers which remained. There were that of the Nizam, and that of the Marhattas. It was obviously the interest of the British Government that the power of the Nizam should continue to exist in a state of independence.

‘ If there had been any reasonable ground for hope that his Highness’s state could continue in independence, there might possibly have been no occasion for an alteration of the treaty by which the Company was then allied with his Highness; but it could not exist in that state, unless the Peshwah should consent to admit the mediation and arbitration of the British Government in the question on claims which his Highness had upon the Nizam.

‘ The Governor General therefore offered to allow the Peshwah to participate in the acquisitions made by the destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, provided his Highness would admit the arbitration of the British Government in his disputes with the Nizam, and would receive a subsidiary force. The Peshwah declined to accept this offer, and the acquisitions made in the war were divided between the parties concerned in carrying it on.

‘ The state of the Nizam’s government, after this refusal of the Peshwah, must still have pressed upon the consideration of the Governor General. By the treaty of 1798, his Highness was precluded from the employment of the British

subsidiary troops against the Marhattas, or against certain tributaries of his, who were likewise tributaries of the Peshwah; and it was obvious that, however advantageous the treaty of 1798 had been to his government in many respects, his Highness was still in the situation, in respect to the Marhattas, in which he had been in 1797; with this difference, however, that he had no longer the support and services of the corps commanded by the French officers.

‘ It became necessary, therefore, for the Governor General to decide respecting the Nizam’s government, whether he would allow it to fall into the hands of the Marhattas; whether he would allow it to revert into the hands of the French adventurers, from whom he had relieved the Nizam in the year 1798; or whether he would, by an alteration of the treaty of 1798, extend the objects of the alliance, and render it defensive against all powers whatever; and in this manner, undertake the defence of the Nizam against the vexatious claims which it was certain that the Marhattas would make upon him.

‘ It is scarcely necessary that I should advert to the consequences which would have resulted from the first. The Marhattas would shortly have exercised the power of the Nizam’s government, whose territory at that time extended to the southward of the Kistna and Toombuddra, along the frontier of the newly established government of Mysore. They would soon have found the means of making claims in his name, or in that of the Peshwah, on the Rajah of Mysore, or the Nabob of the Carnatic, or even the Company; and the consequence would have been a war with that restless power, of which the seat would have been the territories of the Company, or their allies, and the sources from whence the means to carry on the war were to be drawn. The second mode would have been in direct contradiction to the opinion of parliament and the nation, and of every man who had given an opinion on the Governor General’s conduct in his transactions with the Nizam’s government in the year 1798. It would have introduced Frenchmen, French interests, influence, and power, into the heart of India, after they had been expelled by the Governor General.

‘ There remained only to take the Nizam under the protection of the Company; and this measure was adopted by the general defensive treaty of 1800; although every man



who knew any thing of the politics of India foresaw that the consequences of this measure might be, sooner or later, a war with the Marhattas.

‘ The probability of such a war was foreseen by the former Governor General, Sir John Shore, in a minute, in which he discussed the question regarding a closer alliance with the Peshwah ; and it is supposed that Lord Wellesley saw clearly, that the only mode of avoiding that war was to induce the Peshwah to become a party to the alliance, and to submit his claims to the arbitration of the British Government.

‘ Consistently with this opinion, it was the duty of the Governor General to repeat his offer of alliance as frequently as opportunities might occur ; and accordingly they were repeated upon different occasions.

‘ I cannot agree in opinion with the Author of the “ Observations,” that the offers to admit the Peshwah as a party to the general defensive alliance were not accepted, because the Governor General insisted that a body of British troops should be posted in his Highness’s territories.

‘ In the first place, it does not appear that the Governor General insisted upon that object as a *sine quâ non*. He may, for reasons into which I shall hereafter enter, have thought it desirable that a body of British troops should be at Poonah, but he did not insist upon it. However, I shall consider this point upon the facts stated by the Author of the “ Observations.”

‘ Till the end of the year 1800, Scindiah was at Poonah with an army. It was obvious that he would not willingly consent to the defensive treaty, because it must have put an end to all his prospects of ambition in the Deccan ; and the Peshwah would not consent to it, because he would have been exposed to the tyranny of Scindiah, from the time at which he should sign the treaty, to that at which the British troops should arrive at Poonah.

‘ When circumstances obliged Scindiah to quit Poonah with his army, he appointed the Peshwah’s ministers, who still continued to negotiate with the British Resident ; and it is a fact, well confirmed, that the Peshwah did not know even of the existence of a negotiation, much less the nature of the objects offered to his acceptance and refused by his servants.

The result of this statement and reasoning is, that the



policy of a connexion with the Marhattas did not arise "from the connexion subsisting previously to the conquest of Mysore, between the Company, the Marhattas, and the Nizam, by the treaty concluded in 1790, at Poonah;" but subsequently to the conquest of Mysore. It originated, first in the necessity of preserving the state of the Nizam in independence; secondly, in the unjust claims of the Marhatta nation on the Nizam; thirdly, in the certainty that those claims would be asserted in arms; and that the Nizam must submit, unless he should protect himself by raising an army to be officered by European adventurers, principally Frenchmen; fourthly, in the necessity of preventing the Nizam from entertaining these adventurers, and of affording him protection, at least equal to that which he could have procured for himself by those means, even at the risk of a war with the whole Marhatta nation.

‘ In this view of the question, I have entirely omitted the enlarged considerations which must be obvious to every statesman who discusses it. I have likewise omitted to advert to the peculiar situation of the British power in India, which requires that the funds, applicable to the defence of the country, should be applied to commercial purposes; and therefore renders it necessary that the local government should derive means of supporting armies different from those usually resorted to. I have considered nothing but that which was absolutely necessary for security in the first instance, and for peace in the second.

‘ There can be no question respecting the Marhatta claims, or that they could have been enforced with arms, or that the Nizam must have yielded, unless protected by the French, or by the Company. The question is, whether the best mode of preventing the war was to prevail upon the Peshwah to become a party to the defensive alliance.

‘ It is not necessary that I should consider the particular circumstances of the times, at the different periods at which proposals were made to the Peshwah to become a party to the defensive alliance. It will be sufficient for the purpose under consideration, to state that the consequence of the conclusion of the defensive arrangements with the Peshwah, at any period since the year 1799, must have been to join against Scindiah a great proportion of the Marhatta nation.

It is possible, that under these circumstances Scindiah might have acquiesced in the arrangement; but supposing that he should have gone to war to oppose it, the war would have been one of far less extent and difficulty than that in which the Company must sooner or later have been involved with the whole Marhatta nation, by the necessity of supporting the Nizam. The seat of it would have been the territories of our enemies, instead of our own, and the sources from which we were to draw the means of carrying it on.

‘ But the question is not properly referrible to the admission of the Peshwah to the defensive alliance, at any period antecedent to the treaty of Bassein, but to that treaty itself. In order to be able to form a judgment whether the circumstances under which it was negotiated afforded the best chance of preserving the peace of India, it is necessary to advert to the situation of Marhatta affairs from the years 1798 and 1799.

‘ Dowlut Rao Scindiah appears to have possessed the power, to which I have referred in the former part of this Memorandum, from the time at which he placed the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, on the musnud. He was involved, however, in a contest in Malwa, with the females of the family of his predecessor, Mahdajee Scindiah; and after the death of Tuckojee Holkar, he was desirous of influencing the disposal of the succession of that chief, in such a manner as to forward his own political objects. In pursuance of these views, he murdered Mulhar Rao, the son of Tuckojee Holkar, at Poonah. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the natural son of Tuckojee Holkar, fled upon that occasion, and after a variety of adventures in the territories of the Nizam, and of the Rajah of Berar, he first joined the Bhyes, and then plundered them. He afterwards, in the year 1800, attacked and defeated a detachment of Scindiah’s army at Ougein.

‘ These events obliged Scindiah to quit Poonah towards the end of that year. He defeated Holkar in a pitched battle, fought at Indore; and in 1801 and 1802, drove him out of Malwa into the Deccan. Holkar then attacked the Peshwah, and having a large body of troops, he defeated the army of the Peshwah, joined by a detachment of Scindiah’s troops at Poonah, in the month of October, 1802. The Peshwah fled, and took refuge under the Company’s protec-

tion at Bassein, having, previous to the battle of Poonah, signed an agreement which contained all the principal objects of the treaty of Bassein.

‘ In this crisis, all the Marhatta powers pressed the Governor General to interfere in their affairs. Scindiah repeatedly urged the Governor General to settle the Peshwah’s affairs, and begged that his Highness and himself might enjoy the benefit of the Company’s friendship. I believe it might be proved, that Scindiah was fully informed of every point in the negotiation of the treaty of Bassein. His vakeel, Ballojee Koonger, was the Peshwah’s dewan at the time, and he knew every thing.

‘ Holkar’s declared intention, and apparent object, was to establish a new government at Poonah, under one of the sons of Amrut Rao, as Peshwah. The government at Poonah would, under this arrangement, have been administered in its military branch by Holkar, and in its civil, by Amrut Rao. These persons both repeatedly requested the Company’s countenance for themselves; and in fact, the arrangement failed, because Amrut Rao saw that the British Government was determined to oppose it, and to support Bajee Rao. At all events, Holkar and Amrut Rao requested the Company’s mediation in the disputes with the Peshwah, and urged the Governor General to interfere to settle the affairs at Poonah.

‘ Although it cannot be asserted that the Peshwah is a powerful prince, there is a large party in the empire attached to his person, all of whom were anxious in the expression of their wishes that the British Government should interfere in his affairs. The Peshwah’s right to the musnud is universally acknowledged, although his authority is, from circumstances, imperfect, and his orders but ill obeyed; and his cause, supported by the British Government, was certainly popular in the southern parts of the empire.

‘ The southern chiefs, who are naturally the principal support of the government of Poonah, had not submitted to Holkar. They were in arms, waiting for the arrival of the British troops, as the instruments of the interference of the British Government in the Peshwah’s affairs; and they joined the British army when it arrived in their neighbourhood. There was no probability that Holkar would make



any serious opposition to the march of the Company's troops to Poonah. He had not made his peace with Scindiah; indeed, neither party thought of it; and he would have opposed himself singly, in an unpopular cause, to all the great powers in India.

‘ Under all these circumstances, and allowing for the treachery of the Marhatta character, there was every reason to believe, that the close of the year 1802 was the most favorable period that had ever occurred, or that could occur, for the admission of the Peshwah as a party to the defensive alliance without a war.

‘ I have already stated my reasons for thinking that this measure was the only one that could be devised, in order to avoid the war which sooner or later must have occurred with all the Marhatta powers, in the support and defence of the Nizam; and the Author of the “ Observations ” has pointed out with great truth and accuracy the sentiments of the Court of Directors, and of the Government at home, on the subject of the admission of the Peshwah to the defensive alliance.

‘ It is true, that the Court of Directors do not appear to have had a very distinct knowledge of the objects of the defensive alliance; and, like the Author of the “ Observations,” supposed that it was founded upon the triple alliance of 1790, to defend the allies against Tippoo, who was no more. However, whatever may have been the reasons of the approbation of the Court of Directors, and of the authorities at home, they approved the measure, and ordered the Governor General, according to the Author of the “ Observations,” to carry it into execution.

‘ Surely it will not be denied, that if the Governor General had passed over the opportunity which offered at the end of the year 1802, he would have been guilty of the most flagrant disobedience of orders and dereliction of his own principles and measures, repeatedly reviewed by himself, and by the first authorities in India and in England.

‘ If the Governor General had omitted to take advantage of the opportunity which presented itself at the close of the year 1802, I think the most probable result would have been a war with the Poonah state, under the government of Holkar and Amrut Rao; and it is not improbable, but that the



war might have extended to the whole of the Marhatta states.

‘ The British Government might, on this plan of proceeding, have collected their armies, and have remained upon the frontier to watch the course of the proceedings, as recommended by the Author of the “ Observations;” or they might have passed over, as unworthy of notice, every thing that was doing at Poonah, and have delayed to take any steps, till the moment at which they or their allies should be attacked.

‘ I cannot exactly discern the object in assembling the army upon the frontier, if it was to do nothing. The most expensive article in India is an army in the field, and the most useless is one destined to act upon the defensive. An army, in a state of preparation to act offensively when opportunity shall offer, is indeed useful; and I believe no army ever seized so favorable an opportunity as that which marched to Poonah in March and April, 1803. But the Author of the “ Observations” says that we ought to have concerted our arrangements with Scindiah; that we ought to have offered a disinterested mediation, and to have acted in concert with Scindiah at one time, and at another with the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I have already shown, and the Author of the “ Observations” acknowledges, that the British Government were encouraged, nay, strongly urged, by all the principal Marhatta powers, among others by Holkar himself, to interfere in the settlement of the Peshwah’s affairs.

‘ In respect to a concert, the Author of the “ Observations” forgets the difficulty and length of every communication to be made with the chief who was to be party to the concert. Supposing that it had been possible to bring Scindiah into our measures, the direct object of which was to take the Nizam out of his reach, and to deprive him of all objects of ambition in the Deccan, it would still have taken six months before the Commander in Chief in the army could receive the orders of the Governor General to advance to Poonah, even if the diplomatic agent, charged with the negotiations with Scindiah, should have had occasion to make only two references to the Governor General.

‘ But in this case, the objects of the British Government,

of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, would have been entirely different. That of the British Government would have been to restore the Peshwah to the exercise of his authority, independently of any of the feudatory Marhatta chiefs, in order that his Highness might perform his treaty with the Company in favor of the Nizam: that of Scindiah would have been to restore the government of the Peshwah, in order that he might usurp and exercise its authority, and revive the old claims and objects of ambition in the Deccan: and, as far as it is possible to form a judgment of the course of politics of any Marhatta, the Rajah of Berar favored Holkar's usurpation at Poonah, and the establishment of the new government to be founded upon it.

‘Supposing that it had been possible, by placing the treaty of Bassein on a broader basis, as proposed by the Author of the “Observations,” to induce Scindiah to agree to its only important stipulation, viz., that of the mediation and arbitration of the Marhatta claims, in the Peshwah's name, upon the Nizam, it would have become a question of considerable importance to the British Government to decide, whether that chief should be allowed to resume his situation at Poonah, and to usurp all the power and authority of the Peshwah's government.

‘It must be recollected that Scindiah's usurpation of his power must have been preceded by the defeat of Holkar's army in the Deccan. Scindiah's power was already established in the whole of Hindustan and Malwa. The reduction of Holkar's force, and the re-establishment at Poonah of Scindiah's power, would then have replaced Marhatta affairs in the situation in which they had been since the death of Madhoo Rao Narain, from which they had been relieved by a variety of unforeseen events. One powerful Marhatta chief, with a French force as his principal support, would have possessed all the territory, influence, or power, from the sources of the Ganges to the Toombuddra; the situation of affairs which all Indian politicians have deprecated, since the British nation have had any thing to do with Indian politics.

‘It is therefore very probable, that the British Government and Scindiah would not have agreed in a detailed concert for the settlement of the Peshwah's government, and

it is certain that they would not have agreed with the Rajah of Berar.

‘ In this diversity of opinions and objects, the negotiations would have been protracted possibly more than a year. In all military operations, but particularly in India, time is every thing ; and I am decidedly of opinion, that if we had not seized the opportunity which was taken, the march to Poonah would never have been effected.

‘ If the British Government had hesitated in the measures which it should have adopted, Amrut Rao would have consented to the arrangement proposed for his son. This boy would have been placed upon the musnud with the title of Peshwah. The southern chiefs would soon have submitted to Holkar. Although immediately belonging to the Peshwah, they are generally connected with Amrut Rao, and that party in the state which favors his pretensions : and Holkar had already detached troops, and adopted other measures to reduce them ; and he would have extended his authority to the frontiers of Mysore.

‘ We should then have seen at Poonah the Peshwah’s government administered by the ablest Marhatta in the civil affairs of the empire, and served by a most formidable army, commanded by the most enterprising chief. This army, however, would have had no means of support, for the revenues of the Peshwah’s country are already assigned to the jaghiredars and chiefs in the southern districts, who, if they had not been certain of British assistance, would have submitted to Holkar, and would have joined his army with their troops. Holkar would have been under the necessity of keeping his army together, and after the southern chiefs would have submitted, he must have attacked the Nizam or the Company in order to support his troops.

‘ It was well known that when Holkar was at Poonah, he was collecting documents to enforce the pretended claims of the Poonah state upon the Nizam ; and that every discontented pretender of every description from the territories of the Company, or the Company’s allies, was received with distinction, and encouraged to hope for the assistance of Holkar’s armies, in enforcing his pretensions to portions of those territories.

‘ While the British Government would have been wasting



its time and resources, according to the plan of the Author of the "Observations," with an army upon the frontier, and in a vain attempt to frame a concert with Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar, Holkar would have attained the greatest degree of strength.

We have seen that the Rajah of Berar favored Holkar's usurpation at Poonah. Scindiah certainly was adverse to it; but I doubt much whether Scindiah could have done any thing against Holkar. Scindiah certainly would have done nothing without bringing his brigades to Poonah. The country had been already destroyed in a great measure by Holkar, and the destruction would have been completed if Scindiah had attempted to move. It may be said that he moved his brigades afterwards into the Deccan, for the purpose of opposing the British Government, and that he might equally have moved them to Poonah, to destroy the power established by Holkar's usurpation. But in answer, I observe, that an operation of this description is very different when opposed by British troops, and when opposed by such an army as Holkar's. The former do not, and indeed have not the means, of destroying the country. To destroy the country is the only mode of warfare of the latter, and it is certain that this mode would have been adopted by Holkar to prevent Scindiah from entering the Deccan.

'If it be true, as I have supposed, that the concert preferred by the Author of the "Observations" could not have been formed; if the Rajah of Berar favored Holkar's usurpation at Poonah, and if Scindiah could not have advanced his troops into the Deccan, it is my opinion that the result of the negotiations would have been a combination of all the Marhatta states to attack the Company and the Nizam.

'In the negotiations for the proposed concert, the British Government must have kept aloof from the new government at Poonah. Neither our principles, nor our practice, permit us to encourage, by marks of favor or kindness, an usurpation, while we are negotiating with other powers the means of destroying it. But in this instance the state of our negotiations must have been known to those against whom they were to be directed. There is no secret in a Marhatta durbar, and it may be depended upon that this secret, above all others, would have transpired. Then would have



commenced a counterplot, conducted by certainly the ablest Marhatta in the empire, I mean Amrut Rao.

‘In considering a question of this kind, respecting the remote consequences of any particular line of policy which never was adopted, it is not possible to do more than to state the general principles and opinions of the parties concerned, their conduct upon other occasions, and to draw from those premises a conclusion respecting their conduct in the supposed case.

‘There can be no doubt whatever that the great object of every Marhatta statesman has been to combine their force to attack the British Government: and if they had ever been free from disputes among themselves, they would have carried that plan into execution. The person whom I believe, of all the Marhattas, to have been the most determined enemy to the British Government, and who was the soul of this plan, was the Rajah of Berar. This person would have been the centre of the negotiations for the concert, supposing that the Governor General had adopted the plan of the Author of the “Observations;” and, on the other hand, he would have been the instrument of Amrut Rao’s counterplot to support his own usurped authority.

‘We have seen the Rajah of Berar, under circumstances very unfavorable, negotiate a peace between Scindiah and Holkar, for the purposes of a combination against the Company. The question is, whether, supposing the British Government had not brought back the Peshwah to Poonah, and had followed the plan of the Author of the “Observations,” he would not have had in his hands materials which would have enabled him to effect that pacification with greater ease than he effected that under which the combination was formed in the summer of 1803.

‘The loss which Scindiah sustained by the subversion of the Peshwah’s government was power and influence. He lost no territory in consequence of Holkar’s victories. Those which he had in the Deccan remained with him till he went to war with the Company.

‘On the other hand, Holkar had claims to the possession of his family in Malwa, and to certain portions of territories which Madhajee Scindiah had conquered in Hindustan. In the pacification, which was effected through the mediation of

the Rajah of Berar in the summer of 1803, with a view to the combination against the Company, all these territories and claims were ceded by Scindiah to Holkar.

‘We have already seen that Scindiah, singly, would have found himself unable to do any thing against Holkar in the Deccan ; and, on the other hand, the British Government, according to the plan of the Author of the “Observations,” would have done nothing excepting in concert with Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar. We have seen that Scindiah’s object in restoring the Peshwah’s government would have been again to usurp its authority, and to assert its claims, and revive the old plans of ambition in the Deccan. Ours would have been to make the Peshwah so independent of all the Marhatta powers, as that he would have been able to perform his treaty with the Company in favor of the Nizam ; that of the Rajah of Berar would have been to establish and support the new government formed by Holkar’s and Amrut Rao’s usurpation.

‘These discordant views were to be reconciled by negotiation, before the British Government could have taken any step to overcome Holkar ; and these negotiations must have been attended by all the tediousness which is the usual consequence of references to Calcutta.

‘Amrut Rao and the Rajah of Berar would, in the mean time, have endeavored to bring about a peace on the basis of Holkar’s cession of his territories and claims in Malwa, &c. ; of Scindiah’s acknowledgment of the new Peshwah, and the state of affairs established at Poonah ; and of a combination of the whole Marhatta nation to enforce their claims upon the Nizam, the Nabob vizier, and the Company.

‘We have seen that the negotiations for the concert with Scindiah would have turned upon the degree of power which Scindiah was to have at Poonah, after the Peshwah’s government should be restored. The object of the British Government would have been that the Peshwah should be independent ; that of Scindiah to have the whole power of the state in his hands, and he would have been aware that the British Government would never consent to that arrangement.

‘In this state of affairs he would have had to choose

whether he would co-operate with the British Government in restoring the Peshwah's government, in rendering it independent of himself, and in removing all its vexatious claims upon the Nizam; or whether he would leave the power at Poonah in the hands of Holkar and Amrut Rao, keeping peaceable possession of what he had in Malwa, Hindustan, and the Deccan.

‘In either case the power at Poonah would have been lost to him : and he would have derived no advantage from the arrangement with the British Government, excepting the gratification of his enmity against Holkar. On the other hand, by the pacification with Holkar, and the combination with the British Government, he would have adopted a favourite and popular plan among the Marhattas, in the execution of which he would have played the principal part; and if it had been successful, he would have been the greatest gainer.

‘I have no doubt respecting the choice which Scindiah would have made; and I declare that I conceive that peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and a combination upon the basis supposed, would have included more interests, and would have been more practicable than that which was formed in the summer of 1803.

‘If the British Government had remained warned, and a tacit spectator of events in the Marhatta empire, the result would probably have been the same. Holkar would certainly have been obliged to spread his armies into the Nizam's country for subsistence, and we must eventually have been at war. But as we should not have been actively employed in negotiations for a concert against the new government at Poonah, it is possible that Amrut Rao might not have thought it necessary to commence his administration by combining all the Marhattas against us. Nothing, however, would have been able to destroy the new government; and whenever the peace between Scindiah and Holkar should have been effected, the British Government and its allies would have been attacked.

‘In the consideration of this part of the question, I have omitted purposely to introduce any reference to the French. It must not, however, be forgotten, that at the time the Governor General decided on the part which he would take

in the Marhatta affairs at the end of the year 1802, he had every reason to expect the arrival of the French in India; and I leave those who shall peruse this Memorandum to judge, how much this event would have increased the difficulties of a protracted and complicated negotiation, against which one of the parties would have been plotting with Amrut Rao and Holkar.

‘I may, therefore, conclude that the treaty of Bassein, and the measures adopted in consequence of it, not only afforded the best prospect of preserving the peace of India, but that to have adopted any other measures would have rendered war with Holkar nearly certain, and war with the whole Marhatta nation more probable, than it could have been under any other course of events.

‘Having now considered the general policy of admitting the Peshwah as a party to the treaty of general defensive alliance, and the policy of concluding the treaty of Bassein at the time at which it was concluded, and of the measures which were adopted in consequence of that treaty, I come to consider the particular articles of that treaty, to which the Author of the “Observations” objects, and the nature of his objections to them.

‘I have already pointed out that the object of the Company in concluding any arrangement with the Peshwah, was to secure the Nizam against the vexatious claims which might be made upon him, either by the Peshwah or by one of the great chiefs acting in his name, and under the authority of the government of Poonah. It is obvious that the Company’s object could not have been gained, unless the Peshwah should agree, either to give up entirely the claims upon the Nizam, or to admit the mediation and arbitration of the Company in deciding on the justice of those claims.

‘To have insisted on the Peshwah relinquishing his claims entirely would have been an unjust and arbitrary proceeding, which would probably have occasioned the loss of the whole treaty. The only mode, therefore, which remained, was to insist upon establishing the mediation and arbitration of the Company, as the mode of deciding all questions of disputes and claims between the two powers.

‘The Company were bound to the Nizam to settle the



questions and claims existing on the part of the Peshwah or his Highness's government.

‘ It does not appear practicable for the Company to be bound in a defensive alliance with both governments without stipulating to arbitrate their disputes; and this will appear more clearly, when the events are recollected which have occurred since the year 1792.

‘ In respect to the article by which it is required that a body of troops should be stationed within the territories of the Peshwah, this will appear the more necessary, when the situation of the Peshwah's government, in relation to the other great Marhatta powers, is considered.

‘ The object of these powers, as stated by the Author of the “ Observations,” was to get possession of the Peshwah's government at Poonah. The attainment of this object, it is very evident, must have defeated the great view which the British Government must have had in admitting the Peshwah at all to become a party to the general defensive alliance.

‘ As soon as Scindiah, or Holkar, should have established themselves at Poonah, they would immediately have revived the old claims upon the Nizam: and the Peshwah without power would have been unable to execute his own treaty. The question then upon this part of the subject comes to be, whether the Peshwah is more likely to be able to maintain his independence, in relation to the other great chiefs of the empire, by having the troops stationed in his territory, or by having the force subdivided by himself stationed in the territories of the Company.

‘ Upon this point I have to observe, that in order to defend the Peshwah against the attempts of either of those chiefs, to establish an influence at his durbar by means of an armed force, it would be necessary to bring the troops from a great distance, and they would have to arrive and operate in a country in which no magazines or establishments would have been formed for them.

‘ I can have no doubt respecting the expediency, as a military question, of establishing the subsidiary force within the Peshwah's territories. As a political question, I consider that, inasmuch as the subsidiary troops, being on the spot, would provide a force ready at all times to support the Pesh-

wah's power, to hire them in that situation would be more likely to prevent attempts to influence his durbar, by force of arms, which must occasion war, than to station them in the Company's territories.

‘In respect to the notion of the Author of the “Observations,” that by extending the basis of the treaty of Bassein, it might be hoped to include some of the other great Marhatta powers, I have to observe, that the object is to make the Peshwah powerful in his own government, so that he may be able to keep his treaty with us.

‘I have already shown that there was no ground for hope that any of the great chiefs would consent to any arrangement which would place the power at Poonah out of their reach; and nothing short of such an arrangement would answer our purpose. It would not be desirable that any of them should become parties to the defensive alliance, if the great object of our policy should be defeated by that measure.

‘In this view of the question, it is scarcely necessary to advert to the assertion of the Author of the “Observations,” that a subsidiary alliance such as that formed in 1768 with the Nizam is most applicable to the situation of the Peshwah and his territories. The independence of the Peshwah's power is our object; and that we must effect by whatever means we may have in our power; but if it were necessary to the argument, I could point out that the Peshwah is a power much nearer to us, and who touches us upon many more important parts than the Nizam does.

‘When considering this objection to the 4th article of the treaty of Bassein, it is necessary that I should advert to the objection of the Author of the “Observations,” that, by placing the troops in the territories of the Peshwah, it is necessary to increase the number of European troops in India; and that Great Britain cannot afford to supply the number of European troops required for the service in India.

‘The 4th article does not specify that European troops shall be stationed in the Peshwah's territories; and, therefore, the objection does not apply to the treaty of Bassein. It is perfectly true that in the important services in which the Company's troops may be engaged, on the part of the

Peshwah, European troops may be necessary : but as those services must equally have been performed, if the troops had been stationed in the Company's territories, European troops would equally be necessary.

‘But the Author of the “Observations” has not supposed that an increase of European troops would be required on the ground, that their services might be necessary in the Peshwah's territories ; but on a general calculation of certain proportions of European to native troops in India in general.

‘In the first place, the increase of European troops would be necessary on this ground also, whether the subsidiary force were or were not stationed in the territories of the Peshwah, the native army must still have been increased (unless, indeed, it should be proposed to take the Peshwah's subsidy, and not furnish him with any troops), and the number of European troops must likewise have been increased, in order to keep up the due proportion. But in the second place, this calculation of proportions of European to native troops is entirely erroneous, and does not exist in the mind of any man who has ever conducted or considered the details of any service in India. If the proportion does exist, on what calculation is it founded ? In what part of India is it practically carried into execution ?

‘In almost all services in India, it is necessary certainly that there should be some European troops ; but the number, in proportion to the native troops employed on the same services, must vary according to the nature of the service required, and the description of the enemy against whom it is directed.

‘For instance, in the wars against Tippoo Sultaun, the proportions of European to native troops were about one third in the first, and one fourth in the second. In the late war against the Marhattas, the numbers of Europeans employed in proportion to natives was not more than one tenth or one eleventh.

‘I certainly agree with the idea of the Author of the “Observations” so far, that a body of 8000 or 10,000 native troops ought never to be assembled without some Europeans, for very obvious reasons ; but as there are few such collections of troops in India, I should conceive that I

founded my calculations upon erroneous principles, and deceived those to whom I should communicate them, if I should, upon this opinion, state that the European troops ought to be in the proportion of one eighth or one tenth to the native troops throughout the Indian establishment. Thousands of native troops must necessarily be employed in garrisons in the interior, and on various duties, in which it would be very inconvenient to employ Europeans; and, on the other hand, Europeans are absolutely necessary in certain garrisons, stations, and services, in some cases, in equal proportions: in others, one third of the number of natives.

‘The only safe mode, therefore, of forming an opinion respecting the number of European troops required in India, is to call for and examine details: and if this mode should be adopted, it will be found that the treaty of Bassein does not add, and does not render it necessary to add, one European infantry soldier to the establishments in India.

‘In respect to the increase of the European troops in India in general, it is my opinion that it will be found that they are not more numerous at this moment than they were in 1790, 1791, and 1792.

‘According to the detailed distributions which I have seen, the number of regiments of European infantry, now required for the continent of India, is twenty, including those of the Company’s regiments: viz. six for Bengal, ten for Madras, including one for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and four for Bombay, including one for Goa. This is the peace establishment. In the years 1790, 1791, and 1792, there were of King’s infantry in India nine regiments, two regiments of Hanoverians, six Company’s regiments in Bengal, four at Madras, and two at Bombay, making altogether twenty-three regiments. The artillery at the different presidencies were nearly of the same strength with the artillery at present.

‘At all events, if an increase of European troops is necessary, which in my opinion it is not beyond twenty regiments complete, of 1000 rank and file, the necessity of this increase must not be attributed to the treaty of Bassein.

‘In respect to the proposal that the treaty of Bassein



should be altered in this article, viz., that the troops should be removed from the Peshwah's territories, I have reason to know that his Highness would be exceedingly alarmed, if the proposal were made to him, and that it is more than probable he would move with the troops.

‘ I have now to consider the objections of the Author of the “ Observations ” to the 12th and 17th articles of the treaty of Bassein; by the first of which the Peshwah is bound to abide by the Company's mediation and arbitration in all cases; and by the last, not to commence any negotiation, without giving previous notice to the Company's Government.

‘ In order to understand clearly the object of these articles, it is necessary to consider the nature and constitution of the contracting parties, to examine their political objects and systems, to see by what rules or systems of policy they are respectively bound, and in what manner affected by their respective connexions with other sovereign authorities.

‘ European governments were, till very lately, guided by certain rules and systems of policy, so accurately defined and generally known, that it was scarcely possible to suppose a political event, in which the interest and conduct of each state would not be as well known to the *corps diplomatique* in general, as to the statesmen of each particular state.

‘ The Asiatic governments do not acknowledge and hardly know of such rules and systems. Their governments are arbitrary, the objects of their policy are always shifting; they have no regular established system, the effect of which is to protect the weak against the strong: on the contrary, the object of each of them separately, and of all of them taken collectively, is to destroy the weak; and if by chance they should, by a sense of common danger, be induced for a season to combine their efforts for their mutual defence, the combination lasts only so long as it is attended with success, the first reverse dissolves it; and, at all events, it is dissolved long before the danger ceases, the apprehension of which originally caused it.

‘ There cannot be a stronger proof of this defect of policy in the Asiatic governments than the dissolution of the combination of the year 1790, between the English, the Marhattas, and the Nizam, by the attack of the Marhattas upon the Nizam in the year 1795.

‘ These observations apply to the government of the Marhattas, more than to any other of the Asiatic governments. Their schemes and systems of policy are the wildest of any. They undertake expeditions, not only without viewing their remote consequences upon other states, or upon their own, but without considering more than the chance of success of the immediate expedition in contemplation.

‘ The Company’s government in India, the other contracting party to their alliance, is one bound by all the rules and systems of European policy. The Company’s power in India is supposed to depend much upon its reputation: and although I do not admit that it depends upon its reputation, as distinguished from its real force, as appears to be contended by some, I may say that it is particularly desirable for a government, so constituted as the Company’s, never to enter upon any particular object, the probable result of which should not be greatly in favor of success.

‘ Besides this, the Company’s government in India is bound by acts of parliament not to undertake wars of aggression, not to make any but defensive alliances, and those only in cases in which the other contracting party shall bind itself to defend the possessions of the Company actually threatened with hostilities.

‘ The Company’s government in India are also connected with his Majesty’s Government, and, as an Asiatic power, are liable to be involved in wars with European powers possessing territories in India, whenever his Majesty shall be at war with those powers.

‘ The picture above drawn of the state of politics among Asiatic powers, proves that no permanent system can be adopted, which will preserve the weak against the strong, and will keep all for any length of time in their relative situations, and the whole in peace; excepting there should be one power which, either by the superiority of its strength, its military system, or its resources, shall preponderate and be able to protect all. This is proved by the last fourteen years. The Company has been the preponderating power: and, by the second article of the treaty of Bassein, has, in so many words, taken the Peshwah under its protection.

‘ I might contend that the stipulations of the 12th and 17th articles are only consequences of the protection pro-

mised and really afforded. But in my opinion, these stipulations are the necessary consequence of the alliance between a power, such as the Peshwah's, and one such as the Company's; bound by rules of policy, acts of parliament, and by the acts of his Majesty's Government.

‘ It would be impossible to define the various claims and grounds for war, existing not only between the Peshwah and the Nizam, but between the Peshwah and all the other powers of India.

‘ The Marhattas claim the Choute of all India, and all the claims of this description centre in the Peshwah's authority. Besides this general claim, there are others of various descriptions and denominations upon every power, of all of which there are records at Poonah; and it is a mistake to suppose that the Peshwah, however weak in point of troops and resources, will not find persons in the Marhatta empire ready and willing to enforce these claims in his name.

‘ All the warfare which would be the consequence of bringing forward these claims, will be prevented by the stipulation that the Company should mediate and arbitrate in every case.

‘ But the Author of the “ Observations ” says, that the benefit to be derived from the 12th article ought to have been left to the operation of the British influence in the Peshwah's councils, and ought not to have been the subject of a treaty.

‘ To this objection to the article in question, the best answer is to state the fact: viz., that notwithstanding the right which we have required by treaty to mediate between the Peshwah and other powers, and the influence which we have in his councils by that stipulation, and a variety of events which have occurred since the treaty of Bassein was concluded, it is not so easy as the Author of the “ Observations ” imagines, at all times to prevent the evils which must result from the Peshwah enforcing his claims.

‘ The Author of the “ Observations ” says, that if the Peshwah should, contrary to our advice and opinion, commence an unjust war, he ought not to be supported by the British Government. This is perfectly true: but the object of the 12th article is to prevent the possibility of unjust wars, and to preserve the Peshwah's government from the destruc-



tion which must be the consequence of his entering into any war without the Company's assistance. This article is the bond of peace to India. It is this which renders the treaty really defensive, and makes the Governor General responsible for every war in which the British Government may be engaged. If this article were not in the treaty, the Peshwah would be the responsible person.

‘ If the general mediation on the part of the Company be necessary to ensure peace, there is certainly no occasion that the Peshwah should be in communication with other independent powers. All his foreign affairs must be transacted and ultimately settled by the Company, and any other communication must be intended only for sinister purposes.

‘ The stipulation of the 17th article is necessary in order to enable the British Government to have a knowledge of, and stop at once, any intrigues which have a tendency to war. Those who have seen the course of proceeding of a Marhatta durbar will not be at a loss to find reasons for this stipulation; and, in fact, even this stipulation cannot entirely check the intrigues which are its constant occupation. But the mode in which it will operate most beneficially will be, by checking intrigues with European powers; and surely this cannot be deemed an inconsiderable object by the Author of the “ Observations.”

‘ The principle and foundation of the treaty of Bassein, which is protection from the Company's government to that of the Peshwah, would prevent the stipulation of the 17th article from being reciprocal. The Company's government must have communication with some powers with which the Peshwah never had any; and it would be very inconvenient to be obliged to lay these communications before the Peshwah's durbar. But it must be recollected that the Company are constantly liable, by the acts of his Majesty's prerogative, to be at war, or to hold communications, with European nations having territories in India; and it would be a curious proceeding to lay these communications before the Peshwah's durbar. This measure would be necessary if the stipulation of the 17th article were made reciprocal.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*Memorandum submitted to Mr. Duncan, Governor of Bombay, on the formation of the subsidiary Force at Poonah\*.*

‘ 12th July, 1804.

‘ 1. The point of the greatest importance to the government of Bombay, in the Governor General’s instructions of the 25th of May, is the establishment of the Bombay troops at Poonah, as the subsidiary force with the Peshwah. This measure will require various preparations and arrangements, the nature of which will be considered in this memorandum.

‘ 2. The equipment of a body of troops in Guzerat, eventually to be called the subsidiary force serving with Scindiah, is a matter, at present, of secondary consideration. First, because the equipments of troops are more easily collected in Guzerat than at Bombay; secondly, because there is already a large body in that quarter well equipped, which may eventually form the foundation of the force to be styled Scindiah’s subsidiary force; and thirdly, because the Governor General has given orders to the Commander in Chief to provide a body of Bengal troops, as Scindiah’s subsidiary force, till it shall be seen whether the Bombay government will have the means of supplying two such bodies as the Peshwah’s and Scindiah’s subsidiary forces, besides providing for their ordinary garrisons, and a subsidiary force for the Guickwar government.

‘ 3. The Governor General attaches great importance to the relief of the Bombay troops from the coast of Malabar; a measure which cannot be carried into execution till the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George shall be relieved from the territories of the Peshwah. The formation of the subsidiary force to be established in his Highness’s territories would appear, therefore, to be the first object for the attention of the government of Bombay.

‘ 4. The subsidiary force is to consist of six battalions, each consisting of 1000 rank and file; one company of artillery; and one company, or 100 pioneers, with their proper complement of ordnance and warlike stores.

‘ 5. After the 1st batt. 7th regiment shall have arrived at Poonah, the number of troops to be furnished will be five

\* This Memorandum is not inserted according to its date, but among the other papers relative to the British establishments of the army in India.

battalions, or 5000 men. And the artillery at present at Poonah, being 91 rank and file, to be completed to one company, and the Madras pioneers to be relieved by others belonging to the government of Bombay.

‘ 6. General Stuart will let Mr. Duncan know at what period he will be able to have the coast troops in Malabar or Canara, and at Goa; and what corps, and what stations will be first relieved; and Mr. Duncan will be able to send vessels for them according to the intelligence which he shall receive on this subject from General Stuart.

‘ 7. After the arrival of the corps at Bombay, the first thing to be done will be from the number of men that shall arrive, to complete as many battalions as possible with disciplined men.

‘ 8. The battalions on the coast of Malabar have only lately been completed with men; they were all weak before they received the last levies; and as there are no arms upon the coast, it is not very probable that much progress will have been made in the discipline of the recruits. I earnestly deprecate the sending into the Peshwah's territories more than 100 men in each battalion, who shall not be thoroughly trained as soldiers. It is to be expected that this corps will be immediately and constantly employed; to compose it of recruits may have the worst effects in respect to the national interests and reputation; besides the disgrace and inconvenience of the desertion of a large body of men, which will be the certain consequence of not composing the battalions which will serve the Peshwah almost entirely of old soldiers.

‘ 9. It will be necessary, therefore, in the first instance, to draft the old soldiers from one of the battalions which will first come up, to complete the others; and to place all the recruits of all the battalions, in the battalion from which the drafts will be taken.

‘ 10. The next subject for consideration is the equipment of the corps for the field. The commanding officers of native corps on the establishment of Fort St. George carry the camp equipage and regimental stores for their corps; an arrangement which is certainly convenient for the service, and, as far as I am able to judge, economical. However, it is one which could not be introduced into the establishment of the government of Bombay, without reference to the Court

of Directors. It will therefore be necessary to continue the present mode of carrying the camp equipage at the expense of the public; but I recommend that the tents should be carried upon camels instead of upon bullocks. This arrangement will be an economical one eventually, and will be attended by other advantages. A camel will carry three of the tents used by the Bombay army, with their poles, with great facility.

‘ 11. In respect to the camp equipage for the officers, I recommend that they should be obliged to show at muster their tents, and the carriage and attendants for them once a month. If this regulation should be made, the government ought to regulate the size and description of tents which the officers of each rank ought to have, and the carriage and attendants for them.

‘ 12. The corps on the Bombay establishment are particularly deficient in regimental establishments to supply the troops with water. During the late war, the bullocks, which carried water for the 78th regiment, were supplied by the public departments; and the number expended for this service, for want of the care of the watermen and bullock-drivers, is beyond all calculation; and the 78th was ill supplied with water after all. It would be a much better arrangement to give the adjutants of corps an allowance of twenty-six rupees per mensem, to supply two puckalie men and two bullocks with bags, for each company; the watermen, bullocks, bags, &c., to be mustered once a month, at the same time with the corps; and the bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps, and the letter W, to distinguish them from all others\*.

‘ 13. There is another establishment also much wanted with the corps of the Bombay army; and that is, one of bullocks to carry spare ammunition and intrenching tools, &c., of which I enclose a list which the corps ought always to have with it. It would be proper to give an allowance of — per mensem to the adjutants, or any subaltern officer

\* ‘ Upon reference to the regulations of the government of Bombay, I observe, that when a corps takes the field, a bullock is allowed to the puckalie for each company; for which he is paid four rupees per mensem. Is that pay the hire of the bullock, or in what light is it considered? I always considered that the hire of a bullock at Bombay was twelve rupees; and I know that the puckalies of the 78th regiment had the use of the public bullocks.—A. W.’

of corps, to provide bullocks and drivers for this service. These bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps, and the letter A; and to be mustered with their drivers once a month with the corps.

‘ 14. In respect to carriage for the sick, I am fully aware of the difficulties under which the government of Bombay must always labour in this part of their equipments, I would therefore recommend that the establishment of doolies, with each native corps, should be only four; but that waggons should be made at Bombay to carry twenty men of each corps, besides those for whom doolies will be provided. General Bellasis will be able to make a pattern waggon; if it could be done with convenience and without great expense, the waggons ought to be upon springs, and at all events covered from the weather. Their wheels and axletrees ought to be strong, and they ought to have a greater capacity of turning than the waggons which General Bellasis lately sent to Poonah. It is not a matter of much consequence what number of men each waggon is made to contain, although possibly six men would be the most convenient number.

‘ 15. The Governor General will probably send his orders hereafter, regarding the commanding officer and the staff of the subsidiary force; in the mean time, it is desirable that the whole should be left as they are. The establishments for each department, of which I enclose a statement, are formed upon the model of the establishments for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and they appear to me to be necessary.

‘ When the Bombay native infantry shall form the subsidiary force, it will be necessary to add an establishment of armourers to the department of commissary of stores; as those corps have no battalion armourers, and the repairs of their arms are always performed in the public stores.

‘ 16. General Stuart will possibly leave it optional with Mr. Duncan, to retain or to send down to the Carnatic the ordnance now with the Madras corps, when they shall be relieved. If he should leave the ordnance, the whole will require new carriages; and it will be easy to get, from the commanding officer of artillery, the dimensions of the guns,



in order that new carriages may be made. I recommend that their wheels and axletrees should be of great strength and solidity. In case General Stuart should not find it convenient to leave at Poonah the ordnance at present there, the ordnance which should be in the Peshwah's territories, for the service of the subsidiary force, are,

2	iron	18	pounders,
2	. .	12	. .
2	brass	12	. .
18	. .	6	. .
2	. .	5½	inch howitzers,

with their proportion of tumbrils; and five spare tumbrils for stores; thirty platform carts, and an artificer's cart, and eleven arrack carts.

‘ 17. The Commissary of Stores at Poonah has a general state of stores, which he ought to carry (exclusively of the stores for the heavy guns, which can be but seldom required, and must be the subject of a distinct arrangement when required), and there will be required one thousand bullocks, including their complement of spare cattle, of one to every six bullocks.

‘ 18. The bullocks which the Commissary of Stores has at present are hired cattle, on the principle of the Madras establishment. It is not very probable that the owners and masters of the cattle will remain at Poonah, when the troops belonging to Fort St. George shall be withdrawn. Indeed, I know that some of them, and indeed all those in the store department, have determined to come away with the troops; and I have already given it as my opinion, that they cannot be replaced in the Peshwah's territories or at Bombay.

‘ 19. But supposing that they could be replaced, or that they would stay, it is notorious that the worst mode of procuring bullocks for the public service, is to hire them; and the best is to have an establishment of bullocks and drivers, the property and in the service of the public; provided the persons composing it really know, or are taught, and are forced to perform their duty.

‘ 20. I am therefore induced, by every consideration, to recommend that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay, to the extent at least that will be necessary to carry the stores for the subsidiary force. I shall consider

hereafter the propriety of extending still further that establishment, and of forming one also of draught cattle.

‘ 21. If the establishment should be formed, it should be in regular karkanas, according to the system recommended in my letter to the Secretary of Government, of the 4th of November, 1803. The drivers entertained for these bullocks should be accustomed, at an early period, to bring in their forage. The bullocks of each karkana should be picketed in a separate line. They should receive their grain at the same time, and in the presence of the officer who will have the temporary charges of the department at Bombay. This officer ought also to see the forage which the drivers bring in for the cattle; and that the bullocks are rubbed down and cleaned every night. The drivers ought to be taught the mode of saddling, and of loading and driving cattle, and every thing which relates to the duty of a bullock driver.

‘ Unless those who have charge of the cattle understand these duties, the cattle are destroyed, and the public are obliged to incur the expense of replacing them.

‘ 22. I recommend that the troops of the subsidiary force should be fed, whenever they may be on active service, and when rice is not sold in the bazaar of the camp at twelve pice seers (each of two pounds) for a rupee, in the manner in which I fed the troops during the late war. They received their batta in money, and each man, besides, received half a seer, or a pound of grain.

‘ As rice was seldom at so low a rate as six seers a rupee, the public gained by this arrangement, in the mere expense of the rice issued to the troops, the expense of half the carriage which would have been required to carry rice to last the troops for an equal length of time supposing that a seer of rice had been issued to each man instead of batta; and I had the further advantage of not over-burdening the army with cattle. I therefore strongly recommend this system.

‘ 23. The number of bullocks which I have attached to the grain department of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah is 5000, although there are none in the grain department with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

‘ 24. The reason for which I have departed from the

model of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, in this instance, is, that there is a famine in the Deccan at present, the effects of which may be felt for some time; and I could not depend upon the Marhatta brinjarries in the same manner as I knew that the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam can upon those belonging to his Highness's territories. I have, however, lately suggested to Colonel Close the expediency of giving the Marhatta brinjarries a trial, from which Mr. Duncan will be able to judge whether they can be depended upon.

‘25. At all events, whether they can or not, I conceive that the quantity of grain, for the carriage of which I have above provided, is far more than will be necessary upon any future occasion. In ordinary times, when the subsidiary force will not move, it is probable that no establishment of grain bullocks will be necessary; particularly if Colonel Close should find that he can command the services of the Marhatta brinjarries upon the plan proposed, or upon any other plan. If he should not be able to command their services, a bullock establishment to carry rice, to feed the number of fighting men at the half allowance for thirty days, will be necessary. But as it is possible that the plan proposed in respect to the Marhatta brinjarries will answer, and as at all events, supposing it should not, it is probable that some of the Mysore and Madras bullock owners and mairies attached to the grain department may be prevailed upon to stay; I do not now propose that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay for the grain, as well as for the store department; although if it should be necessary to keep bullocks permanently to carry grain, in consequence of Colonel Close's being unable to depend upon the brinjarries, it will be necessary hereafter to form such an establishment.

‘26. In that case they ought to be formed regularly at Bombay, in the manner recommended for those of the store department.

‘27. The number of European troops will be so small, that there will be no difficulty, at any time, in arranging for the carriage of their provisions.

‘28. The number of draught bullocks which I have allotted for the service of the subsidiary force with the



Peshwah, as appears by the enclosed papers, is 1250; besides 100 belonging to Captain Douglas's old department, which I placed by the orders of the 2nd June under the charge of Major Spens.

‘ 29. After making a liberal allowance for all the carriages to be drawn, and allowing the usual number of spare, this number is 350 more than the number of carriages will require.

‘ 30. However, the service in the Marhatta territories will require great celerity and independence of movement, and it cannot be performed unless the commanding officer has the command of good cattle in high condition to draw his carriages. He may be obliged to be in the field during the monsoon. It must be expected that some cattle will die in that season, and yet the military operations must be continued. Besides the ordnance and store carriages, for which provision has been and must be made, I have recommended that waggons should be constructed for the carriage of the sick; they may require four or six bullocks each, and will increase the demand from 100 to 120 bullocks.

‘ 31. It is therefore my opinion, that the number of draught bullocks with the subsidiary force ought not to be less than 1300.

‘ 32. I know that the Mysore people who attend the draught bullocks now with the subsidiary force, will not stay in the Peshwah's territories after the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George shall come away. Indeed it would be unreasonable to expect that they should stay. Their families reside near Seringapatam, and they can purchase food and all the necessaries of life in Mysore, at one sixth of the price at which the same articles can ever be procured at Poonah.

‘ 33. Supposing, therefore, that it should be convenient to the government of Fort St. George to hand over to the government of Bombay the bullocks now at Poonah, it would be necessary that the government of Bombay should entertain persons and form an establishment of servants to attend upon the cattle.

‘ 34. My letter to the Secretary of Government of the 4th of November, 1803, communicated my opinion regarding the plan to be adopted to form a bullock establishment under



the government of Bombay; and I proceed now to detail the mode in which I recommend that that plan should be carried into execution, in reference to an establishment of draught bullocks for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah.

‘ 35. The number of karkanas which will be required will be 13, to be numbered accordingly. In my opinion the best place at which to collect the drivers and other servants, and of training them to their business, will be the head quarters of the subsidiary force. There are already a certain number of Marhatta drivers in the Mysore karkanas left at Poonah, which might be the foundation of the establishment.

‘ 36. I recommend that Mr. Duncan should correspond with Colonel Close upon this subject, and that he should desire that Major Robertson may be instructed to form an establishment of servants and drivers for 13 karkanas of draught bullocks. It is very probable that there may be at Bombay some old head bullock-drivers, whose services Major Robertson might require at the head of the karkanas to be formed; and if Colonel Close should ask for them they ought to be sent.

‘ 37. In this manner the establishment of servants and drivers may be formed upon the best model that we know of; and they will have the advantage of having trained cattle to attend to, and of seeing how the business is carried on.

‘ If the government of Fort St. George should require the cattle, they can be sent down with ease, and, as I observed in my letter of the 4th of November, 1803, when drivers and attendants are formed and trained, there is never any difficulty in procuring cattle.

‘ 38. It will not be possible to hire in the Marhatta territories, or at Bombay, servants and drivers of bullocks at the same rate of wages as those receive who belong to the Company's establishments in Mysore. On the other hand, it is very desirable for the Government, as well as for the officers of the army, that the wages of labor prevalent at Bombay should not be paid in the subsidiary force. I recommend, therefore, that Mr. Duncan should leave it to Colonel Close and Major Robertson to settle the rate of the wages of the different descriptions of servants and drivers who are to form the establishment of draught bullocks, but he must

take care to fix the wages of the drivers of the karkanas of carriage bullocks for the store department, which must be formed at Bombay, at the same rate; otherwise it will be necessary to raise the wages of the attendants and drivers belonging to the draught karkanas to the Bombay standard.

‘ 39. It will be impossible to form the carriage karkanas in camp. There are no carriage bullocks in camp on that establishment, and there is no model; and as the camp will be moving, it will not be possible to train the servants and drivers so well as they can be trained at Bombay.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

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*Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley relative to the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government.*

‘ Fort William, 2nd November, 1804.

‘ The late letters from the Resident at the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, show that the affairs of that Chief are in a very desperate state, and that but little, if any, assistance can be expected from him in the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, even if the Company's government should relieve his pecuniary distresses by such advances of money as it might be practicable to make at present.

‘ Indeed it is probable, and as the large bodies of horse which Scindiah had undoubtedly in the last war are no longer to be found, I suspect that the majority of his followers have already joined the standard of Holkar. Measures are now in progress which must end in the destruction of Holkar's power, however constituted, whether Scindiah is enabled to join in the effectual prosecution of the war or not. But after Holkar's power shall be destroyed, and particularly if he should escape alive, it will be necessary to re-establish the authority of Scindiah's government in Malwa, or there will be no peace.

‘ This must be done in three modes: first, by the assistance of a body of British troops; secondly, by advances of money, to enable Scindiah to collect about him again the old adherents of his family; and thirdly, by a public declaration from the British Government that they are determined that

Scindiah's authority should be re-established in Malwa ; and that those Rajahs and others who had heretofore paid him tribute (excepting always those freed from tribute by the operation of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum) should pay the arrears of tribute due, and all that might become due hereafter.

‘ In respect to the first mode, the subsidiary force for Scindiah will answer the purpose as soon as Holkar's power shall be destroyed. It ought to be placed under the direction of the Resident at Scindiah's durbar, in the same manner as the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan are under the Residents at the durbar of those princes respectively.

‘ In respect to the second mode, the attention of the Resident ought to be called, as soon as possible, to endeavor to devise the mode of procuring the money for Scindiah's use. The Resident should be accurately informed of the object of government in making the advance, and should be allowed to use his discretion respecting the amount to be advanced.

‘ No money ought to be advanced after the government of Scindiah shall become settled in Malwa, or that he shall recover any of the arrears of tribute due by the Rajahwary.

‘ The Resident at Scindiah's durbar might see an opportunity of making an advance of money with advantage before Holkar should be defeated ; and he ought to have a discretionary power to make such an advance. But the principal object of the advances to be made ought in my opinion to be to settle Scindiah's government, and to re-establish tranquility in Malwa.

‘ In respect to the third mode, it is my opinion that nothing ought to be made public on the subject till the war with Holkar shall be concluded, that is to say, till Holkar's power shall be completely and really destroyed.

‘ It is very obvious that these rajahs or their servants do not understand and are not aware of the benefits which they enjoy from their connexion with the Company. They suspect that government entertain some design which they have hitherto concealed ; that hereafter their situation will not be better than it was under the Marhattas ; and that they will have less chance than they had formerly of avoiding to pay their tribute.



‘ The connexion between the petty states and the Company must strengthen their governments: but the servants of all these governments are interested in preventing the growth of their strength; as, the moment they become strong, the peculations, exactions, and tyranny of their servants must cease.

‘ There is always a profit to the servants of one of these governments in the irregular payments to a Marhatta chief, however injurious and distressing they may be to the governments themselves.

‘ The connexion between the Company and these governments has therefore hitherto been an object of suspicion to the rajahs themselves, and odious to their servants. On the other hand, it has answered none of the objects which were in view when it was formed. Holkar has passed through the territories of the only one of the principal Rajahs with whom the Company is connected. He has not been opposed effectually; it is doubtful whether he has been opposed at all, or whether the Rajah of Jeypoor has not assisted him with money, &c.

‘ It does not appear, therefore, to be desirable to extend these alliances; and I doubt whether it would not be better for the Company to have nothing to do with any of these Rajahs.

‘ But whether the policy of forming the connexion was wise or otherwise, it appears that the Company have no right now to interfere to prevent Scindiah’s government from collecting the tribute due to him from those Rajahs who have omitted to connect themselves with us. The object of any future treaty with the Rajahs not already connected with us, supposing such treaty to be advisable, can be only the tribute due to or claimed by Holkar: but Scindiah’s tribute must be secured.

‘ Indeed I doubt whether it would be proper to treat for the exemption of the payment of Holkar’s tribute, after the promise made to Scindiah that he should have the whole of Holkar’s possessions north of the Taptee.

‘ It would be desirable, however, to take no decided steps, and to avoid publishing any opinion on the subject until the war with Holkar shall be concluded. I have already shown that the Rajahs themselves are not aware of the benefits



which they receive from their connexion with the Company, and do not feel confidence; and that their servants would prefer the former state of their masters' government to that of independence in which they have been placed by their treaties with the Company.

‘ But one of the instruments of confusion, the most powerful of the means which they have had of resisting the payment of the tribute, has been the collision between the houses of Holkar and Scindiah. This they would lose by the destruction of Holkar's power; and it is obvious that they would be interested in the support of it, and would probably take an active part in the war against us, if they were to learn that the result of that war was to be the immediate payment of their tribute, with all its arrears, to Scindiah's government.

‘ The mode then to be pursued would appear to be, to apprise the Resident at Scindiah's durbar of the intention of government that Scindiah should collect the whole tribute from the Rajahs not already connected with us, as soon as the war with Holkar should be concluded, and to leave it to his discretion to inform Scindiah's ministers of this intention or not as he may think proper.

‘ The advantage which Scindiah's government will derive from the right to collect the tribute from the Rajahwary will be, that he will have employment for an army, which the tributes will give them the means of paying. He will immediately appoint a sirdar to collect the tributes, which sirdar will gather a body of troops for that purpose; and then subsistence and employment will be given to a large number of the military class.

‘ It is possible that the Company may be obliged to give Scindiah assistance to collect the tributes, and this point ought to be left to the discretion of the Resident. But he will see how desirable it is for many reasons that the Company's troops should not be involved in these hostilities, and that Scindiah should have no other assistance than the Company's name, and the public declaration of their intention that he should have the tribute.

‘ While writing on this subject, I beg to suggest that, after the strength of Holkar's army shall be broken, either by a defeat or by a vigorous pursuit, a detachment of light troops

may be appointed, under the command of Captain Gardner, or any other active partisan, to pursue and get possession of Holkar's person. Besides the payment of the expenses of the detachment, Captain Gardner ought to have a large reward if he should succeed.

‘ The nature and strength of the detachment to be employed on this service, and indeed the whole question, might be referred to the Commander in Chief ; particularly whether it ought to have guns, or Company's troops, or a small body of regular cavalry with galloper guns.

‘ As Scindiah's government is in such a state of weakness, it may be depended upon that, unless some measure of this description be adopted to get possession of Holkar's person, he will remain at large, tranquillity will never be established in Malwa, and the whole business will be renewed.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

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*Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, relative to the Freebooter System in India.*

‘ Fort William, 2nd Nov., 1804.

‘ The letters which have been already laid before the Governor General have apprized him of the extent and danger of the freebooter system in India, and of the causes of the evil. The remedy would appear to be to find some employment for the numerous military classes in India. It is not reasonable to expect that persons of that description will adopt habits of industry ; and unless they have some military employment, they must remain a burthen upon the public. They will not enter into the Company's service, as the system of restraint necessary for our discipline and subordination is equally irksome to them with the habits of industry required for their subsistence in a civil capacity.

‘ The only remedy therefore is to find for them employment in the present system of India, of the same description which they have had heretofore ; and of this remedy, it may be said, that it will cure the evil by two modes : first, by giving employment to a number of persons, who must otherwise prey upon the public, as these persons will certainly

render some service, particularly against troops of the same description with themselves; secondly, by giving strength to the governments in alliance with or depending upon the Company.

‘ These governments are the Soubah of the Deccan, the Peshwah, Scindiah, the Guickwar state, the king. In respect to the Soubah of the Deccan, it is my opinion that, in consideration of the advantages which he gained by the last war, he ought to be required to support a body of Silladar horse, which should be gradually increased to the full number he is required by treaty to furnish to co-operate with the Company’s troops in war.

‘ He will naturally object to the measure, and will propose that, in order to carry it into execution, he may be assisted to confiscate jaghires, &c.

‘ But it may be observed to him that a body of troops of this description, which will strengthen his government so effectually, must prevent the disorders which have either really caused the diminution of his revenues, or have afforded to his aumils motives for withholding payment; that he will be able to curb his aumils and managers, and enforce the payment of the circar dues; and that, in fact, in a very short time, this body will pay its own expenses.

‘ At all events, the Soubah of the Deccan ought to be obliged to have some Silladar horse supported by the state, and paid with regularity; and the number might be increased in proportion as the benefits of the measure could be felt.

‘ The Peshwah cannot afford to keep any troops himself, but the measures already in progress under Mr. Strachey’s charge will support a large body of troops of this description in his Highness’s territories. As soon as the war with Holkar shall be concluded, the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah ought to be moved to the southward to enforce these measures, and in order to force the Rajah of Kolapoor to a settlement.

‘ The memorandum given to the Governor General this day respecting Scindiah’s government, points out a mode of giving employment and subsistence to troops of this description. Besides this, Scindiah ought to be urged constantly to keep up the number of troops required by treaty.



‘ The finances of the Guickwar state are so deranged, that I fear they cannot afford to keep any troops. However, Mr. Duncan’s attention ought to be drawn to this object, and he should be desired to fix, in concert with Major Walker, the military establishments which the Guickwar should support hereafter.

‘ A part of the sum of money to be allotted for the support of the king ought to be laid out for the support of a body of troops, and these ought to be Silladar horse.

‘ Besides these measures, which will provide for the subsistence of 30,000 or 40,000 men, and which will give a disposable force of those numbers to act against persons of a similar description, who are now living by plunder, others may be adopted in the Company’s territories, to . . .

*[The remaining part of this Memorandum is wanting, it having been mislaid in the Political Department at Fort William, as appears by a Letter from Major Shaue.]*

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*Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the Military Establishments of India.*

‘ Fort William, Nov., 1804.

‘ 1. On the 11th February, 1801, the Court of Directors wrote orders that the military establishment of Fort St. George should consist of seven regiments of European infantry and fourteen regiments of native infantry, including three regiments for the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

‘ 2. They ordered at the same time three European regiments and eight regiments of native infantry for the establishment of Bombay, under the notion that all above four of the latter would be paid for by the subsidies from the Rajah of Travancore, and the Nabob of Surat.

‘ 3. I shall advert hereafter to the European establishment for those governments. It does not appear that the Court of Directors have had before them any detailed statements of the want of troops when they gave these orders: but they have given them in an arbitrary manner, without considering at all the circumstances of the country to which they were intended to be applied.



‘ 4. In respect to the establishment of Fort St. George, it was not increased by these orders beyond that ordered in the year 1796, excepting to supply the subsidiary force for the Nizam. The establishment ordered in 1796 was eleven regiments, and one for the Nizam, if he should require one; that of 1801 was eleven regiments, and three for the Nizam. Yet in 1799 an addition was made to the Company’s territories of Coimbatour, of the districts bordering on the eastern ghauts (besides Canara and Soonda, for which provision was supposed to be made from the Bombay establishment); and the Company engaged, in consequence of a subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas from the Rajah of Mysore, to defend his territories and support his government.

‘ 5. As the Court of Directors have not condescended to particulars, it is impossible to say whether they adverted to the necessity of defending Mysore or not; but whether they did or not, three regiments were certainly necessary for the purposes of Mysore and Coimbatour, in addition to the old establishment necessary for the Carnatic and the Nizam’s subsidiary force.

‘ 6. After the letter of February, 1801, was written, the treaty of 1800 was concluded with the Soubah of the Deccan, by which a large territory was ceded, in perpetuity, in commutation of subsidy. The principle on which this territory was ceded, was that the Company should receive nearly double the amount of the sum paid as subsidy, in order to defray the expense of defending and governing the territory ceded: it cannot be denied that this territory would require troops.

‘ 7. Subsequently to the dispatch of this letter from the Court of Directors, the civil government of the Carnatic was transferred to the Company. The Nabob’s troops were discharged, and the duty which they had performed devolved upon those of the Company. This was a fresh demand for the services of troops, for which the advantages gained provided the means of payment.

‘ 8. These two last demands may be fairly stated to have occasioned a necessity for two regiments; and in this manner has the establishment of Fort St. George amounted to nineteen regiments.

‘ 9. In respect to the establishment of Bombay, the Court

of Directors have decided that two battalions in Malabar, and two battalions in Canara, are fully sufficient. That establishment has certainly never been sufficient, as the Court might see by referring to their records. But the Court have admitted of eight regiments on the Bombay establishment, and fortunately it has been possible to post a large portion of the force in Malabar.

‘ 10. Since these orders have been written, the following additional demands have been made upon the establishment of Bombay: viz., two battalions for Goa; four battalions, if they should be of their present strength of 700 men, and if 1000 men, three battalions for the Guickwar state. Only one regiment has been raised to make up this deficiency, so that there remain three battalions to be provided for.

‘ 11. Besides this deficiency, the subsidiary force at Poonah is paid for, and to be supplied either by the Government of Fort St. George or Bombay; and the territories ceded by the Guickwar, the Peshwah, and Scindiah in Guzerat, which altogether are of the value of fifty lacs of rupees, would appear to deserve some troops to take care of them.

‘ 12. Reckoning that these territories require only one battalion, the total deficiency of native infantry, for the payment of which provision is made (excepting for the two battalions at Goa, and one in the territories in Guzerat, for which twelve lacs at Baroach may be considered a fair equivalent), will amount to ten battalions.

‘ 13. I shall now consider the subject in reference to the detailed wants of each establishment, the only mode in which a question of this kind can be fairly considered.

‘ 14. The Guickwar subsidiary force must be 3000 men, or three battalions of Bombay troops; there must be two battalions of Bombay troops at Surat; and one battalion of Bombay troops at Baroach; six battalions of Bombay troops at Poonah; four at Bombay; and two at Goa: making the total of Bombay troops eighteen battalions, or nine regiments.

‘ 15. The battalions of Bombay infantry ought to be 1000 men in time of war at all events. Hereafter I shall give a memorandum regarding the mode of arranging the Guickwar subsidiary force.

‘ 16. General Stuart’s distribution of the army at Fort St.

George will require fifty four battalions, from which, if two battalions to be posted at Goa, and to be found, according to this plan, by Bombay, are subtracted, there will remain fifty two battalions. He has now thirty eight battalions, and if he should be authorised to raise five more regiments to make up for his deficiencies of Bombay troops, the deficiency in his distribution will be four battalions. These may be extra battalions until the orders of the Court of Directors shall have been received.

‘ 17. It is desirable that the orders for completing these five regiments should be given as soon as possible, as in their present state the extra battalions are useless ; and in the season of operations General Stuart will be deficient—in fact all the Bombay troops which will have been relieved ; and the five Madras battalions, still remaining at Poonah, whose return cannot be expected till the end of the year—making a total deficiency of fifteen battalions in an army of forty eight battalions, or nearly one third.

‘ 18. In respect to Europeans, the difference between the Court of Directors and General Stuart is not very great. They have given twenty battalions, and therefore we cannot tell on what they have founded their calculation. But since they have made it, one regiment has been given to the Nizam, for which he makes provision, and the ceded districts certainly require one, and may be fairly estimated as supplying the means of paying one. General Stuart’s estimate is eleven regiments, including Goa. If Goa is to be supplied by Bombay, the number demanded by General Stuart is reduced to ten regiments, which is only one regiment more than is allowed by the Court of Directors, adding one for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and one for the ceded districts, both of which are paid for.

‘ 19. The Court of Directors have fixed three regiments of Europeans as the establishment for Bombay, including one for Goa. There ought to be four, of which number two ought to be at Bombay, one at Goa, and one to the northward.

‘ 20. In respect to cavalry at Fort St. George, the original establishment in 1796 was four regiments ; since that time the Nizam has paid for two regiments, and the Peshwah for one regiment. There are now eight regiments, so that the



increase of the establishment is one regiment since the year 1796. Of all the increases of establishments which have been made, and which are now necessary, this is the only one which it appears to me not to have been paid for by subsidies from the native powers, and this may be fairly counted as provided for by the revenues of Coimbatore, &c.

‘ 21. It may be urged against this statement, if no increase has been made to the army, not provided for, how came the military expenses of Fort St. George to be still such a burthen on the finances ? I answer, because Fort St. George has now the burthen of defending Malabar, which Bombay formerly had.

‘ In case this Memorandum should be approved of, it would be desirable to acquaint Mr. Duncan of the alteration of the arrangement respecting Scindiah’s subsidiary force and Goa ; and to adopt General Stuart’s distribution for the territories of Fort St. George, and to order the increase of the establishment.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

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*Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, on the Rank of Colonel, from four new regiments being raised for the Presidency of Fort St. George.*

‘ Fort William, November, 1804.

‘ When the four new regiments shall be raised at Fort St. George, Lieut. Colonel Wallace will be superseded, particularly by two officers, Lieut. Colonels Hallyburton and Macleane, doing duty in the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, and at this moment immediately under his command.

‘ It will therefore be desirable to send orders to the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George, to appoint Colonel Wallace a Colonel in the army of Fort St. George, of the same date with Colonels Hallyburton and Macleane.

‘ I observe that Colonel Carlisle of the Artillery is dead, and Lieut. Colonel Bell of the Artillery will consequently be promoted to be a Colonel. He is a Lieut. Colonel of the year 1801 : and consequently junior, not only to Lieut. Colonel Wallace, but to many other officers, both of the



King's and Company's service under the government of Fort St. George.

‘ The Lieut. Colonels in the King's service, senior to Lieut. Colonel Bell, will have claims to promotion under the orders recently received from England, and they will supersede by this promotion Lieut. Colonels of the Company's army senior to them.

‘ Either the orders above referred to must not be construed as applicable to the promotions in the Company's artillery or cavalry, or engineers, as they will create much discontent in the Company's army, and fresh complaints and references from the officers, all of which ought to be avoided ; or the orders from England ought to be applied to the Lieut. Colonels in the Company's, as well as in the King's service, in instances in which the Company's Lieut. Colonels of one branch of their service should supersede those of another.

‘ It is my opinion, that the last would be the best mode of settling the question. It would remove all discontents and jealousies respecting the operation of the orders from England, and would leave every officer of the King's and the Company's army in the situation, in respect to rank, in which he would have been placed by his promotion to the rank of Lieut. Colonel.

‘ If this plan should be adopted, it would be necessary for the Commander in Chief to send orders to General Stuart, to desire him to give local temporary rank to Lieut. Colonels of the Company's army, as well as of the King's, when any of the former should be superseded by the promotion of Lieut. Colonels of any particular branch of the service.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

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*Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, as to Colonels of Artillery when Major Generals being competent to be placed on the Staff of the Army.*

‘ Fort William, November, 1804.

‘ Shortly after I quitted Bombay, in the month of May last, a question was agitated at the Council, regarding the propriety of leaving the command of the artillery in the hands of Major General Bellasis ; and the propriety of

placing that officer on the Staff; upon which subjects, Mr. Duncan having required my opinion, I gave it to him, as nearly as I can recollect, to the following purport:—

‘ I do not recollect any regulation in the King’s service, which prevents officers having the rank of general officers from doing duty with their regiments. It is not customary to require that they should do regimental duty, and leave of absence is generally given to them ; but I apprehend that, unless they had that leave of absence, they would be obliged to join and do duty with their corps equally with other officers. They are returned absent by his Majesty’s leave.

‘ The regulations of the Company’s army are different. They say positively, that a general officer is not to join the corps to which he may be regimentally attached ; but it is my opinion, that this regulation was never intended to apply to the officers of the corps of artillery.

‘ In the first place, the commandant of the artillery has duties of far greater importance to the public in all the Presidencies, in India, than attach to the Colonel of any regiment. He is a member of the military board, he is at the head of all the ordnance departments, acting under the orders of his Presidency. The arsenal, the laboratory, the ordnance carriages, and the ordnance on the works at the Presidency in particular, are under his immediate superintendence, and all these are duties performed by the Master General of the Ordnance in England, and appear not unworthy of the attention of a general officer in the Company’s army at each of their Presidencies.

‘ But the annexed extract from the orders of the Court of Directors, of January, 1796, show that the Court contemplated the possibility that a general officer might be commandant of the artillery ; and accordingly, they have provided an allowance for him, when he should not be on the staff. I therefore conclude, that the duties of commandant of the artillery are not unworthy of the rank of a general officer ; and that the Company’s orders and regulations contemplate the possibility that a general officer may be employed in that situation.

‘ It may be said, that if a general officer is employed in the situation of commandant of artillery, he may be placed under the command of a general officer on the staff, junior

in rank to himself as a general officer. In answer, I observe that he holds his situation as commandant of the artillery only as colonel. This brevet of major general gives him no rank and no authority over any part of the army with which he is not posted as a major general by the orders of Government. This brevet only makes him eligible to command in the army, or any part of it, when Government may call for his services by placing him on the staff; but does not give him a right to command a man over whom he is not specially appointed, and whom he did not before command under his commission of colonel.

‘ I might urge that it is not very probable that the Government would place the commanding officer of the artillery and his duties under the inspection of any general officer of the line, and, therefore, that the case in question could not occur. But I consider the principle to be sound, that no general officer has any authority as a general officer till he is placed upon the staff; therefore, that no public evil, or even momentary confusion, can result from placing a senior general officer commanding the artillery, or colonel of a regiment, under the command of a junior employed upon the staff.

‘ The feelings of the senior may be affected upon seeing the junior preferred to him upon the staff; but those feelings cannot affect the general question; and at all events, the senior may, if he should think proper, resign his situation.

‘ I now come to consider the second branch of this discussion, viz., the propriety of appointing general officers of the artillery to the staff.

‘ I do not know that there is any rule upon this subject in the King’s service; but I have read accounts that his Majesty had refused to appoint officers of the artillery to the general staff of the army, or to confirm appointments of that kind, when made by authorities abroad. There is one instance in particular, of General Philips in America.

‘ The reason of the exclusion of the officers of the artillery and engineers from the general staff in European armies, I consider to be, that these officers are supposed to be, and in general are in reality, educated at the public expense in the scientific branches of the military service. It is supposed that the public gain more by employing them in those

branches, than in any general duty for which others would answer equally well; and therefore Government, which ought to consider only the public benefit, have determined that they shall be so employed.

‘ These facts, and this reasoning, do not apply to the service in this country. It is true, that the officers of the artillery and engineers are scientifically educated; but it occurs but seldom, that such an army, with such a corps of artillery and engineers, is collected in the field, as to render expedient the employment of a general officer of artillery or engineers with their respective corps. The consequence, therefore, of the application of the rule or practice of the European armies to the service in this country, would be, that general officers of the artillery and engineers would never be employed.

‘ The number of general officers on all the establishments in India is but small in comparison with the size of the armies, and the number to be placed on the staff; and certainly it cannot be sound policy to adopt a rule unnecessarily, the effect of which must be to diminish the number of those from whom a choice must be made.

‘ But it is my opinion, that the orders of the Company allow the general officers of the artillery and engineers to be on the staff; and this is proved by an extract from their letter of January, 1796; from which it appears, not only that a general officer of the artillery might be on the staff, but that being on the staff, he might retain the command of the artillery.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

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*Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, relative to the Army under the Commander in Chief, in his Operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.*

‘ Fort William, 5th Nov., 1804.

‘ The state of the equipments of the army of the Commander in Chief appears to be such, that there are but slender hopes that he will be able to push his operations against Holkar so vigorously as to bring his army to a general action, and to drive it away from the Company’s frontier in a reasonable space of time, namely, two or three



months. The deficiency in the equipments is in provisions, in which, from all that I can learn, his Excellency depends entirely upon the Dooab.

‘ In this state of affairs, besides the capacity of the Dooab to supply the provisions, and the means of carrying them required for the active prosecution of the war, it is necessary ;

‘ First,—That the inhabitants should be willing to supply the provisions, or, that there should be a power in the country to oblige them to supply the provisions.

‘ Secondly,—That the communication with the Dooab should be open and always secure.

‘ There is no doubt whatever, I believe, of the capacity of the Dooab to supply every thing. It appears, however, to be very certain that the inhabitants are not inclined to give the assistance to the Commander in Chief which the country can afford ; and indeed their disturbances and rebellions have impeded the arrival of convoys of provisions from the countries beyond the Ganges.

‘ These disturbances may be attributed partly to the nature of the people ; partly to the want of civil government ; but principally to the efforts of the enemy, through the medium of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor.

‘ In respect to the last cause of the disturbances of the Dooab, I have to observe, that the papers transmitted in the Commander in Chief’s dispatch of the 21st of October, do not prove the facts stated ; either that Runjeet Sing did endeavor, through his vakeel, to excite disturbances in the Dooab ; or that he gave protection to Holkar’s baggage and bazaars under his fort of Bhurtpoor. If he has been guilty of the former of these acts, or of both, his conduct has been most dangerously hostile to the British Government. If of the latter only, it has been of a very suspicious nature ; but it is not quite certain that he may not have been induced to adopt that dubious line of conduct to save his own country ; and very probably, if Holkar’s army had been defeated, he would have taken and destroyed the camp to which he had given protection.

‘ In my opinion the remedy for the evils in the Dooab consists in the following measures :—

‘ First,—In establishing the civil government.

‘Secondly,—In dividing the Dooab into military divisions, and allotting to each a sufficient military force.

‘The military divisions might be as follow :

‘1. The upper part of the Dooab, including Delhi, and all the Company’s possessions north of the Nabob Vizier’s.

‘2. The lower part of the Dooab, including Agra as far as Allahabad ; and the Nabob Vizier’s territories.

‘3. Bundelcund.

‘4. Benares, Chunar, Gorruckpoor.

‘5. Bahar.

‘6. Bengal.

‘7. Presidency, including Cuttack, Midnapoor, &c.

‘Care to be taken, in making the military divisions in the Dooab, that a magistrate’s or collector’s division may not be in two military divisions, so that every collector and magistrate may know to whom to apply for military assistance when it may be wanted.

‘These measures will re-establish tranquillity, will bring affairs into such a shape as to secure it, and ensure punishment to those who endeavor to disturb it ; and in this manner will secure the resources of the country for the army of the Commander in Chief. They will also afford the means of defence for all parts of the Jumna, when that river shall become fordable, if previous to that time Holkar’s army should not have been driven out of Hindustan.

‘These arrangements also will give the ability to furnish convoys for the supplies going to the Commander in Chief’s army, and will thus ensure the second object ; viz., the communication between the army and the Dooab.

‘In order to carry these arrangements into execution, it is necessary to prevail upon the Commander in Chief to reduce his force. It should not be stronger than is absolutely essential to beat Holkar’s army. An additional benefit which will result from this measure is, that it will be more easy to supply its wants.

‘In respect to the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, if he has been guilty of the conduct imputed to him, he is the most dangerous enemy that the Company could have. In fact, he has identified himself with Holkar ; and the species of assistance

which he has given him has entirely altered, in my judgment, the nature of Holkar's power.

‘ The line to be taken with the Rajah of Bhurtpoor must depend upon circumstances. If the country was in a state of tranquillity, and it was possible to fit out and support two armies in advance from the Dooab, I should recommend that an army should be prepared to attack the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's forts, whilst the Commander in Chief's army should be employed in the pursuit and defeat of Holkar's army. But that appears impossible at present; and the measures to be adopted respecting the Rajah must be guided by circumstances.

‘ Our first object must be, at all events, to beat Holkar in the field; our next to introduce a sufficient force from the Jumna into Malwa, in order to establish a fixed authority in that province; and our third, to destroy the Rajah of Bhurtpoor.

‘ The question is, whether it be possible to send a force into Malwa, either in pursuit of Holkar, or after having beaten him, without taking possession of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's forts?

‘ This question must be decided, in a great measure, by the conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor. If Holkar should be beaten in Hindustan, and the Rajah should either have joined his army, or if it should turn out that he has excited the disturbances in the Dooab, and given protection to Holkar's baggage; and he does not destroy or take that baggage when Holkar may be beaten, or give some proof that he does not intend to act with hostility against the Company, it will be very evident that Holkar's power in Hindustan will not be destroyed when his army is defeated. The Rajah's forts must be taken before the troops can move into Malwa; unless it should be possible to fit out and equip properly at the same time, a second body of troops for the operations directed immediately against the Rajah of Bhurtpoor.

‘ If Holkar should not fight in Hindustan, but should fly into Malwa, the question will be nearly the same, and the decision whether the troops ought to follow him into Malwa must depend upon the same circumstances. It will be rather more urgent, however, than in the former case, to follow

him into Malwa, and to delay the operations against the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's forts, if that should be possible, as it may be depended upon that, if they should be commenced, Holkar will return again immediately, and commence the old Marhatta operations upon the communication between the army and the territories in the Dooab.

‘In short, the question regarding the Rajah of Bhurtpoor is, in my opinion, a very delicate one, unless two corps can be now equipped and supported from the Dooab, one for active operations, the other for sieges.

‘If that cannot be done, and it appears that it cannot, it is my opinion it would, upon the whole, be best to wink at the conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, till circumstances shall be more favorable, and enable the Government to attack him with vigor.

‘The next point to be considered is the orders to be given to Colonel Murray. It is very evident that much time till elapse before the troops can advance from the Jumna into Malwa; that Colonel Murray can do no good where he is; that he cannot advance to the northward, and that if he could advance, he could be of no use; and that he could re-equip his troops with more ease, and less expense, and would be in greater safety if he were to draw nearer to the frontiers of Guzerat. He could also defend that country. It is my opinion, therefore, that he ought to be desired to draw off gradually towards the frontiers of Guzerat.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

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*To Major Shawe.*

‘Government House, 3rd Nov., 1804.  
3, P.M.

‘MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘I enclose a memorandum which contains the result of my inquiries of this day, respecting General Lake's mode of conducting his supplies, and an account of that which I have always adopted in detail, as far as is necessary.

‘In truth, no person here knows how General Lake is supplied, any more than if his army was in Japan.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’



*Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, detailing the system for regulating the Supplies of an Army in the Deccan, a copy of which was sent to the Commander in Chief, &c.*

‘ Fort William, 3rd November, 1804.

‘ After every inquiry I have been able to make, I cannot learn the mode in which the system of supplies is conducted by the Commander in Chief, I rather believe, however, that the whole rests in the hands of Captain Morrison, who is superintendent of supplies of the army.

‘ Without local knowledge, it is impossible for me to say whether that mode is a good one ; I shall, however, detail that in use with all the armies in which I have commanded in the Deccan, and which has succeeded in enabling me to go to a very great distance from the sources of supplies.

‘ There are in every army, four descriptions of persons or animals, to be supplied with food, viz.,

‘ First, European soldiers.

‘ Secondly, Native troops.

‘ Thirdly, Horses of the cavalry.

‘ Fourthly, Followers of all descriptions, including horses, cattle, servants, &c., of officers, departments, soldiers, &c.

‘ First. To feed the European soldiers, a commissary of provisions is appointed. The quantity of provisions necessary for the number of men for any given period of time (two or three months), is issued to him from the public stores, or he purchases them, according to the orders which he may receive. Carriage is allotted for this provision, either carts or bullocks, &c.

‘ In this quantity of provision, the commissary of provisions has only five days’ grain, and the carriage allotted for that quantity, and he indents on every fifth day on the commissary of grain for that grain which will be necessary for the European troops for the following five days.

‘ The object of this arrangement is to keep the account of the grain clear, and that it may always be known what length of time the quantity of grain in camp will serve for the whole army.

‘ Secondly. The native troops receive grain only.

‘ When the army is assembled, a quantity of grain which will last the troops, including the Europeans, a given period

of time (two or three months), is issued from the public stores to the commissary of grain. Carriage is allotted for it; viz., bullocks, either the property of the Company, or hired for the purpose, and under the immediate charge of the commissary of grain.

‘ When the commissary of grain makes an issue, he replenishes it, either by drawing again upon the stores, if he can communicate with them, or by purchases in the country, or the bazaar, according to the orders which he may receive from the officer commanding the army.

‘ Thirdly. The horses of the cavalry.

‘ When the number of horses to be fed is ascertained, a quantity of grain is issued from the public stores to the gram agent general, to last them for a given number of days; viz., forty, fifty, or sixty. The quarter masters of the regiments of cavalry have under their charge a bullock for each horse in the regiment, which bullock carries grain to last the horse fifteen days. He receives this grain from the gram agent general. The gram agent general has under his charge and superintendence bullocks in sufficient number (either hired, or belonging to the Company) to carry the remainder of the gram. When he makes an issue to the quarter master, he replaces it either by drawing again upon the stores, or by purchases in the bazaar or the country, according to the orders which he may receive from the Commanding officer of the army.

‘ Fourthly. Followers of all descriptions.

‘ These persons live by the daily purchases they make in the bazaar, the supply of which becomes an object of the greatest importance. What follows is the mode of supplying the bazaar which I have seen practised.

‘ The bazaars are placed under the charge and superintendence of an officer called the superintendent of supplies, and in him the whole business of the internal police and supply of the camp rests.

‘ The following modes are adopted to supply the grain required for it.

‘ 1st. Brinjarries. These are a class of carriers who gain a livelihood by transporting grain or other commodities from one part of the country to another. They attend armies, and trade nearly in the same manner as they do in common

times of peace. They either purchase grain themselves in the country with their own money, or with money advanced to them by the Company, and sell it in the bazaar at the rates of the day on their own account, or they take grain at the Company's stores at certain reduced rates, and sell it on their own account in the bazaars ; or they take up grain in the Company's stores, and carry it with the army, and receive a sum of money for every march they make, and the grain is sold in the bazaars on account of the Company ; or they hire their cattle by the month to the Company, and take up grain from the public stores and carry it with the army, where it is sold in the bazaars on the account of the Company.

‘ It is the business of the superintendent of supplies to settle all these various accounts, and to see that the brinjarries get fresh loads as fast as they empty them, and to know always, as nearly as possible, the quantity of grain which this description of people have got.

‘ 2nd. Biparries. This is another description of dealers. They do not go in large flocks like the brinjarries, and to such distances, to look for grain. They are generally attached to the camp bazaar, and they go out to the villages and towns in the neighbourhood of the camp, and purchase grain and bring it in immediately for sale. These are a more civilized, industrious, and useful people than the brinjarries ; they are much more active, and if the country is open, the supply which they bring is more plentiful.

‘ 3rd. The Biparries of the country. These are of the same class with the second, only not immediately attached to the camp. They bring grain to the camp from the neighbouring villages, when ordered by the amildars and Government, or excited by their own interests ; but their attendance is not so constant. Besides these three principal descriptions, there are others, but they may all be classed under one of the three general heads.

‘ From this statement it is obvious, that when the communication between the army and the country is not free, that alone upon which the bazaar can depend, is the brinjarries, who are generally assembled in large numbers, and attend it when the campaign is opened.

‘ It frequently happens, as was the case with me in the

last campaign, that the brinjarries desert the army. The communication with the country may be cut off from many causes; the enemy, the swelling of a river, bad roads, rainy weather, &c. On the other hand, the army may outmarch the supplies which might be expected from biparries, &c. In any of these cases, it is usual for the commanding officer of the army to order the commissary of grain to issue to the superintendent of supplies any quantity of grain that may be required to supply the consumption which falls upon the bazaar. The commissary of grain makes his purchases again from the bazaar when it fills.

‘ The gram agent general also issues, by order, gram to the superintendent of the bazaar when that article is wanted for officers’ horses and cattle. He frequently issues it by order, to the agent for the public draught bullocks, when the supply of grain in the bazaar is not sufficient for the cattle in his department.

‘ In this manner, the army can never be in want. The camp stores are always kept complete, and supply the bazaars occasionally; while the bazaars, in more plentiful times (which, under good arrangement, must occur frequently), supply the camp stores.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

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*Memorandum on the System adopted for regulating the Intelligence Department in the Army under the Command of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ Fort William, November, 1804\*.

‘ One of the great difficulties of war in this country is to obtain intelligence of the enemy’s movements and intentions

\* *The Governor General to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 9th November, 1804.

‘ 1. Adverting to the situation of public affairs at the present period of time, I deem it expedient, on the occasion of your return from the Residency to the Deccan, to renew the civil and military powers with which you were vested by my orders of the 26th of June, 1803. You will accordingly consider yourself to be vested, as before, with the chief command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies serving in the territories of the Peshwah, of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, or of any of the Marhatta states or chiefs, subject only to the orders of the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George, or of his Excellency General Lake.

‘ 2. You will also consider yourself to be empowered and directed to assume



sufficiently early to take advantage of them. The following modes of procuring intelligence were adopted in the late campaign in the Deccan, and were generally successful.

‘1. Three distinct departments for intelligence were formed in camp, the head of each of which communicated directly with Major General Wellesley. To each department was attached such a number of intelligence hircarrahs, as rendered it certain that one would come in to each department from the enemy’s camp on every day.

‘2. The heads of the intelligence departments reported immediately on its arrival, the intelligence received, and questioned the hircarrah particularly regarding the hour at which he had quitted the camp. His intelligence was then compared with that brought in by the other hircarrahs, as received from other quarters, and a tolerably accurate opinion was generally formed of the facts reported.

‘3. Great care was taken that the persons employed in one department should not be known to those employed in the others, and that they should not communicate. The hircarrahs were highly rewarded, besides receiving monthly pay, particularly when they brought any intelligence on which an operation could be founded; and were punished and turned out of the service when they brought any which was known to be false.

‘4. The intelligence departments were kept, one by the Deputy Adjutant General, one by Mr. Elphinstone, who acted as Persian interpreter, and one by Govind Rao, a servant of the Rajah of Mysore, who was used in the communications with the native sirdars.

‘5. Besides these departments for intelligence, a constant and to exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British Government in the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, of the Peshwah, and of the Marhatta states and chiefs.

‘3. You will be guided by the express directions contained in my letter of the 26th of June, 1803, in all cases to which they may specially apply in the actual situation of affairs. In all other cases you will regulate your conduct by a just application of the spirit and intent of those instructions to the circumstances under which you may be required to act.

‘4. Copies of this letter will be transmitted to the government of Fort St. George and of Bombay, and to the several Residents at the native courts, requiring their attention to these orders.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘WELLESLEY.’

communication was kept up and encouraged with the native vakeels. They came every evening to Major General Wellesley; he communicated with them personally, and learned all that they had heard in the course of the day.

‘6. A correspondence was also kept up with the amildars of the country, and measures were taken constantly, by means of the Mysore sirdars and horsemen, and their communications with the heads of villages, &c., in the neighbourhood of camp, to find out the reports of the country, and every thing which could throw light upon the enemy’s designs.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

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*To the Governor General.*

‘On board the Bombay Frigate,  
14th November, 1804.

‘MY LORD,

‘1. I have hitherto omitted to lay before your Excellency the services of, and to recommend to your notice, Kistna Rao, the principal servant of the Mysore Residency, who attended me during the late war.

‘2. This person was employed under Major Malcolm in the last war against Tippoo Sultaun, and performed services of the greatest importance, in the superintendence and in settling the accounts of the brinjarries who accompanied the Major from Hyderabad. He was afterwards employed by the Resident in Mysore, from the year 1799 to the year 1803, during the whole of which time he conducted himself much to the satisfaction of the different gentlemen who filled the office of Resident.

‘3. He accompanied me to the field by the permission of the Resident, and I employed him confidentially in many of the negotiations with which I was intrusted, particularly those with Amrut Rao and his adherents; the result of which was to deprive the confederated Marhatta Chiefs of the powerful assistance which they would have derived from that party in the state, and to gain it for the Honorable Company and their allies.

‘4. When peace was concluded, I sent Kistna Rao with Major Malcolm to the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and he there performed services of equal importance, and in a

manner equally creditable to himself and beneficial to the public, with those which he performed in camp under my immediate direction.

‘ 5. Kistna Rao is a person of good birth, being descended from a family of rich soucars in the Cuddapa country, who lost all their property in the course of the revolutions by which the government of that country has at different times been affected. His salary in the Company’s service is but small, and the important nature of his services, and the fidelity with which he has performed them, appear to merit a reward from Government.

‘ 6. I therefore beg leave to recommend Kistna Rao to your Excellency’s favor ; and as the mode of rewarding him which will be most agreeable to his feelings, and least expensive to the Honorable Company, I beg leave to recommend that the revenues of the villages named in the margin, and situated in the ceded districts, may be given to him. It is not supposed that the amount of their revenue will be more than 5200 rupees. This is an average revenue, and sometimes will produce 500 rupees more or less.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ On board the Bombay Frigate,  
15th November, 1804.

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ I received yesterday your letter of the 12th, and I have since considered the intelligence which it contains regarding the movements of Holkar and the Commander in Chief. His Excellency having been able to divide his army, must have been in some state of equipment ; and it is possible that the result of the present operations may be to drive the infantry corps to a distance ; and Holkar, with the cavalry, being pressed by the Commander in Chief’s division, may be obliged to follow them.

‘ If we should have luck, and the British divisions are really well equipped with provisions, it is possible that both Holkar’s divisions may be defeated. His division of infantry will want intelligence, as the cavalry will be at a distance, and General Fraser may be able to approach them ; and the division of cavalry, when pressed by the Commander in

Chief in the Dooab, may find it difficult, if not impossible, to escape.

‘ However, we must look to the other side of the question, and consider not only what it is desirable should happen, but that which may happen, however disagreeable.

‘ Holkar’s object is certainly to cross the Ganges ; to create a disturbance in Bundelcund, and to penetrate through the northern provinces to Benares. I do not think that he can effect that object with the Commander in Chief’s division in his neighbourhood ; but we must suppose that there are many of the patans in Bundelcund inclined to support and assist him ; and it is not impossible but that the means of crossing the Ganges are already arranged for him.

‘ Nothing more can be done to oppose Holkar’s operations in the field than has been already done. All that remains, is to adopt such measures for the security of Benares, as shall preclude the possibility of danger to that city ; supposing that affairs in the Dooab should take a turn so different from that which we have reason to hope they will, and that Holkar should be able to cross the Ganges, and to penetrate Bundelcund and Gorruckpoor without being destroyed by the Commander in Chief, which is hardly possible.

‘ The object at Benares is to prevent a body of horse from doing any mischief, or levying a contribution upon that city, in the few days which may elapse between that on which Holkar, and that on which the Commander in Chief will arrive there.

‘ It is evident, that the small corps of infantry which is stationed at Benares, can do nothing offensively against this body of horse. It cannot defend itself, unless collected in a body ; or if divided, unless assisted by fortified works. If collected in one body, it is obvious that it will provide but ill for the defence of the city, unless the city is so situated as to be under the command of some ground in its neighbourhood. There must be many roads into the city, by which horse can penetrate, all of which it must be necessary to guard ; but if the troops are separated to guard these avenues, it must be obvious that no part of them will be sufficiently strong ; indeed, none of them may be able to defend themselves, unless placed in fortified works.



‘What I should therefore recommend under present circumstances at Benares, would be,

‘First; To collect a magazine there, which will last the troops allotted to the defence of the place a certain time.

‘Secondly; To construct a redoubt on each of the great roads leading to Benares, capable of holding forty or fifty men, with a gun: it should be of course in the most commanding situation that could be found, and near water; and provisions for the garrison for eight or ten days should be lodged in it.

‘Thirdly; a camp ought to be intrenched for a battalion, in which should be the grain, magazine, &c., that might be collected for the use of the troops.

‘In this manner, Benares would really be secure from danger for the few days which Holkar may be supposed to precede the Commander in Chief.

‘Whether the corps destined for the defence of Benares be stationed at Mirzapoor or not, it would be desirable to adopt these arrangements at Benares. They will secure that city in case of an attack of this description. The intrenchments will be ready for the troops, which I conclude will cross the Ganges from Mirzapoor, as soon as it shall be known that Holkar has crossed into Bundelcund.

‘I trust that care will be taken to support General Fraser’s division beyond the Jumna; that is an object which will require constant care and attention.

‘The pilot leaves us this day.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘On board the Bombay Frigate,  
20th Nov., 1804.

‘MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘I expect to land at Madras to-morrow, and I write to you at present, in order that I may be able to send off my letter immediately after I shall land.

‘There are some points upon which I omitted to speak to the Governor General, to which I beg you to draw his attention and let me know his wishes.

‘First,—Mr. Duncan gave me a memorandum regarding

a proposal which he made to the Governor General on the 6th February, 1804, that he might be permitted to reward the services of Sr. Miguel de Lima de Souza by the grant of an enaum in some one of the pergunnahs ceded by the Guickwar to the Company. Mr. Duncan has stated the nature of the services of Sr. Miguel de Souza, in the letter above referred to, and there is no occasion for my repeating them; I have only to say that it is very desirable for many reasons, referrible as well to our affairs in Guzerat as to those at Goa, that they should be rewarded; and, at all events, that Mr. Duncan should have an answer.

‘ As he gave me a memorandum upon this subject, and as I shall have many matters to settle with him, it is desirable that he should have the answer, if possible, before I reach the western side of India, or as soon as may be convenient.

‘ Secondly,—With the memorandum regarding Sr. Miguel de Souza, he gave me another regarding the pension to Mehdy Ally Khan’s son. This is a subject upon which every body knows that Mr. Duncan is very anxious: and it is very desirable that he should receive an answer. I spoke to the Governor General regarding it soon after I arrived in Bengal.

‘ Thirdly,—Besides this, there is a demand from the late Mehdy Ally Khan for his expenses in Persia, upon which Mr. Duncan wrote to the Governor General in Council on the 8th March, 1801, to which letter he has received no answer. It is very desirable that the Governor General should decide upon this subject.

‘ Fourthly,—When I arrived in Bengal, I spoke to the Governor General regarding the claim of the Guickwar government, that the extra expenses incurred in the war by that Government should be defrayed by the Company. It appears that the claims of that Government, as stated by Mr. Duncan, were of two distinct descriptions: one, for the reimbursement of the expenses incurred for troops, levied to replace the subsidiary force when it marched to Lunawara, at the commencement of the war, under the command of Colonel Murray; the other, for the expenses of the Guickwar troops themselves, when they marched with Colonel Murray, towards the conclusion of the war, to Dohud.

‘ When I spoke to the Governor General upon the subject,

I did not know of the first claim, and I find, by a letter from Mr. Duncan, that the decision of the Governor General has been passed only upon this claim. In my opinion the Guickwar Government has no ground for this claim. This Government was bound to give assistance in the war by the spirit of its alliance with the Company, and the subsidiary troops, in particular, ought to have been employed. It is not consistent with the nature of the alliance between the parties, that the Company should bear the expense of the troops levied to perform the internal duty, which the subsidiary troops performed in time of peace, when the circumstances of the times required that those troops should be employed against a foreign and a common enemy.

‘ The claim, however, for the remuneration of the expenses incurred by the Guickwar Government in the expedition to Dohud, stands upon different grounds. Although the spirit of all our treaties with the Guickwar state requires that they should assist us in war against foreign powers, the words of those treaties do not contain such a provision; and it must be recollected that those who made those treaties were of opinion that the Guickwar Government were not bound to assist us; and the claim of compensation for expenses incurred by troops for internal purposes in lieu of the subsidiary troops, must have been made upon the same principles, and shows that the Guickwar Government, and Mr. Duncan, and Major Walker, conceived our connexion with that state to be nothing more than a contract for the hire of a few thousand troops.

‘ The Guickwar Government gained nothing by the war, notwithstanding that it afforded this assistance, of which it is to bear the expense. It is my opinion, that if we force the Guickwar Government to adopt, in its connexion with us, the spirit of our defensive treaties with the other powers of India, we ought also to hold out to them the same advantage, and either to give them a share of the benefits resulting from successful war, or to pay the expenses incurred by the actual prosecution of external hostilities. When I spoke to the Governor General upon this subject, he was of my opinion, and said that the subject should be revised. From what Mr. Duncan has written, however, I rather believe that he has decided only on the first claim; but if he should have

decided on the second, I shall be obliged to you if you will urge him to reconsider the subject, and to decide that the Company shall defray the expense of the expedition to Dohud, if he should approve of the principle which I have stated in this letter.

‘ I took Malcolm on board at Ganjam, and he is going with me to Madras. I learn from him that Webbe is very unwell, and I acknowledge that I much fear that he will be obliged to come away from Scindiah’s durbar. I have frequently mentioned to the Governor General and to Sydenham, the necessity that the latter should join his Residency at the earliest period. Webbe’s illness renders his arrival there a matter of the greatest urgency. Only conceive the inconvenience to which the public interests may be exposed, and the difficulties which I shall have in managing that durbar, if Webbe should be obliged to come away, and the residency should be left in the charge of a man so young and inexperienced as Mr. Jenkins.

‘ As the Governor General intends that Mr. Webbe should go home in the ship with him, and as Webbe is determined not to stay in India an hour after Lord Wellesley, it is desirable that he should be relieved at an early period; if it is not intended that the residency should fall into the hands of a gentleman, who certainly cannot now be deemed capable of managing the business: but when I find that Mr. Webbe is sick, and that he may be obliged to come away, and when I know that the Governor General does not require Sydenham’s services in Bengal, I cannot avoid urging, in the most earnest manner, that he may be sent off at the earliest period. If he should sail for Bombay by the first opportunity, after you shall receive this letter, he will arrive there in a very short time, and I shall probably be able to forward him on to Ougein, so that he will arrive there by the end of January. If he should not leave Bengal early in December, his passage to Bombay will be very tedious, and his arrival at Ougein be delayed to a very late period indeed.

‘ I do not believe that the Governor General wrote orders to Colonel Murray to draw off towards Guzerat, as he intended. Holkar is now established on the Jumna, and it appears probable that he will not leave that river till he shall be beat in a general action, in which his power may be



entirely destroyed. It is not probable that Colonel Murray's corps can co-operate in the action which will be fought upon this occasion, even if it should be possible to equip it well, and to compose it as it ought to be, as it is not to be supposed that that corps can march to the Jumna.

‘ By drawing Colonel Murray's corps towards Guzerat, it may be re-equipped with greater facility and at less expense; it will always be in safety; and it will defend the territories in Guzerat, and preserve their tranquillity. It will always be ready to advance, in case an opportunity should offer of moving it forward with advantage.

‘ Against withdrawing Murray's corps there is only the effect which that measure might have upon Scindiah's durbar. But, as well as I recollect, Webbe wrote long ago to Colonel Murray, that he might do whatever would be most convenient to himself, without reference to Scindiah's interests or wishes. At all events, Webbe might be left to judge whether the corps should be withdrawn or not; and I rather think that this is the course which I shall adopt.

‘ Fifthly,—I do not recollect whether any thing was done respecting Major Macauley. There is not a doubt but that the mode in which he brought forward his proposition regarding the tobacco was unguarded. But Major Macauley is an honest and deserving servant of the public; one who, I know, is attached personally to the Governor General, and to the good principles of government in India; and it is evident that he has felt the censure which he has received. The explanation which he has given of his conduct is satisfactory, and there is nothing against him, excepting that he did not at first sufficiently explain the transaction which he brought under the view of the Governor General. That being the case, he no longer deserves the censure of the Government; and, as it is certain that these censures never fail to damp the zeal and cool the attachment of the public servants of the Government, and as the attachment of a man such as Macauley must always be of use, I most anxiously recommend that some measure may be adopted to soothe his feelings. In fact, if it be true that Macauley did not deserve the censure, and received it only because he made an erroneous or imperfect statement of a transaction in which he had been concerned, which I believe to be

the case, to recall or cancel the censure is only a matter of justice.

‘ From the length of this letter you will observe that I have but little to do, and that we have moderate weather. We have really had the best passage I have ever had at sea.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shaue.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ We landed this morning, all well.’

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Fort St. George, 21st Nov., 1804.

‘ I have just time to write a few lines to inform you that I arrived here this day, and that I propose to leave as soon as the bearers can be posted for me.

‘ I shall go to Seringapatam, and thence either by the route of Darwar or Meritch to Poonah; or, if I should find the country is not in tranquillity, I shall go to Mangalore, and thence by sea to Bombay. I shall be with you about Christmas, by one route or another.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General Lake.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 23rd November, 1804.

‘ An application has been made to me, by a respectable officer of the 33rd regiment, that I should request you to appoint his brother, Mr. Henry Young, a Cornet in the 19th Dragoons. His family is a respectable one in Ireland, and particularly patronized by Lord Cornwallis, and I therefore take the liberty of recommending Mr. Henry Young to your protection.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Government House, 23rd Nov., 1804.

‘ General Stuart has written to me, and has informed me that he had desired you to appoint an officer to fill Major Barclay’s office of Deputy Adjutant General in Mysore, in consequence of his promotion.

‘As the rule that a field officer shall not hold an office upon the staff is not a standing regulation of the service, under the government of Fort St. George; as it may be altered; and, above all, as Major Barclay has long assisted me, and as it would be very inconvenient to me to be deprived of his assistance at the present moment, I hope that you will do me the favor to allow him to continue in his office till Sir John Cradock shall arrive, and shall decide whether the principle which would deprive Major Barclay of his office is to be adopted under this government.

‘I have to mention to you that I have reason to believe that General Stuart would have allowed Major Barclay to retain his office, so long as I should require his assistance, if he had remained in India.

‘Major Cunningham, lately Deputy Quarter Master General in Mysore, took charge of the remount lots of horses for the cavalry in the year 1803, at Mangalore; and he has lately desired me to offer his services to take charge of those now expected at the same place. As I have reason to believe that many of the officers of the cavalry are sick, and the services of all are required, I beg leave to recommend that Major Cunningham may have charge of those lots of horses intended for the remount of the cavalry employed in the Deccan. If you should approve of this arrangement, and will give me leave, I will send Major Cunningham instructions by which route to bring the horses to the regiments, and will take care that he is supplied with forage and grain upon the road.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Campbell.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Montresor.*

‘DEAR SIR,

‘Fort St. George, 24th Nov., 1804.

‘I understand that you are ordered to march by the route of Beejapoor and Punderpoor to Poonah, in the command of the detachment of troops now collected at Bellary; and I have the pleasure to enclose you a letter for Madhoo Rao Rastia, a Marhatta Chief of some importance, to whom the territory belongs through which the first part of your route will lie, and copies of a proclamation to the inhabitants of the whole country, and translations of those papers.

‘ Madhoo Rao Rastia resides near Baugracottah, on the Gutpurba; and you will do well to transmit to him the letter to his address when you shall approach the Kistna, and you will use the proclamations upon such occasions as you may find them necessary.

‘ Besides these papers, I write to the Resident at Poonah to furnish you with orders from his Highness the Peshwah addressed to his servants on your road, and to send hircarrahs of the sircar to meet and conduct you to Poonah.

‘ As I have served much in the Marhatta territory, and from experience must have acquired some knowledge of the people, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to preserve the most strict discipline among your troops and their followers; and to make them pay for every thing which they may want. You will do well to keep up and encourage by mild treatment a constant intercourse with the natives of the country through which you will pass, as the best means of drawing from them the resources which the districts can afford.

‘ In the enclosed letter and proclamations you will observe that I have called upon those to whom they are addressed to supply your wants; however, I must apprise you that the best mode of drawing supplies from the country is to have it generally believed that you are not in want of supplies; and then, if money is produced, whatever you may require, and can be afforded, will be given.

‘ The route by which you will march from Beejapoor is that by which Captain Moor travelled to Poonah from that city in the year 1792; and an account of it is given in the book entitled “Moor’s Narrative.” You will find, at this season of the year, a greater plenty of water than he found, and green forage everywhere. When you shall approach Poonah, you will have to descend the little Bhore ghaut, unless you should be able to find the road which passes into the valley of the Beemah, to the northward of that ghaut. I do not recollect the names of the stages, but I know there is a good road which branches off at Baramootty, or Morishwar, and is only one march longer than that by the Bhore ghaut, and I recommend it, as the ghaut is very bad, and may break your carriages.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Montresor.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*Proclamation to all Killadurs, &c., of the Talooks of Beejapoor, Pundapoor, Aklooss, Baramootty, Morishwar, Rajahwary, &c.*

‘A detachment of the Company’s troops is marching to Poonah, on the business of his Highness Sreemunt Bajee Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder. This is to require you to give every assistance to Colonel Montresor, the commanding officer of the said detachment, and by no means to molest him. He, on his part, will take care that the strictest discipline shall be preserved, and that payment shall be made for every thing that is required.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Madhoo Rao Rastia.*

‘A detachment of the Company’s troops is marching to Poonah, on the service of his Highness Bajee Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behauder, under the command of Colonel Montresor. They will pass by the road of Beejapoor and Punderpoor; and I have desired the Colonel to preserve the strictest discipline on his march, and to pay for every thing he shall require; and I request you to give the Company’s troops every assistance which you can afford.

‘*Madhoo Rao Rastia.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘Fort St. George, 24th Nov., 1804.

‘I have received your letter of the 26th October. I omitted to inform you that I had arranged that Campbell should retain his situation, and Lieut. Hamilton and Captain Johnson, as well as Agnew. The others will be replaced by officers of the Bombay establishment, whenever I may think that the change can be made with propriety. The officers removed from the subsidiary force at Poonah will be provided for elsewhere. All this is settled.

‘When I was in Bengal I knew that the promotion of Colonel Hallyburton would supersede you, and I did every thing in my power to prevent this event. General Lake had received orders from England to give the local rank of colonel to such officers of the rank of lieut. colonel as should be superseded by the operation of the regimental rise of the

officers of the Company's army to the rank of colonel; and I proposed that you should be appointed a colonel in the army of Fort St. George without delay. General Lake, however, refused to adopt this arrangement, as he said that, although he had received orders from the Commander in Chief upon the subject, he had not received the King's warrant to authorize him to give the rank of colonel to any officer.

‘ I acknowledge that I do not exactly understand the validity of this objection; but it comes from the first authority, and nothing can be said against it.

‘ In the mean time, Colonel Hallyburton is promoted, and you are superseded in your command; which, at the present moment, must be unpleasant to you, and inconvenient to the service. However, as it could not be avoided, and I did every thing in my power to prevent it, I am convinced that you will, with your usual zeal, exert yourself to prevent it from being so detrimental to the service as might be expected, and that you will do every thing in your power to assist Colonel Hallyburton.

‘ I shall be with you in a very few days after you will receive this: I set out for Seringapatam on Monday, when my palanquin boys will be on the road, and I shall not lose any time afterwards.

‘ Ever, my dear Wallace, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To General Lake.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 24th Nov., 1804.

‘ Since my arrival at this place I have been informed that Colonel Montresor, of the 80th regiment, sent in his resignation of his commission before he embarked for Prince of Wales's Island, where he died; and as I understand that Major White, the senior Major of the 80th regiment, has not long been promoted, and his commission of Major has not yet been confirmed, I take the liberty to draw your notice to Lieut. Colonel Elliott, the senior Major of the 33rd regiment, to purchase Colonel Montresor's Lieut. Colonelcy, in case your Excellency should give permission that it should be sold.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Elliott is a deserving officer, of great zeal

and experience in his profession, and one who will be an acquisition to any regiment to which he may be appointed.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 24th Nov., 1804.

‘ I enclose a memorandum from Captain Hayes, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will endeavor to arrange the points to which it relates. He has conducted himself much to my satisfaction. He is going off this morning. The Governor does not go with him, but stays here to settle his accounts.

‘ We have sad intelligence here of the state of health of poor Webbe. Indeed I am much afraid that we shall lose him. He has an intermittent fever, which prevents him from attending to business, and the Doctor says that he has entirely lost his appetite, and does not rest.

‘ For God’s sake send Sydenham off as soon as possible. There is no other mode whatever of providing for that Residency. Malcolm, although in some degree recovered, is neither in health nor strength sufficient to enable him to bear the journey, or the fatigues to which he would be liable at that durbar. He cannot go into the sun at all.

‘ I hear that the troops in the Deccan are miserably unhealthy; but the campaign there has been most successful.

‘ My palanquin boys will be laid on the road on Monday, and I shall set out on that evening.

‘ I do not like matters here, but I cannot write upon them without going into details, for which I have not time at present. The government is in the greatest distress for want of money; a want which, I am told, exists equally on the other side of India.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Fort St. George, 26th Nov., 1804.

‘ Upon talking over, with Lord William Bentinck, the state of our money resources in the Deccan, I think there is

reason to believe that there will be a deficiency of four lacs of rupees to pay the troops the 1st of February, by which time the revenues of Fort St. George will come in. I think that it will be advisable to endeavor to procure that sum from the resources of Bombay and Poonah; and if you still continue the system proposed by me of raising all the money you require in communication with Mr. Duncan, I shall be much obliged to you if you will communicate to him this want, and take measures to supply it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I leave this place to-night.’

*To Captain Sydenham.*

‘ MY DEAR SYDENHAM,

‘ Seringapatam, 1st Dec., 1804.

‘ I arrived here last night, and expect to be able to set out again in the course of four or five days. I have received no intelligence from the army in the Deccan since the capture of Gaulna, and none from Bengal since I left it.

‘ Webbe is still very unwell, and is so weak as to be unable to walk from his bed to his couch; I trust, therefore, that you will not have delayed your departure for Bengal. It is absolutely necessary that you should arrive at your station at Scindiah’s durbar at an early period. I have not leisure at present to enter into the details of affairs at Madras.

‘ Tell the Governor General that I spoke to Lord William about sending away the Meuron regiment. He agrees with me that we could spare that corps more conveniently than any other; but we cannot spare that corps until it be replaced by another European regiment to come to the Madras establishment.

‘ If this war with Holkar should ever be finished, I shall prevail upon Mr. Duncan to send a corps from Guzerat or Bombay, which will enable Lord William to send away the Meuron regiment.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Sydenham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 1st Dec., 1804.

‘ I arrived here about ten o’clock last night, having met your son and Captain Brown on the Madras side of Auscotta.

‘ When passing Arcot, I took an opportunity of looking at my old friends the 19th light dragoons and the 4th regiment of cavalry, and I am happy to tell you that both these corps looked remarkably well. The horses of the 4th are lean, but their coats were smooth and clean. I acknowledge that I should have been much pleased if it had been possible to allow this corps to rest and refresh for six months at Arcot. I sent them into the Carnatic because I was aware that they required rest, and I knew that the men had not seen their families since the corps marched with the grand army to Seringapatam in February, 1799.

‘ Allow me to recall to your recollection Mr. Gilmour, the superintending surgeon with the subsidiary force at Poonah, for one of the officers of the superintending surgeons in Malabar, *vice* those of the Bombay establishment, when they shall be removed.

‘ Major Walker did me the favor to express a desire that I should look at the 8th regiment at Arcot, with which I complied. I never saw a more promising corps, or one so perfect in its exercise, or so good in its general appearance, for the time during which this corps has been embodied. It really does the Major much credit.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major General Campbell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 2nd Dec., 1804.

‘ 1. I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I arrived here on the 30th November, and I propose to set out from hence to join the army in the Deccan as soon as the officers of the staff shall have arrived.

‘ 2. As I find that Major Malcolm’s health is re-established, and I imagine that his services will not be required immediately in Mysore, where his duties are ably performed by Major Wilks, and as I shall derive the greatest benefit

from the assistance and advice of Major Malcolm in the affairs which I may have to arrange, I have requested him to accompany me to camp, and Major Wilks to continue in charge of the Residency in Mysore, till your Excellency's further orders shall be received.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Armstrong, Military Secretary to the Governor General.*

‘ MY DEAR ARMSTRONG,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th Dec., 1804.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 16th November, for which I am very much obliged to you. I think there is reason to hope that General Lake will shortly bring the war to a conclusion.

‘ I send the copy of a long letter which I have received from Murray, and of the letter enclosed in it. I do not know what to do about this corps of his. I know that it is useless and dangerous for him to carry into execution the plan which he proposes, viz., to advance towards Kota; and yet, as the Commander in Chief has ordered him to advance, I do not see how I can interfere. My intention was to order him to draw towards Guzerat, if the Resident with Scindiah did not think it desirable that he should stay in his territories. It appears that Colonel Murray has determined to quit Ougein, but he advances to Kota by the orders of the Commander in Chief.

‘ I have received Mr. Elphinstone's dispatches to the 4th November. The only danger which I apprehend is the meeting of the parties at Hoossingabad. I wish the corps in Bundelcund was better composed and provided.

‘ All the officers are not yet arrived, but I shall set out as soon as they come, which will be, I believe, about the 8th. I shall take with me 3000 Mysore horse in very good order.

‘ The Governor General will receive, in a few days after this letter, a most able and satisfactory report on the affairs of Mysore drawn up by Major Wilks. I recommend that he should send a copy of this paper to Fort St. George, and to order that it may be recorded at that Presidency.

‘ There is some little difference between that paper and my report, which may require an alteration in the Governor

General's minute on the affairs of Mysore, but only in the details. The principles remain the same, but since the army has returned, it appears the account of the expenses of the war to the Rajah is larger than I supposed. His surplus revenue is also rather larger.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Armstrong.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

EXTRACTS from the Report on the interior administration, resources, and expenditure of the Government of Mysore, under the system prescribed by the Orders of the Governor General in Council, dated 4th September, 1799; by MAJOR M. WILKS, of the establishment of Fort St. George, acting Resident at Mysore, 5th December, 1804.

*Major Wilks, Acting Resident at Mysore, to the Right Hon. Lord W. Cavendish Bentinck, Governor in Council, &c., Fort St. George.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 5th Dec., 1804.

‘ A variety of causes have prevented the successive residents at the court of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore from preparing, for the consideration of the government of Fort St. George, the detailed reports on the interior administration, the resources, and expenditure of the government of Mysore, which were prescribed in the orders of his Excellency the most noble the Governor General in Council, dated 4th September, 1799.

‘ During a considerable portion of the time in which Colonel Close filled that important office, his attention was necessarily engrossed by the means of establishing and consolidating the authority of the new government; and subsequently, a long series of severe ill health deprived the public of the useful information which, during that interval of leisure, might otherwise have been expected from his well known talents.

‘ The successors of Colonel Close have hitherto been prevented by other avocations of extensive national importance, from a residence in Mysore of sufficient continuance to admit of any considerable attention to the detail of such a report.

\* \* \* \* \*

‘ When to this state of things is added the turbulent

character of the numerous Mahommedans, then inhabiting Mysore, who were necessarily excluded from the liberal provision which had been extended to the principal officers of the late administration, the task of establishing the new government was of no ordinary difficulty; and its early and successful accomplishment must, next to those measures of a general nature which directed the great arrangements of that period, be attributed to the energy, the talents, and cordial co-operation of the uncommon men who were selected for the execution of the civil\* and military† duties; and to the fortunate choice of a dewan‡, who, to a mind of singular vigor, added an extensive acquaintance with the resources of the country, and an intimate knowledge of characters; and was thus capable of collecting and combining at once all that had been useful in the establishments of the late government.

\* \* \* \* \*

‘The province of Bullum was never effectually conquered, until military roads were opened through the forest towns by the Hon. Major General Wellesley, in the year 1801-2.

‘The authority of Hyder Alli, or of Tippoo Sultaun, over this province, was extremely precarious, and the presence of an army was always necessary, to enforce the payment of the revenue; the rates of the land tax had accordingly fluctuated; but have been fixed by the present government at a standard which appears to be acceptable to the landholders. No part of Mysore has been more tranquil than Bullum, since the period that the actual authority of the government was for the first time introduced into that province in 1801-2.

\* \* \* \* \*

‘The cordial and efficient support afforded by the Hon. Major General Wellesley to the Government of Mysore, on all occasions, even during his absence, has not only prevented inconvenience, but has perhaps been essential to the prosperity of the country. I am far from intending an un-

\* Colonel Close, Mr. Webbe, Lieut. Colonel Malcolm.

† Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‡ Purneah, a bramin, who was formerly the minister of finance under Tippoo Sultaun; he was selected by Lord Wellesley as a proper person to fill the important office of prime minister to the Rajah of Mysore.



becoming compliment to that officer, at the expense of others, in stating a doubt, whether the same extent of support may be always afforded by his successors ; because the actual duties of that command can never be made to prescribe the parental description of care with which the Hon Major General Wellesley has guarded the authority of the government of Mysore.

\*            \*            \*            \*            \*

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 5th Dec., 1804.

‘ I am much concerned to have to inform your Excellency that I received last night, through a private, although authentic, channel, accounts of the death of Mr. Webbe, in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 9th November.

‘ Your Excellency is so well acquainted with the merits of that gentleman, manifested by a long course of able and zealous service to the public, under your Excellency’s administration, that it is unnecessary that I should take up your Excellency’s time by an attempt to enumerate them ; but I cannot avoid expressing the sorrow which I feel, on private as well as on public grounds, to have to announce to your Excellency this misfortune at such a crisis as the present.

‘ I take the liberty of expressing a most anxious wish that Captain Sydenham may be sent to take charge of the Residency without loss of time.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shaue.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 5th Dec., 1804.

‘ I have sent off by express this day to the Governor General an account of the death of poor Webbe, and I hope that Sydenham will have left Calcutta before you will receive this letter.

‘ I now enclose a list of the villages which ought to fill up the blank in my letter to the Governor General of the 14th November, and a letter from Malcolm on the subject of Kistna’s claims.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shaue.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Strachey.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 5th Dec., 1804.

‘ I have perused the copies of your letters which you sent to me, and your dispatch of the 25th November. I am fully satisfied that you did every thing in your power to bring your negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion; and I am convinced that they failed from causes which were not foreseen when you were dispatched on your mission, and which you could not control.

‘ The result of your mission, however, although not exactly what I could have wished, has been attended by many circumstances of public advantage. We have gained an accurate knowledge of the sentiments and intentions of all the southern chiefs; we know the real points of difference which exist between them and the Peshwah, between them and the Rajah of Kolapoor, and between each other; and we are enabled to form an opinion regarding the best mode of negotiating with them hereafter. I consider these advantages to be important, and that the public are indebted for them to your zeal, intelligence, and ability.

‘ As it appears to me that I shall not have occasion to detain you for any great length of time from the duties of the office to which you have been appointed in Bengal by his Excellency the Governor General, I beg you to commence your journey to Calcutta whenever you may find it convenient to yourself.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Mr. Strachey.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 8th Dec., 1804.

‘ I have received a copy of Mr. Edmonstone’s letter of the 17th to Mr. Elphinstone, which has alarmed me a good deal. However, I shall delay to write upon the subject till I shall have turned over in my mind all that must be done in the crisis which may be expected.

‘ The gentlemen of the staff arrived this day, and I propose to set out on the day after to-morrow. I have been sadly annoyed by my servants leaving me. Those who have lived with me ever since I arrived in India have declared that they will not return again into the Deccan. Indeed, if

the prevalent reports are founded, they are not in the wrong; the sickness of the army is terrible, and must sweep off many who have escaped the famine.

‘ I have received a letter from Captain Mahony in Koorg, in which, among other things, he desires to know whether I heard any thing of the sword which the Governor General announced an intention of giving to the Rajah of Koorg. I think it would be desirable to send the sword round to Madras as soon as possible.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Campbell.*

‘ MY DEAR MAJOR,

‘ Seringapatam, 8th Dec., 1804.

‘ When I was at Madras, I was very anxious to have an opportunity of speaking to you and Major Munro, regarding your own situations and objects. General Stuart was always most kind to me. I had no acquaintance with, or claims upon, him, excepting those of service; and I owe every thing to his confidence, his favorable opinion, and his support. I feel for him an affection and gratitude which I cannot describe; and nothing would give me greater pleasure than to forward the views of any of his friends in this country; particularly of officers so intimately connected with him as you and Major Munro. I therefore trust to you to let me know if you should think that I can render you, or Major Munro, or any of General Stuart’s friends the smallest service.

‘ We have sustained a sad loss in poor Webbe. The General will be much afflicted when he hears of it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Campbell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Money Penny.*

‘ MY DEAR MONEY PENNY,

‘ Seringapatam, 11th Dec., 1804.

‘ Major Wilks has shown me your letter to Mr. Piele, on the subject of the assistance which you have required from the Mysore government, and his answer; I observe that he has referred to a communication which I should make to you regarding the Mysore troops; and as I wish to give you every information and assistance in my power, I proceed to

give you my opinion regarding the best mode of employing these troops, and the nature and extent of the service which you can reasonably expect from them.

‘ Major Wilks has explained to you the mode in which it will be necessary that you should employ the peons. They must be under the Collector, in the same manner as his own sebandy, unless you should have them in your own camp, or actually on duty with a detachment of the Company’s troops.

‘ You will find the peons to be very trustworthy, and good for that description of troops.

‘ In respect to the regular infantry, they are well clothed, armed, and equipped; well paid, trustworthy, orderly, and disposed to render every service of which they can be deemed capable. Their discipline is not very great, but it is sufficient to enable them to make their marches with Company’s troops. They have no European officers.

‘ It is my opinion that they ought not to be employed to make any attack singly. I have employed them in a jungle, on the flank, and in support of the Europeans, and they performed the service required of them, in which they sustained no small loss, as well as it would have been performed by any description of troops.

‘ I much doubt, however, if they had not seen or known that the Europeans were in their neighbourhood, whether they would have advanced an inch.

‘ The horse are the best of their description that I have seen, but, like other cavalry, they must not be exposed to the fire of any description of infantry posted. It results from this account of the nature of the troops, that you may safely employ the peons in the mode you propose, provided that you place them under the Collector, or should take them in your own camp.

‘ You must not expect any active service from the regular infantry, excepting they should be joined by the Company’s troops.

‘ They will answer well alone to prevent the enemy’s progress into Mysore, but they will not answer to make an attack upon a poligar fort or fortification.

‘ You may use their cavalry on the same service that you would any other cavalry of the same description, and you will find them trustworthy.



‘ Captain Little accompanied the regular troops, and will communicate to them your orders and instructions.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Money Penny.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 11th Dec., 1804.

‘ I have been detained here these last two days by something very like a fever and ague ; but I still hope it is only an increased attack of the rheumatism.

‘ I received yesterday the accounts of the successes of General Lake and General Fraser ; and I most sincerely congratulate you upon them. I am rather of opinion, that these successes will render it unnecessary for me to go to the northward. However, I am prepared, and shall not delay after I am well to proceed if I should find that they are not so complete, as by the first accounts they appear to be ; or if there should be any serious appearances in Berar.

‘ I acknowledge that I do not agree with Elphinstone respecting the Rajah of Berar. He has undoubtedly been looking for Holkar’s success ; and if it had continued, he would have co-operated with Holkar. But I really believe the Rajah’s armaments, at present, to be defensive ; and I think that what he says himself, upon the subject of the letter from Meer Khan, is unanswerable. If we are to be in constant apprehension, my opinion is, that we are in a worse situation than we were before the last war ; and there will be an end to surpluses, investments, and payments of debts.

‘ I hope that we shall take advantage of this great success against Holkar, to adopt a conciliatory language and policy with all the native powers, and take my word for it, the peace will be permanent ; if we adopt the other line, we shall have war immediately.

‘ If we now go to war with the Rajah of Berar, I must have troops and money ; and I must have civil servants, and establishments to take possession of, and govern, his country. Nothing else will answer.

‘ The Nizam must complete his subsidiary force ; he must fill his forts in Berar proper with grain ; and take measures to keep in tranquillity his own countries. Unless all these arrangements are adopted in time, we shall march to Nag-

poor and plunder that place; but then we must return to procure provisions. After all, supposing that we should succeed in establishing a government at Nagpoor, it must be weak and precarious.

‘ I have received your letters of the 22nd November, and Sydenham’s of the 23rd.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shaue.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 11th Dec., 1804.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 2nd, and I assure you, that I have regretted most sincerely our poor friend. This loss is a public misfortune, in my judgment; and I am convinced will be so considered by every man who has a spark of public feeling, or the capacity to understand the public interests.

‘ I arrived here on the 30th of November, and should have marched for Poonah on the day before yesterday, only that I have had an attack not very unlike a fever and ague. I am induced to think it is nothing more than the increase of rheumatism, which I have had hanging about me for the last eighteen months; but it is attended by all the symptoms and inconveniences, and requires the same remedies, as fever.

‘ General Lake’s and General Fraser’s victories in Hindustan have made a great alteration in our situation. We have now a little time to breathe, and I acknowledge that I am of opinion that all will go right.

‘ I do not participate in the fear of Elphinstone respecting the conduct of the Rajah of Berar. I am rather of opinion, that his armaments are intended for his own defence against Meer Khan, and not to annoy us. However, I think it will be a prudent measure to order the detachment in Candeish to draw towards Berar, by the valley of the Poorna, and to take up a position somewhere in that country, which may be convenient for forage and other necessities; and at the same time will afford the facility of either immediately commencing offensive operations, or of acting on the defensive, as may be thought most proper. I am also of opinion, that Rajah Mohiput Ram ought to be desired immediately to commence forming magazines in Berar. This object he will

be able to effect with great facility; particularly, if he is assisted with a little money.

‘ I had some idea at first, of breaking up the large detachment under Wallace, to bring his corps down towards Poonah; and to send Hallyburton into Berar with his corps, being four battalions, the 94th regiment, and two regiments of cavalry, and all the Mogul troops. In my opinion, this would still be the best plan, if the next letters from Elphinstone should be satisfactory, and if you should agree in opinion with me, that the Rajah of Berar’s objects in his armaments are to defend himself.

‘ My reason for this opinion is, that I see that another corps of freebooters is forming about Perinda, and I suspect that it will be very troublesome, now that Scindiah has the country between Ahmednuggur and Poonah, unless opposed by a body of the Company’s troops. But if Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Meer Khan, are likely to join with an intention to invade Berar, and the Nizam’s territories, the whole force will be required to oppose them; and the detachment, as now constituted, ought not to be broken up.

‘ As for Scindiah, my opinion is, that he is hearty in his detestation of Holkar. He was reduced to great distress, and the British Government either could not, or would not, give him assistance. In this state he was found by Sirjee Rao Ghautky, who immediately proposed to him the old Marhatta game, as a mode of relief from his distresses; Scindiah has adopted his proposition, and has acted accordingly against the Nabob of Bopal. However, in my opinion, the late successes against Holkar, and the offer of a supply of money to Eitul Punt, will bring all right again in that quarter; and possibly Sirjee Rao Ghautky will be blown from a gun, if something very bad does not happen before the accounts of Holkar’s defeats will reach Scindiah in the Rajah of Berar’s territories.

‘ I have seen Elphinstone’s letter to you of the 20th November.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ The two regiments of cavalry, and the battalion, were to march to Poonah by the route of Beejapoor. I think it

would be advisable again to lay the dawkh upon that road. These troops are under the orders of Colonel Montresor, of the 22nd Dragoons, and I wish that you would send him sircar hircarrahs, perwanahs, &c., to meet him. I have given him every thing I could.'

*To Colonel Close.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ' Seringapatam, 12th December, 1804.

' I received last night your letter of the 3rd. Your financial statement which it contains, is very satisfactory; and I see exactly, that we have to provide for the Madras corps for the month of December, (*i. e.*, arrears for November, December, and January.) There is not a farthing of money at Madras, or in the ceded districts, or in Mysore. Indeed, I doubt much whether the cavalry, which will march from Bellary, will take with it a sufficient sum for its payment to the period at which Lord William Bentinck promised to provide for the payment of all the troops in the field, and in the Deccan.

' We have, therefore, no resource excepting the produce of our bills upon Bombay and Bengal; which, of course, must be negotiated and arranged by the government of Bombay, for reasons referrible to the Bombay finance. I must request you, therefore, to correspond with Mr. Duncan on the subject, and I think that you ought to have from Bombay the amount I mentioned to you in the letter which I wrote to you from Madras.

' I had a very slight attack again last night, but I am better this morning than I have yet been, and I hope that I shall have no more.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Colonel Close.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

' MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ' Seringapatam, 12th December, 1804.

' Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received your letter of the 6th instant. I acknowledge that I do not attach so much importance as you do to the information received from Elphinstone, or to the movements of the armies of Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, as you will have observed by my letter of yesterday. However, I may be



wrong, and I know that I want information, as I have not received any intelligence from Scindiah's durbar, or the opinion of its temper from our lamented friend, for a great length of time.

'My letter of yesterday will have communicated my opinion of the measures to be adopted immediately, in case you should think the danger real. Besides this, I think we ought to keep the Madras corps, notwithstanding they may be relieved by others from Bombay. Keep the 18th, at all events, till we see the result of these movements in Berar, and I will take it upon myself.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shaue.*

'MY DEAR SHAW,

'Seringapatam, 14th December, 1804.

'Colonel Close has sent me a copy of Mr. Jenkins' dispatch to Mr. Edmonstone, of the 15th November; which, although short, appears to me to contain some very important matter.

'I think it almost certain, that the accounts of the victories of the British armies of the 13th and 17th November will produce an alteration in the councils of Scindiah. He will not be so ready to join himself with Meer Khan, and neither will be bold enough to venture upon an attack upon the British possessions.

'The facts, however, stated in Mr. Jenkins' dispatch are curious, and well deserving the attention of every European politician who has any thing to say to India. Scindiah, whose enmity to Holkar was become proverbial; who allied himself with the Company for the express purpose of defending himself against, and eventually destroying, Holkar; who rejoiced when he found that the war was determined on and inevitable; who has suffered severely in its progress by Holkar's plunder of his town of Mundleysir, and by Meer Khan's plunder of Bhilsa; and who has every thing to hope from its successful conclusion, which the smallest exertion on his part would ensure; instead of making that exertion against his enemy, joins his enemy for the purpose of destroying his friend and ally.

'It is unfortunate that I have not yet got the copies of

the memorandum, and other papers which I gave to the Governor General at different times, when I was in Bengal; as in considering this subject, I should have wished to have before me the details of what was intended for Scindiah. However, I believe I recollect enough to be able to make what I shall say tolerably clear.

‘ There can be no doubt but that Scindiah has already broken the treaty of defensive alliance. Whether the intelligence sent by Mr. Jenkins, of his connexion with Meer Khan, and its object, be true or false, it is probable that he will not now act according to the plan which that intelligence supposes that he has formed; and it will rest with the British Government to determine what line of policy it will adopt.

‘ If Scindiah should act upon the plan supposed in Mr. Jenkins’ intelligence, the British Government have no option; we must take Malwa for ourselves, and destroy him and his government. That will certainly be a difficult object to accomplish; but we have no alternative between that and being destroyed ourselves. He will not act upon that plan, however, and the question is what line we shall adopt.

‘ In the case of a breach of treaty, it certainly rests with the British Government to adopt that measure which will be most convenient for its own interests. It would be fully justified in having recourse to arms, at the same time that war is not the necessary consequence of every breach of treaty.

‘ The question, therefore, is simply one of convenience; and upon this point I have no scruple in declaring, that the present is of all others the worst time to attempt the conquest of Malwa; which must be the object of the war, and the only one which can bring it to a conclusion. We have neither troops, money, civil servants, magazines, nor any one object which would be necessary to carry this plan into execution. There are other reasons also for delaying to attempt it, referrible to the state of affairs in England.

‘ It will not be easy hereafter for Scindiah to get any European allies; and his armies and resources will certainly not improve during the interval in which we may think proper to leave him to himself, and to the prosecution of his own plans against Holkar.

‘ The plan which I should recommend to the Governor

General would be to call upon Scindiah now to take measures to seize Holkar; if he should refuse, or omit to take any measures for that purpose, I would leave him to himself. I would form the armies in Bundelcund, and in the conquered provinces, according to the plan proposed in one of my memorandums; and the subsidiary forces with the Soubah of the Deccan, and the Peshwah on the Godavery, according to a plan proposed in one of my letters to you, and another to the Governor General. I would then intimate to Navel Kyn, or whoever may be the head of the English party at Scindiah's durbar, that the Governor General had been prepared to advance money to Scindiah, and to assist him with troops in the true spirit of the defensive alliance, in order to enable him to settle a government in Malwa, but that Scindiah had broken it in all its essential articles, and that the British Government would not revive it; or would not act upon it in any manner as long as Sirjee Rao Ghautky formed a part of the council, or remained in Scindiah's presence. At the same time, I would intimate an intention to perform every article of the treaty of peace.

‘ This plan of conduct may revive the English party, and if it should, we may depend upon its permanence, and may act with it in the spirit of the defensive alliance; but if Ghautky should last, we may have peace with Scindiah for a time, and possibly, after the example which has been made of Holkar, for a very long time, but we cannot venture to act upon the defensive alliance.

‘ It may be asked, what will be done with Holkar, who, I suppose, has escaped alive? I answer, he cannot now be formidable to the British Government. Let him be followed, as I proposed in one of my memorandums to the Governor General, with a reward for his apprehension. If we should take him, so much the better; if not, leave him to his contest with Scindiah, which will revive with double fury.

‘ At all events, Scindiah's intentions being doubtful, I should hesitate to advance into Malwa, any but such a body of troops, that it does not appear that the means of the Commander in Chief are capable of appointing. If such a body of troops should advance into Malwa under present circumstances, it would be best at once to seize that province for ourselves.

‘ But I conceive it impossible to form, or support such an army at present; the first operation, I suppose, after the battle of the 13th, will have been to invest Deeg, and prevent the escape of any of Holkar’s troops or guns; and I conclude that the Rajah of Bhurtpoor will be punished. If Holkar has flown off to the southward, which I suppose he must have done, the cavalry ought to be joined to the Bundelcund corps, which, if there be any, is now the point of danger.

‘ According to this plan, with the troops in Hindustan and the Deccan, posted as proposed, Ragojee Bhoonslah satisfied, and the Residents at the durbars of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, vigilant, but not unnecessarily alarmed, we should be in a great situation; though certainly not in that state in which we should have been if many unfortunate events had not occurred since the treaties of peace were concluded.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have received Mr. Elphinstone’s dispatches to the 2nd November.

‘ I am rather better, but not well yet.’

*To J. Duncan, Esq.*

‘ HONORABLE SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 16th Dec., 1804.

‘ In respect to Colonel Murray’s operations, it is my opinion that they ought now to be more solid than they have been hitherto. He ought to attack Hinglisghur, or any other fort that Holkar may have in that neighbourhood, of which he may be able to get possession. I do not know what orders the Colonel has received from the Commander in Chief, and I cannot venture to give him any.

‘ The Commander in Chief’s late victories, however, have made a very material alteration in the situation of affairs; and Colonel Murray’s advance to the northward cannot now answer any purpose, excepting to distress his own troops, and to place Guzerat in a state of risk. By undertaking the siege of Hinglisghur, or any other fort in that quarter, and within his reach, he will not only forward the objects of the war, but will secure his own position; and he



will not be far removed from Guzerat, in case it should be necessary to move into that province.

‘ I am induced to give you this opinion, not only from a consideration of the state of the war with Holkar in Hindustan, but from a general view of the politics of the other courts at the present moment.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *J. Duncan, Esq.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 16th Dec., 1804.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the day before yesterday, it has occurred to me that the Governor General may imagine that I wish to recommend to him a violent remonstrance to Scindiah. That is far from my intention; I doubt whether any remonstrance is advisable; at all events a violent one can never be so, and it is certainly very undignified.

‘ What I recommend is to leave Scindiah to himself, if he should refuse, or omit to attack Holkar; and just to hint to his ministers that as long as Sirjee Rao should remain with him, the British Government would do nothing.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter which I have written to Mr. Duncan. I am still unwell.’

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 17th Dec., 1804.\*

‘ I rather think that it would be best to send Goklah on the service against the Prittee Niddee. He will have per-

\* *Secretary of the Supreme Government to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 18th Dec., 1804.

‘ The Governor General in Council deems it to be probable that you will have received from Colonel Close all such notification of the arrangement which has been adopted by that officer, from withdrawing Lieut. Colonel Wallace to Poonah, in consequence of his supercession in the command of the detachments from the subsidiary forces of Poonah and Hyderabad, by the promotion of Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton to the rank of Colonel, and for purposes connected with the present condition of the battalions stationed at Poonah; I am directed, however, to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a dispatch from Colonel Close stating that arrangement, and the circumstances which, in his opinion, appeared to require its adoption.

formed it, it may be expected, before I can reach Poonah; and, at all events, supposing that he should not, there can be no difficulty in drawing him off again.

‘ I saw the dispatch from Major Kirkpatrick regarding Scindiah’s vakeel, before I received your letter. It affords another proof that we cannot go on with Scindiah’s durbar, if Sirjee Rao Ghautky is continued the minister. It also shows clearly the disposition and intention of that durbar if Holkar’s successes had continued.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter which I wrote yesterday to Mr. Duncan, regarding Colonel Murray’s operations. I propose to write this day to Colonel Kirkpatrick, regarding the want of troops on the western frontier, and in Berar.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 19th Dec., 1804. ’

‘ The late dispatches from Mr. Elphinstone to his Excellency the Governor General, particularly one of the 27th of November, in which he relates a conversation with Jeswunt Rao Runchunder, upon the subject of the claims of the Rajah of Berar upon the Soubahdar’s government, for the revenues of the pergunnahs under Gawilghur, collected by his Highness’s officers, render it expedient that I should trouble you upon that subject.

‘ There can be no doubt of the justice of the demand of the Rajah of Berar, and it is unfortunate that at this moment he should have a just claim of this description, and still more

‘ The Governor General in Council is of opinion that the arrangement adopted by Colonel Close is judicious and proper; his Excellency, however, is pleased to refer the question to you, and to desire that you will communicate to Colonel Close your sentiments on the subject of his dispatch.

‘ It is further his Excellency’s desire that you will consider the means of providing for the command of the detachment, in the event of your not assuming that command in person; and the Governor General in Council hereby authorizes you, in the event of your deeming such a measure to be necessary or expedient, to direct Colonel Hallyburton to retire to Hyderabad during the continuance of the detachment from the subsidiary force on its present service.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ N. B. EDMONSTONE,

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ Sec. to Gov.

so, that one of the Company's allies should evade or delay to satisfy him. I therefore most earnestly urge you to adopt such measures as you may think most likely to obtain speedy payment for the Rajah ; and to communicate upon this subject with the Rajah's vakeel at the Soubahdar's durbar, and to correspond with Mr. Elphinstone concerning it ; in order that the Rajah of Berar may know not only that the British Government is not concerned in this act of injustice, but that you have exerted yourself to remedy it.

‘ Connected with this subject is the entirely defenceless state of the province of Berar. It is strange that the Soubahdar's government should be guilty of an act of injustice which, at any other period, would have occasioned an attack from the Rajah of Berar, and that he should not adopt common precautions for the security of that valuable territory. You will observe that this state of want of defence has not escaped the observation of the Rajah's ministers ; and that they expect that Meer Khan's pindarries will make an irruption into the province. The consequences will be fatal to the Soubahdar's government ; the least important will be the loss of the revenue of Berar, and of all the advantages acquired in the late war ; and I therefore request you to adopt such measures as you may think necessary, to oblige the Soubahdar to provide for the defence of this part of his territories.

‘ I have not received any accounts of the state of affairs on the western frontier, to which you refer in your late dispatches to his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ During the last war, the banditti upon this same frontier increased in number, because they were neglected ; and, at last, nothing but the British troops could force them. The same causes will have the same effects this year ; but it must not be forgotten, that the loss to the Soubahdar, in the mean time, is immense. I must also request that you will point out to the Soubahdar's government, that the British troops cannot hold out against the constant exertions which they are obliged to make in his service ; exertions rendered necessary, not by the common course of events, but by the faults and neglects of his government.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.





of the Rajah of Berar are pacific. It is very possible that he may have opened a negotiation with Holkar, or Meer Khan, the object of which may have been hostility towards the British Government; but the design to attack us, if it ever existed, has certainly been relinquished by the Rajah; and it is most probable that he has been attacked by Meer Khan for this reason.

‘ It is not improbable that as soon as the Rajah of Berar shall hear of the late successes of the troops under the command of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, he will ask for the assistance of the Honorable Company against Meer Khan; particularly if the operations of that freebooter should press upon him, and if his troops should approach to Nag-poor. It does not appear to me that the Rajah of Berar possesses the means of paying for any assistance that may be afforded to him; much less those of subsidising permanently a body of the British troops. At the same time, it would be very desirable to afford him assistance against Meer Khan; particularly if that freebooter should be too strong for him, and if the assistance can be given without risk to the Company’s allies.

‘ I have therefore written a letter to Colonel Close this day, of which I enclose a copy. I have requested him to authorize the officer commanding the British detachment, which will shortly be in Berar, to move to the assistance of the Rajah, if he should be required to do so, on certain provisions therein stated.

‘ I beg you to take an opportunity of mentioning this circumstance to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, and point out to him the extent of the service which may thereby be rendered to the Rajah’s state.

‘ In case the Rajah should require the Company’s assistance, I beg you to examine very minutely the grounds which he may have for calling for it; and I beg you to decline to write to the officer commanding the detachment in Berar, unless you should have reason to think that the danger which menaces the Rajah’s state is great and immediate.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Hon. M. Elphinstone.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 19th Dec., 1804.

‘ I cannot better explain my opinion of the Rajah of Berar’s intentions than by sending the enclosed copies of two letters which I have written this day to Mr. Elphinstone and Colonel Close.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I rather think the state of affairs, at present, to be such as that the Governor General would prefer that I should return to England to going into the Deccan. However, I have not decided yet ; I wait the next dispatches from Mr. Jenkins, and I shall then, I hope, be quite well, and shall be able to set out, if it should be necessary.\*

\* *To Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 22nd Dec., 1804.

‘ 1. I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor General, to transmit to you, for your information, the accompanying copy of a dispatch to the Acting Resident at the court of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of this date

‘ 2. A copy of his Excellency’s instructions to the Resident at Nagpoor, referred to in the 24th paragraph of the enclosed document, will be transmitted to you in a separate dispatch.

‘ 3. You will observe, from the tenor of the enclosed document, that his Excellency the Governor General has judged it proper to place under your control the conduct of those officers in the prescribed negotiations at their respective courts. With reference to this arrangement, I am directed to observe, that the instructions which you may have occasion to issue to the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to the Resident at Nagpoor, under the present communication of his Excellency’s sentiments and resolutions, must necessarily be regulated by the course of events, and by the tenor of the communications which you may receive from those officers ; but that the extensive powers with which you have been invested will enable you to act under any state of circumstances, without any reference to the Governor General’s authority.

‘ 4. With a view to provide for the defect of your presence with the army of the Deccan, or at Poonah, at the time when this dispatch may arrive at that station, the Governor General has deemed it necessary provisionally to invest Colonel Close with authority to regulate and control the proceedings of the Acting Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Resident at Nagpoor.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ N. B. EDMONSTONE.



we ought to take advantage of the present moment, to effect the settlement with the southern Chiefs. I am decidedly of opinion that the troops of the Deccan cannot cross the Taptee, and that the force which Colonel Hallyburton has with him to the northward, is fully equal to any thing that can be brought against him, if not stronger than is necessary. Might not the Madras corps, coming down from Poonah, with one of the Bombay battalions, and the two regiments of cavalry ordered up from the ceded districts, reinforced by Goklah, move down towards the Kistna, and effect this long wished for settlement? The only doubt I have upon the subject is, their equipment; for I judge from your letter of the 16th, that Wallace has returned alone, and has left his bazaars, departments, &c., with Colonel Hallyburton's corps. If that should be the case, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to equip a corps for him at Poonah, as it ought to be; and if his corps should not be properly equipped, it would be better that the business should not be attempted.

‘The only chance, then, remaining, of effecting a settlement with the southern Chiefs, will be to assemble a corps hereafter upon the frontiers of Mysore, or the ceded districts, when all the Madras troops shall have returned within the Madras territories; this will be expensive, but it cannot be avoided.

‘If this should be the case, the object of your attention should be, as soon as possible, to form the Peshwah's subsidiary corps upon the Godavery, somewhere about Toka, and engage as many brinjarries as possible to attend it.

‘While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid advert-  
ing to a very material point, viz., the settlement, on a permanent basis, of the Peshwah's authority in Candeish and the countries on the Godavery, which heretofore were in the possession of Amrut Rao. In this point, two or three subjects are involved, upon which I wish to furnish you with my opinion.

‘The first of these is the person to whose charge the territories in Candeish should be given. In my opinion they ought to be given to one of the Peshwah's ministers. Supposing that it were possible to find another person sufficiently qualified and rich to take charge of these territories, he



would find it difficult to support himself in the management, against the constant intrigues working in the durbar at Poonah; the result would be that we should be obliged to take them from him, which would be equivalent to a fresh conquest of Candeish. I only mention this point as one of importance; of course the manager of Candeish must have been fixed upon long ago, and I trust that he has possession of the whole.

‘The next subject for consideration is the mode of defending and supporting the government in that province. I should wish much to see our troops withdrawn from the forts; and as we have drawn off towards Berar by this time, and may not require the communication with Surat, I beg you to turn over in your mind, whether we might not give possession of the forts to the Peshwah.

‘But how is the Peshwah to keep them? is a consideration of great importance, in which the competency of the manager appointed again falls in the way. If one of the ministers is the manager, I believe we may depend upon his keeping possession, provided he has a few good troops; but I really think that in a state of such importance as the possession of that frontier province, we ought to stretch a point, to see that the Peshwah has a few good troops to support his government in it, and defend its forts. What say you to allowing him an European officer or two to discipline a body of infantry, to be placed under the manager of Candeish, to defend the forts, &c.? Such a corps, countenanced and supported, as it would be, by the subsidiary force stationed near Toka, and by the Nizam’s subsidiary force lower down the Godavery, would do every thing we could require, and would keep the rascals effectually out of the Deccan, particularly if I can prevail on the Nizam’s government to have something of the same kind in Berar. Let me have your sentiments upon the whole of this letter.\*

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

\* To Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘SIR,

‘Fort William, 25th Dec. 1804.

‘1. The recent dispatches received from the Residents at Nagpoor, and with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, combined with the actual state of affairs at Hyderabad,

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 25th December, 1804.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 17th. In respect to Joolall he appears to be on the Nerbudda, and he may certainly return into Candeish as soon as he hears of Colonel Hallyburton’s march into Berar.

‘ Scindwah, and the countries north of the Taptee, were to fall to Scindiah’s share of Holkar’s spoils; and it was my intention that that fort should be attacked eventually, by the subsidiary corps to serve with that chief. That, however, appears now to be very uncertain; and if advantage should be taken of the possession of Scindwah, or even of Mihissur, to disturb Candeish, and the Rajah of Berar should remain tranquil, and Scindiah and Meer Khan keep to the north-

have appeared to render it expedient to issue instructions to the Right Hon. Lord William Bentinck, of which I enclose a copy for your information.

‘ 2. In conformity to the tenor of the second paragraph of those instructions, I desire that you will communicate to Lord William Bentinck your sentiments as to the most advisable mode of strengthening the detachment now stationed at Hyderabad, if you should deem that measure to be necessary or advisable; and that you will adopt such other arrangements as may be within the reach of your immediate authority, for completing the corps which it is proposed to establish at that city.

‘ 3. You will observe that the utmost addition which it is proposed to make to the detachment now at Hyderabad is one regiment of Europeans, one regiment of the cavalry, and two battalions of sepoy, with the usual proportion of artillery; you will, however, possess more correct means of judging at the period of time when this dispatch may reach you, whether such an addition, or any other reinforcement of the corps now at Hyderabad, be necessary; and I accordingly authorize you to modify the proposed arrangements in such manner as you may deem advisable with reference to the state of affairs in the Deccan, and to the means which you may possess of furnishing the additional troops required for the service at Hyderabad. Under any circumstance, it appears to me to be desirable, during the continuance of hostilities, to strengthen the corps at Hyderabad, and I conclude, that as soon as you receive this dispatch, you will direct the battalion of Madras sepoy, which has been ordered to return from Poonah to the territories of Fort St. George, to proceed in the first instance to Hyderabad.

‘ 4. Copies of this dispatch, and of my instructions of this date to Lord William Bentinck, have been forwarded to the Resident at Hyderabad, who is also directed to communicate with you on this subject, and to whom you will be pleased to signify an early intimation of the measures which you may adopt in consequence of these instructions.

I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ N. B. EDMONSTONE,

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ Sec. to Government.

ward of the Nerbudda, we must make an effort to take possession of Scindwah by means of Colonel Hallyburton's corps. I conclude that it will be possible to bring it back from Berar, if all should be quiet on the side of Nagpoor.

‘As I see that we have a store in Jaulna, it will perhaps be necessary to retain, for some time longer, a British garrison in that fort. Upon this point you will be the best judge. Certainly, if we operate against Scindwah from the Deccan, the depôt at Jaulna becomes of great importance.

‘It is my opinion that the store of rice at Poonah ought to be in this year 40,000 loads, and 10,000 in Ahmednuggur. With a large store at Poonah it is always in your power to throw grain forward to any of the posts in advance; and if you should be able to do any thing to the southward in this year, it will be more conveniently situated there than at Ahmednuggur.

‘I am sorry to lose Major Graham. However, I have no doubt that Mr. Frissell will do his business well.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Seringapatam, 26th December, 1804.

‘I received last night your letter upon the subject of Lieut. Frissell's appointment to take charge of the collector's office at Ahmednuggur, in which you included your correspondence with Mr. Waring upon that subject.

‘You are responsible for the choice of the person who should undertake the conduct of Major Graham's duties upon his departure; and it is my opinion that it was not necessary that you should choose a gentleman among those belonging to the Residency.

‘But supposing that it had been necessary that you should depute one of your assistants upon this duty, I conclude that you are bound to choose any particular gentleman; all that is necessary is that the gentleman you should choose should be qualified, and I really believe Lieut. Frissell to be so.

‘On these grounds I conceive that Mr. Waring has not any reason to complain, more particularly as you have

thought it proper to state your reasons for having deputed Lieut. Frissell rather than him upon this duty; which reasons must have satisfied his mind that you had no disinclination to employ his talents, whenever circumstances would permit.

‘Mr. Waring has written me a few lines upon this subject, and I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to him this letter.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Mahony at Koorg.*

‘DEAR SIR,

‘Seringapatam, 27th December, 1804.

‘I am very much obliged to you for the perusal of all the papers which have been written regarding the transfer of the territory in Canara to the Rajah of Koorg; they have been copied, and now returned to you. It is very satisfactory to see that this arrangement has been made in a manner conformable to the spirit which prevailed in the original grant.

‘I will take care that the Rajah of Soonda is received at the military stations in Canara, in the same manner as he was received when he before passed into Koorg, which I believe was satisfactory to the Rajah of Koorg.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Captain Mahony.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘Seringapatam, 27th December, 1804.

‘I received last night a private account from Poonah that Vincatjee Bhoonslah had taken possession of Manik Droog, in Berar.

‘This place is exceedingly strong, and must have been lost by the treachery of the killadar, or the neglect of the Nizam’s government to keep in it a proper and well paid garrison; but those points, however interesting, and upon which I shall give my opinion hereafter, are not so important as the consideration of the mode in which the place has been taken.

‘Nana Saheb, as he is called, has always been discon-



tented, and has generally been in rebellion against the government of the Rajah of Berar. He suffered particularly by the construction given to the article of the treaty of Deogaum, in respect to the tributary Rajahs; and he has always been of the war faction at Nagpoor.

‘The first intelligence we have received of the fall of Manik Droog is from the Rajah of Berar’s minister. If the Rajah had intended to attack the Company, it is my opinion that he would not have directed his efforts on the side of Berar, but on that of the Bengal provinces, on which alone the Marhattas know well that they can make any impression, which can materially affect us. Under these circumstances I am induced to conclude, *primâ facie*, that the Rajah has nothing to do with this attack, and that Nana Saheb alone is to blame.

‘Our policy and our arms have reduced all the powers in India to the state of mere cyphers; at the same time that their intriguing, discontented, and rebellious followers still remain, with increased causes of discontent, diminished sources of profit, and field for speculation and plunder. Nothing can keep these people in order excepting the Company’s arms, or a complete state of defence on all points which they can reach.

‘The Company’s arms cannot be every where; at this moment we have six disposable battalions in the Deccan: and because the allies do not choose to defend themselves or their territories, their services are required on the frontiers of Candeish; on the frontier of Berar; at Manik Droog; on the Nizam’s western frontier, between the Godavery, Ahmednuggur, and Poonah; and upon the Kistna. There remains then only to force the allies to take some measures to defend themselves; and upon this point I have already written volumes.

‘All that I can say upon the subject is, that it is not in the power of the troops to march over the ground, much less to do all that is required from them at this moment; and we must either alter our system in respect to our allies, or we must double or treble the subsidiary force with each, or our empire must crumble to pieces from its size, and the inefficiency of the measures adopted for its defence and preservation.

‘There is another supposed remedy, viz., to make the Rajah of Berar, in this instance, and other hostile powers, in similar instances, responsible for the acts of those who sally out from their countries on these plundering expeditions. That would do very well in Europe; and if the Governor General is prepared to take possession of the territories of the Rajah of Berar, what has happened at Manik Droog affords a good pretence. But I say that neither the Nizam, the Peshwah, Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, or the Guick-war, have the power of controlling their own servants, from causes which it is not necessary now to canvass; and therefore I think that it would not be quite just to punish any of those powers for acts for which they cannot be responsible.

‘In respect to the steps to be taken on this occasion, I can give no opinion till I shall receive more detailed information. But I suspect that we can do no more than tell the Rajah, that we require him not to give protection to his brother in his country, after this act of hostility. I have desired that if it should be practicable, Colonel Lang, who took Manik Droog before, may be sent there again with two battalions, and Salabut Khan’s horse, to retake the place: but this is a terribly inconvenient movement at the present moment; and I cannot express to you the concern with which I have desired that the troops may be again made to march this great distance.

‘If the Governor General is resolved to turn out Meer Allum, that is to say, if any body else can be appointed with a better prospect of success, this would be a favorable opportunity to remonstrate with the Soubah against his conduct.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Seringapatam, 27th December, 1804.

‘If poor Webbe were alive now, I should have no doubt that we should be able to drive out Ghautky with disgrace to himself and his adherents, and re-establish our friends and influence. Mr. Jenkins ought to receive instructions framed upon a memorandum of mine in the end of November, which

embraced all points, and a little dexterity would settle every thing. The want of money by Scindiah offers the most favorable opportunity that could occur for the operation of the new plan, and if taken advantage of, with ability, would certainly re-establish every thing.

‘I think that you will do well to order a detachment against the Bheels, but take care that it is sufficiently strong and well supplied, and that it has guns.

‘I have already told you that I thought that Goklah should be sent against Prittee Niddee; I understood that an arrangement had been made which provided for the pay of his corps, out of the Ahmedabad farm. What more is required? If you will let me know the particulars, I will consider the subject, and give you an answer.

‘Rajah Mohiput Ram’s intelligence is proverbially false; and it would be well to give Colonel Hallyburton a caution not to attend to it implicitly.

‘I received last night your letter of the 19th. It is certainly very difficult to form a judgment of the intention of the Marhattas; but I acknowledge that I am of opinion that the Rajah of Berar is not hostile. The attack upon Manik Droog has been made, in my opinion, without his knowledge or consent. His brother has generally been in rebellion against his government, and he has always been discontented. He suffered particularly by the operation of the peace, and by the Governor General’s seizure of the tributary Rajahs upon the frontier; he has been always the main spring of the intrigues of Nagpoor.

‘There is no longer any power in any of the governments to restrain the rebellious and discontented spirits, and we must expect that they will fly out whenever they see a weak or undefended point. The only remedy is, to be guarded every where, and to force our allies to keep up troops for their own defence. Till that is effected, our system is rotten to the core, and our empire must crumble to atoms by the operations of its size and weakness.

‘The question in this instance is, would it be fair or politic to make the Rajah of Berar responsible for the conduct of his brother? *Primâ facie*, I say it would not; but before I can decide, I must have more knowledge of the details of the transaction. In the mean time it is a most

distressing event; we have only six or seven disposable battalions in the Deccan, and their services are called for on the frontiers of Candeish, on the frontiers of Berar; at Manik Droog, near Perinda; against the Bheels; and on the Kistna.

‘ It is difficult to say what ought to be done. However, if Scindiah and Meer Khan remain across the Nerbudda, and the Rajah of Berar is still quiet, the best mode would be to detach Lang with two battalions, and Salabut Khan’s horse, against Manik Droog, to keep Hallyburton to the northward in Berar, somewhere upon the Poorna, and to endeavor to equip Wallace’s corps again at Poonah.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Seringapatam, 29th Dec., 1804.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 20th. I suspected that Manik Droog was not taken, as we had no report of the circumstance from Hyderabad; and I am glad to find that the circumstance is contradicted from Nagpoor. I am only afraid now that the Rajah will be bullied into a war, before he can hear of Holkar’s defeat.

‘ The Nizam must defend his own country against common plunderers, and the Company must not be involved in a war upon every trifling occasion of this description.

‘ It is my opinion that there ought to be at Poonah and Ahmednuggur the quantity of rice stated in my former letter upon this subject. The arrack at Panwell, if brought up to Poonah, will make the supply sufficient for the present.

‘ You will see Manik Droog to the westward of the Wurda, in the map of Lang’s marches in Berar, of which Captain Johnson has a copy. Lang took the place, and says it is strong.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 29th Dec., 1804.

‘ I received last night the further accounts from Nagpoor, which afford ground for hope that Manik Droog has not





vate letter of the 23rd instant, by which I learn that you were likely to commence your march towards Colonel Wallace's camp on the 26th instant.

'The detachment of cavalry attached to the Resident at the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah was made unusually large, on account of particular circumstances in that officer's situation; and it appears that the charge was too extensive for a native officer, the late Resident having had strong grounds of complaint against the soubahdar, who had the command of the party. Under these circumstances, I think it very desirable that an European officer of cavalry should have the command of this detachment, and I request you to give the command of it to Lieut. St. John Blacker, of the 1st regiment of cavalry, who I understand has lately gone to Poonah on leave of absence.

'I shall take measures to apprise his Excellency the Governor General, and the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George, of this appointment.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

'MY DEAR SHAWE,

'Seringapatam, 30th Dec., 1804.

'I have received the copy of Mr. Edmonstone's dispatch to Colonel Close, of the 4th instant. This arrangement may answer well; but I must still take the liberty to press that Sydenham may be sent to the Residency with Scindiah; if it is intended that he should fill that situation.

'We must not forget, that if Webbe had had with him a person in whom from his age, experience, and station, he or the public could have had confidence, he would have halted, and have left the Residency in his charge; and if he had been able to halt, he would have recovered. Colonel Close is in a very bad state of health; he has a fever regularly every year, and possibly oftener; and he keeps it off only by doses of laudanum. Surely it will not answer to expose the public interests a second time to such inconvenience, if not danger, as has existed since the death of poor Webbe.

'But at all events, I know that Colonel Close, and indeed, every man, would feel uncomfortable, at taking such a charge

as that Residency, without the possibility of being able to resign it into competent hands in case of sickness ; and as, of course, he would not desire to remain there longer than during the period which may be necessary to accomplish the objects of his particular mission, he will wish to see on the spot the person possessing the confidence of the Governor General, to whom he can resign, when it shall be expedient or necessary.

‘ If Sydenham’s services are so desirable to the Governor General that he cannot spare him, it would be better for the public interests to appoint another gentleman to the Residency with Scindiah. There is one at Madras, who, for sense, discretion, and a knowledge of the languages, is fully qualified. This is Captain Munro, who was secretary and Persian interpreter to General Stuart, and who I imagine will not be employed by General Cradock. But of course, if this officer should be employed in a diplomatic situation, he must have some chance and hopes of rising, as he will give up the offices which he now holds, of Deputy Quarter Master General of the army, and of Persian interpreter to Head Quarters. I am afraid that I shall be deemed a bore upon this subject ; however, I have now said enough, and shall never write another line upon it.

‘ I have received a letter from Elphinstone of the 7th, which would have alarmed me much, if I were not very certain that the Rajah of Berar is not inclined to war. It would be very unfortunate, however, if Elphinstone were obliged to come away ; particularly, as probably, if he were to wait three days longer, accounts would arrive of the defeat of Holkar, and of Scindiah’s better behaviour.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 30th Dec., 1804.

‘ I wrote a letter to Colonel Close some days ago, on the subject of the appointment of Lieut. Frissell to the charge of Major Graham’s office at Ahmednuggur, when that gentleman should come away. Since I wrote that letter I have received a copy of Mr. Edmonstone’s dispatch, of the 4th instant, to Colonel Close, by which I perceive that the

Colonel is ordered to proceed to the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that his Excellency the Governor General has ordered Captain Thomas Sydenham to proceed to Poonah to take charge of the Residency with the Peshwah, in the absence of Colonel Close.

‘ As under this arrangement you are removed farther from the charge of the Residency than you were when Colonel Close appointed Lieut. Frissell to the charge of Major Graham’s office; and as I conceive that you will be still more desirous to obtain that charge, I have to request that you will proceed to take charge of Major Graham’s office, either as soon as Lieut. Frissell can return to Poonah, to relieve you at the Residency, or if you should be desirous to remain in charge of the Residency, till the arrival of Captain Sydenham. You will proceed to Ahmednuggur as soon as Captain Sydenham shall reach Poonah; and Mr. Frissell is to return to his duty at the Residency with the Peshwah.

‘ You will be so kind as to make arrangements, and give directions upon this subject without loss of time, and let me know the nature of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *E. S. Waring, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 2nd Jan., 1805.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. Elphinstone.

‘ The letter is written on the day after the Rajah had begun to discharge his troops, and to seize the jaghires of his brother, and had recalled his infantry to Nagpoor.

‘ Mr. Elphinstone had been informed many months ago that Amrut Rao was going to Benares by my desire, and that his route would be through Berar and Nagpoor; and if he had recollected the cautious and wary character of that chief, and his conduct in the former war, he would have drawn from his arrival at this period at Oomrawutty, a conclusion directly the reverse from that which he has drawn. It is my decided opinion that Amrut Rao would not have ventured into Berar, or in the neighbourhood of the Rajah



of Berar, if he had thought there was a chance of hostilities between him and the Company ; notwithstanding that, I do not trust Amrut Rao more than I do any of the others.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ P. S. I intend to desire that Amrut Rao may be allowed to proceed.’

‘ *To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th Jan., 1805.

‘ I enclose a letter of the 18th December, just received from Mr. Elphinstone.

‘ Prubbaukur Bellall, who is Amrut Rao’s vakeel, was with me for above a year, and in the course of that time he had frequent opportunities to do mischief and to intrigue ; and I watched him more closely than I ever did any Marhatta. In the whole course of my connexion with him, he was never guilty of any one act of which I could disapprove. He is paid by the Company, and is fully sensible of the advantages which he and his employer enjoy under the British Government. He owes his station in Amrut Rao’s councils to his having been the instrument employed in arranging his affairs with the English ; and, of course, he is the last man who would now become the instrument of connecting him with the opposite party.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th January, 1805.

‘ When I left Calcutta, the objects of my journey into the Deccan were to prevent Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar from becoming parties in the war against the Company ; and, if possible, to march a corps of cavalry to join the troops acting in Malwa, under the orders of Colonel Murray. It appeared to me possible, that before I could arrive in the Deccan, some event might occur which would render my presence in the Deccan unnecessary, and I asked the Governor General his opinion upon that subject. He answered, that he conceived that the defeat of Holkar’s army would

render it unnecessary for me to go there; or to stay, if I should hear of its defeat after my arrival.

‘ Under these circumstances, and having had an attack of fever on the day before that fixed for my departure, I determined to delay my march to the northward as soon as I heard of Holkar’s defeat, until I should see the impression which that defeat had made upon the durbars of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

‘ I believe that Malcolm apprized you in due course of this determination; but should he not have so done, I mention it now, in order that you may be informed of the cause of my delay to march.

‘ The latest intelligence gives reason to believe that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar will remain at peace; and therefore I consider that one of the objects in view in sending me into the Deccan is accomplished. In regard to the other, to endeavor to march a corps of cavalry from the Deccan into Malwa, I have to observe,

‘ First, That as the troops are only now ready in the ceded districts, the season is too far advanced to make the attempt.

‘ Secondly, I see that Colonel Murray is running, the Lord knows where, away from General Jones and all his supplies, in obedience to orders which he says he has received from the Commander in Chief.

‘ Thirdly, Holkar’s army having been defeated, the necessity of a corps of cavalry in Malwa is no longer so pressing; and the difficulties and dangers attending the undertaking, (the latter as affecting both the corps of cavalry which should make the attempt, and the Deccan,) exist to as great a degree as ever.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I conceive that I am justified in not going into the Deccan, by the accomplishment of one object in view in sending me there; by a concurrence of circumstances, which render another impracticable, useless, and dangerous; and by the sentiments of the Governor General.

‘ I acknowledge, however, that I have determined not to go into the Deccan without a considerable degree of doubt and hesitation. I know that all classes of the people look up to me, and it will be difficult for another officer to take my place. I also know that my presence there would

be useful in the settlement of many points which remain unsettled, and which probably will require time and peace to bring to a conclusion. But these circumstances are not momentary ; whenever I should depart, the same inconveniences would be felt even in an increased degree, and very possibly the same state of affairs which now renders my presence in the Deccan desirable, will exist for the next seven years. I certainly do not propose to spend my life in the Deccan ; and I should not think it necessary, in any event, to stay there one moment longer than the Governor General should stay in India. I conclude that he intends to go in February, as he proposed when I left Calcutta, in case Holkar should be defeated, and the peace should be certain ; and upon this point, having considered whether my presence in the Deccan for one, two, or three months would answer any purpose whatever, I am decidedly of opinion that it would not.

‘In regard to staying longer, the question is exactly whether the Court of Directors or the King’s Ministers have any claim upon me, strong enough to induce me to do any thing so disagreeable to my feelings (leaving health out of the question) as to remain for a great length of time in this country.

‘I have served the Company in important situations for many years, and have never received any thing but injury from the Court of Directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments, and in communication with all the Political Residents, and many civil authorities ; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill temper from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted.

‘The King’s Ministers have as little claim upon me as the Court of Directors. I am not very ambitious ; and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered in the scale in which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the Staff in India ; and yet if it had not been for the lamented death of General Fraser, General Smith’s

arrival would have made me supernumerary. This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject of a good deal of conversation.

‘ If my services were absolutely necessary for the security of the British empire, or to ensure its peace, I should not hesitate a moment about staying, even for years ; but these men or the public have no right to ask me to stay in India, merely because my presence, in a particular quarter, may be attended with convenience.

‘ But this is not the only point in which this question ought to be viewed. I have considered whether, in the situation of affairs in India at present, my arrival in England is not a desirable object ? Is it not necessary to take some steps to explain the causes of the late increase of the military establishments, and to endeavor to explode some erroneous notions which have been entertained, and circulated upon this subject ? Are there not now a variety of subjects in discussion, relating to this country, upon which some verbal explanation is absolutely necessary ? I conceive, therefore, that in determining not to go into the Deccan, and to sail by the first opportunity for England, I consult the public interests not less than I do my own private convenience and wishes.

‘ I have now detailed the grounds upon which I have formed my plans and determination to go home ; however, I must inform you, that I am not in a hurry to carry them into execution. I am prepared for every thing, and in five days I can be at Madras ; and on the other hand, if I should see any solid necessity for going into the Deccan, I shall not be remiss in my duty. But I can tell you that I shall not be drawn there by mere suspicions and unfounded surmises.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th January, 1805.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st of December, and your dispatch to the Governor General, No. 347.

‘ I observe that the minister has required that you should



afford him some support with his Highness the Soubah, in order that he may be enabled to carry into execution the measures which are necessary for the protection of the territories of his Highness against the marauders, who have taken advantage of the employment of the Company's troops in operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, to commit depredations in his Highness's territories. As long as Meer Allum is the minister, and particularly considering that he was appointed to that situation by the operation of the influence of the British Government, there can be no doubt of the propriety, and indeed necessity of supporting him, to enable him to carry into execution the measures which are necessary to provide for the defence of his Highness's territories.

‘You will observe from my former correspondence with you, that I am of opinion that the only mode by which the army of the Soubah can be made efficient, is to take into the Soubah's immediate pay a body of silladar horse. Meer Allum appears to be of the same opinion, but he proposes to provide for the expense of the levies of silladar horse by a confiscation of the jaghires of those jaghiredars who have rendered this measure necessary by deficiency of their quotas of troops.

‘The Governor General has positively disapproved of the measure of resuming the jaghires of those chiefs, in a letter to you : and I have to observe that it will be peculiarly harsh and unjust at the present moment, as the late famine in the Deccan has increased the expense of maintaining troops six times its former amount ; and of course the jaghiredars must be unable to afford to keep the numbers for the support of which in ordinary times lands are allotted to them.

‘But supposing the measure to be wise and just, and permitted by the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, the first step towards carrying it into execution must be to collect and pay a force of another description ; for the jaghiredars in the present state of the Soubah's government, will not tamely resign their jaghires ; and I conclude that the British troops are not to be employed to force them.

‘The suggestion therefore of Meer Allum upon this subject is impracticable, will produce no resource for the payment of the new troops, and will occasion discontent, and very

probably the rebellion of a powerful and respectable class of his Highness's subjects and servants.

‘My opinion upon this subject has long been decided; the only mode of restoring strength and efficiency to the Soubah's government, for its own internal purposes, and to make it an useful alliance to the Company, is to oblige the Soubah to have in his own pay a body of silladar horse besides his regular infantry. The revenues of Berar and the improvement of his situation in that province, if well managed, would have covered the expense of this body of troops. The Government might then bring into order the jaghiredars without the risk of rebellion; and by reducing their jaghires to a moderate size, and by the power which they would have of counteracting the aumils, and of obliging them to pay to the state the revenues of the country as they became due, they would soon gain a sum far greater than that which might be expended in the support of the troops.

‘Besides this advantage, the country would be in tranquillity; employment would be given to the numerous idle horsemen who are in all parts of it, and are ready to join the standard of any plunderer; and the Soubah's government would be an useful and efficient ally to the Company instead of a burthen.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Seringapatam, 6th January, 1805.

‘I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Major Walker, from Mangalore, to which I beg to draw your attention. What Major Walker says certainly merits consideration.

‘I have long observed that the horses die very suddenly after they are first landed; and it would certainly be desirable to try the mode proposed by Major Walker to save their lives, which, if successful, would be a measure of economy. Nothing can be done I fear this year, but probably it would be desirable to authorize Major Walker to have the stables prepared for the reception of the horses of the next season.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major Gen. Campbell.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 6th Jan., 1805.

‘ Since my arrival here I have had some correspondence with Colonel Close, on the subject of a supply of money to make good the deficiency required for the payment of the troops in the Deccan, to the 1st of February; and the Colonel has proposed to me from Mr. Duncan, that your Lordship should allow the house of Messrs. Forbes and Co. to receive sandal wood at Mangalore, on the same terms as that which they received upon a proposition of mine in the last year, to the value of four lacs of rupees. This sum will make good the deficiency of the funds required to pay the troops to the 1st of February; and if your Lordship should consent to the arrangement, and will let me know it, the house of Messrs. Forbes and Co. will pay the money immediately.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 7th Jan., 1805.

‘ I have received accounts from Bombay, stating that Colonel Murray has advanced to Kota, having left behind him, in the possession of the enemy, the forts of Purtaubghur and Hinglisghur. Gungaram Cotaree was collecting a force upon the former of these two forts, to impede the communication with Guzerat, of which Colonel Murray was aware, and he had taken no steps to secure it, and had left General Jones to his own devices, both as to the mode of supplying the army, and of joining it, and I rather believe that he has taken with him out of Guzerat the *corps de reserve*, which, in my original instructions, I ordered him to leave in that province. Colonel Murray, in one of his letters to General Jones, tells him that the communication is insecure, and desires him to provide a secure one, knowing that General Jones has not a soldier left in the whole province.

‘ In the mean time I learn from your letter that General Lake has ordered Colonel Murray to advance to Shahabad. The communication with Guzerat is gone; and I conclude it is not intended again to depend upon the Kota Rajah for

supplies. At all events, the troops will want money, which the Kota man certainly cannot supply. The least that can happen will be that Colonel Murray will be obliged to return towards Guzerat, even if he should be unopposed; and in the mean time that province is exposed to the depredations of rascals of all descriptions, who are collecting under Gungaram Cotaree's standard, without a man to defend it.

'The order from the Commander in Chief must have left it in Colonel Murray's option to advance or not, according to his judgment of the safety of the movements, as affecting his own corps particularly, and Guzerat in general. But the Colonel appears to have forgotten all the circumstances which opposed his advance at a critical period in the last summer, and to be running away now from every thing which is to insure his existence. At all events the Commander in Chief can never have intended that Colonel Murray should advance to remain and carry on operations at Shahabad, leaving behind him and on his road the two forts of Purtaubghur and Hinglisghur in the possession of the enemy. The Colonel has taken possession of the country in the name of the Company, and the consequence of leaving those forts in the hands of the enemy has been, that the people paid by him to keep the country have joined Gungaram Cotaree.

'I really am at a loss to know what to do to remedy these evils. We have not a man to send into Guzerat, and if we had, they are now too late.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Shawe.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

'SIR,

'Seringapatam, 8th January, 1805.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th of December. I was convinced that you would do every thing in your power to induce the Soubah of the Deccan to preserve the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar; and if I had seen your dispatch, No. 340, to his Excellency the Governor General I should not have had occasion to trouble you.



‘ It is my opinion that nothing has occurred lately at Nag-poor, which should prevent the Soubah of the Deccan from paying the Rajah the sum of money which is due to him, or the British Government from urging his Highness to pay it, and from adopting every measure which can be devised to induce him to do this act of justice.

‘ This being the case, it is my opinion, that if the Soubah of the Deccan should not immediately place at your disposal, or at the disposal of the Rajah’s vakeel, the funds required to discharge this demand, you ought to carry into execution the proposition contained in the seventh and eighth paragraphs of your letter of the 29th of December, and inform the Soubah of the Deccan that you will apply to the discharge of the Rajah’s demands the sums in your hands, due to his Highness for the arrears of the sircar pesheush.

‘ In whatever mode the money may be procured, I think that it ought to be paid to the Rajah without further loss of time, and without reference to other transactions; respecting which I have considerable doubts.

‘ In my letter of the 4th instant, I entered into the consideration of the increase and reform of the Soubah’s military establishment; and it is unnecessary that I should instruct you further upon the subject at present; excepting to inform you that I have reason to believe that the sentiments delivered in that letter are exactly conformable to those of his Excellency the Governor General. I beg leave to refer you to a letter which I wrote to you on the 16th of January, 1804, for the details of my opinion upon this subject.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government at Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 8th January, 1805.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th of December.

‘ Colonel Murray, in his letter to Captain Nicolls, of the 29th of November, has not explained the situation of the Rajah of Purtaubghur, or the causes for which he thought

it necessary to make the treaty, a translation of which he has enclosed. As I have no information on these points, I must defer giving any opinion on the treaty.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Montresor.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 9th January, 1805.

‘ Major General Campbell has transmitted to me a copy of the orders of the 4th instant, which he has sent to you, by which I observe that you are ordered to march.

‘ I have received intelligence of a date much later than that which Major General Campbell has received, on which he has founded his instructions to you, from which I am induced to believe that your march at the present moment is unnecessary. I have, therefore, to request that you will halt when this letter shall reach you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Montresor.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 9th January, 1805. P. M.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 6th, containing your instructions of the 4th to Colonel Montresor.

‘ Whatever may be the real nature of Scindiah’s intentions, there are no grounds whatever for Rajah Mohiput Ram’s report, and Colonel Hallyburton ought to have taken care to ascertain its truth before he reported it to you.

‘ It has been positively proved that Mohiput Ram had no ground whatever, excepting his own fears, for his assertion.

‘ In respect to the Rajah of Berar, he has disbanded some of his troops, and has dispersed others; and the British Resident has fixed upon the cantonments which they are to occupy.

‘ Under all these circumstances, I believe I am warranted in the assertion, that peace is at present more certain than it has been at any moment since Colonel Monson’s defeat. I have, therefore, written to stop Colonel Montresor till he shall receive further instructions from you.

‘ I hope that Government will approve my having given

these orders; as I have done so from the intelligence from Nagpoor of the 22d of December, from which I am induced to form the most favorable opinion of the intention, not only of the Rajah of Berar, but of Scindiah.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Campbell.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Seringapatam, 11th January, 1805\*.

‘I have just had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th instant.

‘Early in the month of December, the Resident at Nagpoor appears to have entertained an opinion that Rajah Ragojee Bhounsleh intended to attack the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan; and shortly after he had remonstrated with the Rajah upon the supposed intention, he received intelligence from one of the Rajah’s ministers, that the Rajah’s brother, Vincatjee Bhounsleh, had

\* *The Governor General to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘SIR,

‘Fort William, 9th January, 1805.

‘I have the honor to enclose for your information a copy of a letter, which I have this day addressed to the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St George, on the subject of the augmentation, which I directed in my letter to his Lordship, under date the 25th of December, 1804, to be eventually made to the corps serving at Hyderabad.

‘2. Although for the reasons stated in my dispatch, of this date, to his Lordship, I have deemed it advisable to annul my instructions to the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George of the 25th of December 1804, it is not my wish to supersede the exercise of your judgment with regard to the expediency of reinforcing, from the territories of Fort St. George, or Mysore, the troops now serving at Hyderabad. You will, therefore, be pleased to advert to the state of affairs in the Deccan, at the period of time when this dispatch may reach you; and you will determine whether the public interests appear to you to require that any augmentation should be made to the force at Hyderabad. You will communicate the result of your determination to the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George, and will be prepared to attend to any suggestions which you may submit to him on the subject of the troops which are now stationed at Hyderabad. You will also be pleased to signify your intentions on this subject to the Resident at Hyderabad. A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George; copies of my dispatches of this date to you, and to the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George, have also been transmitted to the Resident at Hyderabad.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘WELLESLEY.

attacked and carried the Soubah's fort of Manik Droog. Upon receiving this information, he declared his intention to take his leave of the Rajah.

‘ Ragojee Bhoonslah did every thing in his power to convince the Resident that his intentions were pacific ; and he promised to comply with certain conditions respecting the discharge and distribution of his troops, dictated to him by the Resident. He has since performed these promises in every particular.

‘ It has been discovered also, that Vincatjee Bhoonslah did not attack the Soubah's fort of Manik Droog, although some of his troops did plunder a village within the Soubah's territories ; and Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah has sequestered his brother's jaghire for this act of outrage, and has promised that he will detain his person at Nagpoor.

‘ The above is the outline of late transactions and intelligence from Nagpoor, the detail of which would prove in the clearest manner that the Rajah of Berar does not intend to commence hostilities against the Company.

‘ It is my opinion that he never did intend immediate hostilities ; but on this subject I differ with Mr. Elphinstone, a gentleman for whose abilities I entertain the highest respect. I have no doubt but that if Holkar's success had continued, the Rajah of Berar, and every other power in India, would have attacked us ; but the Rajah is too cautious to think of making his attack, till he should find Holkar's success against our real strength far more decided than it has ever yet been.

‘ As a proof that the Rajah did not intend hostilities, I mention that he promised, and actually commenced, to comply with the conditions dictated to him by our Resident, before he received intelligence of the defeat of Holkar's armies.

‘ In regard to the attack of Manik Droog, it was never made. The Marhatta armies have long been in the habit of plundering the Soubah's countries ; and I acknowledge, that I know no mode of preventing their plunder, excepting by obliging the Soubah to defend his territories. Vincatjee Bhoonslah, the Rajah's brother, whose troops made the plundering incursion, has long been hostile to the English. He suffered by the operation of the late peace ; and he



has frequently been in rebellion against his brother's government.

‘ It is very doubtful whether it is advisable, supposing it to be just under the circumstances of this case, to make the Rajah responsible for his brother's acts. However, supposing all this to be right, the Rajah has punished his brother, and deprived him of the means of committing similar injuries for the future.

‘ I have, therefore, no scruple in declaring, that the Soubah of the Deccan has nothing to fear from the Rajah of Berar, and that, as far as he is concerned, there is no occasion for a reinforcement at Hyderabad.

‘ In regard to Scindiah, it appears that a person, by name Sirjee Rao Ghautky, Scindiah's father-in-law, has lately enjoyed the principal influence in his durbar. This person has long been connected with freebooters of all descriptions, in the territories of the Rajah of Kolapoor, of whom he is likewise a relation ; and I defeated his troops, and his brother, in an action which I fought with them in the Nizam's territories, on the 5th of February last, and they fled to Kolapoor. He contrived, after I went to Bengal, to pass through the Peshwah's territories to Burhampoor.

‘ Scindiah's pecuniary distresses, and the difficulties which his former ministers found in relieving them, are the foundation of Ghautky's influence ; and he proposed as a relief that Scindiah, unmindful of the terms of his defensive alliance with the Company, should turn his arms against his neighbours, and plunder the Nabob of Bopal first, and then the Rajah of Berar.

‘ It is also reported that Ghautky entered into an engagement with Meer Khan, one of Holkar's chiefs, that Scindiah should join him in an attack upon the Company's territories : I have seen no proof of the truth of this report ; and from the last accounts from Scindiah's durbar, not only I suspect its truth, but also that Ghautky's influence is declining, as all his plans for relieving Scindiah's necessities have failed ; they are greater than ever ; and it is said that Scindiah is going to Ougein, to which place he has been advised to go by the British Resident. Indeed, the conduct of the Rajah of Berar is not a bad indication of Scindiah's real intentions.

‘ However, supposing I am mistaken, still the Soubah of the Deccan has nothing to fear from Scindiah, as that Chief has crossed the Nerbudda with his army. Therefore, on the ground of Scindiah’s hostile intentions, I do not see any necessity for reinforcing Hyderabad. As for Holkar, he has not a man in the Deccan of any description.

‘ In respect to circumstances at Hyderabad itself, I know of none which require the presence of our troops.

‘ I have long been of opinion, that when the Company are engaged in war with any of the Marhattas, it is prudent to collect a *corps de reserve* upon the frontier; and, at the present moment, I consider it far more important to keep even the two regiments of cavalry to the southward than to take them to Poonah.

The southern chiefs are decidedly with us; but if Scindiah should take a turn, under the influence of Ghautky, it is difficult to say what line the Rajah of Kolapoor would adopt; and, even supposing he were neutral, I am convinced that, if there is not a *corps de reserve* upon the Company’s frontier, either Visvaz Rao Ghautky, who is still at Kolapoor, or some other freebooter, will lead a band of plunderers into the Company’s territories.

‘ If, therefore, any *corps de reserve* should be collected, it is my opinion that it ought to be on the Company’s frontier. But I think that no *corps de reserve* is necessary, so long as the cavalry shall remain in the ceded districts. If it should be necessary to move the cavalry forward, which I do not think by any means probable, there will always be time to collect another reserve upon the frontier before any mischief can be done.

‘ I have now given your Lordship an outline of our political situation, as far as it has come to my knowledge, and my opinion upon it. Considering the difficulties of your Lordship’s government, both for want of money and troops, I think you ought not to collect and send forward the reserve to Hyderabad; and I am convinced that the Governor General will be of the same opinion, when he shall receive further intelligence.

‘ The Madras battalion, to which the Governor General refers, as being on its march to the southward, has, I believe, already entered Mysore, and I do not think it advisable that

it should be ordered to return. It might be kept in Mysore, or ordered into the ceded districts.

‘ There are still four Madras battalions in the Peshwah’s territories. Two of them are with the Nizam’s subsidiary force, and are at this time in Berar proper ; one is at Poonah, and another in the garrison of Ahmednuggur.

‘ The Bombay battalions which have arrived at Poonah are by no means in a state of discipline or efficiency ; and I am concerned to add that the number of men which they lose by desertion in every month is enormous. One of them which arrived at Poonah in July, one thousand men strong, has not now more than four hundred.

‘ Under these circumstances I recommended to Colonel Close, when I first heard of the alarm of the Resident at Nagpoor, to keep the Madras battalion which he had at Poonah, and also that in the garrison of Ahmednuggur. These are the only two extra Madras battalions now in the Deccan, as only four Bombay battalions have arrived. I believe that it will be advisable to leave these corps for some short time longer in the Deccan, on account of the inefficiency of the Bombay troops, but by no means on account of any enemy there may be there.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Stevenson.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 11th January, 1805.

‘ I shall not pretend in this letter to give you a detail of public affairs since you quitted this country. Shortly after your departure it became necessary to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar ; but the operations of the war fell entirely upon the Bengal army ; and I am sorry to say that a detachment of them, under Colonel Monson, were not quite so successful as we might have wished. The disasters, however, with which they met have lately been entirely compensated by two grand victories gained in Hindustan, one by the Commander in Chief, and the other by General Fraser.

‘ I quitted the army in the Deccan in June, by order of the Governor General, to go to Bengal, and they have since taken all Holkar’s possessions in Candeish, &c., without much opposition.

‘ I arranged that you should have one thousand shares instead of six hundred of the prize money ; and I prevailed upon the Governor General to give you six months’ gratuity of your allowance as commanding the subsidiary force, as well as of your batta, so that you see I have not neglected your interests nor your wishes.

‘ You will have heard of Captain ——’s disgrace. I really had a regard for him, and considered my own credit, as well as yours, involved in his character ; and therefore I did every thing in my power to screen him from an inquiry. However, the complaints against him were of a nature so serious, and as they had been laid before the Nizam’s durbar, I could do nothing but make the inquiry ; and the result has been the discovery of a scene of disgraceful fraud, such as I believe has never before been practised. I enclose you herewith copies of all the papers upon this subject ; from which you will be able to form a judgment of every thing that has passed, and of my motives in permitting the inquiry.

‘ I hope that your voyage to England has been beneficial to your health, and that you, Mrs. Stevenson, and my godson are well. Pray remember me kindly to her and my godson.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 12th Jan., 1805.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Brunton, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will endeavor to obtain for him, if he should deserve it, the mark of the Governor General’s approbation of which he is solicitous.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Seringapatam, 12th January, 1805.

‘ I enclose you the copy of a letter from the Collector at Ahmednuggur to the Resident at Poonah, which has been transmitted to me, and to which I beg to draw your attention.



‘ The Bheels have long been troublesome on the roads to the northward of Ahmednuggur, and it appears to be necessary to take some effectual measures to check them. Those proposed in the letter from Major Graham appear likely to be successful ; I wish you to take them into consideration, and carry them into execution if you should find them practicable.

‘ The first, to form a detachment of five companies of sepoys, with two guns, at Jaumgaum, appears perfectly practicable. It will be necessary only to take care that this detachment has plenty of provisions, and is well commanded ; and to instruct the commanding officer very particularly as to the object of placing him there, and to desire him to conciliate Scindiah’s officers, and not to interfere with them.

‘ The second, to occupy the post at Taarabad, is also necessary. This must be managed as follows. I enclose a letter, and a translation of it, for the aumil of Jaumgaum, or the head person belonging to Scindiah in the Ahmednuggur districts, in which I inform him that I have ordered that this post may be occupied for the purpose of checking the Bheels. The collector of Ahmednuggur should see him, and endeavor to procure his assent to our occupying it. If he should not consent, the post must be forced, as we must have it ; and the collector may as well hint this to Scindiah’s head man, if he should find any difficulty in settling the business.

‘ The third, to occupy the post at Heura, will easily be settled. I enclose a letter, and a translation of it, to Cavy Jung, who will, of course, consent. If he should refuse, the post must be forced ; but it is strong, and will require guns.

‘ The fourth measure Mr. Waring must settle with the Peshwah’s durbar.

‘ I do not know whether you have any horse at your command ; if you should not have any, it will be necessary that the collector of Ahmednuggur should entertain some, as he did in the former war.

‘ Let great care be taken to throw in supplies of provisions wherever the troops may be posted ; and wherever the collector’s peons will answer as well as the Company’s troops, I should prefer to see them in the posts.

‘Communicate this letter to the Residency and to the Collector of Ahmednuggur.

‘Believe me, my dear Wallace, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Manager of Jaumgaum, on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

‘I have received information that the Bheels and other plunderers have lately been very troublesome in your neighbourhood, and that they have had the insolence to plunder some of my people. This I shall never permit. I have therefore ordered a detachment of the Company’s troops into the field, who will take post somewhere in your neighbourhood; and I apprise you of the circumstance, as a friend, in order that you may apply for assistance to the commanding officer of this detachment, if you should require it, and give him such intelligence of the haunts of the Bheels and other plunderers as you may obtain.

‘I also think that it will be very desirable, and will tend materially to check the Bheels, and to preserve the peace of the country, if the village of Taarabad is occupied by a party of my troops. The collector at Ahmednuggur will settle this matter with you. I have desired him to occupy the place with his troops, for the purposes above mentioned; but to be very cautious not to interfere with your authority, and to take care that his troops do no mischief to the country.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*[A Letter to the same effect written to Cavy Jung.]*

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘SIR,

‘Seringapatam, 13th Jan., 1805.

‘I have received your private letter upon the subject of the refusal of the Peshwah’s minister to receive Colonel Wallace at the durbar in an honorable manner, and to distinguish him by those marks of his Highness’s favor which are usual upon such occasions.

‘I received accounts some time ago of difficulties made by some of the Marhatta sirdars in the Peshwah’s service to serve under an officer of the rank of Colonel Wallace; and I am induced to be of opinion that the objection to receive Colonel Wallace with the usual marks of distinction is referrible to,

and connected with, these difficulties and objections, rather than to the desire of saving the trifling expense which must be incurred upon the occasion.

‘ Upon this ground I conceive it to be proper not to allow this subject to pass unnoticed. I request you therefore to state to Suddasheo Munkaiseer that I am of opinion, and I know that the Governor General considers, that Colonel Wallace has performed services of the greatest importance to the Peshwal’s state, with a degree of gallantry, celerity, and skill, which has seldom been surpassed; that under these circumstances it might have been expected that his Highness would have received with becoming honor and distinction an officer who had served him so well; and that the excuse for not receiving him in this manner is futile and extremely unbecoming, and will be very displeasing to his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ If this remonstrance should not have the desired effect, I beg that Colonel Wallace may not go to the durbar, and you will inform the minister that I have given you this direction.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Mr. Waring.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major General Campbell.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 14th Jan., 1805.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 10th instant.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to an officer of rank in Bengal, on the subject of a plan for horse artillery on that establishment, upon which my opinion was required\*. Horse artillery would be desirable, certainly, if well arranged, with proper drivers, and a full equipment of persons and means to take care of and feed the horses. But, even supposing that all this could be arranged, which I should doubt, in time of war, I rather believe that the equipment which I propose in that letter, viz., horses sufficient to draw the field train into action, added to, and being a part of, the draught bullock establishment, in time of war and on service, although not so flashy, would be more useful.

\* See Letter to Major General Dowdeswell, dated Fort William, 16th Aug., 1804.

‘ However, there is no doubt that horse artillery would, on many services, particularly against an European enemy, and near home, be very useful, nay, necessary ; but I do not like to undertake to arrange such an establishment during a campaign, because I know that I cannot accomplish it.

‘ I am much obliged to you for your attention to my recommendation of Captain Brown. Captain Osborne must certainly be very useful to Colonel Macleod ; but, in my opinion, he ought not to hold the two offices of Secretary and Malabar interpreter. If the salary of the latter is not sufficiently large to induce Captain Osborne to remain in Malabar, it ought to be made so ; for it cannot be expected that an officer endowed with the rare qualification of speaking and understanding the Malabar tongue, will serve at a distance from his own Presidency, unless adequately rewarded.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Gen. Campbell.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 14th Jan., 1805.

‘ When I was at Bombay in May last, I settled a plan with Mr. Duncan, by which the Peshwah’s rights at Ahmedabad were to be given in form to the Guickwar for ten years. There was some difference respecting the rent which was to be paid, but that was to have been settled between Colonel Close and Major Walker.

‘ The produce of the farm, whatever it might be, was to have been allotted to the payment of Goklah’s troops, at the rate of 75,000 rupees per mensem, and the difference between the amount of the expected rent (I believe six lacs of rupees annually) and that sum, was to be made up in a future settlement of accounts with the Peshwah.

‘ I believe you will find all this in my correspondence with Colonel Close, between April and August last, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will inquire what has been done, first, in the settlement of the farm between the Guickwar state and the Peshwah ; and secondly, supposing the farm to have been settled, what money has been paid on account of it, and how disposed of.

‘ As soon as I shall know that this business has stopped, I



shall be able to apply a remedy, and to provide for the payment of Goklah's troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Mr. Waring.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 15th January, 1805.

‘ Mr. Frissell wrote to me on the 29th of December, and informed me that Mr. Forbes was willing to make an advance of four lacs of rupees to the Madras government for the sandal wood, to be received on the same terms as that given to him through my mediation in the last year.

‘ In consequence of this information, I wrote a letter to Lord William Bentinck, of which I enclose a copy ; I have received his consent to Mr. Forbes' proposal, in a letter from his Lordship, of which I likewise enclose a copy.

‘ I request you to communicate these papers to Mr. Duncan, through whom, it appears, that the proposal was made from Mr. Forbes, and to urge Mr. Forbes to send the money to Poonah as soon as may be convenient.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Mr. Waring.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,

‘ Seringapatam, 15th January, 1805.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 6th.

‘ The Bombay corps which have arrived at Poonah are on the Bombay establishment, and every thing relating to them must be governed by the regulations of the Bombay army.

‘ If they have not tents, that is the fault of the government of Bombay ; but you cannot make a charge to the government of Fort St. George, of any money advanced to their commanding officers to provide either for their camp equipage or for the carriage of it.

‘ It appears that these officers have tents of their own, now in use with their corps, for which the Bombay government give them no allowance. The way to settle this difficulty is to apply to the government of Bombay for an allowance for the time during which the tents have been in use. In respect to the carriage, if the Bombay government adopt our tent regulations, the advances made to the com-

manding officers of corps can be easily settled with them hereafter; and application must be made to allow these regulations to apply from the period at which those officers received the advance. If our tent regulations should not be adopted by the Bombay government, the bullock agent, who is Robertson, must find carriage for the tents of the Bombay corps, as well as any other carriage that may be required.

‘It is a difficult matter to transfer the departments, &c., in one day, as you propose; but by no means difficult to continue some of the corps and departments on the establishment of Fort St. George, and others on that of Bombay. Upon this point I refer you to orders which I issued when in camp, of which I enclose copies. The transfer of Robertson’s grain and bullock departments will be scarcely practicable while the troops remain in the field.

‘I do not at all approve of the Madras mode of carrying the native sick, and I hope that Mr. Duncan will not adopt it.

‘Ever, my dear Wallace, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘MY DEAR LORD,

‘Seringapatam, 17th January, 1805.

‘I have received your letter of the 14th instant. I shall take care to keep you informed of events as they occur and come to my knowledge. I have heard nothing from the durbars of Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar since I wrote to you last.

‘The last letters which I had from Bengal were of the 22nd of December. You are, I believe, aware that Colonel Monson had withdrawn the army from the neighbourhood of Deeg; a movement with which the Commander in Chief was much dissatisfied. His Excellency formed the army near Muttra, on the 30th of November, and advanced again towards Deeg, and he was to invest that place on the 11th of December. Holkar’s heavy guns, and about sixty pieces of light ordnance, with the remains of his infantry, are in Deeg, and one letter says Holkar himself. The last part of the story, I am convinced, is not true. There is no other intelligence of any importance. I think that the siege of Deeg will put an end to Holkar’s means of mischief.

‘It is absolutely necessary that your Lordship should be

informed of every thing that occurs, otherwise it is impossible that you can regulate the affairs of your government in such a manner as to give the aid in your power to forward the objects of the Governor General. I rather believe that the private Secretary had formerly a private correspondence with the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah, by means of which the government of Fort St. George was informed of every thing. So long as the Residents send me their dispatches, I can give you the necessary information, but when that practice ceases, unless the correspondence between your private Secretary and the Resident at Hyderabad should recommence, you will be uninformed of events.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 18th January, 1805.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th, with which you have enclosed copies of your dispatches of that date, addressed to the Secretary of Government in the political department.

‘ I regret much the dismissal of Byajee Naig, more particularly as it does not appear to me probable that any steps which could be taken to induce the Peshwah to take him again into his service would have the effect of replacing him in the confidential situation in which his services were so useful to the British Government. Indeed, it appears to be difficult, if not impossible, to communicate with his Highness either upon the subject of the removal of Byajee Naig, or upon other measures which you believe that Suddasheo Munkaiseer has in contemplation.

‘ I recommend therefore that you should have a private conference with Munkaiseer himself upon these subjects. In this conference you will point out to him the various benefits which the Peshwah has derived from his connexions with the British Government. You will state that in an alliance of this description, it must be expected that at times designing men will endeavor to disturb the existing friendship; and that to my certain knowledge endeavors of this kind had been made more than once at Poonah, the effects of which would have proved very detrimental to the Pesh-



wah's state. That upon all these occasions Byajee Naig, although a man of inferior rank in the state, and holding no ostensible office, came forward as the friend to both governments, and availed himself of the opportunities which he had of seeing and speaking to the Peshwah and to the British Resident, to set matters in their true light, and to explain to each the truth as it really existed. That under these circumstances I consider the dismissal of Byajee Naig as a misfortune to the Peshwah's government, and to that of the Company, as far as it is concerned in his Highness's welfare; and that I anxiously hope either that he will be again recommended to his Highness's favor by Munkaiseer, or that some other person will be appointed to conduct the communications between his Highness and the Residency, equally qualified by sound sense, honesty, and attachment to his Highness and to his alliance with the Company, and equally favored by his Highness's confidence.

‘ You may take this same opportunity of adverting to the supposed intention of depriving Kundee Rao Rastia of his office of Sirsoubah of the Konkan, and Vittojee Naig of his office of killadar of Poonadur. You will point out to Munkaiseer that he will draw upon himself and the Peshwah's government great odium by these measures, and that he will be involved in difficulties of which he will probably not see the end. You will tell him that the British Government have no right to interfere in the internal concerns of his Highness's government, but that I cannot contemplate arrangements, to effect which must require a British army and a formidable heavy equipment, without remonstrating against them. That scarcely a year has elapsed since, at the expense of the Company and with the British troops, I put his Highness in possession of Poonadur, and afterwards marched a detachment against Loghur. That these places were given to the persons whom his Highness pointed out, as those to whose care he wished to trust them, and no cause of complaint has been assigned against either of them. That, under these circumstances, Munkaiseer cannot expect that, in the midst of a foreign war, the British troops should be brought down to give possession of these forts to newly chosen killadars.

‘ If the assistance of the British troops should not be



given to effect these arrangements, the consequence must be, that if they are attempted, the country will be in a state of rebellion against his Highness's government, and the old troubles will be renewed.

‘ In respect to the fort of Loghur, the Peshwah has promised that the person to whom it shall be given shall be agreeable to the British Government—a promise which you will tell Munkaiseer that I beg him to recollect in his arrangements.

‘ If you should find that notwithstanding this conversation with Munkaiseer, it is determined to deprive Kundee Rao Rastia and Vittojee Naig of their offices, I recommend that you should adopt measures to convey a memorial to the Peshwah himself upon these subjects, either in a private audience, or in any manner you may think proper, in which you will insert the substance of this letter.

‘ It is my opinion that you will do well at the proposed conference with Munkaiseer, to urge him to give to Goklah a part, at least, of the serinjaumy lands of Prittee Niddee. You will tell him that to take them for himself will be a most shameless proceeding.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Mr. Waring.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 18th January, 1805.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th instant. The point in it which requires an answer is the employment of Colonel Hallyburton's corps across the Taptee.

‘ In considering the propriety of such a movement, it is necessary to advert to the situation of the Deccan in general; and here I must observe that it is the only body of troops whose services we can command from the Taptee to the Toombuddra, and from the frontier of Berar to the sea coast.

‘ The natural boundary of the Deccan is the river Taptee, and as long as this body of troops is within that boundary it must have its influence. But if it should once pass that line, particularly for such operations as the sieges of Sindwah and Myhissur, we must not expect tranquillity in the Deccan; and if once there is a serious insurrection, God

knows how it is to be overcome. I mention these circumstances only to point out the danger of this movement.

‘I am perfectly aware of the necessity of clearing out the countries between the Nerbudda and the Taptee; and if nothing else can be got, Colonel Hallyburton must be employed on this service at all risks. But before we incur these risks, would it not be advisable to consider whether there are not, or might not be, under better arrangements, other modes of effecting this object?

‘In the first place Colonel Murray’s corps is useless, and in a dangerous situation in its position at Kota. That corps is the proper one for these operations.

‘In the next place, the necessity for clearing out the country between the Nerbudda and the Taptee is founded upon the notion of Scindiah’s adherence to the alliance. If he should adhere to the alliance, it is surely time that his subsidiary force should be brought into play, and then that will be the proper corps to be employed in these operations.

‘But supposing the necessity to exist after all, of employing Colonel Hallyburton’s corps upon this service, it would be prudent to delay in commencing it till the Bombay corps should be in a state of efficiency, discipline, and equipment.

‘What I would recommend with a view to this object, would be to draw away from Colonel Hallyburton’s corps, if they can be spared, the troops belonging to the Poonah subsidiary force. If the battalions with Colonel Hallyburton should not be sufficiently strong, then these corps must be left; but Colonel Robertson’s departments, the store department, and every thing belonging to the equipment of the Poonah subsidiary force, ought to be brought away. In this I include the bazaar, the draught bullocks, the carriage bullocks in Colonel Robertson’s grain and provision departments, leaving the grain with Hallyburton, the carriage bullocks in the store department, the ordnance, and military stores in charge of Captain Noble, excepting what may be necessary for Colonel Hallyburton’s operations.

‘I would then leave two battalions in the camp at Poonah, and collect the Peshwah’s subsidiary force at Ahmednuggur. Let it be disciplined and prepared there; and as soon as it shall be at all fit for action, Colonel Hallyburton might with safety commence his operations.

‘ If the two Madras corps, and the 74th, and the cavalry, could be spared from Colonel Hallyburton’s detachment, which I think they might, the operations between the Nerbudda and the Taptee might be commenced immediately. The Bombay troops might be placed in Ahmednuggur, Chandore, Gaulna, &c., and the four battalions, and the best of the Bombay troops collected in the camp at Ahmednuggur.

‘ It will be absolutely necessary, under this arrangement, that Colonel Wallace should have at least one of the regiments of cavalry; as it must be recollected that he has no native cavalry. His bazaar and Robertson’s grain bullocks will also be essential to him; otherwise he will not be able to subsist any where at a distance from Poonah.

‘ These are my notions upon this operation, which I must now leave to you to carry into execution, at the time you will think the most proper. I would advise you to commence immediately to break up Colonel Hallyburton’s detachment, and to send back to Ahmednuggur the corps belonging to the Poonah subsidiary force, as the first step towards enabling you to do the rest with safety.

‘ I entirely agree with you about the southern chiefs; however urgent it is to come to an arrangement with them, it will not answer to commence it until we shall have settled Holkar.

‘ Scindiah will never agree to the proposed exchange of his districts in the Deccan for Saugur. However, it may be tried.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘ MY DEAR WALLACE,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 19th January, 1805.

‘ I have received your letter of the 10th instant.

‘ I received and forwarded immediately your letter to the Governor General; but as I before informed you, he had already done every thing in his power for you. The redress of your grievance depends upon the Commander in Chief.

‘ I do not augur any thing unfavorable to your promotion, because it is not confirmed by the last gazettes. You will

recollect that it was made two months after the other promotions which have been confirmed, and it is probable that it will be confirmed in due course.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 19th January, 1805.

‘ I have received a letter of the 8th instant from Captain Sydenham, in which he enclosed the copy of a private letter from yourself to the Governor General, of the 7th of December, which Captain Sydenham informs me was the immediate cause of the late orders from his Excellency, directing an increase of the British troops stationed at Hyderabad.

‘ As, in consequence of the opinions I have given to the Governor of Fort St. George, his Lordship has not carried those orders into execution, I think it proper to apprise you of the nature of those opinions.

‘ The principal object in view in the increase of the force at Hyderabad was to provide for the security of that city, and the Soubah’s government, in case Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, or both, should join Holkar in the war. It might have been necessary to provide for such an event when you wrote to the Governor General in December, or when the Governor General gave his orders consequent to the receipt of your letter. But since the receipt from the northward of the letters written in the end of December, I conceive that Hyderabad cannot be considered to have been in any danger.

‘ Considering the nature and extent of the force with which it is possible that an attack might have been made upon Hyderabad, in the event which you expected in December, I doubt whether the two battalions stationed at that city were not fully sufficient to prevent that force from doing any mischief. I should therefore have hesitated before I should have consented to the march of the troops to Hyderabad, even if affairs had remained in the situation in which they were when you wrote in December.

‘ I am fully aware, however, of the general want of troops in the Soubah’s territories, and I am convinced that his



government cannot exist unless his army is reformed, and his military establishments increased. But this evil is permanent, and requires something more than a temporary remedy, such as the measure of increasing the British corps stationed at Hyderabad.

‘At all events, when I was called upon to decide whether additional troops should be sent to Hyderabad, not to provide against a casual danger, but to remedy inconveniences of a permanent nature, it was necessary that I should consider the general state of the military resources of the government of Fort St. George, and see, whether to detach such a body of troops as was required at Hyderabad, would not produce inconveniences in the Company’s territories, the seat of all our resources, at least as great as those existing in the Soubah’s territories, which this measure was supposed likely to remedy.

‘Upon this point, I have to inform you, that, from a variety of causes, the government of Fort St. George could have sent from their territories only one battalion, and that was already allotted to another service. The other battalion was to have been drawn from Poonah; from which place, as it is the only efficient battalion stationed there, it could not well be spared. The regiment of cavalry was to have been one of two ordered in September last, to be prepared to march with me into the Deccan; and the European regiment to have been composed of the only five companies of Europeans in the ceded districts; and five companies stationed at Vellore, in the Carnatic.

‘In this manner to furnish this corps for Hyderabad would have deprived Poonah of its only efficient battalion; would have drawn another battalion from a service to which it was allotted, viz., to march with two regiments of cavalry into the Deccan with me; would have destroyed the corps of cavalry, which is still in reserve in case of accidents; and would have drawn the European troops from the ceded districts, and Vellore, in the Carnatic.

‘I have already stated, that I should have hesitated before I had marched a reinforcement to Hyderabad in any event; and I should have been decided regarding the measures to be adopted by the intelligence which I might

receive of the nature and extent of the force destined to make the supposed invasion of the Soubah's territories.

‘Hyderabad is not the proper situation for a *corps de réserve*. This ought to be in the Dooab of the Kistna and Toombuddra, or upon the Company's frontier; and thus posted, it would be prepared to resist an invasion of the Company's territories, which, in the case under consideration, I think far more probable than an attack upon Hyderabad. But supposing that attack should be made, the reserve might march, and be at Hyderabad long before the enemy could do any mischief.

‘I now come to consider another ground for assembling a larger corps at Hyderabad than is there at present, viz., a view to recover our influence at that durbar, which is supposed to be on the decline.

‘It must ever be difficult to trace exactly the causes of the influence of one power over the councils of another; particularly for a person who has not a very accurate knowledge of characters.

‘I am fully aware, that at one time the presence of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad was absolutely necessary to give the British Resident an influence in the councils of the Nizam; because, at that period there were several parties in the court, each of which was backed and supported by a powerful body of troops, either in, or in the neighbourhood of that city, or occupying some important post in the country. The chiefs of these parties acted upon the Nizam's feelings by the terror they inspired; and it was necessary that the British Resident should have at his command a force which should keep these chiefs in awe, in order that he might have at least some chance of his share of influence in conducting the affairs of the Government.

‘These bodies of troops have disappeared entirely; and so far as they were the cause of the necessity for the presence of the British detachment at Hyderabad, that course exists no longer.

‘I believe I was not mistaken upon this point. Since I have had a knowledge of political transactions at Hyderabad, two of the most important points have been carried at times when the British detachment has been weakest.

Indeed, these points were fundamental, and the success in carrying them affords the strongest symptoms of the pervading influence of the British Government. One is the succession of Secunder Jah to the musnud, at certainly the most critical period of the British existence in India that has occurred for many years; the other, the appointment of Meer Allum to be minister, against the inclinations of the Soubah, of the family and adherents of his predecessor in office, and I may add, of the whole court.

‘ I believe, therefore, I may venture to conclude, that the decline of our influence is not to be attributed to the want of force immediately at Hyderabad, but to other causes which I shall consider presently. In fact, if it were otherwise, if our influence in the councils of our ally were to be attributed to any thing excepting a sense of our general strength in all parts of India and the world, and of his own interest in connecting himself with that strength; if its increase could be attributed to a stronger, and its decline to a weaker corps stationed at Hyderabad, it must be the worst of all kinds of influence; viz., that of immediate strength operating upon the fears of a timid individual, and must be precisely of the same description with that exercised by the chiefs of parties upon the councils of the late Nizam, from which it must be our greatest boast to have liberated him.

‘ If this should be the nature of our influence at Hyderabad, it cannot be considered permanent, and it must cease the moment the cause of it is removed from that city. It must cease also, the moment that the Soubah or his ministers should discover your disinclination to come to extremities, by using the power in your hands to force the measures which you recommend.

‘ I do not know whether I may venture to reason upon the operation of a strong force stationed at Hyderabad, upon the councils of the Soubah, from the experience which I have had at Poonah. I collected there, in May, 1803, the largest British army that was ever assembled in the Deccan; and, however important or trifling, I do not recollect, that either the Resident or I carried any one object which we urged at the durbar. Afterwards, although we had only two battalions at Poonah, when the Peshwah found that we were really able and willing to protect him against all India,



and he experienced the benefit of his alliance with the Company, we found him as willing to attend to our advice, as we had found him before obstinate and reserved.

‘ I have gone much into detail upon this part of the subject, because I think it very material in every discussion regarding these subsidiary alliances; and I am aware that I differ in opinion upon it with many authorities, for whom I have the greatest respect.

‘ I acknowledge that I am much inclined to doubt whether all the evils of which we feel the pressure in the Soubah’s territories at the present moment, are to be attributed to the decline of our influence, although possibly a remedy cannot be applied, unless our influence is revived. The radical cause of these evils is the want of force in the country to carry on the government; and of this want I had much reason to complain at a period when, I believe, our influence was greatest.

‘ In fact, we are now come to a crisis at Hyderabad. The operation of our system there has been to reduce the force of the sovereign of the country, and troops of banditti have proportionably increased: and at last there is no public force left in the country, excepting the troops subsidized from the Company.

‘ There cannot be a stronger proof of this fact than the present demand for troops. The Deccan is entirely at peace. There is not an army belonging to any known power or chief within a thousand miles of its boundary, and yet the Soubah’s government is insulted by troops of banditti; and his Highness has no means of defending himself, excepting by a few of the Company’s battalions employed against the common enemy of all the allied powers.

‘ It will not answer to bolster up this force by reinforcing it from the Company’s armies. Neither the military establishments of the Company, nor the finances of the Soubah, will bear the demand of troops on the one hand, and of money on the other; and after all, supposing that both could afford a demand, such as the Governor General lately ordered, the remedy would be incomplete, till a force three times the strength of the present subsidiary force should have been supplied by the one party, and paid for by the other.



‘ Besides, the evil has been produced by the introduction of our troops into the country : the Soubah has discharged his own, and these have become plunderers from want ; and his Highness has no means of conducting his government, or of checking these plunderers, excepting by the assistance of the Company’s battalions. These people can be checked by the Company’s armies ; and in the course of time, when these fighting classes will have adopted habits of industry, and will have ceased to breed horses, the tranquillity of the Deccan may be as secure as it is in Bengal. But a shorter, and a less expensive mode of proceeding, which will lead to the same result, will be to oblige the Soubah to support a portion, at least, of those troops which have always served his father’s government. This will be an alteration and an amendment of our system ; but we must either amend our system at Hyderabad, or we must adopt one entirely different from that on which we have hitherto acted. The amendments of the system I have already considered in detail, in different public letters addressed to you. If we should not adopt them, we must either withdraw altogether from the alliance, or we must take the country for ourselves ; as its revenues will not support the number of our troops necessary for its government, and the Soubah’s government likewise. But these alternatives are out of the question, and it is not worth while to trouble you with discussing them for one moment.

‘ In order to carry through the proposed amendment of our system, it is necessary to re-establish our influence at Hyderabad, which is upon the decline. I trace the decline of our influence in the Soubah’s councils to our having recommended to him a minister, in whom from circumstances we can have no confidence, and to whom, therefore, no support is given.

‘ The remedy is plain and certain. Either displace Meer Allum, and appoint as his successor an able man in whom we can have confidence, or support Meer Allum. I have not seen all the dispatches regarding the conduct of the latter, and have not made up my mind upon his competency for his office, supposing him to be honest, or even upon his honesty. But, in my opinion, matters have gone to such a length at Hyderabad, the evils are of such a magnitude,

and require a reform so radical, that I can admit no question about men ; and I have no scruple in saying, that if you are of opinion that you shall be better able to carry through the measures which are necessary, by means of another person in the office of minister than by means of Meer Allum, this minister ought to be displaced.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 21st January, 1805..

‘ 1. I have the honor to enclose copies of all the letters which I have written to the Residents at the different durbars, since I arrived in this part of India. The directions which they contained are sufficiently explained in the letters themselves, and it is not necessary that I should detain your Excellency by any further explanation of them.

‘ 2. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of letters from the Secretary of Government in the Political Department, of the dates as per margin.

‘ 3. I have not deemed it expedient to make use of the authority which the letter of the Secretary of Government, of the 18th of December, 1804, gave me to relieve the 77th regiment at Goa, by sending the 84th regiment to that settlement from Bombay, as some time would elapse before the relief could be effected ; and, in the interval between its commencement and its completion, inconvenience might be felt for the want of the European regiment at Bombay.

‘ 4. Between the settlement of Bombay and the territories to the northward, there are now five European regiments, including the Company’s Bombay regiment, which is very weak. In this account I do not include the 77th regiment at Goa.

‘ 5. There ought to be only three regiments in those stations, supposing them complete, and one at Goa.

‘ 6. It appears to me, therefore, that it will be practicable, hereafter, to remove one of them, the 84th, to Goa ; and then to march the 77th regiment into the territories of the government of Fort St. George. By this arrangement the regiment de Meuron may be relieved from its duties at Seringapatam.

‘ 7. The presence of Lieut. Colonel Wallace appears to me to be very necessary with the subsidiary force in the service of the Peshwah ; and I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Colonel Hallyburton, in the command of the detachment, from both subsidiary forces, since he assumed it.

‘ 8. I have also to inform your Excellency, that I have suggested to Colonel Close the expediency of breaking up the large corps under the command of Colonel Hallyburton, and of sending into the Peshwah’s territories the troops and equipments belonging to his Highness’s subsidiary force ; and of assembling the whole, excepting two battalions to remain at Poonah, in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur.

‘ 9. My reasons for recommending these measures are, that I wish to draw out from Poonah, if possible, some of the Bombay corps, so as to equip them and discipline them as they ought to be for service in the field. I am desirous also to have it in my power to cover a greater proportion of the country with our troops ; and to be able to keep a detachment in the field, south of the Taptee, in case Colonel Close should find it expedient to call Colonel Hallyburton’s corps north of that river, in order to cover Scindiah’s march to Ougein. These objects cannot be effected, unless it should be possible to break up Colonel Hallyburton’s corps. But as there is no enemy in the Deccan, I should hope Colonel Close will find that measure to be practicable.

‘ 10. I have also the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency’s orders of the 25th of December, relative to an increase of the corps stationed at Hyderabad, of which Lord William Bentinck had sent me a copy.

‘ 11. Before I had received those orders, I was convinced that the Deccan was in safety. There were no troops of Holkar’s south of the Nerbudda, the Rajah of Berar had disbanded a part of his army, and had disposed of that part which he kept, according to directions given to him by the British Resident. It appeared that Scindiah was returning to that line of conduct which is most consistent with his true interests : it was reported that he had crossed the Nerbudda ; and, at all events, the conduct of the Rajah of Berar was not a bad indication of Scindiah’s real intentions.

‘ 12. I know of no event at Hyderabad which required at

that city the presence of a larger body of the Company's troops. It appeared that the influence of the British Resident was not so great as might have been wished; but I conceived that the decline of his influence was to be attributed to causes entirely independent of the strength of the detachment stationed at Hyderabad.

' 13. There existed a general want of strength throughout the Deccan; but the presence of a larger detachment of the Company's troops at Hyderabad would not have remedied this evil, that must depend upon the exertions which the Government of the Soubah of the Deccan and of the Peshwah will make in their own defence and support against the efforts of the rabble, who may annoy them in all parts of their territories.

' 14. At the same time, the Government of Fort St. George would have found the greatest difficulty in completing the detachment ordered to Hyderabad; indeed, it would have been impossible, without ordering from Poonah the Madras battalion, which is still there, and is the only efficient battalion at that station; and without stripping the ceded districts and Vellore of the European troops.

' 15. Under these circumstances, and considering the difficulties experienced in supplying with money the troops in the Deccan already, I hope that your Excellency will approve of the recommendation which I gave to Lord William Bentinck, under your Excellency's authority, to suspend the movement of this detachment.

' 16. Mr. Waring communicated to me a copy of the letter from the Secretary of Government to the Resident at Poonah, of the 14th of December, relating to the conduct of the Prittee Niddee. Your Excellency will have seen from the Poonah correspondence, that the Prittee Niddee has been defeated and taken prisoner by Goklah.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

' SIR,

' Seringapatam, 21st January, 1805.

' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th instant, in which you enclosed the copy of your dispatch of that date to the Secretary of Government.



‘ The lands granted as serinjaumy to the sirdars of the Marhatta state are held upon a tenure very different from those called jaghires. The serinjaumy lands are granted for the payment of the expenses attending troops and their equipments, and are resumable at pleasure; and it has been customary to resume them, and not to allow any sirdar to hold particular lands for any great length of time, when the Government has been in such a state of strength as to be able to enforce its orders.

‘ In discussing the question regarding the disposal of Prittee Niddee’s lands, it is absolutely necessary to recollect this distinction.

‘ I have always been anxious to protect the great families of the Marhatta empire, living under the Poonah state; as I am convinced that the peace of the country is more likely to be secure through their means, than through those of any other description of persons who might be brought forward by the Peshwah or his ministers; and in consideration of the length of time during which the Marhatta government has been disturbed by the factions which have existed; of the state of weakness to which the government was reduced; and of the irritation which was produced on the mind of the Peshwah on the one hand, and on those of his sirdars on the other, I have been induced to wink at the disobedience of the Peshwah’s orders by the great serinjaumy sirdars to the southward; and to be of opinion that we ought to wait till time shall have effaced from the minds of both parties a recollection of their mutual injuries, and till the allies will be at peace externally, before we endeavor to establish the Peshwah’s rights over the serinjaumy sirdars.

‘ There is, however, a great difference between the conduct of these sirdars in general, and of the Prittee Niddee. They have not come forward to assist the Peshwah with the quotas of troops which they ought to have in his service; but they have never been in rebellion to his government, have never used the power which they had in their hands to obstruct the operations of the British armies, and thus to injure the alliance.

‘ Forbearance towards them, therefore, may be very proper, on the grounds which I have above detailed, but towards the Prittee Niddee it would be weakness: it would



fore the instructions which my letter of the 21st instant contains are not applicable to the actual state of affairs.

‘ The Prittee Niddee had connected himself with bands of plunderers, contrary to the inclination of his mother and his guardian Bulwunt Rao, and his supposed interests. The Peshwah detached Goklah against him, and, with the assistance of the mother and guardian, Goklah got possession of his person; and the mother and guardian promised, that if the Prittee Niddee were delivered into their hands, he should go to Poonah; he was then delivered into their hands. In the mean time, the confiscation of the Prittee Niddee’s possessions became a subject of discussion, of which the mother and guardian must have been apprized; and as they would have suffered by this measure, they of course must have altered their intention of going to Poonah, supposing them even to have seriously intended it.

‘ There is no doubt but that the possession of the Prittee Niddee’s person is a great object to the Peshwah’s government, the attainment of which would be likely to lead to a speedy settlement with the other southern chiefs. These chiefs are well aware of this fact, and although it is very probable that they were not sorry to see the defeat and dispersion of the banditti which the Prittee Niddee had collected; still they were ready to step forward when called upon, by his guardian and his mother, to prevent the removal of the Prittee Niddee’s person to Poonah, and the confiscation of his possessions, and their transfer to a person more likely to support the Peshwah’s government. On this ground it is, I conceived, that Chintomeny Rao has detached troops to the support of the mother and guardian of Prittee Niddee; and although Goklah has served well upon many occasions, and appears to have done his duty in the commencement of this service, my mind is not free from suspicion that even he has not been very anxious in his endeavors to remove the person of the Prittee Niddee to Poonah. It must be recollected that this chief is very necessitous, and he is well acquainted with the Peshwah and his minister. It is probable that he heard that he was not to reap the principal benefit from the service which he performed, and not improbable but that the mother and guardian of the Prittee Niddee have paid him.

‘ In this state of affairs, the Peshwah and his minister came to the Residency for advice. They knew well that the

British Government will support them in carrying into execution the measures which the Resident will advise; and that I suspect to be the cause of the apparent confidence and cordiality upon this occasion. However, these sentiments deserve encouragement, and ought to receive it, whatever may be the ultimate decision upon this subject.

‘ My opinion upon it now is, that it is merely a question of convenience and of means. There cannot be a doubt but that Chintomeny Rao will be supported by all the southern Chiefs; and the question is, exactly, whether it is convenient, or whether we have the means now to undertake a contest with those chiefs, and to provide at the same time for the other services required.

‘ It is my opinion that we have not the means at Poonah, in the present state of the corps there, supposing that Chintomeny Rao alone were concerned, much less against all the southern Chiefs; and the means cannot be brought from the Company’s territories under the government of Fort St. George, without greater inconvenience to those territories than can result from any delay in the settlement of this question respecting the Prittee Niddee. They cannot be afforded at all from Bombay.

‘ Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that you ought to inform the Peshwah’s minister that the Prittee Niddee having been given over to the charge of his mother and his guardian, without the advice of the British Government, or of any of its officers, the situation of affairs respecting that chief is so materially altered, that you cannot take upon yourself to advise any measures. That Goklah had the Prittee Niddee in his power, and it would certainly have been desirable to bring that chief to Poonah; and that it would still be desirable to see him there: that it appears that to bring him there would require force; and that his Highness and his ministers were best informed whether the means they possessed were sufficient to accomplish that object. If they should doubt respecting their means, you should advise them not to risk an attempt to force the Prittee Niddee again, but to endeavor to accommodate affairs in such a manner with the mother and guardian, as to ensure the future tranquillity of the country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Mr. Waring.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 23rd January, 1805\*.

‘ I have at last received from Bombay a copy of the orders of the 7th December, from the Commander in Chief to Colonel Murray.

‘ His corps is entirely out of my reach and control at all events; and I have frequently stated my apprehensions of the consequences of his advance in the manner in which he has made it. The greater the distance he may advance, the greater must be the apprehensions of the consequences.

‘ He can have now no communication with Guzerat, and that province and government are left entirely defenceless; however that is not so important, as the probable loss of his corps. The only mode of saving it, is to endeavor immediately to open a communication with it from Bundelcund; and to send forward to it from thence supplies of grain, money, cattle, &c., which it will require.

‘ Only reflect that in this corps there are two European regiments, the loss of which by the same species of disaster as happened to Monson, will not be heard of with common patience in England.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Should you not have received a copy of the instructions to Colonel Murray†, I send one.’

\* *The Governor General to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*  
(*Extract.*)

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort William, 24th January, 1805.

‘ In the actual condition of public affairs in the Deccan, it does not appear to me to be necessary for you to proceed to the Deccan, and to assume the exercise of the powers vested in you by my instructions of the 9th of November, 1804. I am unwilling, however, to abrogate those powers without affording you an opportunity of exercising your judgment with regard to the expediency of your retaining those powers; but unless any objection should occur to your mind, I am of opinion that they may now be resigned by you without inconvenience to the public service. It is not my intention to issue any orders on this subject until I receive a communication of your sentiments in reply to this dispatch. You have my permission, however, to resign those powers if you should think proper, and in that case, it will be necessary for you to give early notice of your resignation to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the several authorities in the Deccan, in order that they may act accordingly.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ WELLESLEY.

† See Letter to Colonel Murray, dated Fort William, 14th September, 1804.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Seringapatam, 24th January, 1805.

‘ 1. Since I had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the 21st instant, I have written two dispatches to the Residency at Poonah, relative to the Prittee Niddee, copies of which I have now the honor to enclose.

‘ 2. It is not necessary that I should detain your Excellency by an explanation of my motives in writing those dispatches, as they are sufficiently explained in the dispatches themselves. But it may be necessary that I should state my reasons for thinking that the force at Poonah is not in a state to be employed at present against the southern Chiefs, and that no reinforcement to it can be drawn from Bombay. I conclude that the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George will have acquainted your Excellency with the distresses of his government for want of troops.

‘ 3. Colonel Close has, I believe, informed your Excellency of the inefficient and undisciplined state of the Bombay infantry at Poonah. They have not yet got the means of moving their camp equipage, and they are not disciplined; the men are not attached to the service, and desert in large numbers, and the battalion which arrived at Poonah, in July last, one thousand strong, has not now four hundred effective.

‘ 4. The government of Bombay might send Europeans to Poonah, but those troops, without a body of disciplined, efficient, and well equipped native troops, would be useless.

‘ 5. The government of Bombay have only one battalion of the 9th (newly raised) regiment at that settlement, and a battalion of fencibles, so that they can send no native troops to Poonah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Sydenham.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 26th January, 1805.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving Mr. Waring’s letter of the 17th instant, in which he has enclosed a copy of his correspondence with the Secretary of Government of Bombay, relative to the march of two battalions of Bombay native in-

fantry, from Goa to Poonah, through the territories of the Marhattas.

‘ By letters from Malabar, I learn that the Right Honorable the Governor of Fort St. George has stopped the march of those troops to Goa, and they are now stationed in Malabar. But as in this march they would have to pass through the territories of the Rajah of Kolapoor, through the possessions of various polygars and Chiefs, with whom I have no communication, and over whom the Peshwah exercises no authority, as well as through the possessions of the southern Chiefs; and as it is certain that these battalions would be badly equipped and supplied, and would depend for every thing upon the country, I earnestly recommend that they should not be marched by the route proposed. If it should be necessary or desirable that they should march to Poonah, by far the best mode would be to bring them into Mysore from Canara, to equip and provide them for the march in this country, and that they should proceed by the route on which we have our posts of communication, and by which our detachments always march.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Captain T. Sydenham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Mahony, at Koorg.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 26th January, 1805.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 22nd, which, according to your desire, I have communicated to Major Malcolm. As the arrival of that dispatch in Bengal is not very urgent, I have taken the liberty of marking a passage in it, which I think it would be advisable to omit.

‘ It does not appear to be at all explanatory of the Rajah’s sentiments, excepting those of gratitude and exultation, upon the occasion of receiving from the Governor General a mark of favorable distinction\*; which sentiments are very manifest in the whole tenor of his conduct, as related in the dispatch. But the paragraph in question might be supposed to convey a meaning which it certainly has not, even by those to whom it is immediately addressed; and above all, by other authorities, either in Europe, or who may hereafter

\* A sword.

be in India ; and therefore as a friend to the Rajah of Koorg, I have taken the liberty of marking it, and of recommending that the sheet of the dispatch should be written over again, and the marked paragraph omitted. Major Malcolm agrees with me in opinion upon this subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Mahony.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Malcolm.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 27th January, 1805.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th instant. It was arranged that Major Graham should take upon himself the payment of the party of horse, commanded by Hyder Khan, which served under the collector of Ahmednuggur ; and it is but reasonable that when that officer had no further occasion for their services, he should give them a sum of money to enable them to return to Mysore. According to this principle, I have written to the collector of Ahmednuggur, to desire that he will make arrangements to pay you a sum of money equal to two months’ subsistence for Hyder Khan and his party, and I request you to pay that sum to Hyder Khan.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the collector of Ahmednuggur, on this subject.’

*To the Collector at Ahmednuggur.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 27th January, 1805.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Resident at Mysore, relative to the pay of Hyder Khan and his party.

‘ It appears to me to be reasonable and fair that Hyder Khan and his party should be paid for the time during which they might be expected to be on their march from Ahmednuggur to Mysore, after the day on which you discharged them.

‘ I have accordingly requested Lieut. Colonel Malcolm to



take measures to give Hyder Khan pay for himself and party, for the months of December and January; and I beg you to pay Lieut. Colonel Malcolm a sum equal to that disbursement, which you will charge in your account as paid to Hyder Khan to pay the expense of his march to his own country.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Collector at Ahmednuggur.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 28th January, 1805.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. Buchan, on the subject of a monument which it is proposed to erect to the memory of Mr. Webbe\*.

‘ The application to the Governor General appears di-

\* *Mr. Buchan to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Madras, 23rd January, 1805.

‘ It is probable that you may have been already informed of the subject of the paper which I have the honor to enclose. At the first meeting which was held at this place, for the purpose of considering the best means of testifying those sentiments of respect and regard which are so justly entertained for the memory of Mr. Webbe, I was requested by the gentlemen present to communicate to you the result of their determination, and to refer to your consideration their wish to render the act in contemplation more gratifying, by being carried into effect under the patronage of his Excellency the Governor General. It occurred to the meeting that, from the high degree of estimation with which Mr. Webbe had been honored by his Excellency, it might not be improper to solicit from his Excellency the consecration of the intended monument by such an epitaph as might be deemed by the Governor General to be appropriate to the occasion.

‘ This part of the mournful duty no one could be so equal to perform; and if you should not consider the suggestion to be in itself liable to objection, the gentlemen with whom the undertaking has originated would feel themselves highly gratified and honored in your submitting the subject to his Excellency, and in your affording it the aid of your support, in such manner as you may deem most proper. The plan has in its origin been limited to very few persons; and you will observe from the accompanying paper, that it is still intended to confine it to such a scale as may be sufficient for testifying due respect for the character whom it is meant to honor, without making it more general, as a public measure, than might, under every view of the subject, be deemed necessary.

‘ I have to apologize for my delay in conveying to you this communication, which indisposition has chiefly occasioned. I, however, trust that it will not be too late for the interesting purpose, which it is the object of it to promote.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ G. BUCHAN.

*Paper*

rected more immediately to his private character than to his public situation; and in this light I do not consider it to be objectionable. His patronage of a mark of respect by individuals to a deserving public officer, will add respectability to the undertaking, at the same time that it will mark the Governor General's regard for a man, who was certainly

*Paper enclosed in Mr. Buchan's Letter to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, of the 23rd January, 1805.*

‘The undersigned gentlemen, being impressed with sentiments of the highest esteem and respect for the public zeal, eminent talents, and private worth of the late Mr. Webbe, have agreed to request permission to erect a monument to his memory in the church of St. Mary, Fort St. George.

‘It is supposed that the cost of the monument will amount to £——, for which, or for the sum which may be eventually required, the undersigned gentlemen hold themselves responsible; but as it is suggested that many gentlemen, who are absent from Fort St. George, would be desirous of participating in this mark of respect and esteem for the memory of the deceased, it is agreed that the object be communicated to those gentlemen who are known to have possessed sentiments of respect and regard for Mr. Webbe, or to have lived on terms of intimacy and friendship with him.

‘It is also agreed to endeavor to ascertain if there be any portrait of Mr. Webbe, and to take measures for procuring it for the purpose of having it engraved, in order that each of his friends may be enabled to possess a representation of him; and it is agreed, that the expense of the engraving be provided for under the responsibility of the undersigned gentlemen, in the same manner as that of the monument.’

MEM.—Names of the gentlemen present at the original meeting:—Sir Benjamin Sullivan, the Hon. Basil Cochrane, Messrs. Harrington, Buchan, Hodgson, Hardis, Garrow, Greenway, A. Cockburn, Captain J. Grant, Major J. Munro.

*Note written by his Excellency Marquis Wellesley, at the bottom of the foregoing Paper, at Barrackpoor, 16th February, 1805.*

‘Every motive of public duty and private sentiment concur to demand my most cordial approbation of this just and honorable tribute to virtues and talents never surpassed, and of which the memory cannot be preserved with marks of respect more strong than the genuine feelings of my heart, and the impartial testimony of my judgment.

‘The example of Mr. Webbe's public services should be held forth to the imitation of every British officer, both civil and military, in India; and I shall be anxious to encourage the plan of erecting a monument to him at Madras, by every means within my power; by subscription, if I can be admitted as a subscriber, and by every other exertion which the subscribers to such an undertaking can suggest.

‘It is my intention, at my private expense, to erect an obelisk to the memory of Mr. Webbe in the vicinity of this place, and within view of the house.

‘WELLESLEY.’

much attached to him personally, and to his principles of government.

‘ At all events, if there should be any thing objectionable in the request, it must be attributed to me, who have forwarded it to be laid before the Governor General, and not to the gentlemen at Madras, who referred their wishes to my judgment, either to be made known, or otherwise, according to my sense of their propriety.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Seringapatam, 28th January, 1805.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 16th instant, and it gives me great satisfaction to find that you and I agree in opinion respecting the measures to be adopted in the present situation of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. I have reason to believe, indeed, to be certain, that the Governor General has altered his opinion upon this subject; and I expect that you will receive instructions at an early period to commence a negotiation with the Soubah, for the purpose of placing his military force on an efficient and respectable establishment. But as this measure is one which must have permanent consequences, it is too important for me to venture to instruct you to enter upon it without the express orders of the Governor General.

‘ If the Soubah of the Deccan should raise an army, such as I propose he should, the commander of it will be the person of the first importance in the state. You will, of course, advert to this in good time, and take care that a proper selection is made. Indeed, it is my opinion, that the minister ought himself to command this army, otherwise he cannot expect to hold his place. This is another reason for getting rid of the present minister, if you cannot confide in him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain T. Sydenham.*

‘ DEAR SYDENHAM,                      ‘ Seringapatam, 29th January, 1805.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 21st. Lord Wellesley could not direct your attention to objects more deserving all that you can give them than those to which you have referred in your letter. The records at Poonah are full of my sentiments upon them, both in a public and private form; and upon the subject of the southern chiefs I have lately written some letters to Mr. Waring, which appear to me to contain a full answer to all the points upon that subject contained in your letter.

‘ Those letters will show you that it is my opinion that we have not now the means of entering upon this great arrangement; and, holding that opinion, it may be perhaps unnecessary to point out that this is not the time for entering upon it, supposing we had the means. However, I have no objection to enter into that discussion, and perhaps the knowledge of my sentiments may be of use to you.

‘ We have had glorious successes in the contest with Holkar, but his power of annoying us, or rather our allies, is by no means destroyed. I consider Holkar to be the chief of all the freebooters and vagrants scattered about all parts of India, every man of whom is the declared enemy of the British Government. So long as Holkar exists and is in any strength, we cannot consider the territories of our allies in security, and we must protect them with our troops, as they have no troops of their own to protect themselves.

‘ On this ground, I say, that, while the war with Holkar shall continue, our views must be directed to the foreign contest to the northward; and we must not enter upon any domestic arrangement which will require the exertion of our troops till that shall be brought to a conclusion.

‘ One of the consequences of our moving the subsidiary force to the southward for this purpose will be, that bands of freebooters now upon the Nerbudda will dash across the Taptee, and extend their operations possibly to Poonah itself. Another might be, that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, when they should see the southern chiefs leagued against us, and our troops engaged with them, might think



that another favorable opportunity to try their fortunes again with us.

‘ But that which, above all, induces me to wish to postpone the endeavor to make the arrangement, till after the conclusion of the contest with Holkar, in addition to our present want of means is, that I think that it may be effected amicably, and now I am convinced it cannot.

‘ Perhaps you did not know when you wrote your letter of the 21st of January that Colonel Close might want to draw Colonel Hallyburton’s corps across the Taptee, to cover and protect Scindiah’s march to Ougein; and that in that case Colonel Wallace’s subsidiary force must be moved forwards at least to Ahmednuggur, if it is intended that we should hold any footing in the Deccan, and keep up any communication with the Hyderabad corps, which will cross the Taptee. If you had had a knowledge of these probable operations, you would not have proposed to employ the subsidiary force in effecting an arrangement in another quarter; respecting which I have to say that I have not by any means made up my mind upon the principles on which it ought to be effected, and that I am very certain that it is not very pressing, and that no evil can result from leaving affairs to the southward, in the state in which they are, for some time longer.

‘ You have my opinion upon the march of the troops from Goa. Whenever you may enter upon this southern arrangement, allow me to recommend that you should not depend upon the combined operations of corps which can have no communication; and above all, that on this service, or any other in the Marhatta territory, you should never think of employing, or even marching a body of troops not fully and substantially equipped for its own defence, and well provided with supplies.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain T. Sydenham.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Gore, 33rd Regiment, commanding at Vellore.*

‘ DEAR GORE,

‘ Seringapatam, 1st February, 1805.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 29th of January.

‘ There is no doubt whatever but that I might send to Vellore any quantity of grain, of all descriptions, that you

can require; but I doubt much whether it would arrive there at such an expense as to enable the proprietor to sell it cheaper than grain is sold at Vellore at present, by your account, supposing that he were so inclined.

‘The ordinary price of grain in Mysore is from twenty four to thirty seers for a rupee; and it is probable that it will rise rather than fall in price, in consequence of the scarcity in the Carnatic. A man would load a bullock with rice for about three rupees, or a pagoda; and he would hire a bullock to carry his rice to Vellore from the eastern rice countries, for about as much more. Seventy two seers of rice therefore, landed at Vellore, would cost him six or seven rupees, and supposing that no duties were levied upon its passage through the Mysore country, or the Company’s territories, he could not afford to sell this rice for ten seers for a rupee.

‘This state of the facts proves to me, and I dare say it will to you, that there is no combination at Vellore to keep up the price: and, indeed, considering that there must certainly be a scarcity in the Carnatic, in consequence of the want of rain, it is my opinion that the price is extraordinarily low. What do you think of the common grains in the Deccan being at two and three seers for a rupee at this time last year?

‘I recommend to you to correspond with Major Macleod upon this subject, or with Government; and if there should really be a want of grain at Vellore, Government will communicate with the Resident here upon the subject; through whose means quantities can be sent down at the cheapest rate, the duties will be taken off, and you will get it much cheaper than by any other mode that I could point out.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Gore.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain T. Sydenham.*

‘DEAR SYDENHAM,

‘Seringapatam, 3rd February, 1805.

‘I enclose the copy of a letter from Mr. Frissell upon the subject of Cavy Jung’s jaghire. The letter to Mr. Waring, to which it refers, must be on the records of the Residency, and is dated the 17th of January.

‘ I believe that Cavy Jung was instrumental in getting the fort of Ahmednuggur for the Peshwah’s father, when he held the government, and it is probable that the grant to him was of lands, without requiring service. If this should be the case, service ought not now to be demanded.

‘ The Peshwah must be trained gradually to adhere to the engagements made by himself or his predecessors ; and I wish you to have a little conversation with Munkaiseer upon this subject.

‘ I enclose you the copy of a letter which I wrote some days ago to Colonel Close. It explains the plans which we have in contemplation for the subsidiary forces.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Sydenham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 3rd Feb., 1805.

‘ Your letters of the 14th of January have removed from my mind a load of anxiety upon the subject of my remaining at this place ; and I observe from those documents, and the Governor General’s dispatch of the 9th of January, that I have acted in conformity with his wishes and intentions. I now feel an anxiety only about my departure for England, the extent of which I cannot describe.

‘ I have no confidence in my own judgment in any case in which my own wishes are involved. This is the cause of the great anxiety which I have felt, and still feel, upon these subjects.

‘ I know that my presence in England would be useful, and I am certainly very anxious to go there. The peace appears to be established in India : we are certain that the Rajah of Berar will remain at peace ; and as for Scindiah, he has crossed the Nerbudda, and, by a letter from Colonel Close of the 21st of January received this day, and written from the neighbourhood of Colonel Hallyburton’s camp, I see that, up to that period, he had received no intelligence from Mr. Jenkins. I conclude, therefore, that all is right, particularly as the Rajah of Berar has positively disowned and punished those who were guilty of the late irruption into the Nizam’s territories.

‘ But even supposing Scindiah to be hostile towards

us, his plan must be to invade the Company's territories under the government of Bengal; and I certainly cannot impede his progress. All that can be done in the Deccan, is to seize his districts near Ahmednuggur, the city of Burhampoor, and Asseerghur; and there appears no cause for which I should delay my voyage with a view to carrying on those operations, which any body can carry on with equal advantage and success. The time presses for a decision. If I do not go in the first fleet that sails from Madras, I shall lose the season, and may as well delay my voyage till October next; and then I shall be too late to be of any public utility in England.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I have determined to take my passage in one of the ships to sail from Madras at the end of this month; and as I have been so fortunate hitherto as to view every thing in the same light with the Governor General, I think that I am not mistaken in this decision. I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which his own wishes are concerned; and I have not come to this determination without consulting Malcolm, who agrees in opinion with me upon every part of the subject.

‘ At all events, supposing that, after the Governor General shall have perused my letter to you of the 4th of last month, he should desire that I should not go to England, the only inconvenience which can result from the step which I now take is, to forfeit my passage money, and to return from Madras.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Seringapatam, 4th February, 1805.

‘ I enclose the copy of a letter and other papers received this morning from Mr. Duncan. You will see the real state of General Jones's corps, than which nothing can be much worse. It is very obvious that the Commander in Chief has never had a knowledge of Colonel Murray's real state, or of the impediments to his advance to the northward, and that the orders to advance have been drawn from his Excellency by Colonel Murray's importunities.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



*To Colonel Close.*

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘Seringapatam, 8th February, 1805.

‘I have received your letters of the 22nd and 23rd January. I have nothing to recommend for Colonel Hallyburton in addition to my letter of the 18th January, which I have sent you in triplicate.

‘Since you quitted Poonah, I have written fully to the Residency there upon every point that has occurred. Byajee Naig is, indeed, dismissed, and Munkaiseer has had the impudence to swear that he is still in favor, although his attendance upon the Residency is discontinued, upon his own desire, that he may have more leisure to attend to the education of his son.

‘I shall continue to watch closely the affairs at Poonah, and advise Sydenham upon all occasions.

‘As matters appear to be very quiet to the northward, I am going to take a run to Madras, to meet the Commander in Chief, Sir John Cradock \*. Direct to me by Hyderabad, and Colonel Kirkpatrick will forward your letters wherever I may be.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain T. Sydenham.*

‘MY DEAR SYDENHAM,                      ‘Seringapatam, 9th Feb., 1805.

‘I have received your letter of the 1st instant, with the copy of that from Mr. Forbes. My papers are gone to Madras, and therefore I cannot now refer to Mr. Frissell’s letter upon the subject of Mr. Forbes’s offer for the sandal wood: but I rather think that Mr. Frissell said positively, that Mr. Forbes would give the same price for the sandal wood that he did last year. However, whether he did or not, I never will be instrumental in forcing upon Mr. Forbes a bargain which may prove disadvantageous to him; and therefore I request that you will inquire from him at what price he will take the sandal wood, as I rather believe that Government will be inclined to repay him his money by a delivery of that article.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Captain T. Sydenham.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

\* Now Lord Howden, G.C.B.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘SIR,

‘Fort St. George, 15th February, 1805.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th of January.

‘I consider that it is much to be regretted that Captains Sykes, Fallow, and M’Intosh should have quitted the army to return into Guzerat, escorted by a body of troops, which from their nature could not be depended upon through a country in which no measures had been taken to insure the communication between the army and Guzerat. The misfortunes which happened to them are to be attributed to this first false step. It does not appear to me that the person who took the gentlemen in question is an officer in Scindiah’s service. He appears to be an independent leader of freebooters, who has taken advantage of the confusion of the times to plunder as much as he can on his own account.

‘Supposing him to be a servant of Scindiah, it does not appear that he took these officers in conformity to orders from Scindiah, or in conformity with general orders, specifying the line of conduct to be adopted in respect to European officers who should pass through the country, as his conduct was entirely different from that of the principal manager stationed at Ougein, who, it is to be supposed, acted in the manner which he considered would be most satisfactory to his employer.

‘The result of any application, therefore, to Scindiah upon this subject would be, that Scindiah would deny that this person was his servant, and would allege that he was in rebellion to his government, and would call upon the British Government to subdue him; or he would acknowledge that he was his servant, would allege that his conduct was in disobedience of and inconsistent with all his orders, and as a proof thereof, would advert to the conduct of the manager at Ougein. In this case, he would promise to endeavor to recover from Wittoba buckshee the property plundered from the officers.

‘It is not very probable that any thing would be recovered; and therefore, with a view to the property of the officers, I am of opinion that a reference to Scindiah’s durbar would be entirely useless. But as it is desirable to show

these powers that British officers cannot be injured either in their persons or their property, without attracting the notice of Government, it is my opinion that the Honorable the Governor in Council would do well to draw the attention of the Resident at Scindiah's durbar to this transaction, and to urge him to make a representation upon it to Scindiah, in such terms as he may think proper.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Sir John Cradock, K.B., Commander in Chief.*

‘ SIR,

‘ *Army of Fort St. George, 15th Feb., 1805.*

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I have received the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, to send to Bombay and Fort St. George all corps, troops, and followers belonging to those Presidencies respectively, which may now be in the Deccan, beyond the establishment of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and with the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ The first point to which I beg leave to draw your attention in reference to these orders, is the corps stationed at Bellary, consisting of the 22nd dragoons, the 1st regiment of cavalry, and a battalion of native infantry, with its guns, in readiness to march into the Deccan. These troops might be ordered into their garrisons and cantonments.

‘ The subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, ought to consist of two regiments of native cavalry, each of 500 men, two companies of artillery, one regiment of European infantry, and six battalions of native infantry, each consisting of 1000 firelocks, and two companies of pioneers, with the necessary complement of ordnance and military stores. This corps ought to be, according to the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, entirely composed of troops belonging to the establishment of Fort St. George.

‘ The subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah ought to consist of one regiment of native cavalry, one company of artillery, six battalions of native infantry, each consisting of 1000 firelocks, and one company of pioneers, with the necessary complement of ordnance and military stores: of this corps, one regiment of native cavalry ought

to belong to the government of Madras, and the remainder of the troops to the government of Bombay, according to the orders of the Governor General.

‘ There are in the Deccan, at present, four regiments of cavalry, . . . companies of artillery, two regiments of European infantry, and ten battalions of native infantry, and three companies of pioneers belonging to the government of Fort St. George; and one company of artillery and four battalions of native infantry belonging to the government of Bombay. The excess, therefore, beyond the establishment of the subsidiary forces, is of Madras troops, one regiment of native cavalry, one regiment of European infantry, four battalions of native infantry, and one company of pioneers; and the deficiency is of Bombay troops two battalions of native infantry.

‘ By reference to the returns you will observe the incomplete state of all the corps in the Deccan at the present moment; and the fact is, that the numbers of the whole do not amount to what they ought to be by the treaties with the two powers.

‘ The Bombay corps stationed at Poonah are equally incomplete with those serving under the government of Fort St. George; and they are not in the state of discipline or efficiency in which they ought to be for the service on which they are employed.

‘ I am therefore of opinion that it will not be proper to draw any part of the Madras native infantry out of the Deccan till the Bombay government shall have completed the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, by sending to Poonah two Bombay battalions still in Malabar. When that measure shall have been effected, it is probable that the Bombay troops now at Poonah will have been disciplined and equipped for service, and then all the surplus Madras native infantry may be drawn into the territories of the government of Fort St. George.

‘ The European regiments in the Deccan are the 74th and the 94th. The 74th regiment are reduced to a very small number of men; and the 94th have been harassed by the severe service of the late war, and have suffered much from sickness in this year, which has been the consequence of the famine in the Deccan.



‘ The 74th regiment ought to be marched back into the territories of the government of Fort St. George ; or if it be true, as is reported, that this corps is ordered home, they might be sent to Bombay to be embarked. At all events, if they should be marched back, their disabled men, whether by sickness or wounds, ought to be sent to Bombay.

‘ The 94th regiment requires rest, and ought to be relieved. There are two modes in which this relief can be effected : either by sending into the Deccan a regiment of European infantry, direct from the territories of this government, or by sending there the 77th regiment, as soon as this corps shall be relieved from Goa by the 84th.

‘ If the last plan should be adopted, the 77th regiment might join at Hullihall, in Soonda, the two Bombay battalions which will come out of Malabar, and the whole might march together to Poonah. In this case, it would be necessary to collect at Hullihall the equipments for the 77th regiment, and the supplies of provisions which will be necessary for this corps and the battalions on their march. The regiments of cavalry are the 5th and 7th, with the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah ; and the 3rd and 6th, with the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ The 5th and 7th are incomplete in numbers, ill equipped, and not highly disciplined. They are young corps, which were never in very good order, and the best measure to be adopted in respect to them would be to draw them into the Company’s territories, and to send into the Peshwah’s one complete and efficient regiment of 500 men. If, however, it should be determined to keep in the Peshwah’s territories one of these regiments, the other ought to be draughted to complete it with men, horses, and horse appointments. The 3rd and 6th are good regiments, and were complete in numbers. But it must be obvious that it is desirable to relieve all these corps, which have been so long in the field.

‘ The government of Bombay can immediately relieve the company of pioneers belonging to the Madras government, which is attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, and this company might return with the 74th regiment, or the four battalions of Madras native infantry, as soon as these shall return.

‘ Besides the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George, which are in the Deccan, there are 1200 draught bullocks, which are attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah. I have reason to believe the government of Bombay have provided cattle to relieve those above mentioned, and as soon as they shall be relieved they can come into the Company’s territories with the Madras troops.

‘ In case your Excellency should approve of these proposed arrangements for withdrawing the supernumerary corps from the Deccan, and for the relief of the 94th, I shall write to Mr. Duncan, to propose to him to frame his arrangements accordingly, and at the same time to relieve the staff officers serving with the Peshwah’s subsidiary force who are to be relieved.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Sir John Cradock, K.B.*

*To Mr. Scott Waring.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 16th Feb., 1805.

‘ I have received your letter of the 1st instant. I have no intention whatever of disturbing you at Ahmednuggur, so long as the Company may hold that possession; but, as their tenure must be considered as very uncertain, I think it advisable that you should not incur any extraordinary expense there. I mention this opinion because I conceive that you wrote your letter of the 1st with the intention of incurring expense, to render your habitation comfortable, if you should have a prospect of remaining at Ahmednuggur.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Mr. Waring.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Sir John Cradock, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ 19th Feb., 1805.

‘ I have the honor to inform you that I applied to General Lake, in the course of the last year, for leave to go to England, when the situation of affairs in this country would allow of my departure, and I enclose an extract of his Excellency’s answer\*.

\* *Extract of a Letter from his Excellency General Lake.*

‘ Camp, Nerwa, 12th May, 1804.

‘ I can only assure you that, however reluctant I may feel to part with your

‘ The Governor General has been pleased to allow me to resign the political and military power with which he had intrusted me in the Deccan, because my presence in that quarter is no longer necessary; and therefore I consider that to avail myself of the Commander in Chief’s leave of absence, at the present moment, will not be attended by inconvenience: I therefore request your permission to proceed to England by one of the ships now under dispatch.

‘ In case you should grant my request, I enclose a letter to the Right Honorable the Governor in Council, by which I resign all appointments and offices which I hold in the army serving under his Lordship’s Government, including that of Major General on the Staff, to which I was appointed by the late Governor in Council, at the recommendation of the late Commander in Chief.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Sir John Cradock, K.B.*

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort St. George, 19th Feb., 1805.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I applied to his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India for permission to go to England, whenever the situation of affairs in this country would permit; and his Excellency was pleased to comply with my request.

‘ As the Governor General has permitted me to resign the political and military powers with which I was intrusted by his Excellency in the Deccan, because the state of affairs in that part of India no longer requires my presence, I have applied to Sir John Cradock for permission to avail myself of the leave of absence given to me by the Commander in Chief, and to go to England by one of the ships now under dispatch; and, in case his Excellency should grant my request, I beg to resign all the offices and appointments which I hold in the army serving under your Lordship’s Government, including that of a Major General on the Staff, to which I was appointed by the late Governor

services, advice, and exertions, to carry on the operations we are at present entering into, I shall not, from any selfish motive, withhold the permission you request to proceed to Europe, at whatever time you may wish to avail yourself of it.’

in Council, at the recommendation of Lieutenant General Stuart.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord William Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 21st Feb., 1805.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a letter, which I have received from Mr. Kier at Bombay, upon the subject of his attendance upon the sick officers and soldiers belonging to the army of Fort St. George, who have gone from Bombay to camp for the recovery of their health. This duty has certainly been performed by Mr. Kier in a manner very creditable to himself, and advantageous to those under his care, and to the public; and it is to him an extra duty, which can never have been in the contemplation of Government, and for which, however laborious, no allowance has been given.

‘ I therefore beg leave to recommend Mr. Kier to the consideration of the Honorable the Governor in Council, and to request that he will grant him such an allowance as he may appear to him to deserve, for the extraordinary care and trouble he has had in the attendance upon the sick and wounded officers and soldiers who were obliged to go to Bombay for the recovery of their health.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. General Sir John Cradock, K.B.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 22nd Feb., 1805.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the proceedings of a General Court Martial, ordered by me, under authority from the late Commander in Chief, to assemble for the trial of Captain

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‘ A complaint of the conduct of this officer was made to me by Rajah Mohiput Ram, the Commander of the Soubah’s forces, in the month of March last; upon which complaint, after some previous inquiry through the commanding officer of the subsidiary force, Captain ——— was put in arrest,



on charges framed against him, by my orders, and a court martial was assembled for his trial.

‘ In the course of the proceedings on the trial, it appears that the members and the judge advocate were not sworn, which is an irregularity fatal to the legality of the sentence of the court martial. It also appears that the court martial acquitted the prisoner of some charges brought against him, from ignorance of certain circumstances, which I alone could explain to them ; and for those crimes of which they found him guilty they sentenced but a very inadequate punishment, and one by no means likely to operate as an example to deter other officers, who might be placed in similar situations, from the commission of similar crimes.

‘ The late Commander in Chief, therefore, having been pleased to refer this trial for my opinion, notwithstanding that I was no longer in the command in the Deccan, I ordered that it might be revised, in a letter to the President, which I have the honor to enclose.

‘ From various causes it has not been possible to assemble the general court martial till this day, and the number of members at present alive is not sufficient to form a general court martial. The sentence passed is obviously illegal, supposing it to be adequate to the crimes of which the prisoner has been found guilty ; but of the inadequacy of the punishment awarded there will not be the smallest doubt, after a perusal of the enclosed papers.

‘ There never was a more flagrant instance of breach of trust than that of which Captain —— has been found guilty ; and there is no crime which more justly deserves punishment, or more necessarily requires to be held up to the army as obnoxious to every principle of military service.

‘ He was placed in arrest, in consequence of the complaint of Rajah Mohiput Ram, the commanding officer of the troops of the Soubah of the Deccan, who has proved the truth of his complaints ; and if Captain —— should, by any accident, be suffered to escape with impunity, the worst impressions will be made on the minds of the natives in general, and serious offence will be given to the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ Under all these circumstances, I beg leave to recommend that the general court martial, of which Colonel Maclean is

President, may be dissolved ; and that Captain —— may be suspended from the service till the pleasure of the Court of Directors is known ; and that the enclosed papers may be sent home to show the grounds of this measure.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Sir John Cradock, K.B.*’

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,                      ‘ Fort St. George, 24th February, 1805.

‘ The dispatch of his Excellency the Governor General of the 24th January, of which you have received a copy, contains directions to return to Fort St. George and Bombay all corps, troops, and followers belonging to those Presidencies respectively, which may now be in the Deccan, beyond the establishments of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ In carrying into execution those orders, it was necessary, first, that I should advert to the letter which I wrote to you on the 18th of January, in which I contemplated the possibility that you might call for the services of the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, in operations between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda ; and it has appeared to me, that to carry into execution his Excellency’s orders will not impede this design.

‘ I have therefore written a letter to the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George, and one to the government of Bombay, of which I enclose copies. The Commander in Chief has approved of the suggestions which the letter to his Excellency contains, and a perusal of both will show you in what manner it is proposed to effect the relief in contemplation, and to withdraw the supernumerary troops from the Deccan.

‘ I conclude that you have sent to the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah, the troops and departments belonging to it, as suggested in my letter of the 18th of January ; but should you not have so done, I write orders upon the subject to Colonel Hallyburton, as I consider the separation of the two forces as a measure which will facilitate the relief and the object of withdrawing the supernumerary troops ; and at the same time, will enable

you to employ Colonel Hallyburton's corps across the Taptee, should that measure be necessary.

‘ Besides the orders to withdraw the supernumerary troops, his Excellency's dispatch of the 24th of January contains orders upon different other subjects connected with the service in the Deccan, upon which I am about to give you my opinion.

‘ The first, and most important of these, is the position of the two subsidiary forces. It is my opinion, that that serving with the Peshwah ought to be two battalions at Poonah, and four battalions with the cavalry, artillery, &c., at or near Toka, if the state of discipline and equipment of the Bombay troops should be such as to permit Colonel Wallace to take up this position. In that case Colonel Hallyburton's corps, with the exception of two battalions at Hyderabad, might be lower down the Godavery than the spot fixed upon by his Excellency the Governor General, and somewhere about Khair.

‘ It is probable that the Bombay troops are not in a state to move to such a distance from Poonah as Toka is; and at all events, it will be more convenient for effecting the relief, &c., that the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah should not be so far advanced. This being the case, I should wish them to take up their ground for this season in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur; and if they remain at Ahmednuggur, it would be best that Colonel Hallyburton should be with his corps about forty miles higher up the Godavery than Khair, and to the southward of Jaum.

‘ I propose to make Colonel Wallace acquainted with my sentiments upon this subject; and to leave it to him to decide whether it will be convenient to take up the position as proposed at Toka or Ahmednuggur; and to desire Colonel Hallyburton to post his corps either in the neighbourhood of Jaum, or of Khair, according to the position which will be taken up by Colonel Wallace, unless you should think it necessary to employ his corps beyond the Taptee.

‘ The next subject for consideration under the orders of his Excellency the Governor General of the 24th of January, is the reduction of expense in both the subsidiary forces. All the establishments of the subsidiary force serving with

his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, are fixed by the regulations of the government of Fort St. George ; and it is sufficient to refer Colonel Hallyburton to those regulations, and to desire him not to keep up any extraordinary establishments, excepting of grain, if he should find it necessary, and of brinjarries.

‘The establishments of the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah were fixed by me in General Orders, on a scale nearly similar to the establishments attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, which orders have been approved of by his Excellency the Governor General, and the Government of Fort St. George.

‘The excess of the establishments attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, beyond those of the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, consists in an additional establishment for the commissary of provisions, in consequence of his having a large number of Europeans to feed ; an increased establishment for the commissary of grain, in consequence of his having 5000 bullock loads of grain in his department ; an increased establishment for the agent of hired bullocks, in consequence of his having the charge of 6000 hired bullocks ; and an establishment for the commissary of stores proportioned to the number of pieces of cannon of which he had the charge.

‘The establishment of the commissary of provisions with the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah might be reduced as soon as the European troops are withdrawn ; but as, in my judgment, it will be proper to keep up the number of loads of grain in the grain department to 5000, till such arrangements can be made with the Marhatta brinjarries as to insure a constant supply, the establishment fixed for the commissary of grain cannot be reduced. The same reasoning applies to the establishment of hired bullocks, and the commissary of stores must of course have an establishment proportioned to the number of pieces of cannon under his charge.

‘There appears, therefore, no room for reduction of expense in the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, excepting in the department of the commissary of provisions, when the number of Europeans shall be reduced.



‘There is an officer at the head of the grain department at Poonah, and another in a similar situation at Ahmednuggur ; and I conceive that the commissary of grain with the subsidiary force may take charge of these two depôts, and manage by his native servants, as soon as the effects of the late famine in the Deccan shall no longer be felt. But so long as these appear, I think that it would not be safe to trust the charge of the depôt to natives ; and therefore I consider this European superintendence at the depôts to be still necessary.

‘I have the honor to enclose copies of the letters which I have written to Colonel Wallace and Colonel Hallyburton, in conformity with the principles stated in this letter.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*

‘SIR,

‘Fort St. George, February, 1805.

‘I have the honor to inform you, that I have received the directions of his Excellency the Governor General to return to Fort St. George and Bombay all corps, troops, and followers belonging to these Presidencies respectively, which may now be in the Deccan, beyond the establishments of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘His Excellency has likewise directed that, with the exception of two battalions, with their guns, to be detached from each of the subsidiary forces, and to be posted at Hyderabad and Poonah respectively, each of the subsidiary forces should take up a position upon, or near the river Godavery, for the protection of the territories of the Company’s allies.

‘The first step to be taken in conformity with his Excellency’s orders, is to collect at Ahmednuggur the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah ; and with a view to that object, I request you to march to Ahmednuggur with the troops under your command at Poonah, excepting two battalions with their guns, and such of the heavy ordnance as you may find it convenient to leave in the camp at Poonah. These two battalions are to be stationed at Poonah

until further orders ; and in my opinion you will do well for the present to leave Lieut. Colonel Chalmers in command of them.

‘ The enclosed copy of a letter to Colonel Hallyburton will point out to you the measures which I have directed with the view to the collection at Ahmednuggur of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah ; and you will immediately communicate with Colonel Hallyburton, and do every thing to facilitate the junction of those troops with you.

‘ It is my opinion that the best positions which the two subsidiary forces could occupy, with a view to the defence of the territories of the allies, would be, your corps at Toka, and Colonel Hallyburton’s at Khair ; and I should wish those positions to be occupied if possible.

‘ But, in fixing upon a position for your corps, it is necessary that I should advert to the deficient state of the equipments of the battalions of the Bombay army, of which the Poonah subsidiary force is composed ; to the crippled state of the public departments at the present moment, in consequence of the detachment serving with the Nizam’s subsidiary force, and to the consequent inconvenience which you will feel in advancing to any distance from your depôts. I have also to observe, that the difficulty and inconvenience of relieving the Madras troops, and of withdrawing those which are supernumerary, will be increased in proportion to the distance of the position which they will occupy.

‘ Under these circumstances, as I do not apprehend that any inconvenience will result in this season, from omitting to advance to Toka, and the only benefit which would result from the measure would be, to place the two subsidiary forces at once in the situations which they will probably permanently occupy ; I must leave it to your decision, whether to advance to Toka, or to remain in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur, after duly considering the advantages and disadvantages of both measures.

‘ You will apprise Colonel Hallyburton of your determination upon this subject, in order that he may occupy a corresponding position, according to his instructions.

‘ The orders of the 21st February and the 19th of June, 1804, fixed the establishments of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, and I conclude that they are arranged

accordingly. It does not appear to me that it will be practicable to reduce any of them, excepting that of the Commissary of Provisions, which ought to be reduced to the standard fixed by the regulations of the government of Fort St. George, for the department of the Commissary of Provisions with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

‘It will still be necessary to have 5000 bullock loads of rice in the department of the Commissary of Grain, and bullocks to carry them, in that of the Hired Bullocks; and, of course, the corresponding establishments respectively ordered, with a view to the charge of this grain and these bullocks; and the Commissary of Stores must have an establishment for the number of pieces of ordnance under his charge.

‘In case you should find any increase of establishment necessary, you will report such necessity to the Resident at Poonah and the authorities at Bombay, who will give orders upon the subject.

‘I consider that, until all the effects of the late famine in the Deccan shall have disappeared, it will be necessary to keep the depôts at Poonah and Ahmednuggur under European superintendence, as at present. When those effects shall have disappeared, the Commissary officer, with the subsidiary force, may take charge of the magazines, and manage them by means of his native servants.

‘It is intended immediately to relieve the Madras troops and establishments serving with the Peshwah’s subsidiary force, and you will receive orders upon the subject from his Excellency the Commander in Chief at Fort. St. George.

‘With a view to facilitate this relief, it is necessary that you should take an early opportunity of collecting the corps, either at Toka or Ahmednuggur, according to the choice you will make of a position for the monsoon. I imagine that a part of the 2nd of the 3rd occupies the forts of Chandore and Gaulna; and if that should be the case, it would be desirable that you should relieve them by Bombay troops, as soon as you may be joined at Ahmednuggur by the corps ordered from Colonel Hallyburton’s detachment.

‘I expect that the Peshwah will be able to occupy those forts at an early period, with troops upon whose fidelity dependence can be placed; but in the mean time, till he

shall have such troops in his service, and shall have made arrangements for paying them regularly, it will be necessary that these forts should be maintained by our troops. But you will fix such garrisons for them only as shall be absolutely necessary to maintain them against a surprise; and you will instruct the officers who will be placed in command of these forts, to take every precaution to prevent such a disgraceful disaster.

‘I have the honor to inform you, that I expect that Colonel Robertson, Mr. Gilmour, Captain Welsh, Captain Bellingham, and Captain Noble will be relieved in the discharge of their respective departments with the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, by officers of the Bombay army; but you will inform these officers that I have not forgotten their meritorious services while under my command, and that I have recommended them to his Excellency the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George.

‘When you shall fix upon and take up your position for the rains, I request you to adopt every measure to make your troops comfortable. You must have hospitals prepared for the sick, and sheds for the sick horses and bullocks, and you will communicate to the government of Bombay all your wants, so that they may be supplied at an early period.

‘In case you should have leisure, I wish you to send to Bombay the remainder of the captured ordnance still at Ahmednuggur.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Wallace.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Major General the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.\*, to Lieut. General Sir John Cradock, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Fort St. George, 26th February, 1805.

‘I have the honor to enclose copies of the letters which I have written to the Governor of Bombay and to Colonels Close, Hallyburton, and Wallace, with a view to prepare for the relief of the coast troops in the Deccan, upon which subject I had the honor of addressing you on the 15th instant.

\* The notification of Major General Wellesley being created an extra Knight Companion of the Order of the Bath, was not known in India before the 25th of February, 1805. See pp. 682-3.



‘ You will observe by my letter to the Governor of Bombay, that it is doubtful whether, under present circumstances, he will be able to send the 84th regiment from Bombay to Goa, upon which subject he will communicate with you.

‘ You will observe that, according to the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, I have recommended to the government of Bombay officers of the Bombay army, who have hitherto been on the staff in Malabar, and who have lost their situations in that province by the relief which has lately taken place, to fill the staff offices in the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, of Commissary of Grain and of Hired Bullocks, held by Lieut. Colonel Robertson; of Paymaster and Commissary of Provisions, held by Captain Bellingham; of Commissary of Stores, held by Captain Noble; of Judge Advocate, held by Captain Welsh; and of Superintending Surgeon, held by Mr. Gilmour.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Robertson is an officer of such high rank in the service, that I imagine there is no office in Malabar to which he could be appointed: but I beg leave to recommend him in the most earnest manner to your Excellency’s favor and protection, and to assure you that there is no officer of his rank in the army to whom the service owes so much as to Lieut. Colonel Robertson, for his exertions in different campaigns, in the offices of Commissary of Grain and Provisions.

‘ The late Commander in Chief was pleased, at my request, to appoint Captain Bellingham to be Deputy Quartermaster General in Mysore, and I have only to recommend him to your favorable notice.

‘ Captains Noble and Welsh and Mr. Gilmour remain without offices, and I beg leave to recommend those officers to your favor. They served in important situations throughout the late war, and were appointed to the offices which they held in the subsidiary force as a reward for their services. They have been removed from these offices in consequence of a military arrangement, which rendered their removal necessary; but I hope that they will be considered by you in the appointments to the offices vacated in Malabar, by the removal of the officers of the Bombay army.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen. Sir John Cradock, K.B.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To the Governor General.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort St. George, 27th February, 1805. ]

‘ 1. I have the honor to enclose copies of letters which I have written, containing the proposed arrangements, by which your Excellency’s orders of the 24th of January will be carried into execution.

‘ 2. Copies of these letters have been sent to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah.

‘ 3. As tranquillity prevails throughout the Deccan, and there is no reason to believe that it will be disturbed, I propose to resign immediately the political and military powers in the Deccan with which I have been intrusted by your Excellency, and to avail myself of your permission and that of the Commander in Chief to proceed to Europe by the ships now under dispatch at this place.

‘ I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Fort St. George, 27th February, 1805.

‘ I wish that you would draw the Governor General’s attention to Major Wilks’ report on the affairs of Mysore, as a most able performance, which throws much light on the transactions in that country, and does credit to the British Government.

‘ I should wish that the Governor General would reward Major Wilks by giving him the salary of a Resident during the time he acted in Mysore for Colonel Malcolm; and if hereafter it should be deemed expedient to remove the latter to any other situation, Major Wilks will make an excellent Resident in Mysore. The Dewan and all the principal people of that country have the highest respect and regard for him.

‘ As soon as the war is over, and the pressure upon the finances can be relieved, it will be expedient to order the government of Fort St. George to find means of paying the troops in Mysore, besides the subsidy, and to allow the payments on account of the subsidy to accumulate for a few months to pay the debt due by the Company to the Rajah.

It presses a little upon the Mysore government at present, but it may be delayed till the peace without inconvenience.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To G. Stratton, Esq.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 1st March, 1805.

‘ The bearer, Nella Tamby, who is now a landholder in the jaghire, was formerly a servant in a public office in Seringapatam, in which very great abuses were committed, of which he gave such correct information as enabled me to trace them to their source; and his evidence at a General Court Martial which took place in consequence, was so clear and distinct, that it must have had great weight with the court.

‘ Some of the parties tried by the General Court Martial afterwards prosecuted Nella Tamby for perjury, before the Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras, and put him to great expense and trouble, but he was fully acquitted of the crime laid to his charge.

‘ He has informed me that he is now solely occupied in the management of his lands in the jaghire, and has requested a letter from me to any of the gentlemen in charge of the affairs of that district; I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your protection.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *G. Stratton, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Malcolm.*

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘ Fort St. George, 1st March, 1805.

‘ I enclose copies of letters between me and Webbe, upon different subjects relating to Mysore, principally the arrangement of the arrack concerns in the commands. I issued an order upon this subject, of which Barclay will give you a copy, and when the distribution of the arrack money shall be made in the Carnatic, he will furnish you with a list of the claimants in the Mysore country.

‘ It will be necessary that you should recall to Purneah’s recollection, that he saves about 700 pagodas per mensem by the arrack arrangement; besides the sums which he

collects from the bazaars of Sera, Bednore, Bangalore, &c., as I fear he will growl a little about the sum he will have to pay, which I hope will exceed 100 pagodas per mensem to each commanding officer.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Malcolm.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

‘ As I am about to depart for England, I have written a letter to the Dewan, which I enclose, together with a copy and translation thereof for your perusal ; and I beg that you will do me the favor to deliver the letter to the Dewan.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Malcolm.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Purneah, Dewan of the Rajah of Mysore.*

‘ Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Malcolm will have informed you that affairs having begun to have a more settled appearance in the Deccan, I have obtained permission to go to England, and I shall commence my voyage in a few days.

‘ I part with you with the greatest regret ; and I shall ever continue to feel the most lively interest for the honor and prosperity of the government of the Rajah of Mysore over which you preside.

‘ For six years I have been concerned in the affairs of the Mysore government, and I have contemplated with the greatest satisfaction its increasing prosperity under your administration.

‘ Experience has proved the wisdom of the arrangement which was first made of the government of Mysore ; and I am convinced that under no other management would it have been possible for the British Government to derive such advantages from the country which you have governed, as I have enjoyed in the various difficulties with which we have contended since your authority was established.

‘ Every principle of gratitude, therefore, for many acts of personal kindness to myself, and a strong sense of the public benefits which have been derived from your adminis-



tration, render me anxious for its continuance and for its increasing prosperity; and in every situation in which I may be placed, you may depend upon it that I shall not fail to bear testimony of my sense of your merits upon every occasion that may offer, and that I shall suffer no opportunity to pass by which I may think favorable for rendering you service.

‘Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I must take the liberty to recommend to you to persevere in the laudable path which you have hitherto followed. Let the prosperity of the country be your great object; protect the ryots and traders, and allow no man, whether vested with authority or otherwise, to oppress them with impunity; do justice to every man; and attend to the wholesome advice which will be given to you by the British Resident; and you may depend upon it that your government will be as prosperous and as permanent as I wish it to be.

‘I recommend to your constant favor and protection Bistnapali Pundit, Govind Rao, Ragonaut Rao, Ranary, and all the sirdars and troops who served meritoriously with me in the last war; and Sheshiah and the hircarrahs belonging to you who accompanied me. They are all deserving of your favor.

‘You know that, for some years, I have had under my protection Salabut Khan, the supposed or adopted son of Dhoondiah Waugh. I have given him a sum of money, and placed him under the guardianship of the court at Seringapatam, and I request you to take him into the Rajah’s service hereafter, if you should find him to be worthy of your favor.

‘As a testimony of my sense of the benefits which the public have derived from your administration, of my sincere regard, and of my gratitude for many acts of personal kindness and attention, I request your acceptance of my picture, which will be sent to you from Bengal.

‘*Purneah.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Captain Sydenham.*

‘MY DEAR SYDENHAM,                      ‘Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

‘I have received your letter of the 20th of February. Under existing circumstances, it is my opinion that Ghaut-

ky's carkoon ought not to be allowed to proceed to the southward; although I have no apprehension for any thing he can do. You must take care, however, to proceed with great caution in stopping him; and let him be sent back across the Nerbudda, rather as a suspicious person who has evil designs of his own, than as an agent deputed by Scindiah or Ghautky, and in this proceeding it would be best not to give him an opportunity of explaining to any body the nature of his mission.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Sydenham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Lordship that, in consequence of the communication which I had with you when I was here in the month of November last, upon the subject of funds to be provided for the payment of the troops in the Deccan, to the 1st of February, I commenced a correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, in order that he might endeavor to provide the deficiency of the sums required from Bombay. This deficiency amounted, upon estimate, to four lacs of rupees.

‘ The house of Forbes and Company, to which I particularly referred the Resident, agreed to advance, and have actually advanced, the sum required; and they have proposed to receive in payment of the sum which they have advanced the sandal wood belonging to this government, which may be in store at Mangalore, at the rate of forty pagodas per Madras candy of 500 lbs. of the best sort of sandal wood.

‘ This price is not so large as that which the house of Forbes and Co. paid for the sandal wood which they received from this government in the last year; but they allege that they were disappointed in their expectations in the sale of the sandal wood in China, and it appears that they lost by their speculation.

‘ In case your Lordship should think proper to accept this offer, the house of Forbes and Co. are willing to pay into the treasury in China the proceeds of the sandal wood,

and to receive bills on the Honorable Court of Directors, drawn at the same rate of exchange as in the last year.

‘ If your Lordship should not approve of this offer, the house of Forbes and Co. are willing to receive payment of the four lacs of rupees which they have advanced, from your Lordship’s government, or the government of Bombay, in any manner that you may think proper.

‘ In laying these offers of Mr. Forbes before your Lordship, I cannot avoid observing upon their liberality, and noticing them as an additional instance of this gentleman’s desire to forward the public service, and to lend himself to the public convenience, whenever it may be practicable.

‘ I request your Lordship to make the Governor of Bombay acquainted with your wishes regarding the advance made by the house of Forbes and Co.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Close.*

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

‘ I have received all your letters relative to the late unfortunate occurrence at Scindiah’s durbar; the last accounts from Mr. Jenkins being the 8th February.

‘ There can be no doubt but that the conduct of Scindiah throughout has been very improper; but not, in my opinion, in making an attack upon Bopal or Saugur. There is no doubt but that he had a claim upon the Nabob of Bopal, and it is more than probable that he had one upon Saugur, which, as you observe, holds but very slightly on the Peshwah; but his misbehavior has been, in my opinion, principally towards Mr. Jenkins himself.

‘ The first attack upon Mr. Jenkins was a gross violation of the law of nations, on a point perfectly understood by the Marhattas; and it was Scindiah’s business to punish the persons guilty of making that attack, and to take special care that it should not be repeated. The repetition of the attack adds to the enormity of the first offence, particularly as no measures have been taken to punish the persons guilty of it.

‘ The Governor General, in his dispatches, has decided that Scindiah shall be considered guilty of Ghautky’s acts,

if he retains Ghautky in his service, and does not restrain him; but the question upon this subject, is not whether Scindiah has the inclination, but whether he has the power, of restraining him.

‘ I believe Scindiah to be very weak in intellect, although he has been known at times to assert his own power and dignity with a tolerably strong hand. But I am convinced that neither he nor his real ministers could ever have been concerned in the outrages to which I have referred. I am convinced also, that Scindiah knows that if he were to go to war with the British Government, every respectable man in his state and army would leave him.

‘ It is my opinion, therefore, that he is overawed by Ghautky; that he feels the danger of endeavoring to arrest Ghautky’s person, which can alone put a period to his practices; and he thinks that the measure would, in the event, leave him without resources and without army.

‘ The result of this reasoning is, then, that we have reason to complain of Scindiah’s government for acts committed by Ghautky, which, we have reason to suppose, are contrary to Scindiah’s inclination, and that of his real ministers, and all his sirdars, but which he had not the power, or that he fears to punish.

‘ It is my opinion that neither Scindiah nor Ghautky mean to attack the Company. If they had intended it, they would not have lost the time before Saugur, during which Holkar and Meer Khan have been defeated; and it is to be hoped that the Rajah of Bhurtpoor will have been destroyed; but they would have dashed at once at Bundelcund and upon Benares, during the time that they knew that the Commander in Chief and our troops were engaged with Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpoor’s forts.

‘ Scindiah’s object is, I think, to get together a little money, and to be guided by events; and Ghautky appears to have no object at all, excepting to keep together an army of plunderers, which will give him the power over Scindiah. We must expect that the course of events will be favorable to us; and therefore it is unlucky that affairs have been brought to such a crisis, and that it is absolutely necessary to interfere with a strong hand to save Mr. Jenkins and our honor, by which we shall again risk a war.



‘ I do not see what plan we can adopt, in the execution of which Mr. Jenkins’s life will not be in danger ; and although it is an object of the first consequence to save his life, I declare that I am doubtful whether a strong measure or a moderate one is most likely to be successful.

‘ It is my opinion, that the Governor General or you ought to write to Scindiah, to point out to him the enormity of the acts committed against Mr. Jenkins, who was residing with him in the quality of an ambassador ; and who, therefore, by the laws of nations, as they are fully understood by the Marhattas, was entitled to his protection ; that the Governor General was disposed to believe that these acts had been committed without Scindiah’s knowledge, and against his consent ; but they had passed without punishment or even notice, and it was therefore absolutely necessary to withdraw Mr. Jenkins from Scindiah’s durbar, and to cease all communication with him, unless Scindiah should, immediately on the receipt of that letter, seize Sirjee Rao Ghautky, and punish him as his conduct had deserved.

‘ But in case Scindiah should omit to punish Ghautky, and Mr. Jenkins should withdraw from his camp, Scindiah should be considered responsible for his security, till he should reach one of the posts occupied by the British army ; and if, unfortunately, any accident should happen to Mr. Jenkins, Scindiah must expect the consequences of placing himself in the character of an enemy of the British Government.

‘ At the same time that this letter should be written, orders ought to be given to the Bundelcund corps, if it is supposed to be of sufficient strength, to approach towards Scindiah’s position. If it should not be of sufficient strength, it ought to be strengthened, particularly in cavalry. Our troops in the Deccan cannot do anything in my opinion ; excepting Wallace’s corps, to seize Scindiah’s possessions about Ahmednuggur, if the war should be determined upon ; and Hallyburton’s to seize Burhampoor, and lay siege to Asseerghur.

‘ These operations can be carried on, without impeding the arrangement detailed by me in my letters, of which I sent you copies. The only thing to take care of, is to make Wallace’s corps approach Hallyburton, as soon as he shall have

placed the collector in possession of the countries about Ahmednuggur; in order that he may cover Hallyburton's operations, and prevent Scindiah from impeding the operations against Asseerghur, supposing that he should fly before the Bundelcund corps, and move in that direction.

‘ When Scindiah shall have received the letter, which I have above proposed should be written to him, he will either seize Ghautky, or he will allow Mr. Jenkins to go away, with protection or without it; or he will not seize Ghautky, and will retain Mr. Jenkins. In the first case our triumph will be complete, but I fear that cannot be expected. In the second case, and the third, we shall remain at peace with Scindiah, provided Mr. Jenkins arrives in safety at one of our posts; if he should not do so, the war, in my opinion, is inevitable; and it is not impossible but that the Governor General will go to war, at all events, for what has passed, unless Ghautky should be seized and punished: the only reason for which he may possibly not insist upon Ghautky's punishment is, that the proofs against him are not strong.

‘ In the fourth case, we must equally go to war, for we cannot submit to have our ambassador ill treated by a parcel of barbarians, without noticing the insult in the most serious manner.

‘ There is a line of conduct which Scindiah may adopt, which may also leave peace as a possible event—it is to retain Mr. Jenkins, and to allow Ghautky to escape. When he does escape, he will be followed by all his plunderers, and will join Holkar; but this is a point of immaterial consequence, and would be the event most to be wished, next to that of his being blown from a gun.

‘ In this view of the case, the only chance of immediate war with Scindiah appears to rest on danger to Mr. Jenkins's person, or on Scindiah's retaining him in camp, contrary to the Governor General's desire, while Ghautky shall still remain in power.

‘ To ill treat an ambassador is so violent a measure, one so repugnant to the feelings, even of the Marhattas, that I acknowledge I do not imagine that Scindiah will venture upon it, although Ghautky would. The measure then to be adopted appears to be, to place a force in such a situation, when we shall communicate with Scindiah upon this subject,

as shall convince him that we have the power of protecting him against Ghautky, supposing that he is inclined to be freed from his tyranny ; and, at the same time, shall show Ghautky himself, that he cannot commit any act of violence against Mr. Jenkins's person with impunity.

‘ The Bundelcund corps can easily be placed in such a position, and if the result of the measures to be adopted should be, that Scindiah should allow Mr. Jenkins to go away, he will be able to reach that corps with facility. It is my opinion then, that the approach of a British corps will induce all Scindiah's real ministers, and the old adherents of his family, to declare themselves against the violent measures of Ghautky.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, that to write a letter, such as I have proposed, and to place our Bundelcund corps rather nearer to Scindiah's army, afford the best prospect of maintaining the peace with Scindiah ; which, if we can do with honor, I consider to be an object of the first importance.

‘ In regard to myself, I before informed you, that with the consent of the Governor General, founded upon his hopes that the peace would be uninterrupted in the Deccan, I was going home. From a letter which I received from Major Shawe, dated the 18th of February, since I began this letter, I judge that the Governor General is of opinion, that the late transactions in Scindiah's camp, of which he had received a tolerably accurate report, through hirecarrals, would not lead to war, and he is determined to preserve the peace, if it can be preserved.

‘ Under the circumstances I do not see any thing to alter my determination. But at all events, supposing it were desirable that I should return to the Deccan, three months must elapse before I could join the army ; the season for operations would be over ; and the expectation of my return, as it would check all decided measures, would be more injurious than my presence would be beneficial ; therefore, I still propose to embark with the Admiral.

‘ I acknowledge that I wish that affairs were in a more settled state ; but I do not conceive that my presence will make any alteration in them. We must expect that, for a time, the affairs of the Marhatta empire will be unsettled ;

and I do not consider that the late events in Scindiah's camp have, in any degree, altered the grounds on which I determined to go home ; more particularly as, supposing that war should be the consequence of them, the scene of operations will be in Hindustan.

‘ I leave in this country some valuable friends, with whom I have been intimately connected in friendship, and in constant communication on public affairs for some years ; and I part from them with regret. I consider you as one of them, and I assure you that it will give me the greatest satisfaction to meet you again.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Charles Forbes, Esq., Bombay.*

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

‘ I have received your letter of the 15th of February. I am very much obliged to you for the pains which you have taken with my concerns.

‘ Captain Barclay will write to you about my tents, &c. I beg that you will acquaint him or Captain Bellingham with any sums that you may have paid on my account, either for the lascars, Bombay boxes, &c., and they will settle them with you.

‘ I am going to England, as you will have heard, and I have desired my friends in India to write to me by the overland dispatch, and to send their letters enclosed to you at Bombay. I shall be obliged to you if you will forward such letters as may be sent to you.

‘ I showed to Lord William Bentinck the papers it contained on the subject of the sandal wood, and he is equally impressed with me of the propriety of your proceedings. I enclose the copy of a public letter, which I have addressed to him upon the subject, the answer to which will go to Bombay, and will be communicated to you ; and this will settle every thing.

‘ Upon the occasion of my taking leave of you, I beg to return you my best thanks for much personal civility and kindness which I have received from you ; and I hope that, if you should be of opinion that I can be of any service to



you in England, you will command my exertions. Direct to me, to the care of Messrs. Coutts, bankers, in London.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Charles Forbes, Esq.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ Lord William Bentinck has desired me to ask you to communicate to him, confidentially, the particulars of the arrangements which you made with Mr. Duncan, for the occasional advances of money to his government, and the mode in which that arrangement is carried into execution.’

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Fort St. George, 5th March, 1805.

‘ I received authentic accounts some days ago of the disaster which has occurred in Scindiah’s camp; and I cannot better describe my sentiments upon it, than by sending you the copy of a letter which I wrote yesterday to Colonel Close.

‘ I expect that we shall sail either on Thursday or Sunday. The Admiral appears inclined to wait till the latter day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

‘ DEAR SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 5th March, 1805.

‘ I have received your letter of the 20th of February.

‘ It is my opinion, that the arrangement to be made with the Soubah of the Deccan should be, that the whole of the force which he is bound to furnish by his treaty with us should be silladar horse; and the revenues of the lands in Berar to be collected by the Soubah’s amildars ought to be allotted for their payment. But the payment ought to be made immediately from the treasury to the different jemidars.

‘ If the Soubah has at present any silladar horse in his service, that number may be subtracted from the total number to be now raised for his contingent; but the whole of his silladar horse ought to be put upon the same and the best footing.

‘ The command of the silladar horse ought not to be given to any particular person; of course they will be under

the control of the commanding officer of the army when brought together; but otherwise each russallah should be under its own jemidar, who should receive his pay direct from the treasury or pay office, and should receive his orders direct from the sircar.

‘ I conclude that Appah Dessaye’s claim to the choute of Aurungabad is quite clear; and that this question is not one referrible to the arbitration of the British Government. Indeed, I have reason to believe it is so, and, therefore, that Appah Dessaye ought to be paid. The fact of the matter regarding this choute is, that although originally a denomination of a portion of revenue, established by the Marhatta exactions, and in many instances a grievance upon the people, from the mode in which it is collected, it could not be entirely abolished, without making a very serious and dangerous attack upon property.

‘ In some instances that I know of, the Nizam and his Mussulmann sirdars have the choute of Marhatta districts, which, of course, was originally exacted by the head of the Marhatta government; and, by subsequent arrangements, has been ceded to the Nizam, and granted by him to his servants. In many instances the choute is arranged by the grant of a few villages in a district in lieu of it; in others, the quarter of the district is in the possession of a choutear, in lieu of his claim to a quarter of the actual revenue realized from the whole district; and in others, by a more complicated arrangement, the choutear has a certain number of villages, and the sircar besides pays him the sum in which the rent of these villages is deficient, to make up the quarter of the revenue of the district.

‘ In almost every instance that I have seen, the right of the choute exists in some individual who resides in the country, and who is but little more attached to the government of the Peshwah than he is to that of the Nizam, if at all attached to the former; and in but very few instances does it belong to the Peshwah’s government. This very claim of Appah Dessaye’s is one attached to his office of sirlushkur, and every person holding the office before him has enjoyed it.

‘ It is my opinion therefore, generally, that the question for arbitration by the British Government is, whether the

Soubah shall pay to the Peshwah the choute of Beeder, which is a question depending upon treaties, and not whether his territories shall be exempt from the payment of that portion of revenue called choute, which has always been paid by them.

‘ This choute, to which I have referred, is entirely distinct from that general kind of indiscriminate plunder, to which the Marhattas lay claim all over India. This is a right of the sword, which, of course, ceases when the sword is no longer in their hand; and the Soubah has a right to be exempt from it, excepting in instances in which he has bound himself by acknowledged treaties to pay it.

‘ I enclose you a letter which I have written, and beg you to forward to Colonel Close, upon the late occurrences in Scindiah’s camp. It is a private communication, which I beg that you will keep to yourself.

‘ I admire the abilities of Mr. Jenkins, and I declare that I think he has shown through the late transaction a firmness of mind and of conduct not to be expected from any gentleman of his standing, thrown into his situation.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

‘ Fort St. George, 6th March, 1805.

‘ Upon my departure from hence, I am exceedingly anxious about the fate of my Brigade Major, Lieutenant Colin Campbell, of the 78th regt., and my aide de camp, Lieutenant Close, of the 4th regiment of native cavalry, particularly the former, who has been with me much longer, and from whom I have received great assistance.

‘ You are aware that he is the nephew of Colonel Campbell, and he has already interested the Governor General in his favor by the accounts which he laid before him of the losses of his family in the sea and land services. To my certain knowledge he lost two brothers in the campaign against the southern Poligars, and a brother and a cousin (Colonel Campbell’s son) in the battle of Assye. I did not know him by name when I saw him distinguish himself in the storm of Ahmednuggur, and I immediately appointed him my Brigade Major; and in the battle of Assye he had

either two or three horses shot under him, and ever since he has rendered me most important assistance.

‘He is only a Lieutenant in the 78th regiment, but I have frequently recommended him to General Lake for promotion, and he will get it by seniority in his regiment, it is to be hoped, before much time shall elapse.

‘But in the mean time, I should be much flattered and obliged, and I am convinced it would be satisfactory to the army, if the Governor General would take him into his family.

‘He is now going to Vizagapatam to Colonel Campbell, and I should be obliged to you if you will write to him what may be determined upon this subject.

‘Lieutenant Close has some hopes that he shall be recommended to be appointed to the Body Guard, and I shall be very glad indeed if that can be done for him, and the Governor General will take him into his family.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘MY DEAR SHAWE,                      ‘Fort St. George, 6th March, 1805.

‘I sent you yesterday the copy of a letter which I had written to Colonel Close, on the subject of the late events in Scindiah’s camp, the greatest part of which was written before I had received your letter of the 18th February.

‘I hope to God we shall be able to avoid a war with Scindiah. Take my word for it, we are not now in a state to attempt the conquest of Malwa; an operation which, under other circumstances, would be a mere joke.

‘The army to whose share it would naturally fall is now drawn to the Jumna, by the Commander in Chief; there is not a sepoy at Bombay, and very few sepoys and not two hundred Europeans in Guzerat. The Peshwah’s subsidiary force is not yet efficient; and if it were, neither that corps nor the Soubah’s subsidiary force could be moved from the Deccan with safety.

‘You see the time and lives that have been spent in the attempts to subdue the Rajah of Bhurtpoor; and you will see that the army of Bengal will not be clear of that country before the season comes round, in which it will be necessary



for them to go into cantonments. I therefore most anxiously hope that all that can be done with honor, will be done to preserve peace with Scindiah as long as possible.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

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*To Major General the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ Head Quarters of the 33rd Regiment,  
Vellore, 28th February, 1805.

‘ SIR,

‘ On hearing that you are about to quit this country, the officers of the 33rd regiment cannot allow you to depart, without endeavoring to impress on you, how sensible they are of the very friendly and paternal attention you ever paid to the interests of the corps, while it had the honor of being under your immediate command, as well as of the unremitting manner in which you have continued your vigilance for its welfare since you have been removed to a higher station.

‘ Although by the changes in the service many of the officers have not individually experienced the peculiar advantages of having served under your personal superintendence, yet the benefits which have resulted to the whole corps, by having had you at its head, will long be felt; and it must ever remain a source of pride to the 33rd regiment, that the person who has so eminently distinguished himself in every branch of the public service intrusted to him, and who has been so deservedly honored by our most gracious Sovereign, was the commanding officer of the 33rd regiment.

‘ In the absence of half the corps, whose signatures cannot be obtained, I am requested by the whole to convey to you these, their unanimous sentiments; and to add their most earnest wishes that you may long enjoy every honor, prosperity, and health, that your country can confer.

‘ Allow me also to add the satisfaction it affords me to have this opportunity of subscribing myself, with much respect and esteem,

‘ Sir, your most obedient, &c.

‘ *Major General*  
*Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*’

‘ ARTHUR GORE,  
‘ Lieut. Col. 33rd Regiment.

(ANSWER.)

*To Lieut. Colonel Gore.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th of February.

‘ Nearly twelve years have elapsed since his Majesty was pleased to appoint me to be Lieut. Colonel of the 33rd regiment; and in the whole course of that period, during which I have been either in the exercise of the command of the regiment, or in constant communication with the actual commanding officer, I have had every reason to be satisfied with their conduct.

‘ It has been my uniform object to maintain the system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy, which I found established in the regiment by the Marquis Cornwallis, our Colonel: and by the influence of this system, the foundation of which is vigilance on the part of the officers to prevent the commission of military crimes; and by the support and assistance which I have uniformly received from Colonel Sherbrooke, Lieut. Colonel Elliott, and yourself, and the officers of the regiment, my duties, as Lieut. Colonel, have always been a pleasing occupation.

‘ It is most gratifying to me to receive this mark of approbation, conveyed by your letter, from officers with whose conduct I have so much reason to be pleased, and with many of whom I have been so long and intimately acquainted. I beg that you will assure them that I shall never forget their services, and that I shall always be happy to forward their views.

‘ I have only to recommend to them to adhere to the system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy, which they have found established in the regiment; and above all to cherish and encourage among themselves the spirit of gentlemen and of soldiers.

‘ With the most anxious wishes for the success and prosperity of yourself and of the 33rd regiment,

‘ I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Gore.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Address of the Native Inhabitants of Seringapatam to the Hon.  
Major General Sir A. Wellesley, K.B. &c.*

‘ SIR,

‘ We, the undersigned native inhabitants of Seringapatam, composed of independent soucars, and other persons in the Honorable Company’s service, attached to the several departments, beg leave, with due deference, to acquaint you of the deep regret we feel at hearing that you are so suddenly embarking for Europe,

‘ Gratitude for the tranquillity, security, and happiness we have enjoyed under your auspicious protection, since this country was thrown by Divine Providence under the just and pacific waving banners of the Honorable Company; respect for the brilliant exploits you have achieved, which strengthened the foundation of that tranquillity; and reverence for your benevolence and affability, glow all at once in our hearts with such force, that we are unable to find language sufficient to express our feelings and regret on the occasion of your departure.

‘ We pray to God to grant you health and a safe and pleasant voyage to Europe; but we earnestly hope, and look with anxiety, for the period of your speedy return to this country, once more to extend and uphold that protection over us, which your extensive local knowledge of our customs and manners is so capable of affording.

‘ We have the honor to be, with respect and esteem,

‘ Sir,

‘ Your most obedient humble Servants,

‘ (Signed) Meer Hussain Frajie; Mahomed Ebrahim, and Mahomed Casim, sons to Binky Nobob; Mahomed Hubboolah Cazy; Syed Yakoob, Mufty; Syed Goolam Mustafa, Moulavi; Hafee J. Mahomed Chawn, Meer Eyem; P. Ragavah Charry, Ramakistna, Pundit; &c. &c.’

(ANSWER.)

*To the Native Inhabitants of Seringapatam.*

‘ Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

‘ I have received your affectionate address upon the occasion of my departure for Europe; and I am much gratified

by the proof which it affords, that my endeavors to extend to you the benefits to which the subjects of the Honorable Company residing at Seringapatam are entitled, under the existing regulations, have been successful; and that you are fully impressed with the advantages of your situation.

‘I have had frequent opportunities of observing and reporting your loyalty to Government; and I request you to be convinced, that I shall not cease to feel the most lively interest in every thing which concerns you.

‘*The Native Inhabitants  
of Seringapatam.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Address of the Officers present at the Head Quarters of that Division  
of the Army lately commanded by Major General the Hon. Sir A.  
Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Seringapatam, 27th Feb., 1805.

‘We, the officers present at the head quarters of that division of the army which you have so long commanded, have heard, with unfeigned regret, of your intended embarkation for England.

‘Participating with the army at large, in admiration of those exalted talents and splendid achievements, which have been so recently distinguished by our gracious Sovereign, we are desirous of offering to you the tribute of our particular respect and gratitude for that consideration and justice in command, which has made obedience a pleasure; and for that frank condescension in the private intercourse of life, which it is our pride individually to acknowledge.

‘With these sentiments of public reverence and individual attachment deeply impressed on our minds, our regret on the occasion of your departure is mixed with an humble hope, that we are not to consider this important branch of the British empire to be finally deprived of your eminent qualifications.

‘But in whatever quarter of the globe further honors and distinctions shall await you, our sincerest good wishes will constantly follow your career; and we now beg you to accept our most respectful, but most cordial, farewell.

‘THE OFFICERS of the  
Garrison of Seringapatam.

‘*Major General  
the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*’



(ANSWER.)

*To the Officers of the Garrison of Seringapatam.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Fort St. George, 8th March, 1805.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th February, and I am much flattered by the expression of your regret upon the occasion of my departure from this country.

‘ The period which has elapsed since I was appointed to the command of Seringapatam has been probably the most eventful of the history of the British nation in India, and that place has always been an important point in the military operations which have been carried on.

‘ The discipline and good order of that garrison, and the efficiency of the public departments, have always been objects of most anxious solicitude to my mind, and I am happy to have an opportunity of declaring, that the order and regularity of the troops which have been stationed there have been exemplary; and that the efficiency and zeal of the public departments fixed at Seringapatam have been the principal source and foundation of the successes which you have noticed.

‘ In whatever situation his Majesty may think proper to employ my services, I shall always be interested in the welfare of officers, with whose conduct, in their several public capacities, I have so much reason to be pleased, and in whose private society I have enjoyed so much satisfaction.

‘ I have the honor to be, &amp;c.

‘ *The Officers of the Garrison  
of Seringapatam.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Address of the European Inhabitants and Military Officers of the Presidency of Fort St. George, to Major General the Hon. Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B., on his departure from India.*

‘ Fort St. George, March, 1805.

‘ We have the honor, Sir, to represent the European inhabitants and military officers of this Presidency, who, in justice to themselves, cannot allow you to depart from India, the scene of your splendid career, without offering to you the just tribute of their applause and admiration.

‘ They contemplate the victories of the army lately under

your command, as rendered transcendently glorious by the vast superiority in numbers of the enemy, formidably appointed, with whom you had to contend, exemplifying what is possible to be achieved by brave and disciplined troops, conducted with military skill, and inspired by the heroism of their leader.

‘ Under the influence of these impressions, and considering you as having been eminently instrumental in restoring peace to this part of India, they feel an earnest desire of adding, to what history will record, a particular testimony of the sense they entertain of your services.

‘ We are therefore desired to request you will allow them to possess your picture, for the purpose of its being placed in the Exchange Room at this settlement, among the portraits of illustrious characters which already adorn its walls.

‘ It is peculiarly gratifying to us to have been named to wait upon you on this occasion, to convey the sentiments of the community so entirely our own. With the warmest wishes for your safe arrival in England, we beg leave to pledge to you our respect and our affection.

‘ The EUROPEAN INHABITANTS and  
 ‘ Major General NATIVE OFFICERS of the Pre-  
 ‘ the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.’ sidency of Fort St. George.

(ANSWER.)

*To the European Inhabitants and Military Officers of the Presidency of Fort St. George.*

‘ GENTLEMEN, ‘ Fort St. George, March, 1805.

‘ Although I have served the government of Fort St. George for some years, I have had but limited opportunities of cultivating an acquaintance with the gentlemen at Madras, as I have resided in the provinces. I therefore consider as a most gratifying distinction, the marks of attention with which I have been honored since my arrival here, by a society whose public spirit has been manifested upon every important occasion that has occurred.

‘ The successes of the army which I was so fortunate as to command in the late war, are to be attributed to various permanent causes which I hope will never fail to produce similar effects. The vigilance of Government enabled them

to foresee the impending contest, and preparations corresponding with the extent of the operations, calculated to bring the war to a speedy and fortunate issue, were ordered by the Supreme Government, and were carried into execution by this Government and the Government of Bombay, with promptitude and vigor. The Governments were supported in these efforts by the civil and military servants, and by the commercial bodies at the different Presidencies, with the zeal which has distinguished their conduct on all occasions.

‘ The discipline and bravery of the troops were to be depended upon in every emergency, and a glorious example was held out to them by the army under the personal command of the Commander in Chief. To these advantages I have to add the cordial co-operation of all the political residents and civil servants, in communication with whom I acted, an advantage which I must observe that I have uniformly enjoyed in every situation in which I have been placed since I have served this Government: under these circumstances, I had every incitement to make the exertions which have met with your approbation,

‘ I shall have great pleasure, Gentlemen, in complying with your desire, and I consider myself to be highly honored by being numbered among those who have been deemed by you to be worthy of this mark of your approbation by the services they have rendered to their country in this part of India; and it is most gratifying to my feelings that the desire of this settlement should be communicated to me by gentlemen distinguished by a long course of able and zealous services, and by their public spirit, and for whom I entertain the highest respect.

‘ *The European Inhabitants and  
Military Officers of the Presi-  
dency of Fort St. George.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*General Order by Major General the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘ Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805.

‘ Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley informs the troops under his command, that he has received the permission of his Excellency the Governor General to resign the political and military powers with which he had been lately intrusted

in the Deccan, and the leave of his Excellency the Commander in Chief to proceed to England \*.

\* *General Orders by his Excellency the most Noble the Governor General in Council, Captain General and Commander in Chief of the Land Forces serving in the East Indies.*

‘ Fort William, 7th March, 1805.

‘ The Governor General in Council, Captain General and Commander in Chief of the Land Forces serving in the East Indies, has the satisfaction to publish to the army an extract of a letter from the Right Honorable Earl Camden, one of his Majesty’s principal Secretaries of State.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Downing Street, 30th August, 1804.

‘ Your Lordship’s letter of the 25th December, 1803, has been laid before the King.

‘ The brilliant and decisive success that has attended the progress of the armies which have been employed in the East Indies, under the command of General Lake and Major General Wellesley, is justly appreciated by his Majesty; and I have, in consequence, received his Majesty’s commands to inform your Lordship, that in consideration of the meritorious services and gallant conduct of General Lake, his Majesty has been graciously pleased to create him a peer of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; and that in consideration also of the eminent and brilliant services of Major General Wellesley, his Majesty has been graciously pleased to direct, that the insignia of the most honorable Order of the Bath should be transmitted to that officer; and that he may immediately evince his sense of Major General Wellesley’s merits and services, his Majesty has further directed, that he shall be created an extra Knight Companion of that Order, and that his creation and investiture shall not wait for a succession to a regular vacancy therein.

‘ In transmitting to your Lordship his Majesty’s gracious approbation of the services of General Lake and Major General Wellesley, and in acquainting you that his Majesty has been pleased to bestow these marks of his royal favor upon the respective commanders of those armies which have so much distinguished themselves, it is my duty to state to your Lordship, at the same time, the very high sense which his Majesty entertains of the able and useful co-operation afforded by Lieut. General Stuart, in the arrangements necessary for carrying into execution the plans so judiciously formed by your Lordship, for the operations of the last campaign; and I am commanded to inform your Lordship of his Majesty’s entire approbation of that officer’s conduct.

‘ Your Lordship has received, by a former conveyance, the intimation of the distinguished manner in which his Majesty considers the enterprize, zeal, spirit, and good conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates employed under the respective orders of General Lake and Major General Wellesley. I cannot, however, close this dispatch without repeating his Majesty’s gracious approbation and admiration of that conduct, which has contributed so essentially to the happy and glorious termination of the late war in India.

‘ I have the honor to be, my Lord, &c.

‘ *Marquis Wellesley.*’

‘ CAMDEN.

*Extract.*

‘ Die Jovis, 3 Maii, 1804.

‘ Resolved, *nemine dissentiente*, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that the thanks of this House be given to Major



‘He cannot avoid expressing the regret which he feels upon taking leave of officers and troops with whom he has served so long.

General the Honorable Arthur Wellesley, for the many important, brilliant and memorable services, achieved by him in the command of the separate army within the Deccan ; and also to the several officers of the army, both European and native, for their gallant conduct and meritorious exertions, during the arduous, honorable, and successful campaign in the East Indies.

‘GEORGE ROSE, Cl. Par.’

‘*Earl Camden to Major General the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*

‘SIR,

‘Downing Street, 30th August, 1804.

‘His Majesty having been graciously pleased, as a mark of his Royal approbation of your eminent and brilliant services, and in order that he may immediately evince his sense of the same, to direct that you should be created an extra Knight Companion of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath, and that your nomination and investiture should not wait for a succession to a regular vacancy therein, I have the honor to transmit to you, by the King’s commands, the proper insignia of that Order, which you will herewith receive, together with a dispensation for wearing the same.

‘I have also the honor to transmit to you the Statutes of the Order of the Bath, together with a copy of my letter to the Marquis Wellesley, signifying his Majesty’s commands that his Lordship should perform the ceremony of investing you with the insignia of that order.

‘Allow me, Sir, to offer you my most sincere congratulations on a distinction so highly merited (a).

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major Gen. the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.*’

‘CAMDEN.

(a) Although the creation of extra Knight Companion is dated on the 30th August, 1804, it was not till the 25th February, 1805, that the same was known in India, and it was then published in General Orders as follows :—

#### ‘GENERAL ORDERS.

‘*By his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council.*

‘Fort William, 25th February, 1805.

‘His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council is pleased to publish, in General Orders, the following extract from the London Gazette, Whitehall, Sept. 1st, 1804.

“The King has been pleased to nominate and appoint Major General the Honorable Arthur Wellesley, to be one of the Knights Companions of the Most Honorable Order of the Bath.”

‘By command of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council.

‘L. HOOK.

‘Sec. to the Govt. Mil. Dept.’

The Order of the Bath at this time consisted of twenty four Knights, of whom three or four were civilians ; but in January, 1815, the limits of the order were extended, and composed of three classes. The first class, the Knights Grand Crosses, was extended to seventy two, of whom, twelve were to be for civil and diplomatic employments.

‘In the course of the period of time which has elapsed since Major General Wellesley was appointed to the command of a division of this army, various services have been performed by the troops, and great difficulties have been surmounted, with a steadiness and perseverance which have seldom been surpassed. Upon every occasion, whether in garrison or in the field, the Major General has had reason to be satisfied with their conduct, and he once more returns them his thanks, and assures them that he shall never forget their services, or cease to feel a lively interest in whatever may concern them.

‘He earnestly recommends to the officers of the army, never to lose sight of the great principles of the military service, to preserve the discipline of the troops, and to encourage, in their respective corps, the spirit and sentiments of gentlemen and of soldiers, as the most certain road to the achievement of every thing that is great in their profession.

‘Upon the occasion of taking leave of the troops who have been so long under his command, Major General Wellesley cannot avoid noticing and recording the assistance which he has received from officers commanding districts and divisions under his orders; and the officers of the staff appointed to assist him: of the former, some distinguished characters are now no more, and others are gone to Europe, and all are sufficiently known to the troops; but in noticing the assistance he has received from the staff, he must record particularly his obligations to Major Barclay, Captain Beltingham, and Lieut. Campbell of the 78th regiment.

‘Orders will be given from Head Quarters, regarding the mode of conducting the duties and making the reports in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, as also at Goa.

‘The reports from the corps in the Deccan, under the orders of Colonels Wallace and Hallyburton, are to be made according to the orders by Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley, of the 24th of June, 1804.

‘The troops belonging to the army in the Deccan, entitled to share in the prize money of the late war, are informed that measures have been taken to insure, at an early period, the division of that part of it not yet divided.

‘R. BARCLAY,  
‘Dep. Adj. General in Mysore.’

*To the Resident at Poonah, at Hyderabad, and at Nagpoor.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that having received the permission of their Excellencies the Governor General and the Commander in Chief, and of the Governor of Fort St. George, I am about to proceed to England in one of the ships now under dispatch.

‘ I beg leave to take the opportunity of expressing the great satisfaction which I have had in all my communications with you, since I have had any concern in the political affairs of the Deccan. Wishing you every success,

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *To the Resident at Poonah,  
at Hyderabad, and at Nagpoor.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Colonel Wallace, Major Barclay, and Captain Bellingham.*

‘ GENTLEMEN,

‘ Fort St. George, March, 1805.

‘ His Excellency the Commander in Chief having been pleased to permit me to go to England, it is necessary that I should appoint persons to conduct the prize affairs of the army in the Deccan in my absence, under the orders of his Excellency the Governor General; and accordingly I do hereby appoint you to superintend all affairs regarding this prize, to order a division of it, and to decide upon all claims which may be made to participate in its benefits.

‘ Herewith are enclosed all the papers which I have received from his Excellency upon the subject of prize money, and there remains no question of claims undecided. The only part of the business which remains unsettled is the proceeds of the jewels, which are intended to be disposed of by lottery.

‘ I find upon inquiry that the tickets of the lottery, which it was intended to dispose of at Madras, have not been sold; and I think it probable that those sent to Calcutta likewise remain on hand.

‘ However, to delay drawing the lottery will probably not increase the chance of selling the tickets. I have therefore sent orders to the prize agents to publish at Bombay an advertisement, stating the intention to draw the lottery on the 1st of June; and I have directed that an advertisement

to the same purport may be published here, and at Calcutta, of which I enclose a copy.

‘ My intention is, that the tickets which shall remain unsold on that day should belong to the army; and that the prizes resulting from them, if there should be any, should be sold by the prize agents, as part of the prize property.

‘ As soon after the 1st of June, therefore, as returns can be received from Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay, of the number of tickets sold in the lottery, and the prize agents can ascertain the amount of the property to be divided, you will order a division upon the principles of the division ordered by me on 1st of August last.

‘ There are certain officers who have claims to prize money, of an advanced rank, upon which I have decided. Major Barclay will lay these claims before you, and they must of course be satisfied out of the funds allotted for this second division.

‘ In my opinion, the best thing to do with the lots of jewels which may become the property of the army, in consequence of so many of the lottery tickets remaining unsold, will be to sell them forthwith by auction. I recommend, therefore, that you should take an early opportunity of advertising this sale, describing particularly the lots. Fix the day for the auction, which ought to be at Bombay; and take care that it is known at Poonah, &c.

‘ You will be so kind as to order a third and last division, upon the same principles as the first and second, of the money which will result from this sale.

‘ You will make a report of your proceedings on the subject of the prize property, to his Excellency the Governor General, and I hope that I shall hear from you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Colonel Wallace,

‘ Major Barclay,

‘ Captain Bellingham.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ On board H.M.S. Trident, 29th March, 1805.

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE, Lat. 1° 25' S., Long. 83° 52' E.

‘ The Albion is about to leave us to return to India, and although I am very sea sick, I will not omit to let you know



how we go on. We have had very fine weather ever since we left Madras. Indeed, too much so, as our progress has not been what we might have expected. However, the ships sail well, and as we have now got a tolerable breeze, I hope that we shall get on.

‘ I am very comfortable, and, excepting sea sickness, in good health: you shall hear from me whenever an opportunity offers, and I hope to hear from you by every occasion, whether overland or by sea.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*To Major Shawe.*

‘ On board H.M.S. Trident, 2nd April, 1805.

‘ MY DEAR SHAWE,

Lat. 3° 21' S., Long. 84° 50' E.

‘ The Albion has not left us yet, and I enclose a paper which has been given to me by Captain Page, which I think interesting; and if the Governor General has not yet seen it, or a copy of it, it may be of use to him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

\* \* \* Three other Letters, connected with Indian affairs, will be found under their proper dates: viz., one to Colonel Malcolm (Badajoz, Dec. 3rd, 1809), in vol. v.; and two to Lord Melville (Elvas, March 12th and 13th, 1812), in vol. viii.

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